The Airfields: Wheeler, Hickam, Kaneohe, Ewa, Bellows and Ford Island

The Japanese plan needed control of the air over Oahu in the first minutes of the attack. At Kaneohe, Ewa, Ford Island, Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows it got that control, and most of the American aircraft that might have fought back were destroyed where they were parked.

Why it mattered

The battleships were the main target, but the Japanese planners knew that the torpedo and level bombers could only do their work if American fighters could not reach them. They also wanted to make sure that no American bomber or patrol plane would be left to follow the strike back to the carriers. Because of that, the attack on Oahu was as much an air battle against the airfields as an attack on ships. The Army’s official history counts 199 of the attacking planes, nearly 60 percent of the force, assigned to the airfields (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, ch. VII). Nearly every military airfield on the island was hit within a few minutes of the first bombs on Battleship Row.

It worked. By midmorning the Navy had only a handful of usable patrol planes on Oahu, the Marines at Ewa had no tactical aircraft left that could fly, and the Hawaiian Air Force had lost much of its strength on the ground. The Army’s air history records that 64 of the 231 aircraft assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force were destroyed and that no more than 79 of the rest were reported usable (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 200). The Navy’s own count, sent to the Roberts Commission at the end of December, showed 52 naval aircraft on Oahu usable after the raid out of 301 present that morning (CINCPAC, “Information regarding airplanes,” 27 December 1941). The searches flown that afternoon did not find the Kido Butai, and Nagumo’s carriers withdrew without being attacked.

The airfields also hold some of the day’s best-known stories. Chief Aviation Ordnanceman John W. Finn earned his Medal of Honor at Kaneohe. Lieutenants George Welch and Kenneth Taylor drove to a grass strip at Haleiwa and took off to fight. The B-17s flying in from California arrived unarmed in the middle of the attack. And that night nervous gunners around the harbor shot down American fighters trying to land.

Guarding against sabotage: the fields on the morning of 7 December

After the war warning of 27 November, Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short chose the lowest of his three alerts. In the Army history’s words, his action “had been to order an Alert No. 1,” the alert against sabotage, under a new standing operating procedure (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 179). For the airfields this meant that “the Hawaiian Air Force was ordered to concentrate planes so that they could be guarded more easily” (p. 180). The Air Forces history adds that, under this alert, aircraft were grouped for protection against sabotage rather than dispersed for a quick takeoff, and were on about four hours’ notice to get into the air (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 198). At Wheeler the new P-40s stood in squadron lines, wingtip to wingtip, on the ramp; guards watched them through the night, and .50-caliber ammunition was kept in Hangar 3 (Arakaki & Kuborn, 7 December 1941: The Air Force Story, pp. 113, 115, 118).

The Navy’s patrol planes were organized differently but were not much readier. Admiral Bellinger reported that most of his squadrons were on “Condition Baker 5,” with half their assigned aircraft on four hours’ notice; three squadrons were on four hours’ notice for every plane. At the moment the first bomb fell, he counted 14 patrol planes in the air, 58 on the surface ready within four hours and 9 under repair (Bellinger, Patrol Wing 2 action report, 20 December 1941). At Kaneohe, Patrol Squadrons 11, 12 and 14 had their PBY-5 Catalinas on the ramp and moored in the bay; VP-14 had three planes out on the morning security patrol (Nimitz, CINCPAC report, 15 February 1942).

At Ewa, Marine Aircraft Group 21 was short of aircraft. Its fighter squadron, VMF-211, had gone to Wake with Enterprise and was to receive twelve F4F-3 Wildcats there, leaving a remnant at Ewa, and the scout-bomber squadron VMSB-231 was at sea in Lexington, bound for Midway (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day; CINCPAC report, 15 February 1942). That left VMSB-232’s Dauntlesses, a few spare Vindicators, the fighters VMF-211 had left behind and the group’s utility planes. Of the 47 aircraft parked at the field that morning, 33 were fully operational (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

Kaneohe: the first blows

Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, on the windward side of Oahu, was a new station built for the patrol planes. In the Navy’s account presented to the Joint Committee by Admiral Inglis, the Japanese struck it “at approximately the same time” as the dive bombers appeared over Ford Island at 0755, when “other low-flying planes” attacked the station across the island (Joint Committee Report, 1946, pp. 58–59). Later accounts generally put the first strafing at Kaneohe several minutes before the first bombs at Pearl Harbor; the Marine Corps base that now occupies the site says only that it came “minutes” before (Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”). Either way, Kaneohe was one of the first places on Oahu to be hit.

The first attack lasted 10 to 15 minutes, and then the attackers drew off to the north at low altitude. About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron, which observers likened to one of the Navy’s own light bomber types, came over and began bombing and strafing. It withdrew 10 to 15 minutes later, and salvage began (Joint Committee Report, pp. 58–59). A complete hangar, with aircraft stored inside, was destroyed (p. 64). The second attack was probably made by second-wave B5N level bombers, which the Japanese plan assigned to Kaneohe along with Ford Island and Hickam. If so, it came closer to 0900 than the Joint Committee’s interval suggests, since the second wave did not reach Oahu until about 0855; the timing of the second attack is uncertain.

The losses were close to total. “Only 9 out of the 36 planes at Kaneohe escaped destruction,” the Joint Committee recorded; six of those nine were damaged, and three were the patrol planes already in the air south of Oahu (Joint Committee Report, p. 59). Twenty-seven PBYs were destroyed on the ramp, in the hangar or at their moorings. Eighteen sailors and a civilian contractor were killed at the station (Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”).

The sailors fought back with rifles and machine guns. One of them was John William Finn, a chief aviation ordnanceman in charge of a patrol squadron’s ordnance men. He had been at home when the firing started and drove to the hangars. He manned a .50-caliber machine gun on an open part of the parking ramp and fired at the strafing aircraft. His citation says he was “painfully wounded many times”; later accounts count twenty-one wounds. He had first aid only after he was ordered away from the gun, and then went back to supervise rearming the surviving planes.

Medal of Honor

Chief Aviation Ordnanceman John W. Finn, Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay

During the first attack on Kaneohe, the citation records, Finn manned a machine gun on a “completely exposed section of the parking ramp” under heavy strafing and kept firing although “painfully wounded many times.” It was “only by specific orders” that he left his post. After first aid he “returned to the squadron area” to supervise the rearming of the returning planes. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz presented the medal aboard USS Enterprise at Pearl Harbor on 14 September 1942.

Citation →

Kaneohe also saw one of the few Japanese aircraft brought down over Oahu whose pilot is known by name. Lt. Fusata Iida, leading a group of fighters in the second wave, signaled to his wingman that his fuel tanks had been holed by machine-gun fire and that he could not return to his carrier. He then turned back toward the station. Ground fire tore his Zero apart; it overshot the main hangar and crashed. The Navy buried him at the station. A small marker on Reed Road at what is now Marine Corps Base Hawaii shows where he came down, and Japanese religious groups hold a ceremony there each 7 December (Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”). Whether he meant to dive into the hangar or simply crashed is not something the record can settle.

Ewa: the Marines’ field

Ewa Mooring Mast Field, west of Pearl Harbor near Barbers Point, had been built for Navy airships and was now the Marines’ only airfield on Oahu. The Navy’s account to the Joint Committee said that “apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2 minutes.” It came from two squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seat fighters, flying in from the northwest at about 1,000 feet and strafing. “Within less than 15 minutes,” it continued, “all the Marine tactical aircraft had been shot up or set on fire” (Joint Committee Report, p. 59).

The Marine Corps’ commemorative history, by Robert J. Cressman and J. Michael Wenger, follows the attack in detail from Japanese and American records. Capt. Leonard W. Ashwell, officer of the day, saw two formations at 0755. The fighters that hit the field first came from Akagi and Kaga, followed by divisions from Soryu and Hiryu. Lt. Col. Claude A. Larkin, the group commander, was strafed while driving to the field in his car, reached Ewa at 0805 and was wounded in the finger and lower leg. He refused treatment until later. Dive bombers from Shokaku came over at about 0835, and roughly fifteen more dive bombers attacked about 0930 (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

The Marines fought back with rifles and pistols, then with .30-caliber machine guns taken from wrecked aircraft and the ordnance rooms. M.T.Sgt. Emil S. Peters and Pvt. William G. Turner manned the rear gun of a wrecked Dauntless and are credited with hitting at least two attackers. Turner was mortally wounded. The ambulance was hit more than fifty times. Larkin credited the volume of ground fire with making the last raid “light and ineffectual” (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

In their words

They caught us flat-footed.

The Joint Committee put the cost at “33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa” destroyed (p. 59). Cressman and Wenger count 47 aircraft on the field. They note that the Japanese pilots claimed 60, more than were there, and that Larkin’s report at 1025 said the attackers had destroyed “all bombing, fighting, and transport planes” on the ground. Larkin reported two Marines killed and several wounded. The commemorative history names three Marines who died at or because of the fighting at Ewa that day, so the field’s casualty count is not fully settled.

Ford Island: the patrol planes

Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor occupied most of Ford Island, in the middle of the harbor, with Battleship Row along its southeastern shore. At 0755, as the preparatory signal for morning colors was hoisted, “Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island,” and within seconds torpedo planes and dive bombers were coming in from several directions. Navy patrol flying boats, floatplanes and carrier-type scout bombers were lined up on the field. Inglis estimated that nine aircraft attacked the air station, and then “as suddenly as they had appeared, the Japanese planes vanished” (Joint Committee Report, p. 58).

Bellinger’s staff logged the first bomb at 0757, near the hangar of Patrol Squadron 22, and at 0758 ordered a broadcast: “AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR” (Bellinger, Patrol Wing 2 report). That message and its “this is not drill” are covered in Chapter 4. A second attack hit the patrol plane area while crews were trying to get aircraft ready. It knocked out the station’s radio, telephone and teleprinter circuits. Squadron men fired back with machine guns taken out of the aircraft, some mounted on benches, and Bellinger credited them with about four Japanese planes. After the first attack, he reported, only three patrol planes at Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor were still in commission (Bellinger, Patrol Wing 2 report).

One hangar on Ford Island was badly damaged by fire (Joint Committee Report, p. 64). In all, “33 of the Navy’s best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all types were destroyed or damaged” at the station (p. 58). Ford Island was not as badly hit as Kaneohe or Ewa, because the Japanese planes over the harbor were mostly attacking the ships. Even so, for the rest of the day the station’s runway was a wreck-strewn field beside a burning harbor, where many survivors from the battleships came ashore.

Hickam: bombers on the line

Hickam Field, next to the harbor entrance, was the Hawaiian Air Force’s bomber base and the site of the Hawaiian Air Depot. Its consolidated barracks was the largest in the Army Air Forces, housing 3,200 men (15th Wing, “Hickam Field”). On the morning of 7 December, its B-17s, B-18s and A-20s were parked in close formation in front of the hangars.

The Joint Committee’s account of the Army fields gives three attacks. At about 0755, nine dive bombers hit the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings, with three more coming in from the northwest. At about 0825, six to nine planes struck the No. 1 Aqua System, the technical buildings and the consolidated barracks. At 0900, six to nine more machine-gunned the technical buildings behind the hangar line (Joint Committee Report, p. 62). The heavier blow in the second wave came from level bombers. The Air Force history counts 27 B5Ns over Hickam in the second wave, with 9 more striking Ford Island (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 67).

Hangar 11 was wrecked, killing nearly all of the 11th Bombardment Group’s armament and maintenance technicians. Twenty-two men of a B-18 training crew group sheltering in a hangar were killed. The first bomb on the consolidated barracks hit the mess hall and killed 35 men at breakfast; the Air Force history calls the barracks the most heavily bombed building on Oahu. A direct hit leveled the base chapel. The engineering building of the Hawaiian Air Depot was gutted (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 83, 91–92). Many men ran into the hangars for cover after the first attack, and the casualties there were heavy (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, ch. VII).

The fire station was wrecked. One engine got onto the ramp with its driver dead at the wheel, and the other never left the station. Hickam’s fire chief, William L. Benedict, was blown about 60 feet and strafed; he was reported dead and was found alive with 23 wounds. Honolulu sent fire companies to help. Three Honolulu firemen were killed at Hickam: Capt. Thomas S. Macy, Capt. John Carreira and Hoseman Harry Tuck Lee Pang (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 105–107). In the 40-bed station hospital, about seven medical officers, seven nurses and forty enlisted men treated the wounded as they came in (p. 98).

The Army history judges the damage as both serious and limited. The depot was “completely destroyed,” three of five hangars burned and “more than half the bombers present destroyed or damaged seriously.” The repair shops, machinery and gasoline tanks, however, were largely untouched (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, pp. 188–189). The underground fuel tanks survived because they had been moved more than a year earlier, and the bombs aimed at them fell on a ball field (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 83). The base history counts 189 men killed at Hickam that day and 303 wounded (15th Wing, “Hickam Field”). By 1127, four A-20As of the 58th Bombardment Squadron were airborne looking for the enemy (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 108).

The B-17s from California

While Hickam was being bombed, a formation of B-17s arrived over Oahu after an overnight flight of about 2,400 miles from Hamilton Field, California. They were bound for the Philippines. The Air Forces history says fourteen B-17s of the 38th and 88th Reconnaissance Squadrons left Hamilton Field on the evening of 6 December, two turned back, and twelve reached Hawaii (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199). The Pacific Air Forces history says sixteen were planned and four did not make the trip, leaving four B-17Cs and eight B-17Es flying about ten minutes apart (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 73). These were the aircraft that Lt. Kermit Tyler, at the Fort Shafter information center, expected when the Opana radar reported a large flight to the north at 0702 (see Chapter 3).

To carry enough fuel, the bombers flew without ammunition, and their armor had been moved forward to balance the load. Their crews could only try to get away from the attackers (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199). Maj. Truman H. Landon, leading the 38th Squadron’s flight, had questioned Gen. Henry H. Arnold about the lack of ammunition before departure (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 73). Capt. Richard H. Carmichael called the Hickam tower at 0745, but the reply was garbled.

The bombers came down wherever they could. Capt. Raymond T. Swenson landed at Hickam, and a Zero’s fire hit the flare box in his B-17C, which burned and broke in two. The flight surgeon aboard, 1st Lt. William R. Schick, was wounded and died after reaching Tripler hospital (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 73, 100). 1st Lt. Robert H. Richards abandoned his approach to Hickam and landed downwind at Bellows. His B-17C ran into a ditch with 73 bullet holes and was later used for parts (pp. 73, 130–131). Carmichael and 1st Lt. Harold N. Chaffin set down on the short strip at Haleiwa. 1st Lt. Frank P. Bostrom made a forced landing on the Kahuku golf course; his bomber was repaired there and flown back to Hickam within a week (p. 75). The rest landed at Hickam between attacks. Eyewitnesses also reported one B-17E landing at Wheeler, though the record is uncertain (p. 75).

The Army’s official histories give the result as one B-17 destroyed and three badly damaged (Craven & Cate, vol. I, pp. 199–200; Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 189). The Pacific Air Forces history counts two destroyed, Swenson’s and Richards’s (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 75). The difference is one of definition. Richards’s bomber was not burned, but it never flew again.

Wheeler: the fighters that never left the ground

Wheeler Field, on the plateau in the center of Oahu beside Schofield Barracks, was the Hawaiian Air Force’s main fighter base. Its P-40s and older P-36s were Oahu’s air defense. The field had no antiaircraft guns, trenches or shelters, only five machine guns and rifle-armed perimeter guards (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 111).

The Joint Committee timed the attack at 0802, when “25 planes dive-bombed the hangar lines,” with machine-gun fire as well (Joint Committee Report, p. 62). The Army and Air Forces histories say about twenty-five dive bombers struck shortly after the attack on Hickam began (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 189; Craven & Cate, vol. I, ch. 6). These were Vals of Carrier Division 5, followed by strafing Zeros. Hangar 1 took a direct hit and Hangars 1 and 3 burned. A bomb destroyed the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks, and the tent area between Hangars 2 and 3 was raked with fire. All of the 72d Pursuit Squadron’s new P-40s were set on fire where they stood (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 111–115). At 0900 seven more planes machine-gunned Army fighters that crews were trying to taxi out (Joint Committee Report, p. 62).

The Army history’s summary is short: Wheeler “lost two hangars, and more than two-thirds of its planes were destroyed or badly damaged.” One bomb exploded in a barracks and caused heavy casualties, and the first attack “effectively prevented any large-scale response by Wheeler’s fighter planes” (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 189). The Army’s Hawaii garrison put Wheeler’s toll at 37 enlisted men killed and 59 wounded (U.S. Army, “70th anniversary: Wheeler attacked,” 2011). Witnesses on the ground saw at least two Japanese aircraft crash near the base (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 125).

Some fighters did get off. The Air Forces history says four P-40s and two P-36s took off from Wheeler about thirty-five minutes after the first attack, and that Army pursuit planes flew about 25 sorties between 0830 and 0930 (Craven & Cate, vol. I, pp. 198–199). Lt. Lewis M. Sanders’s flight left Wheeler at about 0850 (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 76).

Timeline

The airfields, 7 December 1941 (Hawaii time)

1. 7 Dec, 0618Enterprise, about 200 miles west of Oahu, launches 18 SBDs to scout ahead and land at Ford Island.
2. 7 Dec, 0745Capt. Carmichael’s B-17 calls Hickam tower; the reply is garbled.
3. 7 Dec, about 0750Fighters strafe Kaneohe and Ewa, at or a few minutes before the first bombs at Pearl Harbor.
4. 7 Dec, 0755Dive bombers over Ford Island and Hickam.
5. 7 Dec, 0757–0758First bomb near the VP-22 hangar; “AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR” ordered broadcast.
6. 7 Dec, 0802About 25 dive bombers hit Wheeler’s hangar line.
7. 7 Dec, 0805Lt. Col. Larkin reaches Ewa under strafing.
8. 7 Dec, 0815–0830Welch and Taylor take off from Haleiwa.
9. 7 Dec, 0825Second attack on Hickam: barracks and technical buildings.
10. 7 Dec, 0830A single fighter strafes Bellows.
11. 7 Dec, about 0835Second attack on Ewa, by dive bombers.
12. 7 Dec, 0900Nine fighters strafe Bellows; third attack on Hickam; Wheeler strafed again.
13. 7 Dec, about 0930Last dive-bomber attack on Ewa.
14. 7 Dec, 0945Last attacks on Army installations end.
15. 7 Dec, 1025Larkin reports Ewa’s aircraft destroyed.
16. 7 Dec, 1127Four A-20As take off from Hickam to search.
17. 7 Dec, 1642Enterprise launches a 31-plane strike; it finds nothing.
18. 7 Dec, nightSix Enterprise fighters try to land at Ford Island; four are lost to American fire.

Bellows and Haleiwa: the outlying strips

Two pursuit squadrons were away from Wheeler that weekend for gunnery practice: the 44th at Bellows Field near Waimanalo and the 47th at Haleiwa on the north shore. Their aircraft were armed and needed only fuel and warm-up (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 190). Because the squadrons were dispersed for practice, not for defense, these were the fighters with the best chance of getting into the air.

At Bellows, a single Japanese fighter strafed the tent area at about 0830 and wounded Pfc. James A. Brown in the leg. At about 0900, nine fighters came in from the north and strafed for about fifteen minutes (Joint Committee Report, p. 62; Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 128–129). The 44th Pursuit Squadron had twelve P-40s on the field and was trying to get some of them up. 2d Lt. Hans C. Christiansen was shot as he climbed into his cockpit. 2d Lt. George A. Whiteman got airborne in a P-40 that did not even have its gun cowlings on and was shot down just after takeoff; Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri was later named for him. 1st Lt. Samuel W. Bishop took off behind him, was shot down about half a mile offshore and swam to the beach with a leg wound (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 129–130). The Army history calls the damage at Bellows “slight” (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 190).

Haleiwa barely figures in the attack record. The Joint Committee says flatly that “Haleiwa Field was not attacked” (p. 62); the Army history says a single plane strafed it and did even less damage than at Bellows (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 190). The Japanese apparently did not know about the small strip, or did not think it worth attacking. That made it the one place on Oahu where American fighters could take off without being strafed.

Fighting back in the air

2d Lts. George S. Welch and Kenneth M. Taylor of the 47th Pursuit Squadron were at Wheeler after a long Saturday night when the bombs began to fall. Welch telephoned Haleiwa to have two P-40s fueled and warmed up, and the two drove the roughly ten miles to the north shore by car (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199; Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 76). The Army history puts their takeoff “at or soon after 8:15 a.m.”; the Air Force history says about 0830 and notes that exact takeoff times are hard to establish (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, ch. VII, n. 53; Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 76).

Ground control sent them toward Ewa, where they found a line of Japanese aircraft and each claimed two. Low on fuel and ammunition, they landed at Wheeler to rearm. Welch took off first. Taylor waited for what he thought was the last of the attackers to pass, was attacked just after takeoff and was wounded. Welch shot down the plane attacking him, his third claim of the day, then went back toward Ewa and claimed a fourth (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 76–78). The Air Forces history credits Welch with four enemy planes (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199). Other pilots of the 47th also took off from Haleiwa: Lts. Harry M. Brown, Robert J. Rogers, John J. Webster and John L. Dains. Dains was shot down on a later sortie, apparently by American antiaircraft fire (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199).

Distinguished Service Cross

2d Lt. Kenneth M. Taylor, 47th Pursuit Squadron, 18th Pursuit Group

Taylor’s citation records that, “surprised at Wheeler Field,” he drove to Haleiwa Landing Field and took off on his own initiative. With one other fighter he attacked a formation near Barbers Point and “shot down two enemy planes.” When a second wave came in, he took off again although advised not to, and escaped a superior force by climbing into the clouds. War Department General Orders No. 2, 5 January 1942.

Citation →

Distinguished Service Cross

2d Lt. George S. Welch, 47th Pursuit Squadron, 18th Pursuit Group

Welch received the Army’s second-highest award for valor for the same fight: two Japanese aircraft near Ewa on his first sortie from Haleiwa, the plane attacking Taylor over Wheeler, and a fourth on his return to Ewa. The Air Forces history credits him with four (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199). Gen. Henry H. Arnold is reported to have recommended both lieutenants for the Medal of Honor; both received the Distinguished Service Cross instead. Taylor’s award was announced in War Department General Orders No. 2 of 5 January 1942.

Air Force account →

Over the windward side, four P-36s of the 46th Pursuit Squadron took on nine Japanese aircraft near Bellows and Kaneohe. They claimed two, and lost 2d Lt. Gordon H. Sterling Jr., who was shot down and killed (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 199; Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 79). 2d Lt. Philip M. Rasmussen, flying a P-36 in the same fight, was credited with one. Another P-36, from a later flight out of Haleiwa, was shot down by machine-gun fire from Schofield Barracks, a reminder of how quickly the gunners on the ground started firing at everything overhead (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 191).

The Pacific Air Forces history totals the Army pilots’ claims at 10 destroyed, 4 probables and 2 damaged, or 11 destroyed if a victory claimed by Dains before he was lost is added. Against that, it counts four Army fighters lost in air combat, flown by Whiteman, Sterling, Bishop and Dains (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 79). The Army as a whole claimed 11 Japanese aircraft and the Navy 28. Those claims added up to more than the 29 aircraft the Japanese actually lost to every cause (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 191). Some of the aircraft claimed by fighter pilots were also claimed by gunners on the ground. Whatever the true count, the Army fighters were too few and got up too late to protect anything on Oahu that morning.

Enterprise’s aircraft: the morning and the night

Scouts into the middle of a raid

USS Enterprise was returning from Wake, where she had delivered VMF-211’s fighters, and was about 200 miles west of Oahu that morning (CINCPAC report, 15 February 1942). At 0618 she launched eighteen SBD Dauntlesses of her air group in nine two-plane sections to search 150 miles ahead of the ship and then land at Ford Island (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day). They arrived over Oahu during the attack and were fired on by Japanese fighters and by American gunners.

The Navy’s first count, sent to the Roberts Commission and repeated in the Navy Department’s public statement of December 1942, was that “four were shot down” and that thirteen of the remaining fourteen flew again later that day to search for the enemy (CINCPAC, “Information regarding airplanes,” 27 December 1941; Navy Department statement, 5 December 1942). The Joint Committee’s figure of 92 naval planes lost includes five scout planes from Enterprise (Joint Committee Report, p. 64). Some later reconstructions count more, because they include aircraft that crash-landed or were too badly damaged to fly again.

Some of the dead are known by name. Ens. John H. L. Vogt and Radioman 3d Class Sidney Pierce appear to have collided with a Japanese dive bomber near Ewa, probably during the last raid on the field around 0930. Both bailed out too low for their parachutes to open fully. Seven Enterprise SBDs reached Ewa at about 1000. Lt. Wilmer E. Gallaher, Ens. William P. West and Ens. Cleo J. Dobson went on to Ford Island. Lt. (jg) Hart D. Hilton, with Ensigns Carlton T. Fogg, Edwin J. Kroeger and Frederick T. Weber, landed at Ewa. There the Marines refueled and rearmed three of them, and Fogg’s, with a holed fuel tank, stayed behind (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

Friendly fire after dark

That afternoon reports placed the Japanese carriers in several directions, and none was correct. At 1642 Enterprise launched a 31-plane strike, including six F4F Wildcats of Fighting Squadron 6, against a reported enemy force. They found nothing. The bombers were recovered aboard, and the six fighters were ordered to land at Ford Island (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

By then Oahu was blacked out, its gunners had been bombed and strafed all morning, and false reports of enemy planes and landings had been coming in all afternoon. As the Wildcats came in low over the harbor with their running lights on, machine guns in Pennsylvania opened fire, and the rest of the harbor joined in. A journal kept by the Marines’ 3d Defense Battalion recorded that six planes with running lights “tried Ford Island landing and were machine gunned.” Three went down almost at once, and a fourth crashed soon after. Two landed at Ford Island (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day). Three of the six pilots died, among them Ens. Herbert H. Menges, for whom a destroyer escort was later named (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 140).

The same thing had happened on a smaller scale during the day, to the scouts from Enterprise and to an Army fighter over Schofield Barracks. After the surprise of the morning, gunners treated any aircraft overhead as an enemy.

People

John W. Finn (1909–2010) was a chief aviation ordnanceman at Kaneohe and the only man to earn the Medal of Honor at Pearl Harbor for fighting away from the harbor itself. He was commissioned in 1942, retired as a lieutenant in 1956 and died in 2010 at the age of 100. He was the last surviving Medal of Honor recipient of the attack. The destroyer John Finn (DDG-113) carries his name. His medal is covered with the other fourteen in Chapter 7.

George S. Welch (1918–1954), from Wilmington, Delaware, was credited with four Japanese aircraft on 7 December and went on to fly combat in the Pacific. He left the service as a major in 1944 to become a test pilot for North American Aviation. He was killed on 12 October 1954 when an F-100A Super Sabre broke up during a test dive and crashed near Rosamond Dry Lake in California.

Kenneth M. Taylor (1919–2006), born in Enid, Oklahoma, was wounded in the arm and leg on 7 December and was credited with two kills. He retired from active duty as a colonel in 1967 and from the Alaska Air National Guard as a brigadier general in 1971. He was a technical adviser on the 1970 film Tora! Tora! Tora! and publicly criticized the 2001 film Pearl Harbor, which drew loosely on his story.

Claude A. Larkin, the lieutenant colonel commanding Marine Aircraft Group 21, was wounded driving to Ewa and kept command of the field. His frank report that the Japanese had “caught us flat-footed” is one of the plainest assessments any commander made that day (Cressman & Wenger, Infamous Day).

Annie G. Fox, an Army nurse at the Hickam station hospital, worked through the bombing as the wounded came in. She received the Purple Heart, then awarded for meritorious service as well as wounds, and is believed to have been the first woman to receive it after the award was revived in 1932 (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 99).

Fusata Iida, a Japanese naval lieutenant aged 28, died at Kaneohe after his fuel tanks were holed. His comrades reported his signal that he could not return to his carrier. The marker on the base where he crashed is one of the few memorials on Oahu to an individual Japanese airman (Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”).

George A. Whiteman and Hans C. Christiansen of the 44th Pursuit Squadron died at Bellows, Christiansen as he climbed into his cockpit and Whiteman just after takeoff. Whiteman was among the first American airmen killed in the war, and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, formerly Sedalia Army Air Field, bears his name (Arakaki & Kuborn, pp. 129–130).

Losses and uncertainty

The best-known figure, 188 American aircraft destroyed, comes from the Joint Committee. Its foreword speaks of “the loss of or severe damage to” 188 planes of all types (Joint Committee Report, p. xi). Its section on damage gives 92 naval planes lost and 31 damaged, a figure that includes five Enterprise scout planes, and 96 Army planes lost (pp. 64–65); 92 plus 96 makes 188. The Naval History and Heritage Command repeats 188 destroyed (NHHC, “Pearl Harbor Attack”). The often-quoted figure of 159 damaged does not come from the official histories. It appears in later secondary work, which counts 188 destroyed and 159 damaged among some 402 American military aircraft in Hawaii (Mark Parillo, in Higham and Harris, eds., Why Air Forces Fail, 2006, p. 288). We have not been able to trace it to a primary tally.

Army figures vary most, because the sources count different things. The Joint Committee’s 96 Army planes lost “includ[es] aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes which were subsequently stripped for parts” (p. 65). The Army’s ground-forces history counts some 249 Army planes involved, “about 74” destroyed and 71 seriously damaged (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, p. 191). The Air Forces history counts 64 destroyed out of 231 aircraft assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force, a number that leaves out aircraft not formally assigned, such as the B-17s in transit (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 200). The Seventh Air Force’s own operational history, as tabulated by Arakaki and Kuborn, lists 234 aircraft on hand, 146 in commission before the attack, 76 destroyed and 83 in commission afterward (Arakaki & Kuborn, App. B, p. 151). The Navy Department’s December 1942 statement gave 97 Army planes lost at Hickam and Wheeler alone, 23 bombers, 66 fighters and 8 others, out of 273 Army planes on Oahu.

Navy figures vary too. The Navy Department’s statement gave 80 naval aircraft destroyed and said that of 202 naval aircraft in flying condition, 150 were “permanently or temporarily disabled” (Navy Department statement, 5 December 1942). The Air Forces history, using a different base, puts 87 destroyed out of about 169 naval aircraft in the Oahu area (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 197). The Joint Committee’s later figure of 92 lost probably reflects aircraft written off after the first counts, along with the Enterprise losses. Before using any loss figure, check what it counts: aircraft destroyed outright, aircraft written off later, or aircraft disabled for the moment.

By the numbers

Army aircraft destroyed: five official counts

Army aircraft destroyed or lost on Oahu, 7 December 1941, as each source counts them

Navy Dept. statement, 1942 (Hickam & Wheeler)97

Joint Committee, 1946 (incl. stripped for parts)96

Seventh Air Force history (Arakaki & Kuborn)76

Army Green Book (of 249 involved)74

AAF in WWII (of 231 assigned)64

Casualty figures for the fields vary the same way. The Naval History and Heritage Command gives Army losses for the whole attack as 218 killed and 364 wounded (NHHC, “Pearl Harbor Attack”). The Air Forces history counts Army Air Forces casualties, most of them at Hickam, as 163 killed, 43 missing and 336 wounded (Craven & Cate, vol. I, p. 200). The base history of Hickam alone gives 189 killed and 303 wounded, and the Army’s figures for Wheeler are 37 killed and 59 wounded. Those field figures together are higher than the Air Forces total, probably because they include men later found dead among the missing, men who died of wounds, and civilians such as the Honolulu firemen. Kaneohe lost eighteen sailors and a civilian; Ewa’s dead are given as two in Larkin’s report and three in the Marine Corps’ history.

Times are uncertain too. Kaneohe and Ewa both claim to have been hit first. The Joint Committee’s witness put Ewa about two minutes ahead of Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe at about the same moment, while other accounts put Kaneohe several minutes earlier. Clocks were not synchronized, and the first strafing runs at each field lasted only seconds. The fairest statement is that the fighters reached Kaneohe and Ewa at about the same time the dive bombers reached Ford Island and Hickam, within a few minutes of 0755.

Questions readers ask

Why were the planes parked wingtip to wingtip?

Because General Short expected sabotage by local sympathizers of Japan, not an air attack. Under the Alert No. 1 he ordered after the war warning of 27 November, the Hawaiian Air Force was told to concentrate its aircraft so they could be guarded more easily (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, pp. 179–180). The same arrangement made them easy targets for strafing. Whether Short was right to fear sabotage more than air attack was one of the main questions in the investigations covered in Chapter 9.

Which field was attacked first?

Probably Kaneohe or Ewa, a few minutes before the first bombs fell at Pearl Harbor at about 0755. The Joint Committee’s testimony puts Ewa about two minutes ahead of the harbor and Kaneohe at about the same time; the Marine Corps base at Kaneohe says only that the station was hit “minutes” before Pearl Harbor. The sources are not precise enough to settle it.

Were the arriving B-17s the planes on the Opana radar?

No. The Opana operators were tracking the Japanese first wave, but Lt. Kermit Tyler assumed the contact was the B-17 flight from California, which was due that morning. The Joint Committee recorded that the radar contact may have been taken for “some B-17’s from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive” (Joint Committee Report, p. 66). The B-17s arrived in the middle of the attack. Chapter 3 tells the radar story.

Did any American fighters get into the air?

Yes, but few. The Air Forces history counts about 25 Army pursuit sorties between 0830 and 0930, from Haleiwa, Wheeler and Bellows (Craven & Cate, vol. I, pp. 198–199). The Army pilots claimed 10 or 11 Japanese aircraft and lost four fighters in the air. No Navy or Marine fighters took off from Oahu during the attack; the CINCPAC count shows none of the fighters on the island usable after the raid.

What is the flag in the famous Hickam photograph?

The flag flying over Hickam during the attack survived, torn by fragments. The 15th Wing says the tattered flag is preserved in the lobby of Hale Makai, the former consolidated barracks, now Pacific Air Forces headquarters (15th Wing, “Hickam Field”). The Pacific Air Forces history adds that the Hickam flag was later flown at major wartime events and was returned to Hickam in 1980 (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 88). Whether every account refers to the same physical flag is not fully clear from the published record.

How it connects

The airfield attacks ran alongside the torpedo and level-bombing attacks on Battleship Row described in Chapter 4, Battleship Row. The dive bombers of Carrier Division 5 and the fighters of all six carriers, whose organization is described in Chapter 2, The Kido Butai, spent the first wave on Ford Island, Hickam, Wheeler, Kaneohe and Ewa. The B-17s, the Opana radar and Lt. Tyler connect this chapter to Chapter 3, The Warnings That Did Not Land. The second wave’s attacks on ships, Nevada‘s run and the decision not to send a third strike follow in Chapter 6, The Second Wave. Finn’s medal is covered with the other fourteen in Chapter 7. Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, whose midget submarine grounded off Bellows and who came ashore there on 8 December to become the first Japanese prisoner of war, appears in Chapter 8. For the whole story, return to the Pearl Harbor collection and its numbers page.

What happened afterward

The surviving aircraft spent the afternoon and the next days searching for the Japanese. Army aircraft flew 48 search sorties without finding the carriers (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 137). Patrol Wing 2 sent its few remaining PBYs, some carrying four 1,000-pound bombs, and Enterprise‘s SBDs and Navy utility planes joined the search (Bellinger, Patrol Wing 2 report). By 10 December the Army had 44 fighters ready for action (Conn, Engelman & Fairchild, ch. VII, n. 55). The fear of a follow-up attack or invasion, with the jumpy gunfire it produced, lasted for weeks.

Five Army men received the Distinguished Service Cross and 65 the Silver Star for 7 December (Arakaki & Kuborn, p. 133). Finn received his Medal of Honor from Nimitz aboard Enterprise in September 1942. The investigations into the attack, from the Roberts Commission to the Joint Committee, examined why the Army and Navy aircraft had not been dispersed and why no long-range search had been flown to the north. Short and Martin were relieved of their commands, along with Admiral Kimmel. That story is told in Chapter 9.

Walking the ground today

Most of the 1941 airfields are still active military installations, and access is limited. Ford Island is the easiest to visit. From the Pearl Harbor Visitor Center at Pearl Harbor National Memorial, a free shuttle runs to Ford Island, where the Pearl Harbor Aviation Museum occupies Hangars 37 and 79, which the museum describes as “bullet-riddled,” along with the restored Ford Island control tower, whose observation deck stands about 168 feet above the harbor (Pearl Harbor Aviation Museum, “Plan your visit”). The battleship Missouri and the Utah and Oklahoma memorials are on the same island.

Hickam is now part of Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam. The former consolidated barracks, Hale Makai, is Pacific Air Forces headquarters, and its walls still show strafing damage, which has been deliberately preserved (15th Wing, “Hickam Field”). Wheeler is Wheeler Army Airfield, and Kaneohe is Marine Corps Base Hawaii, where the Iida marker stands on Reed Road (Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”). Bellows survives as Bellows Air Force Station near Waimanalo. These bases generally require military or Defense Department identification or an escort, so check current access rules before going. The places most visitors see are the memorial and Ford Island. From the harbor you can look south toward Hickam, whose hangar line borders the channel entrance.

Sources and further reading

• Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (U.S. Army in World War II, 1964), ch. VII, “The Attack on Pearl Harbor,” pp. 179–193: HyperWar text.
• Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. I, Plans and Early Operations (1948), ch. 6, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” pp. 194–201: HyperWar text.
• Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn, 7 December 1941: The Air Force Story (Pacific Air Forces Office of History, 1991), chs. IV–VII and App. B: HyperWar text.
• Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Report (1946), Part II, “The Japanese Attack and Its Aftermath,” pp. 58–66: text at ibiblio; foreword: U.S. Senate PDF.
• Robert J. Cressman and J. Michael Wenger, Infamous Day: Marines at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Marines in World War II Commemorative Series, 1992): NPS History edition; Project Gutenberg edition.
• Navy action reports: RAdm. P. N. L. Bellinger, Patrol Wing 2 report, 20 December 1941; Adm. C. W. Nimitz, CINCPAC report, 15 February 1942, and “Information regarding airplanes,” 27 December 1941.
• Navy Department, statement on the attack at Pearl Harbor, 5 December 1942; Naval History and Heritage Command, “Pearl Harbor Attack” (casualty and aircraft totals).
• Congressional Medal of Honor Society, citation for John W. Finn; Military Times Hall of Valor, Distinguished Service Cross citation for Kenneth M. Taylor; U.S. Air Force, “Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii”.
• Base histories: 15th Wing, “Hickam Field” fact sheet; Marine Corps Base Hawaii, “Fusata Iida”; U.S. Army, “70th anniversary: Wheeler attacked”.
• Visiting: Pearl Harbor National Memorial (National Park Service); Pearl Harbor Aviation Museum, Ford Island.

Photographs: Official U.S. Navy photographs and National Archives images, and captured Japanese Navy photographs, all public domain.