China–Burma–India Theater · India · Chapter 1 of 9 · January 1942 – February 1944
The Forgotten Army: Burma, 1942–44
The longest retreat in British history, a frontier with one road, and the general who rebuilt a beaten army and taught it to stand still.
In the spring of 1942 the Japanese Army drove the British out of Burma in four months. Two years later, on the same mountain frontier, the army that had been beaten would inflict on Japan the largest defeat on land in its history up to that time. This chapter is about what changed in between.
Key facts
The longest retreat
Japan invaded Burma in January 1942 to cut the Burma Road, the last overland supply route to China, and to shield its conquests in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Rangoon fell in March. What followed was the longest retreat in the history of the British Army: nearly a thousand miles in four months, north up the Irrawaddy valley, across the Chindwin at Kalewa, and over the mountains to Imphal in the Indian princely state of Manipur. The oilfields at Yenangyaung were blown up to keep them from the enemy. The last troops of Burma Corps walked into Imphal in May 1942 as the monsoon broke, gaunt and ragged but still carrying their weapons.
Their commander was Lt. Gen. William Slim, an officer of the Indian Army’s Gurkhas, raised in Birmingham, who had joined up as a wartime volunteer in 1914. He wrote later that the men looked like scarecrows and marched like soldiers. He also wrote down, plainly, why they had been beaten. The Japanese moved off the roads and through the jungle; the British were tied to their trucks. When the Japanese put a block on the road behind them, the British turned around and fought to get out. And nobody had prepared the army or its Indian base for a war on this frontier.


A frontier with no roads
The border between India and Burma runs for hundreds of miles through ranges of jungle-covered mountains up to 8,000 feet high, cut by rivers that run north to south across any line of advance. It is among the wettest places on earth. From May to October the monsoon turns tracks to liquid mud and brings malaria, dysentery and scrub typhus. In 1943 the Fourteenth Army was losing far more men to sickness than to the enemy: for every man evacuated wounded, about 120 were evacuated sick.
Behind the central part of this front there was one railway, a single-track, metre-gauge line built to serve the tea gardens of Assam. It ran to a station called Dimapur. From Dimapur one road climbed 46 miles to the hill station of Kohima and then ran 80 more miles south to Imphal. Everything the troops on the central front ate, fired or drove came up that road. Chapter 2 explains why that single fact shaped the Japanese plan.

First Arakan and the Chindits
The first British attempt to strike back, an advance down the Arakan coast toward the island of Akyab in the winter of 1942–43, ended in a second defeat. Japanese bunkers stopped the attack, and a Japanese counterstroke through the jungle sent the British back to where they had started. Morale sank further.
The one piece of good news in 1943 came from Brig. Orde Wingate, who led 3,000 men, the Chindits, across the Chindwin on foot in February to cut railways behind Japanese lines, supplied entirely by parachute. A third of them did not return and many who did were never fit to fight again. But the raid showed that British and Gurkha soldiers could live and move in the jungle, and that troops cut off from roads could be fed from the air. It also had an effect nobody intended. It convinced a Japanese general named Mutaguchi that if Wingate could cross those mountains from west to east, he could cross them from east to west.
Gallery · 7 photographs · select to enlarge
Burma and the Arakan, 1942–44







Slim rebuilds an army
In October 1943 Slim took command of the newly formed Fourteenth Army, under a new Supreme Allied Commander for South East Asia, Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten. It was the largest Commonwealth army of the war and one of the most mixed: about three-fifths of its soldiers were Indian, with Gurkhas from Nepal, British battalions, and East and West African divisions. The men called themselves the Forgotten Army, because the newspapers at home were full of Italy and the coming invasion of France.
Slim set about the things he could fix. Anti-malaria discipline was enforced by sacking commanding officers whose units skipped their tablets; the sickness rate fell steeply. Every unit was sent on patrol until it believed it could beat the Japanese in the jungle. And he taught a new rule for when the enemy got behind you. Units would no longer turn and fight their way out. They would form a defended “box,” stay where they were, be supplied by parachute, and become the anvil on which the reserves hammered the attackers.
Idea that won the battle
Stand fast and be supplied by air
The Japanese method of 1942, the hook through the jungle and the roadblock in the rear, worked only if the surrounded force ran out of supplies or nerve. Transport aircraft took away the first. Training took away the second. Chapter 5 follows the airlift.
The Admin Box
The new method was tested in February 1944. The Japanese opened an offensive in the Arakan, code-named Ha-Go, meant to draw Slim’s reserves away from Imphal before the main blow fell. A Japanese column came through the jungle and overran the headquarters of the 7th Indian Division. The divisional commander, Maj. Gen. Frank Messervy, waded a stream in his pyjamas to escape. The division’s administrative area at Sinzweya, a clearing about 1,200 yards across full of clerks, mule drivers, gunners, a hospital and a few tanks, was surrounded.
It did not retreat. For eighteen days, from 5 to 23 February, the “Admin Box” held, fed and armed by Dakotas that dropped more than 2,000 tons of supplies. The Japanese had brought ten days’ food and planned to eat captured British rations. They starved instead, and when fresh British divisions came down the road the attackers broke. It was the first time in the war that a Japanese offensive had been stopped and thrown back by British and Indian troops. Three weeks later the main Japanese offensive began, four hundred miles to the north.
Command decision · you decide
What do you do when the enemy is behind you?
You command a division in the Arakan in February 1944. A Japanese column has come through the jungle in the night, overrun your headquarters and cut the only road to the rear.
People, places and pages in this chapter
Sources and further reading
- National Army Museum, “Battle of Imphal” — the retreat of 1942, Slim’s reforms and the place of Imphal in the Burma campaign
- The Kohima Museum, York, “The Battle of Kohima: Introduction” — the strategic background to the 1944 battles
- Air University, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, “Stout Pilots and Aircraft: Air Transport in the 1944 Burma–India Campaigns” — air supply at the Admin Box and the method of the defended box
- The London Gazette, supplement 39173 (1951): Gen. Sir George Giffard’s despatch on operations in Assam and Burma, 1944 — the commander-in-chief’s despatch on the 1944 campaign, including the Arakan
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