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Marco Polo Bridge · 7 July 1937
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident: questions and answers76 answers, each tied to the record.
What happened outside Wanping on the night of 7 July 1937, who fired first, why twenty days of talks ended in war, how the fighting spread to Beiping, Shanghai and Nanjing, why the sinking of the Panay did not bring America in, how many died, and what a visitor finds at the bridge today. Every answer names its sources and links to the chapter that tells the story in full.
Photograph: the Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge across the dry bed of the Yongding River, 20 August 2005. Fanghong, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Toned for this page.
All 76 questions, by topic
Choose a question to jump to its answer. Figures come from the official histories, the American diplomatic record, the war crimes judgments and the studies cited in each chapter; where those sources disagree, the answer says so and gives the range.
The bridge and Wanping 8
- How old is the Lugou Bridge?
- How many stone lions are on the bridge?
- What was Wanping?
- Why was the crossing so important in 1937?
- What happened at Fengtai in 1936?
- Why were Japanese troops holding night exercises beside Wanping?
- How large were the two armies in July 1937?
- How has the bridge been preserved?
The night of 7 July 9
- What happened, hour by hour?
- Who was the missing soldier?
- Who fired first?
- What did the Japanese say happened?
- What did the Chinese say happened?
- Could Communist agents have fired the shots?
- What do historians conclude about the incident?
- Why could no one ever trace the first shots?
- How many people were killed at the bridge?
Escalation in July 8
- Why didn’t the cease-fires hold?
- What did Tokyo decide on 11 July?
- What was the local agreement of 11 July?
- Who were Ishiwara Kanji and Muto Akira?
- What did Chiang Kai-shek say at Lushan?
- What happened at Langfang and the Guang’anmen gate?
- What was the Japanese ultimatum of 26 July?
- Did Japan’s government want war in July 1937?
Beiping and Tianjin 7
- What happened at Nanyuan on 28 July?
- Who were Tong Linge and Zhao Dengyu?
- Why did the 29th Army give up Beiping?
- What was the Tongzhou mutiny?
- What happened at Tianjin and Nankai University?
- When did Japanese troops enter Beiping, and how long did they stay?
- How far did the war spread in North China in 1937?
Shanghai and Nanjing 8
- Why did the war spread to Shanghai?
- What was Bloody Saturday?
- Were there really 800 heroes at the Sihang Warehouse?
- How did the battle of Shanghai end, and what did it cost?
- How did Nanjing fall?
- What happened in the Nanjing Massacre?
- How many people were killed at Nanjing?
- Who was punished for Nanjing?
America, the Panay and the world 8
- Were American troops in China in 1937?
- What was the Quarantine Speech?
- What did the League of Nations and the Brussels Conference do?
- What was the Panay incident?
- Was the attack on the Panay deliberate?
- Why didn’t the United States go to war over the Panay?
- How did the war in China lead to Pearl Harbor?
- Were the Flying Tigers part of the U.S. military?
Memory and visiting 8
- How is the incident remembered in China?
- How is the war remembered in Taiwan?
- How is the war remembered in Japan?
- Has Japan apologized for the war in China?
- Can you visit the Marco Polo Bridge?
- What is the museum inside Wanping?
- What else is there to see around the bridge?
- Where can I see other sites from the story?
Counting a war that no one counted well
Different sources count different people over different places and periods. Each chart says what it measures; do not add the bars together.
Estimates of the Nanjing dead
People killed in the Nanjing Massacre, by source. Where a source gives a range, the bar shows the upper figure and is striped.
Japanese casualties at Shanghai, 1937
Killed and wounded in the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, cumulative, as recorded in the Japanese official war history.
Six dates in fourteen years
From the staged explosion at Mukden to the surrender at Nanjing. Times are local.
- MukdenKwantung Army officers stage an explosion on the railway at Liutiaohu and seize Manchuria.
- Shots at WanpingAbout 2240: shots near a Japanese night exercise; a private is missing for about twenty minutes.
- NanyuanJapan’s general attack; Tong Linge and Zhao Dengyu are killed and the 29th Army leaves Beiping.
- ShanghaiFighting begins in Zhabei, and the northern crisis becomes a national war.
- Nanjing fallsThe capital is taken the day after USS Panay is sunk upriver; the massacre follows.
- SurrenderAt 0900 Okamura Yasuji surrenders the China Expeditionary Army at Nanjing.
76 questions about the Marco Polo Bridge Incident
Open a question to read the answer. Each one names its sources and links to the chapter where the story is told in full.
The basics
What happened, where it happened, and why it mattered
The basicsWhat was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?
It was the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops outside Wanping, a small walled town at the east end of the Lugou (Marco Polo) Bridge southwest of Beiping (Peking), on the night of 7–8 July 1937. A Japanese infantry company on a night exercise heard shots at about 2240 and found a private missing. He was back within about twenty minutes, but the Japanese demanded to search Wanping, the Chinese refused, and by dawn a Japanese battalion was deployed outside the town. At about 0530 on 8 July it attacked the Chinese posts on the river embankment. Local cease-fires followed and failed, both governments sent troops, and on 28 July Japan launched a general attack around Beiping. The war that followed lasted until 1945 (Crowley, Journal of Asian Studies, 1963; Japanese official history, Senshi sōsho).
Sources: Crowley (1963); Senshi sōsho, as summarized by Iwatani; FRUS 1937, vol. III
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937 · Chapter 4: Twenty Days
The basicsWhere exactly did it happen?
On the east bank of the Yongding River, about 15 kilometers southwest of central Beijing, then called Beiping (Peking). The stone Lugou Bridge crosses the river there, and the walled town of Wanping guards its east end. Just upstream stood the steel bridge of the Beiping–Hankou railway, and on the embankment north of it was a small Dragon King Temple, Longwangmiao, where the Chinese kept an outpost. The Japanese exercise ground was the open land between Wanping’s north wall and the railway embankment. The Japanese battalion came from Fengtai, a railway junction about 7 kilometers to the east. The whole area is now inside Beijing’s Fengtai District, and the exercise ground has long since been built over (Chapter 2; Chapter 3; Beijing Tourism).
Sources: Beijing Tourism; Crowley (1963); Japanese battle maps in Senshi sōsho
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937 · Atlas
The basicsWhy is it called the Marco Polo Bridge?
Because Marco Polo described it. In the account of his travels he wrote of a very large river about ten miles from the capital, on the road west, crossed by a fine stone bridge with a marble parapet set with lions. His figures do not match the bridge exactly; he gave it 24 arches instead of eleven, and his name for the river, “Pulisanghin,” is usually explained as a Persian rendering of “stone bridge” on the Sanggan, the upper Yongding. But no other bridge fits, and Western writers have used his name since the nineteenth century (Polo, The Travels, Book II, ch. XXXV, Yule translation). The Chinese name, Lugouqiao, means the bridge over the Lugou, an old name for this stretch of the river. In China the clash is called the Lugouqiao Incident or the July 7 Incident; in Japan, the Rokōkyō Incident.
Sources: Marco Polo, The Travels, trans. Henry Yule; Chinese and English Wikipedia, “Lugouqiao” and “Marco Polo Bridge”
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons
The basicsWhy does a skirmish at a bridge matter so much?
Because it began the full-scale war between China and Japan, which lasted eight years and killed somewhere between 14 and 20 million Chinese by the most common Western estimates, with some historians giving 20 to 30 million (Mitter, Forgotten Ally; Lary). The first exchange of fire killed no one, and the American ambassador, Nelson T. Johnson, thought it had involved “not more than 200 Japanese soldiers” (FRUS 1937, vol. III). Yet within three weeks Japan had attacked the Beiping–Tianjin region, within five the fighting had reached Shanghai, and by December the capital, Nanjing, had fallen. For Americans the same chain led through the sinking of USS Panay and the oil embargo of 1941 to Pearl Harbor, when China’s war merged with the Pacific war.
Sources: Mitter, Forgotten Ally; Diana Lary, Asia-Pacific Journal; FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 155
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 8: America and the World · The collection
The basicsDid the Second World War begin at the Marco Polo Bridge?
It depends on the definition. The conventional date in Europe and the United States is 1 September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland. But China had by then been at war with Japan for more than two years. Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally starts China’s world war in July 1937. Peter Harmsen has argued that 1931, when Japan seized Manchuria, has as good a claim as 1939, and since 2017 Chinese schoolbooks have counted a “fourteen-year war” from the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931 (China Daily, 11 January 2017). Others hold that the separate wars in Asia and Europe became one world war only in December 1941. What no date changes is that the war in its lasting form began at the bridge in July 1937 (Chapter 9).
Sources: Mitter, Forgotten Ally; Harmsen in National Interest (January 2017); China Daily (11 January 2017)
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
The basicsWho were the troops on each side that night?
On the Japanese side, the China Garrison Army, headquartered at Tianjin. Its infantry brigade under Maj. Gen. Kawabe Masakazu included Col. Mutaguchi Renya’s 1st Infantry Regiment in Beiping, whose 3rd Battalion under Maj. Ichiki Kiyonao was stationed at Fengtai. The company on the night exercise was that battalion’s 8th Company, under Capt. Shimizu Setsuro. On the Chinese side, Song Zheyuan’s 29th Army. Feng Zhian’s 37th Division held Beiping and the country to its west; its 110th Brigade under He Jifeng held the bridge sector; Col. Ji Xingwen commanded the 219th Regiment; and the regiment’s 3rd Battalion, under Jin Zhenzhong, garrisoned Wanping and the bridges, about 1,400 men by Jin’s own account (Wu Yuexing et al., 1987, as summarized by Arms of China; Japanese official history).
Sources: Senshi sōsho, vol. 86; Wu Yuexing et al. (1987) and Jin Zhenzhong’s memoir, as summarized by Arms of China; The Paper (Shanghai)
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The basicsDid China or Japan declare war in 1937?
No. Neither government declared war for more than four years. Japan called the conflict the North China Incident from 11 July 1937 and, from September, the China Incident; it was folded into what Tokyo called the Greater East Asia War only in December 1941. China formally declared war on Japan, Germany and Italy on 9 December 1941, two days after Pearl Harbor (Chapter 9). The lack of a declaration had practical effects. In the United States the Neutrality Acts applied only when the President found that a state of war existed, and Franklin D. Roosevelt chose not to make that finding, because an arms embargo on both sides would have hurt China, which depended on imported weapons, far more than Japan (Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance; Office of the Historian).
Sources: Office of the Historian, “The Neutrality Acts, 1930s”; Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance; Japanese Monograph No. 144
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Background, 1931–37
The six years that put two armies side by side
Background, 1931–37Why were Japanese troops near Beiping at all?
Because of the Boxer Protocol of 7 September 1901, which allowed the powers whose legations had been besieged in 1900 to keep guards in Beijing and at twelve named points along the railway to the sea. Japan, Britain, France, Italy and the United States all kept troops in North China under it. In 1935 the Japanese contingent was about 1,838 men, roughly the size of the French. In the spring of 1936 Japan enlarged its China Garrison Army without Chinese consent, to 5,774 men by its own official history, and posted a battalion at Fengtai, a junction the protocol did not name. The Japanese army’s own later review conceded that the Fengtai garrison had no legal basis (Boxer Protocol, Art. IX; Japanese Wikipedia, “Rokōkyō jiken”).
Sources: Boxer Protocol (1901), Art. IX; U.S. Army count of 1935 via GlobalSecurity.org; Senshi sōsho, vol. 86
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
Background, 1931–37What was the Mukden Incident, and how is it connected?
On the night of 18 September 1931, at about 2220, a small charge exploded beside the Japanese-run South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu, north of Mukden (Shenyang). Kwantung Army officers led by Col. Itagaki Seishiro and Lt. Col. Ishiwara Kanji had planned it, and a Japanese lieutenant placed the charge. The army blamed Chinese soldiers, seized Mukden by morning and overran Manchuria within months. The League of Nations’ Lytton Commission found that the explosion did not justify military action, and postwar evidence confirmed the plot (Lytton Report, 1932; IMTFE judgment). Mukden matters to the story of 1937 in two ways. It began six years of Japanese pressure that carried Japanese troops to Beiping, and it taught Chinese officers to suspect that any “incident” might be another staged pretext.
Sources: Lytton Report (1932); IMTFE judgment, ch. V; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
Background, 1931–37What was Manchukuo?
A state proclaimed in Manchuria on 1 March 1932 with Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as its head: Chief Executive from 9 March 1932 and emperor from 1 March 1934. It was nominally independent, but the commander of the Kwantung Army was also Japan’s ambassador to it, and Japanese vice-ministers held the real power in every department. Japan recognized it in September 1932. The League of Nations adopted the Lytton Report, which refused to accept Manchukuo as the product of a spontaneous independence movement, by 42 votes to one on 24 February 1933, and Japan gave notice on 27 March 1933 that it would leave the League. Manchukuo lasted until the Soviet invasion of August 1945 (Lytton Report; Young, Japan’s Total Empire; Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy).
Sources: Lytton Report (1932); Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire; Christopher Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
Background, 1931–37What was the Tanggu Truce?
The military truce that ended Japan’s campaign in Jehol and along the Great Wall in 1933. After the Kwantung Army took Jehol in less than two weeks and fought its way through the Great Wall passes, Chiang Kai-shek chose to negotiate rather than risk a war he believed China would lose. On 31 May 1933, at the port of Tanggu near Tianjin, Maj. Gen. Okamura Yasuji and Lt. Gen. Xiong Bin signed a truce that pulled Chinese troops back behind a line from Yanqing through Tongzhou to Lutai and created a demilitarized zone roughly 100 kilometers deep in northeastern Hebei. The truce did not mention Manchukuo, but by leaving the Great Wall in Japanese hands it accepted the loss of Manchuria and Jehol in fact, and it left Beiping on the edge of a zone the Japanese army could enter at will (Coble, Facing Japan).
Sources: Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan; IMTFE judgment, ch. V
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
Background, 1931–37What happened in North China in 1935?
The Japanese army pushed to separate the northern provinces from Nanjing’s control. The He–Umezu Agreement, accepted on 10 June 1935, removed Nationalist Party branches and central army units from Hebei. The Qin–Doihara Agreement of 27 June pushed the 29th Army out of most of Chahar north of the Great Wall. On 25 November Yin Rugeng proclaimed the Japanese-backed East Hebei regime at Tongzhou, about 13 miles east of Beiping, covering 22 counties of the demilitarized zone, which soon became an open door for smuggling. Nanjing answered on 18 December with the Hebei–Chahar Political Council under Song Zheyuan. On 9 December several thousand Beiping students marched against “autonomy,” and the December Ninth Movement made resistance to Japan the test of patriotism in Chinese politics (IMTFE judgment, ch. V; Mitter, Forgotten Ally).
Sources: IMTFE judgment, ch. V; FRUS 1936, vol. IV; Mitter, Forgotten Ally
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
Background, 1931–37What was the Xi’an Incident, and did it cause the war?
At about 0500 on 12 December 1936, troops of Zhang Xueliang, the “Young Marshal” who had lost Manchuria in 1931, seized Chiang Kai-shek at the Huaqing Pool hot springs near Xi’an. Zhang and the general Yang Hucheng demanded an end to the civil war against the Communists and immediate resistance to Japan. After two weeks of negotiation, in which Soong Mei-ling, T. V. Soong and the Communist Zhou Enlai took part, Chiang was released on Christmas Day. Zhang flew back with him and spent more than fifty years under arrest (Taylor, The Generalissimo; van de Ven, China at War). Xi’an did not cause the war directly, but it stopped the civil war, opened talks on a second united front and left Chiang less free to make concessions. Some Japanese officers concluded that it was better to strike before China grew stronger.
Sources: Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo; Hans van de Ven, China at War
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
Background, 1931–37Who was Song Zheyuan, and where was he in July 1937?
Song Zheyuan (1885–1940) commanded the 29th Army, which came out of Feng Yuxiang’s old Northwestern Army and had fought the Japanese at the Great Wall in 1933. From December 1935 he chaired the Hebei–Chahar Political Council, which governed Hebei, Chahar, Beiping and Tianjin as a buffer between Nanjing and Tokyo, and he spent eighteen months trying to keep both at arm’s length. In May 1937 he left Beiping for his home at Laoling in Shandong, on the pretext of repairing his ancestral graves, and he was still there when the shooting began, leaving Qin Dechun, the mayor of Beiping, to negotiate. He returned to Tianjin on 11 July, tried to the end to settle locally, led his army out of Beiping on the night of 28–29 July and died of illness in Sichuan in April 1940 (The Paper; FRUS 1937, vol. III).
Sources: The Paper (Shanghai); FRUS 1937, vol. III; Wikipedia, “Song Zheyuan”
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 4: Twenty Days · Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
The bridge and Wanping
An 800-year-old crossing, a Ming fort and the garrisons of 1937
The bridge and WanpingHow old is the Lugou Bridge?
It was built under the Jurchen Jin dynasty, begun in 1189 and finished in 1192, and was first named Guangli Bridge before it took the river’s name. It is a granite bridge of eleven arches on ten heavy piers, usually given as 266.5 meters long and about 9.3 meters wide. The arches and piers are substantially the Jin structure, but the bridge has been repaired many times. A flood destroyed part of its eastern end in 1668; Chinese sources date the Kangxi Emperor’s repairs and the stele recording them to 1669, while many English sources give 1698, the year the river was embanked and renamed Yongding, “forever stable.” In 1751 the Qianlong Emperor had his calligraphy for the scene “Morning Moon over Lugou” carved on a stele that still stands at the east end (Chinese Wikipedia; People’s Daily, 14 August 2023).
Sources: Chinese Wikipedia, “Lugouqiao”; People’s Daily overseas edition (14 August 2023); Beijing Tourism
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The bridge and WanpingHow many stone lions are on the bridge?
The official figure today is 501, on 281 posts. That number is the latest in a long line of counts. Old records claim 627; a survey in 1962 numbered and recorded 485; a recheck in 1979 found 17 more, for 502; and other modern counts run from 482 to 501 (Chinese encyclopedia entry; China News Service, 2025). The counts differ because many of the large lions carry smaller cubs on their heads, backs, bellies and paws that are easy to miss or count twice, and because posts and lions have been lost and replaced over eight centuries, including 164 new lions carved for widened walkways in 1967. Most of the lions date from the Ming and Qing dynasties, only a few from the Jin. A Beijing proverb says the lions of Lugou cannot be counted.
Sources: Chinese encyclopedia entry for Lugouqiao; China News Service (2025); Beijing Tourism
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The bridge and WanpingWhat was Wanping?
A small walled fort built from 1638 to 1640, in the last years of the Ming dynasty, to guard the bridge and the road to the capital against Manchu raiders and rebel armies. It was first called Gongji Cheng. It is a rectangle about 640 meters east to west and 320 meters north to south, with one street running between a gate at each end: the east gate faced the road to Beiping, and the west gate opened onto the head of the bridge. On 1 December 1928, after Beijing was renamed Beiping, the government of Wanping County moved into the fort, which took the county’s name. In July 1937 its magistrate, Wang Lengzhai, found himself negotiating between two armies at his gate, and the town’s walls were shelled on 8 July (Beijing Tourism; Wikipedia, “Wanping Fortress”).
Sources: Beijing Tourism, “Wanping City”; Wikipedia, “Wanping Fortress”
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The bridge and WanpingWhy was the crossing so important in 1937?
Because it was Beiping’s last rail and road link to central China still in Chinese hands. By the summer of 1937 Japanese troops were in Beiping and Tianjin, along the railway to the sea and at Fengtai, the junction southwest of the city where the Beiping–Hankou line met the line to Tianjin and Manchuria. Japan’s client regime in eastern Hebei lay to the east. That left the road and the Beiping–Hankou railway across the Yongding at Lugouqiao as the one route south that Chinese troops controlled. Whoever held Wanping and the bridges could isolate the city. Chinese commanders understood this, and in June 1937 the 29th Army reinforced Wanping and the railway town of Changxindian and improved their field works (Wu Yuexing et al., 1987, as summarized by Arms of China; Chapter 2).
Sources: Wu Yuexing et al. (1987), as summarized by Arms of China; period railway maps; Crowley (1963)
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 4: Twenty Days
The bridge and WanpingWhat happened at Fengtai in 1936?
Japanese troops moved into new barracks at Fengtai between 21 and 30 June 1936, about 300 meters from the 29th Army’s garrison, and China protested that Fengtai was not a protocol point. Within days, by a Chinese account, a quarrel over a stray horse led to a fight with men hurt on both sides. On the evening of 18 September 1936, the fifth anniversary of Mukden, a Japanese unit returning from maneuvers met a Chinese company on the road; the Japanese surrounded the Chinese barracks overnight, and no shots were fired. The settlement reported to the American embassy required an apology to Colonel Mutaguchi and the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Fengtai, which Song Zheyuan accepted (FRUS 1936, vol. IV, doc. 283). Ichiki’s battalion moved into the old barracks. Japanese officers concluded that pressure worked; Chinese officers concluded that every retreat invited another demand.
Sources: FRUS 1936, vol. IV, doc. 283; Renmin Zhengxie Bao (10 July 2014); Wu Yuexing et al., via Arms of China
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons
The bridge and WanpingWhy were Japanese troops holding night exercises beside Wanping?
Japan claimed the right under a supplementary agreement of 1902 that let the protocol powers hold field exercises without notifying the Chinese, and said the fields near Wanping were the only open ground in summer, when tall sorghum covered everything else. Through June and early July 1937 Japanese companies exercised there almost every night. The Chinese protested that the troops trampled crops, fired at night and gave no notice. The American embassy later pointed out that a Chinese note of 15 November 1913 had named Lugouqiao as a drill ground for the legation guards only “temporarily” and on condition that ball cartridges not be used, and that the company out on 7 July carried live ammunition (Embassy despatch no. 1377, FRUS 1937, vol. III). The Chinese troops on the embankment read the exercises as rehearsals for an attack on their own positions.
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 484 (despatch no. 1377); Japanese Wikipedia, “Rokōkyō jiken”
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The bridge and WanpingHow large were the two armies in July 1937?
The figures vary with what is counted. For the Japanese China Garrison Army, its own official history gives 5,774 men on 10 June 1936, and Japanese counts for 1937 give about 5,600; contemporary American estimates ran from “slightly under 5,000” (the embassy in Tokyo, June 1936) to 9,200 (the U.S. naval attaché), and the Tokyo tribunal later spoke of 7,000 to 15,000 (FRUS 1936–37; IMTFE). For Song Zheyuan’s 29th Army, the American military attaché counted 51,800 in January 1937, Japanese estimates run from about 75,000 to 78,000, and Chinese accounts give about 100,000. The imbalance in quality is not disputed: the Japanese had tanks, modern artillery, aircraft and the railway link to Manchuria, while the 29th Army had numbers, rifles and its famous broadswords (Chapter 2).
Sources: Senshi sōsho, vol. 86; FRUS 1936, vol. IV, and 1937, vol. III, doc. 62; IMTFE judgment
Read more: Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge
The bridge and WanpingHow has the bridge been preserved?
After 1949 the bridge was paved with asphalt and carried motor traffic. It was placed on China’s first list of national heritage sites in 1961, and in 1967 its walkways were widened on concrete beams. New bridges took the traffic, and on 24 August 1985 the old bridge was closed to vehicles. A restoration of 1986–87, with a budget of 3.55 million yuan, removed the concrete walkways and asphalt and restored the stone deck; another round of conservation followed in 2018–19. Engineers now monitor settlement, cracks and strain. A 2019 inspection found weathered railings, seepage in the arches and lost mortar, but pier settlement matching readings from the 1970s. During Beijing’s record rains of 29 July to 2 August 2023, the team took readings every two hours and judged the bridge stable (People’s Daily overseas edition, 14 August 2023).
Sources: People’s Daily overseas edition (14 August 2023); Chinese encyclopedia entry for Lugouqiao; Wikipedia, “Marco Polo Bridge”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons
The night of 7 July
Shots in the dark, a missing private and the question of who fired first
The night of 7 JulyWhat happened, hour by hour?
By the Japanese records, as summarized by Japanese historians, Shimizu’s 8th Company began its night exercise at about 1930 on 7 July and was assembling to march back when shots were heard at about 2240. A private was missing at roll call and turned up about twenty minutes later. Messengers reached Fengtai about midnight, and Ichiki telephoned Mutaguchi, who ordered the battalion out. Ichiki took command at Wulidian about 0200, and at 0320 the battalion occupied the low rise east of Wanping. Three more shots came at about 0325. A joint investigation party reached Wanping at about 0500; Mutaguchi had authorized combat at 0420 (some accounts say 0400); and at about 0530 the Japanese attacked. A temporary cease-fire came at about 0930. Chinese accounts often differ by an hour or more for the same events (Senshi sōsho; Iwatani, 2016).
Sources: Senshi sōsho and the 1st Regiment and 3rd Battalion reports, as summarized by Iwatani (2016) and Japanese Wikipedia; Chinese Wikipedia, “Qiqi shibian”
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937 · Timeline
The night of 7 JulyWho was the missing soldier?
Private Shimura Kikujiro, a runner for the leader of the company’s 1st Platoon. When Captain Shimizu took the roll after the shots of about 2240, Shimura did not answer, and Shimizu sent two mounted messengers to Fengtai to report that the company had been fired on and a man was missing. Shimura was found within about twenty minutes. Japanese accounts say he had stepped away to relieve himself and lost his way in the dark; Peter Harmsen, in Shanghai 1937, gives a less flattering story, that he had slipped off to a brothel. His return was not reported before the first message had set the battalion in motion. The Chinese were told of it at about 0200, and the Japanese demand to enter Wanping went on, now framed as an inquiry into who had fired. Chinese writers have long charged that the news was concealed (Japanese Wikipedia; Harmsen).
Sources: Japanese Wikipedia, “Rokōkyō jiken”; Peter Harmsen, Shanghai 1937; Phoenix News (3 September 2014)
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The night of 7 JulyWho fired first?
No one knows, and probably no one ever will. There were really two sets of “first shots.” The first came at about 2240 on 7 July, fired at or near the Japanese company in the dark. The second came in the early morning of 8 July, from three shots at about 0325 to the opening of the battle at about 0530, by which time a Japanese battalion with authority to attack stood outside a Chinese town whose garrison had orders to hold. The Japanese said Chinese soldiers fired first both times; the Chinese said the Japanese did. The American embassy wrote that year that it would presumably never be established whether a Japanese or a Chinese fired the shot that began the fighting, while still holding the Japanese responsible for exercising with live ammunition beside a Chinese garrison (despatch no. 1377, FRUS 1937, vol. III).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 484 (despatch no. 1377); Hata, Rokōkyō jiken no kenkyū (1996); Crowley (1963)
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The night of 7 JulyWhat did the Japanese say happened?
From the first morning, the Japanese army’s version was that soldiers of the 29th Army fired without provocation on a company carrying out a lawful exercise, fired again before dawn and fired first on the morning of 8 July, so that the Japanese acted in self-defense. Maj. Imai Takeo, the assistant military attaché, told the Americans that Chinese troops had fired suddenly on Japanese soldiers at Longwangmiao (FRUS 1937, vol. III). Later the Japanese cabinet went further and claimed the Chinese had planned the clash. The most careful Japanese study, Hata Ikuhiko’s Rokōkyō jiken no kenkyū (1996), concluded that the shots of 2240 most likely came from Chinese soldiers on the embankment, but treated them as accidental, probably fired out of fear in the dark by a low-ranking soldier, rather than a planned act.
Sources: Hata (1996), as summarized in English Wikipedia; Hata in Morley, ed., The China Quagmire (1983); FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 484
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The night of 7 JulyWhat did the Chinese say happened?
The Chinese government called the clash premeditated from the start, and by 9 July the Foreign Ministry had protested an “attack by Japanese troops upon Chinese troops” (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 107). In the Chinese account, the Japanese held a provocative night exercise beside a Chinese town, used a missing soldier as an excuse to demand entry to Wanping, kept demanding entry after he had returned and attacked while talks were going on; Qin Dechun told the Americans that the Japanese opened fire during the negotiations. That remains the account of the national war museum inside Wanping. After the war the Tokyo tribunal accepted much of it, finding that the garrison held an “unusual manoeuvre” and that the opening battle was carried out on the army’s own initiative (IMTFE judgment, ch. IV).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, docs. 107 and 484; IMTFE judgment, ch. IV, pp. 183–185; Chinese Wikipedia, “Qiqi shibian”
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937 · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The night of 7 JulyCould Communist agents have fired the shots?
The theory has been popular with some Japanese writers since the war. It holds that Communist agents fired to provoke a war between Japan and the Nationalists that would save the Communist movement. Its supporters point to Communist members and sympathizers inside the 29th Army, among them He Jifeng, who commanded the brigade at the bridge and was in secret contact with the party; to the Communist call for national resistance issued on 8 July; and to the fact that the Communists gained most from the war. But no document or witness has ever shown that Communist agents fired at Lugouqiao. Hata considered the theory possible but less likely than an accidental shot by a Chinese soldier, and Kimitada Miwa’s 1963 study examined the Communists’ role in spreading the war, a different matter from firing its first shots (Hata, 1996; Miwa, Monumenta Nipponica, 1963).
Sources: Hata (1996); Kimitada I. Miwa, Monumenta Nipponica 18 (1963); Iwatani (2023)
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The night of 7 JulyWhat do historians conclude about the incident?
Since James B. Crowley’s 1963 study, the first Western work to use the Japanese army’s own records, most historians outside China have found no evidence that the Japanese government or army high command planned the shots. Tokyo’s operations chief, Ishiwara Kanji, wanted no war in China that summer. Ambassador Johnson reached the same view on 14 July 1937 (FRUS 1937, vol. III). Rana Mitter and Hans van de Ven treat the origin of the shooting as unknown and place the turning point in the decisions that followed. Nobu Iwatani’s 2023 study, drawing on archives in several countries, found no conspiracy by either the Japanese army or the Communists. But almost no one argues that the Japanese army on the spot behaved innocently: it exercised at night with live rounds beside a hostile garrison and used a false missing-soldier report to demand entry to the town (Crowley, 1963).
Sources: Crowley (1963); FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 155; Mitter, Forgotten Ally; van de Ven, China at War; Iwatani (2023)
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937 · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The night of 7 JulyWhy could no one ever trace the first shots?
Because almost nothing that would trace them existed. The night was very dark, with the moon a day short of new. There was already gunfire in the exercise: the Japanese playing the enemy fired blank rounds from a light machine gun, and a sentry several hundred yards away could not tell a blank from a live round. Sound at night is a poor guide, since a passing bullet’s crack and the echoes off the town wall and embankment can seem to come from the wrong direction. Above all, no one was hit, so there was no bullet to recover, and no one searched in the dark for the cartridge cases a bolt-action rifle drops at the shooter’s feet. Neither side ever produced a bullet, a case or a named shooter. The Japanese company’s live ammunition meant any reply was live fire (Chapter 3; FRUS 1937, vol. III).
Sources: Japanese Wikipedia, “Rokōkyō jiken”; FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 484; astronomical tables
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
The night of 7 JulyHow many people were killed at the bridge?
The shots of 7 July hit no one. The fighting of 8 July killed and wounded men on both sides, but the figures depend on the source and the days covered. Hata Ikuhiko, using Japanese records, gives about 510 Japanese soldiers in action on 8 July, with 10 killed and 30 wounded, and Chinese losses reported at about 180, including about 60 dead (Hata, 1996, p. 218). Japanese Wikipedia, in an unsourced passage, gives more than ten Japanese killed and wounded and more than 20 Chinese dead and 60 wounded for the morning alone. Chinese accounts give no total but say the two platoons holding Longwangmiao and the railway bridge were almost wiped out. The American assistant military attaché, Maj. David D. Barrett, who drove out that morning, saw one dead Japanese soldier near the Japanese lines (Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China).
Sources: Hata (1996), p. 218, via Sekaishi no mado; Chinese Wikipedia; Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China
Read more: Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
Escalation in July
Twenty days of talks, troop trains and ultimatums, 8–27 July
Escalation in JulyWhy didn’t the cease-fires hold?
Because each side kept talking while its soldiers moved, and each read the other’s moves as bad faith. About 0200 on 9 July the local commanders agreed that Japanese troops would hold the east bank of the Yongding and Chinese troops the west; the withdrawal was late, and on the night of 10 July Longwangmiao changed hands again. On 11 July a local settlement was handed to the Japanese at about 2000 in Beiping, but the same day the Konoe cabinet in Tokyo announced that it was sending troops to North China, and Chiang Kai-shek had already ordered Central Army divisions north. Small clashes went on, the 37th Division was slow to leave Beiping, and the vague promises in the local terms gave the Japanese grounds to say they were not being kept. After the clash at Langfang on 25 July the Japanese garrison gave up on them (FRUS 1937, vol. III; Tobe, 2019).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, docs. 116 and 119; Tobe Ryoichi (2019); Japanese reference works after Senshi sōsho
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWhat did Tokyo decide on 11 July?
On Sunday 11 July 1937 the five principal ministers, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, War Minister Sugiyama Hajime, Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa, Foreign Minister Hirota Koki and Finance Minister Kaya Okinori, met at 1130 and agreed on a show of force to obtain a Chinese apology and guarantees, with the incident to be kept local and settled by the field commanders. They approved an expeditionary force of five divisions, three for the time being. The cabinet approved the dispatch at 1400, the government announced it at 1824, and at 2100 Konoe asked party, business and newspaper leaders for national unity behind it (Japanese Monograph No. 144, Appendix 5). The Kwantung Army sent two mixed brigades and Korea the 20th Division. The three home divisions were held back, approved, held back again and finally ordered on 27 July (Tobe, 2019).
Sources: Japanese Monograph No. 144, Appendix 5; Tobe Ryoichi (2019); FRUS Japan 1931–1941, vol. I, doc. 234
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWhat was the local agreement of 11 July?
A document handed to the Japanese in Beiping at about 2000 on 11 July in the names of Zhang Zizhong, commander of the 38th Division and mayor of Tianjin, and Zhang Yunrong of the Hebei–Chahar Political Council, and received by Col. Matsui Takuro of the Japanese army’s special-service agency; Qin Dechun is usually named as the Chinese official who approved it. As the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, summarized it for the House of Commons, the 29th Army would not reoccupy Wanping, it apologized and promised to punish those responsible, and it would control anti-Japanese activity (Hansard, 28 July 1937). Its signing time is given as 2000 in one Japanese account and 1750 in the Beiping agency’s log (Iwatani, 2016). The mayor’s office announced a settlement that evening and withdrew the announcement about 2300 as firing resumed (Johnson, FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 116).
Sources: Hansard, House of Commons (28 July 1937); FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 116; Iwatani (2016); Bunshun Online (7 July 2017)
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWho were Ishiwara Kanji and Muto Akira?
The two officers at the center of the argument in Tokyo. Maj. Gen. Ishiwara Kanji, chief of the Army General Staff’s Operations Division and the planner of the Mukden Incident in 1931, had come to believe that Japan must not be drawn into a war in China. He saw the Soviet Union as the real danger, wanted years of quiet to build up Manchukuo’s industry and warned that a China war would become a swamp. His own Operations Section chief, Col. Muto Akira, sided with those who believed one hard blow would make China give way, the “one blow” school (Tobe, 2019; Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji). Ishiwara could delay reinforcement but not stop it. He lost the argument and was moved to the Kwantung Army in September 1937. Muto rose to head the War Ministry’s Military Affairs Bureau and was hanged in December 1948 after conviction by the Tokyo tribunal.
Sources: Tobe Ryoichi (2019); Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West; Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWhat did Chiang Kai-shek say at Lushan?
On 17 July 1937 Chiang spoke to a conference of educators and public figures at Lushan, the mountain resort where his government spent the summer; the address was published on 19 July. He said the events at Lugouqiao raised problems involving the existence of the nation as a whole, that China wanted peace until the last moment, but that if it reached “the limit of endurance” it would fight to the end, with no distinction between north and south or old and young. He set four minimum conditions: no infringement of China’s territory and sovereignty, no illegal change to the Hebei–Chahar Political Council, no removal of centrally appointed officials under outside pressure and no restriction on the 29th Army’s positions (Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. I). Ambassador Johnson reported that the response across China was largely enthusiastic (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 273).
Sources: The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. I, pp. 21–25; FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 273; Japanese Monograph No. 144, Appendix 6
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWhat happened at Langfang and the Guang’anmen gate?
The two clashes that ended the local settlement. On the afternoon of 25 July a company of the Japanese 77th Infantry Regiment arrived by train at Langfang, a railway town halfway between Beiping and Tianjin, to repair the army’s telegraph line where it ran past a barracks of the Chinese 38th Division. Fighting began that night, at about 2310 by Japanese sources; at dawn Japanese aircraft bombed the barracks, and the Chinese withdrew by about 1000 on 26 July. The War Ministry reported four Japanese killed and ten wounded (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 267). That evening a Japanese battalion of 26 trucks tried to enter Beiping through the Guang’anmen gate; when part of it was through, Chinese troops on the wall opened fire and closed the gate. Japanese records count two soldiers killed and about 17 wounded (Senshi sōsho, vol. 86).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, docs. 267 and 272; Senshi sōsho, vol. 86, pp. 216–217; Japanese War Ministry, Shūhō (4 August 1937)
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Escalation in JulyWhat was the Japanese ultimatum of 26 July?
On 26 July Japanese officers handed the mayor of Beiping two demands with two deadlines. The 37th Division’s troops at the Marco Polo Bridge and at Babaoshan, west of the city, were to withdraw west of the Yongding River by noon on 27 July, and its troops inside Beiping and at the Xiyuan barracks by noon on 28 July. The mayor was reported to have said the division did not intend to withdraw (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 272). Some later histories compress this into a single 24-hour deadline. After the Guang’anmen clash that evening, the China Garrison Army notified Song Zheyuan at about 0200 on 28 July that Japan would act as it saw fit and advised him to take all his forces out of Beiping. On 27 July the cabinet had ordered the home divisions, and the general attack began on the morning of 28 July (Japanese War Ministry, 1937; Tobe, 2019).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 272; Japanese War Ministry (1937); Senshi sōsho, vol. 86; Tobe (2019)
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days · Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Escalation in JulyDid Japan’s government want war in July 1937?
Not a general war with China, at least not at first. The cabinet’s own policy of 11 July spoke of keeping the incident local and settling it through the field commanders, and the army’s operations chief, Ishiwara, fought to limit it. But the same cabinet chose to send troops and to announce the decision loudly, and an influential group of officers believed one sharp blow would settle the North China question. James Crowley argued that Tokyo’s choices after the incident, more than the incident itself, made war likely, and that Konoe expected firmness to bring a quick Chinese concession (Crowley, 1963). The record of the home divisions, held on 13 July, approved on 20 July, held on 22 July and ordered on 27 July, shows a government divided against itself. Meanwhile the China Garrison Army’s staff had finished an offensive plan by about 15 July while talks continued (Tobe, 2019).
Sources: Crowley (1963) and Japan’s Quest for Autonomy; Tobe Ryoichi (2019); Warfare History Network
Read more: Chapter 4: Twenty Days
Beiping and Tianjin
The fall of the north, 28 July to 8 August 1937
Beiping and TianjinWhat happened at Nanyuan on 28 July?
Nanyuan, about 10 kilometers south of Beiping, was the 29th Army’s main barracks. Japanese aircraft bombed it heavily from 0530 on 28 July, according to the American counselor of embassy, Frank Lockhart, who cabled Washington that afternoon (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 290). The 20th Division attacked from the east, south and west, while the Kawabe Brigade moved from Fengtai toward Dahongmen to cut the road back to the city. The People’s Daily puts the garrison at about 20,000 men, including a training corps of about 1,500 university students, most of whom had only just learned to fire a rifle. The barracks were a flat compound without deep trenches, early bombs cut the telephone lines and the Chinese units fought separately. By about 1300 or 1400 organized resistance was over (People’s Daily, 26 May 2015; Harmsen).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 290; People’s Daily (26 May 2015); Harmsen, Shanghai 1937
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Beiping and TianjinWho were Tong Linge and Zhao Dengyu?
The first Chinese generals killed after full-scale war began. Tong Linge, 45, was the 29th Army’s deputy commander and commanded at Nanyuan; wounded in the leg early in the battle, he refused to leave and was killed during the withdrawal on the afternoon of 28 July, by a bomb in most accounts. A memorial on the Beijing street named for him shows a watch set to 1430, the time given for his death. Zhao Dengyu, 39, commanded the 132nd Division and had led the famous broadsword night attack at Xifengkou on the Great Wall in 1933; he was killed the same day on the road to Dahongmen, by gunfire or bombs depending on the account. Both were promoted posthumously to full general, Beiping named streets for them in 1946, and in 2014 both were named among China’s first 300 national anti-Japanese martyrs (Xinhua, 2025; Beijing Daily, 4 September 2025).
Sources: People’s Daily (26 May 2015); Xinhua (23 June and 9 August 2025); Beijing Daily (4 September 2025)
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Beiping and TianjinWhy did the 29th Army give up Beiping?
It did fight, at Nanyuan, Xiyuan, Fengtai and Langfang on 28 July, and lost. By that afternoon Song Zheyuan had lost his deputy commander, a division commander and his main barracks. Beiping had walls more than 500 years old and about 1.5 million people, but no defense against bombers and heavy guns, and Chiang Kai-shek ordered Song back to Baoding on the Beiping–Hankou railway. Song named Zhang Zizhong acting mayor and left that evening, and most of the army withdrew south overnight. Nanjing was stunned, but W. H. Donald, Chiang’s Australian adviser, told Ambassador Johnson that Chiang had regarded Beiping as lost since 1935 and that “things were really just beginning” (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 314). The withdrawal saved most of the army, and it spared the Forbidden City, the Temple of Heaven and the city walls a battle.
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 314; Chinese Wikipedia, “Pingjin zuozhan”; Wikipedia, “Battle of Beiping–Tianjin”
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Beiping and TianjinWhat was the Tongzhou mutiny?
At about 0200 on 29 July 1937 the peace preservation corps of the Japanese-sponsored East Hebei regime at Tongzhou, east of Beiping, turned on the Japanese. The mutineers attacked the small Japanese garrison detachment and the Japanese and Korean houses and shops and killed many civilians, including women and children. The most widely used figure is 223 dead out of about 385 Japanese and Korean residents, from the Japanese army’s history of 1939; other Japanese counts run from 184 to about 260 (Japanese Wikipedia, “Tsūshū jiken”). Why the corps mutinied is still argued: a mistaken Japanese bombing of its camp on 27 July, Chinese radio claims of victory, secret contacts with the 29th Army and anger over the drug trade are all cited. Japanese troops who retook the town carried out reprisals against Chinese civilians (Harmsen). In Japan the massacre fed the cry to “punish outrageous China.” It came the day after Japan’s general attack began.
Sources: Japanese Wikipedia, “Tsūshū jiken”; Wikipedia, “Tongzhou mutiny”; Harmsen, via China in WW2 (29 July 2014)
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Beiping and TianjinWhat happened at Tianjin and Nankai University?
Before dawn on 29 July the Chinese 38th Division under its deputy commander, Li Wentian, with peace preservation units, attacked the Japanese in Tianjin: the guard post at the main station, the garrison headquarters at Haiguangsi and the Dongjuzi airfield. Japanese aircraft and artillery answered by bombing and shelling the Chinese city, and the Chinese abandoned Tianjin and the Dagu forts on the night of 30 July. Nankai University, a center of Chinese patriotism and of research on Manchuria, was bombed on 29 July; on 30 July Japanese troops entered the campus, looted it and set fire to the surviving buildings, and the American consul general reported that the destruction was completed by artillery, bombing and fire (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 321). Nankai joined Peking and Tsinghua universities in exile, from 1938 as Southwest Associated University in Kunming. A Chinese local history puts Tianjin’s civilian dead at more than 2,000.
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, docs. 293 and 321; Wikipedia, “History of Nankai University”; Chinese Wikipedia, “Pingjin zuozhan”
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Beiping and TianjinWhen did Japanese troops enter Beiping, and how long did they stay?
At noon on 8 August 1937 about 2,000 Japanese troops of the Kawabe Brigade, with field guns, tanks and trucks, marched into Beiping through three gates without resistance; the American embassy reported no disorder (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 388). Some accounts date the formal parade to 18 August, and the best-known photograph of Japanese troops passing through Qianmen is dated 13 August. The occupiers closed the telegraph offices, told schools to stop teaching the Nationalist doctrine and went from bookstore to bookstore naming banned books. On 14 December 1937 the Japanese installed a collaborationist Provisional Government under Wang Kemin, and the city took back the name Beijing. It stayed under Japanese control for eight years. The surrender of Japanese forces in North China was accepted in the Hall of Supreme Harmony in the Forbidden City on 10 October 1945.
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, docs. 388 and 391; Wikipedia, “Provisional Government of the Republic of China”
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Beiping and TianjinHow far did the war spread in North China in 1937?
Across the whole North China plain. Tokyo had hoped a quick blow would bring Nanjing to terms; instead Japan organized the North China Area Army at the end of August and pushed along three lines. Northwest, Japanese forces broke through Nankou Pass and took Kalgan on 27 August. Southwest down the Beiping–Hankou railway, Baoding fell on 24 September. In Shanxi the Communist Eighth Route Army’s 115th Division ambushed a Japanese supply column at Pingxingguan on 25 September, China’s first success of the war, though it did not stop the advance; Taiyuan fell on 8–9 November after the hard battles at Xinkou. South down the Tianjin–Pukou railway, the Shandong governor Han Fuju abandoned Jinan, which fell on 27 December; Chiang had him executed on 24 January 1938. By year’s end Japan held the cities and railways but not the countryside (Wikipedia campaign articles).
Sources: Wikipedia, “Operation Chahar,” “Beiping–Hankou Railway Operation,” “Battle of Pingxingguan,” “Battle of Taiyuan,” “Han Fuju”
Read more: Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Shanghai and Nanjing
How a northern crisis became a national war
Shanghai and NanjingWhy did the war spread to Shanghai?
Historians do not agree on exactly why Chiang Kai-shek chose to fight there, and Peter Harmsen writes that the record does not settle it. The sources point to several reasons. The creeks and paddy fields of the Yangtze delta favored a defender against Japanese tanks and trucks. A battle beside the International Settlement would be fought in front of the world’s diplomats and press, and might bring foreign pressure on Japan. And the lower Yangtze was Chiang’s own base, where a stand showed that the national government itself was fighting (Harmsen, Shanghai 1937; van de Ven, China at War). The spark was the killing of Sub-Lt. Ōyama Isao and his driver at Hongqiao aerodrome on 9 August. Fighting began in Zhabei on 13 August, and Japan answered with a field army. In September Tokyo renamed the conflict the China Incident.
Sources: Peter Harmsen, Shanghai 1937; Hans van de Ven, China at War; Mitter, Forgotten Ally
Read more: Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937
Shanghai and NanjingWhat was Bloody Saturday?
The name is used for two events. On Saturday 14 August 1937 Chinese bombers attacking the Japanese flagship Izumo on the Huangpu dropped bombs that fell short, on Nanjing Road beside the Cathay and Palace Hotels and outside the Great World amusement center, where thousands of refugees had gathered. Totals range from about 1,200 dead to about 2,000; among the foreigners killed was Robert K. Reischauer, a Princeton scholar and brother of the future ambassador to Japan. The American consul general cabled within the hour that Chinese planes were not respecting the Settlement (FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 453). Two weeks later, on Saturday 28 August, Japanese aircraft bombed Shanghai’s South Station, and H. S. Wong of Hearst Metrotone News photographed a baby crying alone in the wreckage. Life estimated in October that 136 million people had seen the picture (Life, 4 October 1937).
Sources: FRUS 1937, vol. III, doc. 453; University of Bristol, Historical Photographs of China; Life (4 October 1937); Harmsen
Read more: Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937
Shanghai and NanjingWere there really 800 heroes at the Sihang Warehouse?
No. When Lt. Col. Xie Jinyuan’s battalion of the 88th Division moved into the five-story concrete Sihang Warehouse on the north bank of Suzhou Creek about midnight on 26 October 1937, it had about 420 men. Chinese announcements called them the “800 heroes” to make the force sound stronger, and the name stuck. They held the building in full view of the International Settlement across the creek. A Girl Guide, Yang Huimin, carried a national flag to them, and it went up on the roof on the morning of 29 October as a crowd estimated at 30,000 watched. Under British and American pressure Chiang authorized a withdrawal, and on the night of 30–31 October about 377 defenders crossed into the Settlement, where they were interned. Xie was stabbed to death by four of his own men on 24 April 1941 (Harmsen; The Paper, 2020).
Sources: Harmsen, Shanghai 1937; The Paper (2020); Sun Yuanliang’s report of 31 October 1937; Wikipedia, “Defense of Sihang Warehouse”
Read more: Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937
Shanghai and NanjingHow did the battle of Shanghai end, and what did it cost?
Japan broke the deadlock with a landing behind the Chinese line. On 5 November 1937 the Tenth Army came ashore almost unopposed at Jinshanwei on Hangzhou Bay, and on 8 November Chiang ordered a general retreat, which became a rout. Nantao, the last Chinese-held district, fell on 12 November, where a French Jesuit, Father Robert Jacquinot de Besange, had set up a refugee zone. The Japanese broke the fortified Wufu line and took Suzhou on 19 November. The cost was enormous. Chinese military losses are estimated at 187,000 to 300,000 killed and wounded, falling heavily on the German-trained divisions. Japan’s official history counts 40,672 killed and wounded by 8 November, 9,115 of them dead, though other Japanese records give more. Civilian deaths were never counted (Harmsen; Senshi sōsho, as tabulated by The Paper).
Sources: Harmsen, Shanghai 1937; Senshi sōsho, as tabulated by The Paper (Pengpai); Ristaino, The Jacquinot Safe Zone
Read more: Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937 · Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
Shanghai and NanjingHow did Nanjing fall?
Most of Chiang’s generals and his German adviser, Alexander von Falkenhausen, told him the capital could not be held, but Chiang believed it could not be given up without a fight. Tang Shengzhi volunteered to defend it. The government announced on 20 November that it would move to Chongqing, working first from Hankou, and Chiang flew out on 7 December. On 10 December, after Tang ignored a surrender summons, Gen. Matsui Iwane ordered a general assault. Purple Mountain, Guanghua Gate and the plateau of Yuhuatai fell after hard fighting, and on the afternoon of 12 December Tang ordered a breakout. It collapsed into a stampede to the Yangtze: soldiers and civilians were crushed at Yijiang Gate and drowned trying to cross. The city fell on 13 December. Japanese records give 1,558 killed and 4,619 wounded in the battle for the city (Harmsen, Nanjing 1937).
Sources: Harmsen, Nanjing 1937; Taylor, The Generalissimo; Wikipedia, “Battle of Nanking,” summarizing Japanese records
Read more: Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
Shanghai and NanjingWhat happened in the Nanjing Massacre?
For about six weeks after 13 December 1937, Japanese troops killed Chinese prisoners of war by the thousands, killed civilians in the streets and in their homes, raped women and girls on a vast scale and looted and burned much of the city. The Tokyo tribunal found that about 20,000 rapes occurred in the first month and that about one-third of the city was destroyed by fire (IMTFE judgment, ch. VIII). Men picked out as former soldiers were marched to the riverbank and shot; soldiers’ diaries describe mass executions near Mufushan on 16 and 17 December. A group of about fifteen Americans and Europeans, chaired by the German businessman John Rabe, ran a Safety Zone of about 3.86 square kilometers that sheltered 200,000 to 250,000 people. Their letters and diaries, and John Magee’s film, are among the main records of the massacre (Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape of Nanking).
Sources: IMTFE judgment, ch. VIII; Timothy Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape of Nanking; Rabe, The Good Man of Nanking; Wakabayashi, ed., The Nanking Atrocity
Read more: Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
Shanghai and NanjingHow many people were killed at Nanjing?
No exact count exists, and the figures differ mainly in how they define the area, the time period and the victims. The Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal of 1947 found more than 300,000, the figure the Chinese government uses. The Tokyo tribunal found more than 200,000 civilians and prisoners murdered in Nanjing and its vicinity in the first six weeks, relying largely on burial records of more than 155,000 bodies. Kasahara Tokushi gives more than 100,000 and close to 200,000 or more; Hata Ikuhiko, counting only prisoners and civilians unlawfully killed, about 38,000 to 42,000; John Rabe said in 1938 that the Europeans put it at 50,000 to 60,000. The Japanese government says that the killing of a large number of noncombatants cannot be denied but that the number is difficult to determine. All serious historians agree on the essential facts (Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography).
Sources: Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal (1947); IMTFE judgment (1948); Kasahara, Nankin jiken; Hata, Nankin jiken; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Read more: Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937 · Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Shanghai and NanjingWho was punished for Nanjing?
Few of those responsible. The Tokyo tribunal acquitted Gen. Matsui Iwane, who commanded the Central China Area Army, on 37 of 38 counts but convicted him on Count 55, failing to take adequate steps to secure observance of the laws of war at Nanjing. He was hanged at Sugamo Prison on 23 December 1948. The former foreign minister Hirota Koki was convicted in part over Nanjing. Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, who commanded the Shanghai Expeditionary Army during the capture of the city, was given immunity as a member of the imperial family and never tried. China’s own Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal sentenced Lt. Gen. Tani Hisao of the 6th Division, who was shot at Yuhuatai on 26 April 1947, and in 1948 executed the two lieutenants of the newspaper “killing contest,” Mukai Toshiaki and Noda Tsuyoshi, whose case rested largely on wartime press stories (IMTFE judgment).
Sources: IMTFE judgment (1948); Wikipedia biographies of Matsui, Asaka and Tani and “Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal”
Read more: Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
America, the Panay and the world
From the Quarantine Speech to Pearl Harbor
America, the Panay and the worldWere American troops in China in 1937?
Yes, under the same century of treaties that put Japanese troops near the bridge. Marines had guarded the American legation in Peking since 1905, with detachments at Tianjin and Qinhuangdao. The Army’s 15th Infantry Regiment had been at Tianjin since 1912; it barricaded the foreign concessions when the fighting reached the city in July 1937 and sailed home on 4 March 1938 after 26 years. The 4th Marines had been in Shanghai’s International Settlement since 1927, reinforced in August 1937 by the 2nd Marine Brigade. The Asiatic Fleet’s Yangtze Patrol kept gunboats on the river, among them Panay. On 20 August 1937 a shell fragment killed Seaman First Class Freddie Falgout aboard the cruiser Augusta at Shanghai. The Marines left in North China in December 1941 were captured on 8 December; of 204 Marines and sailors taken, 184 came home (USMC University, Always Faithful).
Sources: USMC University Press, Always Faithful, ch. 5; 15th Infantry Regiment Association; Naval History and Heritage Command
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World
America, the Panay and the worldWhat was the Quarantine Speech?
An address Franklin D. Roosevelt gave on 5 October 1937 in Chicago, dedicating the Outer Drive Bridge in the heart of the isolationist Midwest. Without naming any country, he spoke of an “epidemic of world lawlessness,” of civilians bombed from the air and nations invaded without a declaration of war, and compared the response he had in mind to a community’s quarantine of the sick (Miller Center transcript). He proposed no sanctions, no blockade and no change in the law, and at a press conference the next day he declined to say what a quarantine would mean. Isolationists attacked the speech as a step toward war; Dorothy Borg’s 1957 study found the press reaction far more mixed than legend held. In Tokyo the Nichi Nichi called the speech imprudent (Grew to Hull, FRUS 1937, vol. III). Its practical effect was small.
Sources: Miller Center, University of Virginia, transcript; Borg, Political Science Quarterly 72 (1957); FRUS 1937, vol. III
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World · Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937
America, the Panay and the worldWhat did the League of Nations and the Brussels Conference do?
Condemned Japan in words and did nothing to stop it. On 6 October 1937 the League Assembly adopted reports finding that Japan’s operations in China could not be justified under the treaties and recommending a meeting of the Nine-Power Treaty parties; the same day the State Department said Japan’s actions were contrary to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg–Briand Pact, the first time Washington formally named Japan a treaty breaker in this war (FRUS Japan 1931–1941, vol. I). The conference met at Brussels from 3 to 24 November. Japan refused to attend, and the American delegate, Norman H. Davis, had instructions that ruled out sanctions. On 15 November fifteen states declared that the conflict concerned all parties to the treaty, with Italy dissenting, and on 24 November the conference adjourned without measures. It never met again, and Shanghai had fallen by then.
Sources: FRUS Japan 1931–1941, vol. I; FRUS 1937, vol. IV; Nine Power Treaty Conference records; Mitter, Forgotten Ally
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World · Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937
America, the Panay and the worldWhat was the Panay incident?
On 12 December 1937, the day before Nanjing fell, Japanese naval aircraft bombed and strafed the American river gunboat USS Panay and three Standard-Vacuum Oil Company tankers she was escorting about 28 miles above Nanjing. Panay had taken off the last American embassy staff and several journalists, and large American flags were spread on her awnings. The attack began at about 1327 by the Navy’s history, and she sank at 1554. Storekeeper First Class Charles L. Ensminger and the Italian journalist Sandro Sandri were mortally wounded, and Coxswain Edgar W. G. Hulsebus died in Shanghai on 19 December; the master of one tanker, Capt. Carl H. Carlson, was also killed. The Navy counts 48 wounded. The same day Japanese Army artillery under Col. Hashimoto Kingoro shelled the British gunboat Ladybird at Wuhu (NHHC, DANFS; FRUS 1937, vol. IV).
Sources: Naval History and Heritage Command, DANFS, “Panay II”; Navy casualty lists (HyperWar); FRUS 1937, vol. IV
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World · Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
America, the Panay and the worldWas the attack on the Panay deliberate?
Japan said it was a mistake: its aviators, acting on an Army report of Chinese troops escaping upriver in merchant ships, had not identified the vessels. The American evidence makes that hard to accept. The attack lasted more than an hour in clear weather, the flags were large, the aircraft came in low and Japanese Army motor boats also fired at the scene. Newsreel cameramen Norman Alley and Eric Mayell filmed much of it, and the footage was shown in American theaters weeks later. Okumiya Masatake, who led a squadron of dive bombers in the attack, wrote in 1953 that 24 aircraft took part, that the pilots relied on the Army’s report and did not check closely, and that it was a terrible mistake (Okumiya, Proceedings, June 1953). Many historians conclude that some Japanese officers knew or should have known the ships were neutral; no document has proved an order from above.
Sources: Okumiya Masatake with Roger Pineau, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1953); NHHC, DANFS; Wikipedia, “USS Panay incident”
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World
America, the Panay and the worldWhy didn’t the United States go to war over the Panay?
Because the American public did not want war, and Japan apologized at once and paid. Foreign Minister Hirota Koki called on Ambassador Joseph Grew to apologize, a formal note accepting the American demands reached Washington on 24 December 1937, and on 22 April 1938 Japan paid an indemnity of $2,214,007.36 (NHHC, DANFS). The mood at home showed in Congress. Rep. Louis Ludlow’s proposed constitutional amendment, requiring a national referendum before a declaration of war except in case of invasion, had been bottled up in committee, but in the weeks around the sinking a discharge petition forced a vote. Roosevelt fought it, and on 10 January 1938 the House voted 209 to 188 against bringing it to the floor, a margin of 21 votes (Council on Foreign Relations). The Navy Cross went to 26 men for 12 December 1937, including two British officers.
Sources: NHHC, DANFS; Council on Foreign Relations, “TWE Remembers: The Ludlow Amendment”; Home of Heroes, Navy Cross roll
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World
America, the Panay and the worldHow did the war in China lead to Pearl Harbor?
Step by step, as Washington moved from words to money and trade. A “moral embargo” on aircraft sales to nations bombing civilians began on 1 July 1938. The Export-Import Bank lent China $25 million in December 1938. On 26 July 1939 Hull gave notice ending the 1911 commercial treaty, which lapsed in January 1940. Export controls on oil products and scrap followed in July 1940, and a scrap embargo on 26 September, as Japan entered northern Indochina and signed the Tripartite Pact. China became eligible for Lend-Lease in May 1941. When Japan moved into southern Indochina, Roosevelt froze Japanese assets on 26 July 1941, and American oil stopped. Japan would not leave China; the United States would not settle without it. Hull’s note of 26 November asked for withdrawal from China and Indochina, and on 7 December Japan struck (FRUS Japan 1931–1941, vol. II; Office of the Historian).
Sources: FRUS Japan 1931–1941, vol. II; Office of the Historian, “Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl Harbor, 1937–41”
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World
America, the Panay and the worldWere the Flying Tigers part of the U.S. military?
No. The American Volunteer Group was organized in 1941 by Claire Lee Chennault, a retired Army Air Corps captain who had been Chiang Kai-shek’s air adviser since 1937. With Roosevelt’s approval it recruited about 100 pilots, 60 from the Navy and Marine Corps and 40 from the Army Air Corps, and some 200 ground crew through a private contractor, the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company. The men resigned from the services to join, were employed by the company and served under Chinese authority. The group bought 100 Curtiss P-40 fighters, of which 99 were delivered, and trained at Toungoo in Burma. It first fought on 20 December 1941, twelve days after Pearl Harbor, intercepting Japanese bombers attacking Kunming, and was replaced by the U.S. Army Air Forces’ 23rd Fighter Group on 4 July 1942 (Ford, Flying Tigers).
Sources: Daniel Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and His American Volunteers; Wikipedia, “Flying Tigers”
Read more: Chapter 8: America and the World
The long war and its cost
From 1938 to the surrender, and what the numbers count
The long war and its costWhat happened after 1937?
China lost its cities but did not surrender. On 16 January 1938 Konoe announced that Japan would no longer deal with Chiang’s government. Chinese armies under Li Zongren won their first large victory at Taierzhuang between 22 March and 7 April 1938, though Xuzhou fell on 19 May. Japan took Wuhan in October 1938, and the government moved up the Yangtze to Chongqing, which Japanese aircraft raided 268 times by incomplete count between 1938 and 1944. From 1939 the war settled into stalemate: Japan held the cities and railways, China the interior. After Pearl Harbor China had allies and American aid, but Japan’s conquest of Burma cut the Burma Road. In 1944 Operation Ichigo, about 510,000 Japanese troops by Japanese records, overran much of central and southern China and the American air bases there (Mitter, Forgotten Ally; van de Ven, China at War).
Sources: Mitter, Forgotten Ally; van de Ven, China at War; Wikipedia, “Battle of Taierzhuang,” “Battle of Wuhan,” “Bombing of Chongqing,” “Operation Ichi-Go”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The long war and its costWhat was the Yellow River flood of 1938?
One of the most destructive decisions of the war. After Xuzhou fell, Japanese armies headed for Zhengzhou, where the Beiping–Hankou railway crossed the Longhai line, and beyond it Wuhan. To stop them, Chiang Kai-shek approved breaching the Yellow River dikes. After a failed attempt at Zhaokou, Nationalist troops broke the dike at Huayuankou, north of Zhengzhou, on 9 June 1938, digging by hand when explosives were not enough. The river poured southeast across the plain. A postwar survey by Han Qitong and Nan Zhongwan, published in 1948, counted 893,303 dead in Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu and 3,911,354 people displaced; other historians, including Micah Muscolino and Diana Lary, give more than half a million dead. The flood delayed the Japanese drive and bought time to evacuate Wuhan. The river was returned to its old course only in 1947 (disasterhistory.org; The China Project, 2023).
Sources: Han Qitong and Nan Zhongwan (1948), via disasterhistory.org; The China Project (14 June 2023); Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The long war and its costHow did the war end in China?
After Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender on 15 August 1945 and the instrument was signed aboard USS Missouri on 2 September, with Gen. Xu Yongchang signing for China, the Nationalist government ordered celebrations on 3 September, the origin of Victory Day. The surrender of the Japanese forces in China was signed in Nanjing, the city Japan had taken in 1937, at 0900 on 9 September 1945, in the auditorium of the Central Military Academy. Gen. Okamura Yasuji, commander in chief of the China Expeditionary Army, signed, and his chief of staff presented the document to Gen. He Yingqin. The hour was chosen with care: the ninth hour of the ninth day of the ninth month, since “nine” in Chinese sounds like “long-lasting.” More than a million Japanese troops in China surrendered. On 10 October the North China forces surrendered in the Forbidden City (Mitter; van de Ven).
Sources: Mitter, Forgotten Ally; van de Ven, China at War; Wikipedia, “Surrender ceremony of the Second Sino-Japanese War”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
The long war and its costHow many Chinese died in the war?
No exact figure exists. Western historians most often give 14 to 20 million Chinese dead from 1937 to 1945, most of them civilians, and Diana Lary gives 20 to 30 million. Rana Mitter describes a war that killed up to 20 million and created 80 to 100 million refugees (Mitter, Forgotten Ally). The People’s Republic’s official figure, repeated by Xi Jinping on 3 September 2015, is more than 35 million Chinese military and civilian casualties, a figure that counts the wounded as well as the dead and runs from 1931. For the armies, the Nationalist government’s official tally was 1,319,958 killed, 1,761,335 wounded and 130,116 missing; Western estimates of Nationalist dead run to two million or more, and Communist sources give about 160,000 killed in their own forces. Most Chinese deaths came not in battle but from flood, famine, disease and flight.
Sources: Mitter, Forgotten Ally; Diana Lary, The Chinese People at War; Wikipedia, “Second Sino-Japanese War” (infobox figures)
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The long war and its costHow many Japanese died in China?
Japan’s records are fuller than China’s, though not simple. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare counts 465,700 Japanese war dead in China proper, including about 23,500 lost at sea, and a further 245,400 in Manchuria and at Nomonhan, most of them from the Soviet invasion of August 1945 and the internment that followed rather than from the war that began at the bridge (MHLW, overseas war dead by region). Some reference works give a range of 455,700 to 700,000 Japanese military dead in the China war. Individual campaigns show how the figures were built: Japan’s official history counts 9,115 killed at Shanghai by 8 November 1937, and the 11th Army counted 7,092 killed and 19,112 wounded in the Wuhan campaign of 1938, with more than 100,000 cases of illness. The collaborationist Chinese armies lost somewhere between about 290,000 and 575,000 men.
Sources: Japan, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Senshi sōsho; Wikipedia, “Battle of Wuhan” and “Second Sino-Japanese War”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
The long war and its costWhy do the casualty figures differ so much?
Because the sources count different things. Some count deaths, others casualties, killed and wounded together; the People’s Republic’s 35 million is casualties from 1931, while Western totals of 14 to 20 million are deaths, mostly from 1937. Some count soldiers killed in action and leave out those who died of disease or hunger in the ranks. Some cover China south of the Great Wall, others Manchuria too. Then there is who did the counting: the Nationalist and Communist armies kept separate books, wartime surveys of floods and famines could count refugees and lost births among the dead, and each side’s reports of enemy dead were often inflated. Battle figures vary most of all: Japanese losses at Taierzhuang are given as anything from under 2,500 casualties (Jiang Keshi, from Japanese records) to about 20,000 killed and wounded (Harmsen). This collection gives the range and names the source (Chapter 9).
Sources: Mitter; Lary; Anthony Garnaut (2013); Jiang Keshi; Harmsen; Japan, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937
Memory and visiting
How three countries remember the war, and what a visitor finds
Memory and visitingHow is the incident remembered in China?
As the start of the national war of resistance. For three decades after 1949 the People’s Republic told the war mainly as a Communist story; from the 1980s, Mitter and others note, it became a national story of shared suffering that included the Nationalist armies (Mitter, China’s Good War). The national war museum opened inside Wanping on 7 July 1987, the 50th anniversary, and the anniversary is marked there each year. On 7 July 2014 Xi Jinping led other senior leaders to the bridge. That February the National People’s Congress Standing Committee made 3 September Victory Day and 13 December the national memorial day for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre, and in September 2014 the Ministry of Civil Affairs published a first list of 300 anti-Japanese martyrs, nearly a third of them Nationalist officers. Military parades marked 3 September in 2015 and 2025, and since 2017 textbooks have taught a fourteen-year war from 1931.
Sources: Mitter, China’s Good War; China Daily/Xinhua (28 February 2014); Phoenix News (1 September 2014); China Digital Times
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Memory and visitingHow is the war remembered in Taiwan?
In two strands that do not fit easily together. In 1937 Taiwan was a Japanese colony, as it had been since 1895, and Japan’s health ministry records that 207,183 Taiwanese served in the Japanese armed forces in the Second World War and 30,304 were killed or went missing. For many families, the war was one in which their fathers and grandfathers wore Japanese uniforms. The other strand came with the Nationalist government, which took over Taiwan in October 1945 and retreated there in 1949. For the Republic of China the war of resistance was its own war and victory; it made 3 September Victory Day in 1946, and the date is still Armed Forces Day in Taiwan. On 3 September 2026 President Lai Ching-te led the autumn ceremony at the National Revolutionary Martyrs’ Shrine in Taipei (Focus Taiwan). Retrocession Day, 25 October, was restored as a public holiday from 2026.
Sources: Focus Taiwan (3 September 2026); Wikipedia, “Taiwanese Imperial Japan Serviceman” and “Retrocession Day”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Memory and visitingHow is the war remembered in Japan?
As part of a long argument about how to teach and remember the years from 1931 to 1945. School textbooks must be approved by the Ministry of Education, and the historian Ienaga Saburo sued the government three times from 1965 over its screening of his account of the war; the last case ended in 1997. In 1982 reports that the ministry was pressing authors to call Japan’s “aggression” in China an “advance” drew protests from China and South Korea. Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is the other flashpoint: in 1978 it secretly enshrined fourteen men convicted or accused of Class A war crimes, and visits by prime ministers, among them Nakasone in 1985, Koizumi six times from 2001 to 2006 and Abe in 2013, drew protests from Beijing and Seoul. No emperor has visited since 1975 (Stanford SPICE; Wikipedia, “Yasukuni Shrine”).
Sources: Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education; Wikipedia, “Yasukuni Shrine”
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Memory and visitingHas Japan apologized for the war in China?
Japanese prime ministers have expressed remorse and apology several times. On 3 May 1995 Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visited the bridge and the Wanping museum, where he wrote in the visitors’ book a pledge to face history and keep peace between the two countries; the inscription is on display (Christian Science Monitor, 8 May 1995). On 15 August 1995 his government’s statement said Japan, following a mistaken national policy, had caused tremendous damage and suffering through colonial rule and aggression, and offered a “heartfelt apology” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Later governments reaffirmed it, though Abe Shinzo’s statement of 2015 referred to past apologies without repeating them in his own voice. In 2025 Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru used the word “remorse” in the 15 August address. Many Chinese see Yasukuni visits and textbook disputes as undercutting the apologies.
Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Murayama Statement (15 August 1995); Christian Science Monitor (8 May 1995); Associated Press (October 2025)
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today
Memory and visitingCan you visit the Marco Polo Bridge?
Yes, on foot. The bridge and Wanping are in Beijing’s Fengtai District, about 15 kilometers southwest of Tiananmen Square; Beijing Subway Line 16 stops at Wanpingcheng station, and buses stop at the sculpture park. The bridge has been closed to motor vehicles since 1985 and is a ticketed heritage site; Beijing’s tourism office lists admission at 20 yuan and hours of 0700–1900 from April through October and 0800–1700 from November through March. At the east end stand the Kangxi stele on its stone tortoise and Qianlong’s “Morning Moon over Lugou” stele. From the bridge you can see the railway bridge upstream, on the line of the old Beiping–Hankou railway fought over on 8 July. The site can close in floods, as it did in August 2023, so check before you go, and allow at least half a day for the bridge, the town and the museum (Visit Beijing).
Sources: Visit Beijing, Lugou Bridge listing; Wikipedia, “Wanping Fortress”; People’s Daily (14 August 2023)
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 2: The Bridge, the Town and the Garrisons · Atlas
Memory and visitingWhat is the museum inside Wanping?
The Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression, China’s national museum of the war, at No. 101 Wanping Chengnei Street. Planning began in 1984, construction in 1986, and the museum opened on 7 July 1987, the 50th anniversary of the incident; later phases were completed in 1997 and 2005, and a new permanent exhibition opened for the 70th anniversary of victory in 2015. Its front steps come in two flights, of eight and fourteen steps, for the eight-year and fourteen-year war. By its builder’s account it had received more than 37 million visitors by 2021 and holds more than 25,000 objects. Admission is free; it is open 0900–1630 and closed on Mondays except on holidays and major anniversaries. Bring a passport and check whether advance booking is required (Visit Beijing; Wikipedia, museum article).
Sources: Visit Beijing, museum listing; Wikipedia, museum article; China State Construction, via The Paper
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 3: The Night of 7 July 1937
Memory and visitingWhat else is there to see around the bridge?
Start at the walls of Wanping: on the south wall a plaque marks damage from Japanese shelling in July 1937, and a row of inscribed black stone drums along its foot tells the story of the war. Just south of the walls is the War of Resistance Sculpture Park, opened on 15 August 2000, with 38 bronze columns about 4.3 meters tall and a sculpted “Awakened Lion of Lugou” at its center. A short distance east of the town, on the road toward Dawayao, is the tomb of Gen. Zhao Dengyu, killed on 28 July 1937, rebuilt in 1980 and protected as a Beijing municipal relic (Xinhua, 2025). In central Beijing, Tong Linge Road and Zhao Dengyu Road in Xicheng District carry the generals’ names. The Japanese exercise ground and the Longwangmiao embankment lay north of Wanping, but the ground has changed beyond recognition (Visit Beijing; Art@Site).
Sources: Visit Beijing; Art@Site; Xinhua (23 June 2025); Beijing Daily (4 September 2025)
Read more: Chapter 9: The Bridge Today · Chapter 5: The Fall of Beiping and Tianjin
Memory and visitingWhere can I see other sites from the story?
The collection’s chapters each end with a guide to the ground. In Shenyang, the 9.18 Historical Museum near the Liutiaohu site tells the story of the Mukden Incident, and in Changchun Puyi’s palace survives as a museum. In Shanghai, the Sihang Warehouse Battle Memorial, opened on 13 August 2015, keeps the shell holes in its west wall, and the Bund hotels still face the corner where the bombs fell on 14 August 1937. In Nanjing, the Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre at Jiangdongmen opened on 15 August 1985 on the site of a mass grave, and the John Rabe House on the Nanjing University campus opened as a memorial in 2006. There is no marker on the Yangtze where Panay sank. The road ends at the USS Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor (Chapters 1, 6, 7 and 8).
Sources: Hiroshima Peace Media Center; Shanghai municipal heritage listings; Memorial Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre; John Rabe House
Read more: Chapter 1: From Mukden to the Bridge · Chapter 6: Shanghai 1937 · Chapter 7: Nanjing, December 1937 · Chapter 8: America and the World
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The ground the answers describe




The whole story, in nine chapters
Each chapter is a full account of one part of the story, with maps, charts, photographs, the people involved and its sources. Or start at the collection page with the atlas and the timeline.
All nine chapters, the atlas and the timeline are gathered on the collection page.
← Back to the Marco Polo Bridge collectionWhere these answers come from
- U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1936, vol. IV; 1937, vols. III and IV (including Ambassador Johnson’s telegrams and Embassy despatch no. 1377 on the incident); and Japan, 1931–1941, vols. I and II. Office of the Historian
- International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment (November 1948), chs. IV, V and VIII, via HyperWar; League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (the Lytton Report, 1932).
- Japanese War History Office, Senshi sōsho, vol. 86, Shina jihen rikugun sakusen (1), (1975); U.S. Army, Japanese Monograph No. 144; Hata Ikuhiko, Rokōkyō jiken no kenkyū (1996) and Nankin jiken.
- James B. Crowley, “A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,” Journal of Asian Studies 22, no. 3 (1963), and Japan’s Quest for Autonomy (1966).
- Iwatani Nobu, “From Marco Polo Bridge to Shanghai” (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016) and “Revisiting the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War” (2023); Tobe Ryoichi, on the expansion of the war and the Japanese army (NIDS, 2019).
- Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally (2013) and China’s Good War (2020); Hans van de Ven, China at War (2018); Mark Peattie, Edward Drea and Hans van de Ven, eds., The Battle for China (2011); Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo (2009); Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan (1991).
- Peter Harmsen, Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze (2013), Nanjing 1937: Battle for a Doomed City (2015) and Storm Clouds over the Pacific (2018).
- Timothy Brook, ed., Documents on the Rape of Nanking (1999); John Rabe, The Good Man of Nanking (1998); Joshua A. Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (2000); Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38 (2007).
- Naval History and Heritage Command, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, “Panay II”; Okumiya Masatake, “How the Panay Was Sunk,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (June 1953); Marine Corps University Press, Always Faithful; Dorothy Borg, Political Science Quarterly (1957).
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Quarantine Speech,” 5 October 1937 (Miller Center, University of Virginia); The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, vol. I (1946); Hansard, House of Commons, 28 July 1937.
- Diana Lary, The Chinese People at War (2010); Micah Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China (2015); Japan, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, overseas war dead by region; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Murayama Statement (1995).
- Beijing Tourism and Visit Beijing (the bridge, Wanping and the museum); People’s Daily overseas edition, 14 August 2023; Xinhua; China Daily; The Paper (Shanghai); Phoenix News; Focus Taiwan.
- The nine chapters of this collection, which cite the sources above in detail.
Answers summarize the sources in our own words, with only short quotations. Where sources disagree, we say so and give the range; times are local and approximate, and Chinese and Japanese accounts of the night of 7–8 July often differ by an hour or more. Opening hours, ticket prices and booking rules change; confirm them before you travel. Corrections are welcome. Photographs: Japanese army and Chinese press photographs of 1937 and a U.S. Navy photograph, public domain; the bridge and its lions by Fanghong and Vmenkov, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Charts are original graphics for this page.