The 26th Armoured Brigade and Gore Force

A brigade sent south

The 26th Armoured Brigade had been converted from a motor machine-gun brigade in October 1940. It landed in North Africa as part of Maj. Gen. Charles Keightley’s 6th Armoured Division and fought in the winter battles west of Tunis before it was sent south in February 1943 as a reserve behind the American front. Its two armored regiments were the 17th/21st Lancers and the 2nd Lothians and Border Horse; its motor battalion was the 10th Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, the Tower Hamlets Rifles (Chapter 6).

Its tanks were its weakness, and everyone knew it. The regiments still had Valentines and Crusaders. The Valentine carried a 2-pounder (40 mm) gun and was slow; the Crusader III carried a 6-pounder (57 mm). Both were outranged by the German Panzer IV with its long 75 mm gun. The brigade, under Brig. Charles Dunphie, moved to Thala during the night of 18–19 February, and at 06:00 on the 19th it passed to the control of the U.S. II Corps, although it could be committed to battle only with the specific approval of the First Army commander, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Anderson (Howe; Chapters 5 and 6).

Gore Force goes into the pass

Late on 19 February, the first day of the German attack on the Kasserine Pass, Dunphie and some of his officers drove down from Thala to look at the American position. He found Col. Alexander Stark’s situation unsatisfactory and deteriorating: Stark could not give him precise information about his front, the Germans had already infiltrated between his command post and part of his force, and the Americans had no reserve with which to counterattack. Dunphie recommended to First Army that his whole brigade be committed to clear the pass (Dunphie’s memorandum of 1951, cited by Howe).

Anderson’s chief of staff, Brig. C. V. McNabb, investigated and said no. He judged Stark’s line too far west for British armor to help much, thought that Stark had enough troops to “handle things as they are” but did not seem to have a “grip on things,” and wanted the brigade available in case the Germans broke through at Sbiba instead (Howe, from the II Corps journal). He released only a small detachment. It took its name from its commander, Lt. Col. Adrian C. Gore of the 10th Rifle Brigade, and consisted of C Company of his battalion; C Squadron of the 2nd Lothians and Border Horse, with seven Valentines and four Crusaders; F Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, the Honourable Artillery Company, with 25-pounders; and a troop of antitank guns of the 93rd Anti-Tank Regiment (Playfair, as cited in Chapter 6; Howe). Gore Force left for the northwestern corner of the pass at about 04:00 on 20 February.

At first light it moved forward from a ridge about six miles northwest of the road fork toward the American line on the Thala side of the narrows, supporting the remaining American troops and sending its light tanks forward to reconnoiter. By 10:00, by one account, Dunphie had concluded that Stark Force was about to break and that Gore’s men should cover the Thala side of the pass (Walker, as cited in Chapter 5). When the German attack of the afternoon came, the American line on the Tébessa road had already given way. On the Thala side Gore’s detachment and the remaining Americans stood across the road below Djebel Semmama, and their resistance forced the German commander, Bülowius, to commit the tanks of the 1st Battalion, 8th Panzer Regiment, to break through (Howe; Chapter 5).

The British fought until their last tank was destroyed. Casualties were severe.

Gore Force fell back toward Thala by leapfrogging, one element covering the next, and fought German tanks along the way. It withdrew past Hill 704 at the northwestern exit of the pass at dusk, with five American tank destroyers of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and what was left of it rejoined the brigade about ten miles farther back. It had lost every tank. It had also bought time for Dunphie to form a line, and it had shown the brigade what it would face the next day (Howe; Playfair; Chapters 5 and 6).

A divided command

Behind the pass, the Allied command spent 20 February trying to catch up with a battle it did not understand. Late in the morning Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, the II Corps commander, drove toward the pass and split the battlefield along the Oued Hatab. Brig. Gen. Paul Robinett of the U.S. 1st Armored Division would command everything south of the river and hold the passes at Djebel el Hamra on the road to Tébessa; Dunphie would command everything north of it, including Stark’s remaining forces, and defend Thala. “For the co-ordination of this attack, Robinett comes under your command,” Fredendall told Dunphie. Howe judged that II Corps had in effect passed to Dunphie a responsibility he lacked the means to carry out (Howe; Chapter 5).

First Army added another link to the chain. Brig. Cameron Nicholson, second in command of the 6th Armoured Division, was named to control all the British, American and French units assembling south of Thala, a provisional command called Nickforce, and opened its headquarters at 06:00 on 21 February. During the afternoon of the 20th Dunphie’s brigade formed a line across the Thala road about nine miles north of the pass, and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Leicestershire Regiment, a Territorial battalion of the 46th Infantry Division that had not yet been in battle, dug in on the last ridge astride the road about four miles south of the town. At a meeting at Thala at midnight the commanders agreed to wait to be attacked, fight mainly with artillery and infantry, and conserve tanks (Howe; Chapters 5 and 6).

21 February: ridge by ridge

The German advance on Thala began at about 09:30 on 21 February. Its spearhead was the 7th Panzer Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division under von Broich: by Howe’s count about thirty tanks, twenty self-propelled guns and thirty-five half-tracks, some of them captured American vehicles. Dunphie’s orders, as he understood them, were to hold Thala “at all costs” long enough for the Leicesters to be ready (Howe). With weaker tanks, the way to do that was to give ground slowly: hold a ridge, fire at the advancing armor from hull-down positions, and pull back to the next crest before the German tanks and antitank guns could destroy the British tanks in place.

The brigade fought as Dunphie had planned. On a ridge about nine miles south of Thala it held the Germans until about 16:00, at the cost of fifteen tanks. Rommel came forward himself during the afternoon and took personal charge of the spearhead. Late in the afternoon Dunphie broke contact under a smoke screen and withdrew through a gap in the Leicesters’ line into the night harbor behind it (Howe; Chapter 6).

At about 19:00, as the light failed, a German column came up the road behind the last British tanks, led by a captured British Valentine. In the dusk the defenders took it for a straggler of their own. By the time they realized their mistake, German tanks were among the Leicesters’ trenches and at the edge of the 17th/21st Lancers’ harbor. The fight that followed was fought at point-blank range in the dark; the Tower Hamlets Rifles’ history records that one German tank was set on fire and that the others were picked off by its light. After about three hours the German attack was stopped two or three miles short of Thala. The Germans held the last ridge and took about 700 prisoners by Howe’s figure, most of them apparently Leicesters; the 10th Panzer Division’s own tally of Allied losses was 571 prisoners and 38 tanks. The 17th/21st Lancers alone had fourteen tanks put out of action (Howe; Hastings; Chapter 6).

22 February and after

Before dawn on 22 February Nicholson sent what was left of the brigade’s tanks against the German-held ridge. Of about ten tanks of the 2nd Lothians, only about half reached the German line, and at least five were lost. The attack had an effect out of proportion to its size. The survivors reported far more German tanks than were there, and on the German side it convinced von Broich that the Allies were preparing a major counterattack. He stayed on the defensive, and through the day the 48 howitzers of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division Artillery, which had arrived during the night, and the British guns fired on the ridge and the roads behind it. The German attack on Thala was never renewed (Howe; Zaloga; Chapter 6).

The Axis withdrawal began that night. Nickforce was dissolved at 20:00 on 23 February, and on the 24th British tanks and sappers, among them men of the brigade’s 8th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, moved down the road from Thala toward Kasserine, slowed more by mines and demolitions than by the enemy. The British stand at Thala is sometimes overshadowed by the story of the American guns. Howe says that American units played no significant part in the defense of Thala on 21 February: the brigade and the Leicesters stopped the German attack, at heavy cost, before the guns arrived. After the battle the brigade was re-equipped with American M4 Sherman tanks. Dunphie served afterward as an assistant chief of staff of the U.S. II Corps under Patton and Bradley and received the American Silver Star (Chapter 6).

The insignia, rendered

Illustration Original insignia-style artwork made for the Lake Norman Brief. It is not the unit’s official emblem. The 6th Armoured Division’s real formation sign was a white mailed fist on a black ground.

Timeline

1. 18–19 February 1943The 26th Armoured Brigade moves to Thala; at 06:00 on the 19th it passes to II Corps control.
2. 19 February, eveningDunphie recommends committing the whole brigade in the pass; First Army releases only Gore Force.
3. 20 February, 04:00Gore Force leaves for the northwestern corner of the pass.
4. 20 February, afternoonThe pass falls; Gore Force fights its way back toward Thala and loses every tank.
5. 20 February, duskGore Force withdraws past Hill 704 with five American tank destroyers.
6. 21 February, 09:30The 10th Panzer Division’s battle group advances on Thala.
7. 21 February, 16:00After losing fifteen tanks on one ridge, the brigade falls back through the Leicesters.
8. 21 February, 19:00A German column led by a captured Valentine breaks into the Leicesters’ position; it is stopped short of Thala.
9. 22 February, before dawnThe Lothians’ last tanks counterattack; von Broich stays on the defensive.
10. 23 February, 20:00Nickforce is dissolved as the Axis forces withdraw.

People of the unit

Read the full story

• Chapter 6: Thala and Djebel el Hamra: Where Rommel Was Stopped
• Chapter 5: The Pass: The 19th Engineers and Stark Force, 19–20 February
• Chapter 9: The Cost and the Memory of Kasserine
• The Kasserine Pass collection and atlas

By the numbers

The 26th Armoured Brigade and Gore Force by the numbers

11tanks in Gore Force, seven Valentines and four Crusaders; all were lost in the pass on 20 February

15tanks the brigade lost holding one ridge south of Thala until about 16:00 on 21 February

~30German tanks in the 7th Panzer Regiment’s spearhead, with about 20 self-propelled guns and 35 half-tracks

571–700Allied prisoners taken on 21 February: 571 by the 10th Panzer Division’s tally, about 700 by Howe’s

2–3miles short of Thala where the German night attack was stopped

48American howitzers in position behind Thala by 22 February, after the brigade’s stand

The brigade’s tank losses, 20–22 February 1943

Tanks lost or put out of action, as given in the sources; the counts overlap and should not be added

Gore Force in the pass, 20 Feb. (every tank)

11

On one ridge south of Thala, 21 Feb.

15

17th/21st Lancers put out of action, 21 Feb.

14

2nd Lothians in the dawn attack, 22 Feb.

5 or more

Source: George F. Howe, Northwest Africa (CMH, 1957), chs. XXIII–XXIV; Playfair, vol. IV; Hastings, The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War.

Outgunned

Main-gun calibre in millimetres; the long 75 mm gun of the Panzer IV outranged both British tanks

Valentine: 2-pounder

40 mm

Crusader III: 6-pounder

57 mm

Panzer IV: long 75 mm

75 mm

Source: George F. Howe, Northwest Africa (CMH, 1957), chs. XXIII–XXIV; Chapter 6.

In pictures

More photographs

In the art of World War II

Insignia, posters and art

Mightier Yet! Britain’s Mechanized ArmyTanks: a Ministry of Information ExhibitionRush Tanks Immediately: A Message from North Africa1st Armored Division: Old Ironsides

Explore the Art of World War II →

Sources

• George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), chs. XXIII–XXIV, citing the II Corps journal, the German war diaries and Brig. Dunphie’s memorandum of 1951.
• I. S. O. Playfair and C. J. C. Molony et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. IV (HMSO, 1966), pp. 289–302.
• R. H. W. S. Hastings, The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War, 1939–1945 (Gale & Polden, 1950).
• Steven J. Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel’s Last Victory (Osprey, 2005); Ian W. Walker, Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts (2006); Mike Phifer, “Panzer Strike at Kasserine Pass,” Warfare History Network.
• Wikipedia, “26th Armoured Brigade,” “Nickforce,” “2nd Battalion, Tower Hamlets Rifles,” “17th/21st Lancers” and the biographies of Adrian Gore and Charles Anderson Lane Dunphie, for the works they cite.
• Further reading: Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (1967); Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn (2002).