Upset couple sitting apart and arguing at home in Huntersville North Carolina representing infidelity and marital conflict

What is Criminal Conversation in North Carolina?

A man and a woman sitting in a living room looking upset and distant from each other The woman has arms crossed and an unhappy expression while the man sits on a couch looking concerned — By Christopher Adkins

Introduction

North Carolina remains one of the few jurisdictions in the United States that continues to recognize the tort of criminal conversation (“CC”), a strict-liability civil action for adultery. Despite widespread statutory abolition elsewhere, CC persists in North Carolina courts alongside alienation of affections (“AOA”), together comprising the state’s so-called “heart-balm” torts. These claims have produced multi-million dollar verdicts, attracted national media attention, and provoked constitutional challenges. Yet they remain firmly embedded in North Carolina’s jurisprudence.

This guide synthesizes two centuries of case law, statutory developments, and scholarly commentary to provide a comprehensive reference for practitioners, researchers, and policymakers.

Definition and Elements

At its core, criminal conversation is “adultery made actionable.” It protects the marital right to exclusive sexual intercourse. To prevail, a plaintiff must prove only two elements:

A valid marriage between the plaintiff and their spouse at the time of the conduct; and
Sexual intercourse between the defendant and the plaintiff’s spouse during coverture.

Unlike alienation of affections, CC does not require proof of love and affection, wrongful intent, or malice. Liability follows automatically from proof of sex with a married person.

Historical Development

McClure’s Executors v. Miller (1825): Distinguished seduction actions from CC, holding that a father’s seduction claim abated upon his death.
Barbee v. Armstead (1849): Affirmed a husband’s right to sue for enticement, voiding contracts permitting a wife to be harbored by another.
Johnston v. Allen (1888): Authorized punitive damages where a defendant harbored and debauched another’s wife.
Powell v. Strickland (1913): Established that circumstantial evidence may prove adultery and held that a wife’s consent is no defense.
Cottle v. Johnson (1920): Declared CC a strict-liability tort; punitive damages require aggravating circumstances.
Sebastian v. Kluttz (1969): Restated the elements and damages framework, cementing CC’s role in NC law.
Cannon v. Miller (1984): The Court of Appeals attempted to abolish CC/AOA as outdated, but the Supreme Court quickly reinstated them, preserving their vitality.

Proof Standards

Because direct evidence of sexual intercourse is rare, criminal conversation is usually proven through circumstantial evidence under the “opportunity and inclination” doctrine. If evidence shows:

A disposition or inclination toward adultery, and
An opportunity to consummate that inclination,

then a jury may infer intercourse.

Opportunity and Inclination Doctrine

Because direct evidence of sexual intercourse is rare, criminal conversation is usually proven through circumstantial evidence under the “opportunity and inclination” doctrine. Courts recognize that adultery often leaves no eyewitnesses or direct admissions. Under this doctrine, a jury may infer intercourse if the evidence shows both:

Inclination – a romantic or adulterous disposition, affection, or sexual attraction between the spouse and the defendant; and
Opportunity – a chance to act on that disposition in circumstances reasonably suggesting privacy for sexual relations.

The doctrine requires more than suspicion: there must be facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude adultery occurred. Mere friendship, calls, or ambiguous statements are not enough; there must be evidence of intimacy coupled with opportunity.

Illustrative Cases

Gray v. Hoover (1989): Testimony of admissions, observed intimacy, and cohabitation was deemed sufficient for the jury.
In re Estate of Trogdon (1991): Court confirmed adultery could be inferred from cohabitation plus invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
Coachman v. Gould (1996): Frequent phone calls and ambiguous statements were insufficient; conjecture does not support liability.
Chappell v. Redding (1984): AOA claim survived, but CC failed due to lack of proof of intercourse.
Warner v. Torrence (1968): Motel incident provided enough circumstantial proof to submit CC to the jury.

Example

✅ Example: A married woman has sexual intercourse with a coworker in Charlotte while still legally married and not separated. Her husband may sue the coworker under criminal conversation.
❌ Not CC: Flirtatious texts, hand-holding, or mere suspicion without proof of sex.
❌ Not CC: Affairs wholly outside NC (Bassiri v. Pilling, 2023) unless intercourse occurred in NC.

Statutory Developments

In 2009, the General Assembly enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-13, barring liability for:

Acts occurring after the spouses physically separate with intent to remain apart, and
Acts occurring more than three years before filing suit (statute of limitations).

The statute curtailed CC’s reach, though courts have held that post-separation evidence may corroborate pre-separation conduct (Rodriguez v. Lemus, 2018).

Damages

Compensatory

Recoverable damages include:

Loss of consortium
Humiliation, shame, and mental anguish
Injury to health
Economic losses (e.g., termination of employment: Oddo v. Presser, 2003)

Punitive

Punitive damages may be awarded if the defendant’s conduct is willful, wanton, or malicious. Notable cases:

Horner v. Byrnett (1999): $1 compensatory + $85,000 punitive upheld.
Hutelmyer v. Cox (1999): $500,000 compensatory + $500,000 punitive for secretary’s long public affair with supervisor.
Shackelford v. Lundquist (2014, unpub.): $9 million default judgment.

The North Carolina punitive damages statute (Chapter 1D) caps punitive awards at three times compensatory or $250,000, whichever is greater.

Defenses

Criminal conversation is described as a near strict-liability tort, leaving few viable defenses.

Not defenses: Spouse’s consent, mutual seduction, plaintiff’s own adultery, or an unhappy marriage (Bryant v. Carrier, 1938; Scott v. Kiker, 1982).
Possible defenses:
- Statute of limitations (§ 52-13, three years from last act)
- Statute of repose (ten years from last act, per Misenheimer v. Burris, 2006)
- Consent/connivance of the plaintiff (rare)
- Lack of jurisdiction (acts occurring wholly outside NC: Bassiri v. Pilling, 2023)

Jurisdictional Issues

North Carolina adheres to the lex loci delicti rule: the law of the place where the tort occurred governs. Thus, if intercourse occurs outside NC in a state that has abolished CC, no claim arises (Jones v. Skelley, 2009). However, NC courts maintain jurisdiction where some wrongful acts occurred in NC (Cooper v. Shealy, 2000).

Constitutional Critiques

Cannon v. Miller (1984): COA labeled CC/AOA “obsolete” and abolished them, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court.
Malecek v. Williams (2017): COA rejected a facial constitutional challenge but warned that CC burdens speech and intimate association rights and may be unconstitutional as applied.
Hull v. Brown (2021): Interlocutory appeal of constitutional challenge dismissed; torts remain intact.
Estes v. Battiston (2020): Constitutional challenges not within jurisdiction of three-judge panels.

Why These Cases Matter

Together, the cases show how North Carolina courts balance protection of marriage against proof requirements:

Strong evidence wins: Gray v. Hoover; In re Estate of Trogdon.
Suspicion fails: Coachman v. Gould; Chappell v. Redding.
Jurisdiction limits apply: Jones v. Skelley; Bassiri v. Pilling.
Punitive damages can dominate: Horner v. Byrnett; Hutelmyer v. Cox.

Takeaways

Evidence is king: Direct admissions, eyewitnesses, or compelling circumstantial proof are critical.
Jurisdiction matters: Acts must occur in NC.
Damages can be severe: Nominal compensatory damages may still yield massive punitive awards.
Statutory limits: Post-separation acts and three-year filing limit control modern cases.
Use strategically: CC claims often serve as leverage in divorce litigation.

Conclusion

Criminal conversation remains a powerful, if controversial, remedy in North Carolina. Rooted in centuries-old common law, shaped by statutory reforms, and narrowed by evidentiary and jurisdictional limits, the tort endures as both a practical litigation tool and a subject of scholarly debate. Practitioners must navigate strict proof requirements, limited defenses, and substantial damages exposure.

Adkins Law, PLLC — Huntersville, NC: Law firm and attorneys in Huntersville, NC.

At Adkins Law, PLLC, we help clients navigate complex family law disputes, including claims of alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Based in Huntersville, North Carolina, we provide compassionate counsel, strategic litigation, and practical solutions. If you are facing the painful realities of marital interference or need to understand your rights and options, contact us today to schedule a confidential consultation.

Criminal Conversation — Case File

(i) Master Case Digest Table is strictly chronological by year. (ii) All case briefs are ordered by year to mirror the digest.

1) Master Case Digest Table (Chronological)

Case	Year	Rule / Short Holding	Practical Value
McClure’s Executors v. Miller	1825	Seduction action by father abates on father’s death.	Early abatement; distinguishes seduction from CC.
Barbee v. Armstead	1849	Husband may sue for enticement; contracts to harbor spouse void.	Affirms action; voids agreements encouraging separation.
Johnston v. Allen	1888	Harboring/debauching wife actionable; punitive damages proper.	Early authorization of vindictive damages.
State v. Wiseman	1902	Husband competent to testify re wife’s prior adultery when wife nol‑prossed.	Clarifies statutory spousal competency.
Spaugh v. Hartman	1909	Reputation/cohabitation admissible to prove quasi‑marriage (slave context).	Foundations for marriage/legitimacy proof often cited in CC contexts.
Grant v. Mitchell	1911	Wife incompetent as witness; cannot summarize letters’ “effect.”	Strict evidentiary limits in CC.
Powell v. Strickland	1913	Husband competent; circumstantial evidence sufficient; wife’s consent no defense; punitive permitted.	Key evidentiary and damages rules in CC/AOA.
McCall v. Galloway	1913	Wife’s declarations incompetent; later acts may corroborate.	Reaffirms spousal incompetency; limits hearsay.
Hooper v. Hooper	1914	Spouses incompetent to prove other’s adultery.	Reinforces spousal incompetency in adultery/CC.
Cottle v. Johnson	1920	CC is strict liability; consent no defense; punitive requires aggravation.	Foundational CC elements/damages.
Ham v. Norfolk & Western R. Co.	1922	Punitive damages require malice/fraud/wantonness.	Used to frame punitive instructions in CC/AOA.
State v. Jeffreys	1926	Rumor/neighborhood “report” inadmissible to prove marriage/CC.	Bars hearsay reputation in bigamy/CC.
Townsend v. Holderby	1929	Wife must prove relatives acted wrongfully/maliciously; husband’s delusions explained estrangement.	Good‑faith shield for relatives; nonsuit if no proof.
Rouse v. Creech	1932	Wife incompetent in CC; mere persuasion ≠ rape.	Confirms spousal bar; need physical coercion for ravishment.
Hankins v. Hankins	1932	AOA: happy marriage + alienation + wrongful acts required.	Parent/relative interference standards.
Chestnut v. Sutton	1933	Wife may testify to refute character attacks in adultery context.	Narrow competency carve‑out.
Bryant v. Carrier	1938	Consent no defense; insanity bars punitive but not compensatory.	Damages and defenses clarified.
Johnston v. Johnston	1938	Parents liable only if malicious; good faith presumed.	Narrows parental liability.
Hardison v. Gregory	1955	CC provable circumstantially; survival left open.	Suspicious circumstances enough for jury.
Bishop v. Glazener	1957	Parent acts privileged absent malice; different standard from strangers.	Parental interference guardrail.
Litchfield v. Cox	1966	AOA elements satisfied by evidence of affection, alienation, wrongful acts.	Sufficiency standards; damages guidance.
Warner v. Torrence	1968	AOA failed (no genuine affection); CC proven circumstantially.	Shows CC’s lower evidentiary threshold.
Sebastian v. Kluttz	1969	CC = adultery; AOA requires affection + malicious acts; damages framework.	Core statement of elements and damages.
Golding v. Taylor	1973	AOA/CC fit “injury to person/property” for long‑arm jurisdiction.	Long‑arm basis for nonresident defendants.
Scott v. Kiker	1982	Husband competent; consent no defense; infidelity mitigates damages only.	Trial proof & damages instructions.
Cannon v. Miller	1984	COA tried to abolish AOA/CC; vacated by Supreme Court.	Policy critique; torts persist.
Chappell v. Redding	1984	AOA sufficient; CC insufficient; punitive requires aggravation.	Clarifies punitive thresholds.
Blount v. Blount	1984	Separation agreement bars equitable distribution.	Family‑law crossover.
Darnell v. Rupplin	1988	AOA is transitory; lex loci governs; jury decides place of injury.	Choice‑of‑law venue principles.
Gray v. Hoover	1989	“Scintilla” standard; admissions/cohabitation can prove CC.	Reinforces circumstantial sufficiency.
Johnson v. Ruark OB‑GYN	1990	NIED doesn’t require physical impact; severe distress defined.	Damages theory supporting CC/AOA cases.
Shaw v. Stringer	1991	Don’t need “perfect marriage”; aggravating conduct supports punitive.	Punitive upheld (continued visits/laughter).
In re Estate of Trogdon	1991	Adultery by inclination + opportunity; 5th Amendment inference permitted.	Evidentiary template for adultery proof.
McLean v. Mechanic	1994	Nominal damages implied in CC; punitive may stand without compensatory award entry.	Punitive sustained; DNA proof admissible.
Brown v. Hurley	1996	CC actionable during separation; sanctions denied.	Liability continues until divorce.
Coachman v. Gould	1996	No CC/AOA where intercourse proof conjectural; calls alone insufficient.	Summary judgment standards.
Hutelmyer v. Cox	1999	Public flaunting + long affair = large comp + punitive upheld.	Modern benchmark for evidence and damages.
Horner v. Byrnett	1999	Punitive may rest on nominal compensatory.	Confirms punitive structure.
Ward v. Beaton	2000	Luring not required; willing participation suffices; punitive supported.	Proof and punitive framework.
Cooper v. Shealy	2000	NC personal jurisdiction proper when wrongful contacts directed into NC.	Forum selection guidance.
Anderson v. Anderson	2001	Separation agreement bars equitable distribution claim.	Procedural crossover.
Johnson v. Pearce	2001	CC can be solely post‑separation (pre‑divorce).	Clarifies CC scope until divorce.
Pharr v. Beck	2001	AOA limited to pre‑separation; post‑sep only corroborative.	Narrow rule (later overruled).
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan	2001	No insurance duty to defend/indemnify AOA/CC.	Coverage barrier.
Harris v. Stamey	2002	CC actionable for post‑separation intercourse.	Confirms CC viability until divorce.
Nunn v. Allen	2002	Post‑sep CC actionable; separation agreements no defense.	Third‑party liability unaffected by spouse’s agreement.
Teague v. Teague (unpub.)	2002	Appeal dismissed for gross appellate rule violations.	Appellate compliance cautionary tale.
Oddo v. Presser	2003	Lost income admissible; tuition benefits too speculative.	High awards; remand on compensatory.
McCutchen v. McCutchen (COA)	2005	AOA accrual pegged to pre‑sep (narrow view).	Later reversed by Supreme Court.
Fox v. Gibson	2006	NC jurisdiction proper with calls/emails + NC intercourse.	Personal jurisdiction template.
McCutchen v. McCutchen (Supreme Court)	2006	Accrual when alienation is complete; separation not per se bar; overrules Pharr.	Major expansion for AOA timing.
Stann v. Levine	2006	Appeal dismissed on appellate rule violations; jurisdiction issues flagged.	Procedural/jurisdiction caution.
Misenheimer v. Burris (Supreme Court)	2006	Discovery rule applies to CC accrual.	SOL extension for late discovery.
Misenheimer v. Burris (COA)	2007	Affirms verdict; clergy‑communicant privilege limits at trial.	Trial evidence/privilege guidance.
Boileau v. Seagrave (unpub.)	2008	Nominal compensatory + large punitive permitted; remote evidence excluded.	Damages and Rule 403 discretion.
Jones v. Skelley	2009	Lex loci: CC governed by where intercourse occurred; AOA by where acts occurred.	Conflict‑of‑laws clarity.
Heller v. Somdahl	2010	AOA elements restated; causation must be controlling/effective.	Pattern for sufficiency on AOA.
Carsanaro v. Colvin	2011	Negligent STD transmission claim recognized; duty to warn extends to spouse.	Adds negligence claim alongside CC.
Shackelford v. Lundquist (unpub.)	2014	$9M default (AOA/CC) upheld; constitutional challenge waived.	Default risk; no constitutional relief.
Malecek v. Williams	2017	Facial constitutional challenge to AOA/CC rejected.	Torts constitutional in most applications.
Rodriguez v. Lemus	2018	Liability only for pre‑separation acts under §52‑13; post‑sep conduct corroborative.	Applies statutory limits enacted 2009.
Estes v. Battiston	2020	Constitutional challenges to these torts aren’t for three‑judge panel; common law nature confirmed.	Procedure for constitutional claims.
Hull v. Brown	2021	Denial of transfer to three‑judge panel/interlocutory appeal dismissed.	Torts intact; challenges preserved for later.
Clark v. Barrett	2021	AOA proven; IIED may coexist; $1.2M verdict affirmed.	Recent high‑value verdict affirmed.
Bassiri v. Pilling	2023	NC courts have subject‑matter jurisdiction; choice of law governs.	Jurisdiction vs. choice‑of‑law clarity.
Beavers v. McMican	2024	Supreme Court: must prove pre‑sep conduct; post‑sep only corroborative; conjecture insufficient.	High bar for sufficiency under §52‑13.

2) Case Briefs (Chronological)

1825 — McClure’s Executors v. Miller

Facts

Arthur McClure brought an action against Miller for the seduction of his daughter.
Before trial, McClure died. His executors were substituted as plaintiffs and attempted to continue the action.
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the action abated upon the father’s death. Trial court agreed. Executors appealed.

Key Issues

Does an action by a father for seduction of his daughter survive his death and continue in the name of his executors?
Is such an action one for injury to property (which could survive) or a purely personal tort (which abates)?

Holding

The action abates with the father’s death.
Though styled as an action for “loss of service” (a legal fiction), the true nature of the claim is for injury to the daughter and the parent’s wounded feelings, not damage to property.
Statutory provisions (Acts of 1799 and 1805) that allowed certain torts involving property to survive did not apply here.

Outcome

Judgment dismissing the action affirmed.

Significance

Highlights the “quaint fiction” of treating seduction as loss of service, paralleling how criminal conversation actions treat adultery as injury to the husband’s “marital rights.”

Early North Carolina precedent on the abatement of seduction and related heart-balm actions.

Drew a distinction between actions sounding in property (which could survive) and those based on personal injury or dignity (which died with the claimant).

Not directly a criminal conversation case, but important historically: it shows how early NC courts treated seduction and family-based torts as personal, vindictive claims, setting the stage for later alienation and criminal conversation actions.

1849 — Barbee v. Armstead

Facts

Plaintiff, John Q. Barbee, sued defendant Armstead and his household for enticing away and detaining his wife.
Plaintiff’s wife left him in 1841 at the urging of her mother (living with Armstead), who claimed Barbee was lazy and did not provide for his family.
The wife and child lived with defendants from 1841 onward.
In 1842, plaintiff and Armstead entered into a written agreement: Armstead would keep the wife and child, raise and educate the child, and allow plaintiff limited visitation. Plaintiff later demanded the return of his wife and child, but Armstead refused, saying the wife would not return because Barbee had “advertised her.”
Jury found for defendants, upholding the contract. Plaintiff appealed.

Key Issues

Is a contract allowing another man to harbor a wife against her husband’s will valid?
Can a husband maintain an action against one who entices and detains his wife, even if he previously assented to such an arrangement?

Holding

Such a contract is against public policy and void.
Even if initially assented to, the husband may revoke consent (here, by demanding return of his wife).
Upon refusal, the harborer is a wrongdoer, liable for the continued detention.
An action on the case will lie for enticement and detention of a wife.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.

Significance

A foundational building block for later criminal conversation / alienation of affection cases, cited into the 20th century as authority for the actionable nature of spousal interference.

One of the earliest North Carolina precedents on alienation of affections / enticement.

Established that a husband’s right to his wife’s society cannot be bargained away in contracts contrary to public policy.

Confirmed that enticement and detention of a wife are actionable torts.

Introduced the principle that even if a husband temporarily consents to another harboring his wife, he may revoke that license, and refusal makes the harborer liable.

1888 — Johnston v. Allen

Facts

Plaintiff husband sued defendant Allen for enticing, harboring, and debauching his wife.
Evidence showed defendant supported plaintiff’s wife while she lived in a house belonging to him, supplied her with a sewing machine, and advised her in a divorce action against plaintiff.
Jury found that defendant had wrongfully enticed and harbored the wife.

Key Issues

Was evidence about defendant’s conduct toward plaintiff’s wife (e.g., providing her with a sewing machine, supporting her in divorce) admissible to show an illicit relationship?
Could the jury award vindictive (punitive) damages for harboring and debauching plaintiff’s wife?
When, if ever, may a stranger lawfully harbor another man’s wife against his will?

Holding

Yes, evidence of defendant’s support and close relationship with plaintiff’s wife was admissible to show illicit relations.
Jury could properly consider awarding punitive damages given defendant’s wanton and wrongful conduct.
A stranger may lawfully harbor another’s wife only if the husband’s conduct is so violent as to endanger her safety. Otherwise, harboring her is actionable.

Outcome

Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

Significance

This case, along with later cases like Cottle v. Johnson (1920) and Powell v. Strickland (1913), laid the groundwork for the modern criminal conversation framework in NC.

Early North Carolina criminal conversation/alienation case confirming that:

Punitive damages are available where conduct is wanton and wrongful.

Supporting and harboring another’s wife can constitute actionable misconduct.

A limited defense exists if the husband’s violence endangers the wife’s safety.

Reinforced the idea that criminal conversation and alienation of affection were not just compensatory but also vindicatory torts, aimed at punishing socially disruptive conduct.

1902 — State v. Wiseman

Facts

Defendants Elam Wiseman and Hester Blalock were indicted for fornication and adultery.
A nolle prosequi was entered as to Blalock (the female defendant).
The State sought to call her husband (whom she married after the alleged acts) as a witness to prove the adultery occurred before the marriage.
Defense objected, arguing spousal incompetency.
Trial court admitted the husband’s testimony, which implicated Wiseman. Wiseman was convicted and appealed.

Key Issues

Under North Carolina statutes (The Code §§ 588–590, 1353–1354), was the husband a competent witness to testify about adultery involving his wife before their marriage?
Did public policy bar his testimony despite statutory reforms allowing broader witness competency?

Holding

Yes, he was competent. The statutory reforms removed common-law disqualification of interested witnesses, including spouses, subject to specific exceptions.
The prohibition applied only when a spouse testified “for or against” the other in certain actions (e.g., divorce for adultery, criminal conversation, bigamy).
Here, the wife was not a party, as the case against her had been dropped. The husband’s testimony concerned acts before marriage and thus was not barred.

Outcome

Conviction affirmed; the Court found no error in admitting the testimony.

Significance

Important for evidentiary history: demonstrated how NC moved away from strict common-law spousal disqualification, while still maintaining bars in divorce and criminal conversation proceedings.

Clarified that the statutory competency rules permitted spousal testimony in adultery cases where:

The spouse is not a party to the action, and

The testimony does not directly aid or harm the other spouse.

Reinforced that North Carolina’s legislature—not judicial notions of “public policy”—governed witness competency.

Provided an early precedent for later cases like Powell v. Strickland (1913), which likewise allowed a husband to testify about his wife’s conduct in a criminal conversation case against a third party.

1909 — Spaugh v. Hartman

Facts

The case involved a land inheritance dispute.
Plaintiffs claimed as heirs of Wesley Delap, a formerly enslaved man who received property by devise and died intestate in 1906.
Plaintiffs argued they were legitimate descendants of Wesley and his “slave wife,” Martha Spaugh, through their son Calvin (born around 1853).
Under the Act of 1879 (Revisal § 1556), children of formerly enslaved parents who had lived together as husband and wife before 1 January 1868 could be legitimated and inherit.
Trial court excluded evidence plaintiffs offered to show Wesley and Martha lived together as husband and wife (general reputation and testimony from community members). Jury found plaintiffs were not heirs. Plaintiffs appealed.

Key Issues

What proof is required to show a quasi-marriage relationship between enslaved parents under the Act of 1879, for purposes of legitimating children?
Was evidence of reputation, cohabitation, declarations, and conduct admissible to establish such a relationship?

Holding

To come under the Act of 1879, two essential facts must be shown:
1. Exclusive cohabitation as husband and wife at the time of the child’s birth, not casual intercourse.
2. Paternity of the alleged parent.
Reputation, cohabitation, and declarations are competent evidence to prove such quasi-marriage relations, just as they are to prove lawful marriages in other contexts.
Trial court erred in excluding that testimony.

Outcome

New trial ordered.

Significance

While not a criminal conversation case, it has been cited in criminal conversation contexts because it discusses the evidentiary rule that reputation and cohabitation may prove marriage — except in prosecutions for bigamy or civil CC actions, where stricter proof is required.

Important case on inheritance rights of children of enslaved persons under North Carolina law.

Clarified that slave marriages, though not legally recognized, could be proven through evidence of reputation and cohabitation to legitimate children under the 1879 Act.

Distinguished between casual sexual relations and the more stable cohabitation required to confer inheritance rights.

1911 — Grant v. Mitchell

Facts

Plaintiff (husband) sued defendant for criminal conversation with his wife.
Plaintiff introduced testimony from a witness who had read 10–15 letters allegedly written by defendant to plaintiff’s wife. The witness summarized them as “love letters … couched in very passionate terms.”
Defendant sought to call plaintiff’s wife as a witness to rebut plaintiff’s case. The trial court excluded her testimony under Revisal § 1636 (spousal incompetency in adultery/CC cases).
Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, awarding damages. Defendant appealed.

Key Issues

Was plaintiff’s wife competent to testify on behalf of the defendant to rebut plaintiff’s evidence?
Was it proper to admit secondary evidence of the letters’ content in the form of a witness’s impression (“love letters”), rather than their substance?

Holding

Spousal competency: Under Revisal § 1636, the wife was incompetent as a witness in actions “on account of criminal conversation,” even to rebut plaintiff’s case.
Secondary evidence: While secondary evidence of lost writings is sometimes allowed, it must state the substance, not the effect, of the letters. It was reversible error to allow the witness to characterize them generally as “love letters couched in passionate terms” rather than testifying to their substantive contents.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial because of the improper admission of the witness’s characterization of the letters.

Significance

Part of the line of early 20th century cases (Grant v. Mitchell, McCall v. Galloway, Hooper v. Hooper) that defined evidentiary and competency rules in criminal conversation litigation.

Reinforced the strict statutory bar on spousal testimony in criminal conversation actions.

Clarified evidentiary rules for secondary evidence of documents: witnesses may testify to the substance but not their subjective interpretation or effect.

Shows the Court’s concern with keeping the jury—not witnesses—responsible for drawing conclusions about the meaning of evidence.

1913 — Powell v. Strickland

Facts

Plaintiff, N.P. Powell, sued defendant Strickland for criminal conversation with his wife and alienation of affections.
Evidence showed defendant, a married man of bad character, visited plaintiff’s wife often in plaintiff’s absence, was seen with his hand familiarly on her person, and she later declared she no longer loved her husband and abandoned her family.
Plaintiff testified to these circumstances; defendant refused to testify in his own defense.
Jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages. Defendant appealed, challenging evidentiary rulings and his wife’s competency as a witness.

Key Issues

Could the husband testify about his wife’s conduct in a CC case, or did statutes (Revisal § 1636) bar it?
Must adultery be proven by direct evidence, or is circumstantial evidence sufficient?
Is a wife’s consent a defense to criminal conversation?
Could punitive damages be awarded?

Holding

Husband’s testimony: Admissible. Because the wife was not a party, his testimony about her conduct was not “against” her within the meaning of the statute.
Proof: Adultery need not be proven by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence suffices if a jury can reasonably infer guilt.
Consent: A wife’s consent to adultery is not a defense, since the injury is to the husband’s exclusive marital rights.
Punitive damages: Jury may award punitive damages at its discretion if facts warrant.
Defendant’s silence: His refusal to testify could be commented upon fairly as an adverse inference, given the suspicious circumstances requiring explanation.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court found no error and affirmed judgment for plaintiff.

Significance

Frequently cited as one of the foundational criminal conversation cases in North Carolina, alongside Cottle v. Johnson (1920) and Sebastian v. Kluttz (1969).

Established a key rule on spousal testimony: a husband is competent to testify about his wife’s conduct in a criminal conversation case against a third party, since she has no legal interest in the action.

Cemented the opportunity and inclination doctrine, holding circumstantial evidence sufficient for adultery.

Reiterated that consent of the spouse is not a defense, confirming criminal conversation’s strict-liability nature.

Recognized jury discretion to award punitive damages in CC/AOA cases.

1913 — McCall v. Galloway

Facts

Plaintiff, J.B. McCall, sued defendant Galloway for enticing his wife and for criminal conversation.
Jury found that defendant had indeed debauched and carnally known plaintiff’s wife, awarding $500 in damages.
Defendant appealed, objecting to the issues framed, and to exclusion/admission of certain evidence.

Key Issues

Were the issues submitted to the jury sufficient, given defendant’s objections?
Was evidence of plaintiff’s wife’s declarations about improper relations with defendant admissible?

Holding

The issues framed by the court adequately presented the controversy. Defendant could not complain without tendering his own issues at trial.
Declarations of the wife regarding her improper relations with defendant were incompetent as evidence (under then existing law), which barred spousal testimony in criminal conversation cases.

Outcome

The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the $500 verdict for plaintiff.

Significance

A foundational case often cited alongside Grant v. Mitchell (1911) and Hooper v. Hooper (1914) for the rule on spousal incompetency in criminal conversation cases.

Reinforced the statutory bar on spousal testimony or declarations in criminal conversation cases (later codified as C.S. § 1801).

Clarified that while acts of intimacy or corroborating circumstances may be admissible, a wife’s statements about adultery cannot be used against the husband in such cases.

Signaled the Court’s insistence on keeping criminal conversation actions within the strict evidentiary limits intended to prevent collusion or fabricated testimony.

Note: Many early cases turned as much on evidentiary rules as on substantive standards. For example, spousal incompetency rules often barred a wife or husband from testifying about adultery or even summarizing letters. Those rules are no longer part of North Carolina law—today, spouses are competent to testify, removing a barrier that frequently shaped 19th- and early 20th-century outcomes.

1914 — Hooper v. Hooper

Facts

Plaintiff (husband, Dr. Hooper) sued for divorce on grounds of adultery.
Couple married in September 1912; separated in December 1912.
Husband alleged wife contracted gonorrhea after a trip to Savannah and introduced medical testimony suggesting he was disease-free.
Plaintiff testified that wife wrote amorous letters to other men and that he had never had venereal disease.
Trial court admitted plaintiff’s testimony; jury found adultery, and judgment of divorce was entered.
Wife appealed.

Key Issues

Can a spouse testify to facts tending to establish adultery of the other in a divorce action?
Was it proper to admit the husband’s testimony that wife had venereal disease and letters to prove adultery?

Holding

No. Under the statutes (Revisal 1905, §§ 1564, 1630, 1636), neither spouse is competent to testify for or against the other in actions for divorce on grounds of adultery or in actions for criminal conversation.
This prohibition includes testimony about venereal disease or letters tending to prove adultery.
The rule applies regardless of whether collusion appears likely; it exists to remove the opportunity for collusion.

Outcome

Supreme Court held the husband’s testimony was incompetent.
Ordered a new trial.

Significance

Important precedent in the line of cases (Hooper, Rouse v. Creech, Chestnut v. Sutton) defining competency limits of spousal testimony in heart-balm and adultery litigation.

Reinforced North Carolina’s statutory bar on spousal testimony in adultery and criminal conversation cases (then C.S. § 1801 and predecessors).

Confirmed that admissions, confessions, or testimony by one spouse against the other in such cases are inadmissible as a matter of public policy.

Distinguished from Broom v. Broom (1902), where a wife could testify only to deny accusations and defend her character—not to affirmatively prove adultery.

1920 — Cottle v. Johnson

Facts

Plaintiff (husband) married in 1913. He alleged that the defendant alienated his wife’s affections and committed criminal conversation with her in 1918, after which she left and lived apart.
Plaintiff introduced evidence of his wife’s affection before separation and correspondence between them; also alleged improper relations between his wife and defendant.
Defendant denied enticing her away, claimed she left due to plaintiff’s mistreatment, and that she boarded with defendant’s family as a paying guest.
Jury found alienation but not criminal conversation, awarding $8,000 in damages.
Trial judge instructed jury they could, “in their discretion,” award punitive damages without detailed explanation of aggravating circumstances. Defendant appealed.

Key Issues

What must be proven to recover for alienation of affections?
Can punitive damages be awarded at the jury’s discretion, or only upon finding malice, fraud, or other aggravating conduct?
Is consent of the wife a defense to criminal conversation?
What evidence is admissible to show state of the marital relationship?

Holding

Alienation of affections: Plaintiff must show wrongful, malicious conduct caused the alienation. Malice in law may be implied from unjustifiable interference, not requiring spiteful ill will.
Punitive damages: They are not automatic; may only be awarded if defendant’s conduct included fraud, malice, recklessness, oppression, or wanton disregard. The trial court erred in giving the jury unfettered discretion.
Criminal conversation: Consent of the wife is not a defense; husband’s exclusive rights are invaded regardless of her willingness.
Evidence: Conversations and letters between husband and wife admissible to show the relationship and affection before/after the alleged interference, but must be carefully limited to avoid collusion concerns.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court granted a partial new trial, limited to damages, because of the erroneous jury instruction on punitive damages.

Significance

Along with Ham v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (1922), it set the modern framework for punitive damages in heart-balm torts.

Foundational criminal conversation / alienation of affections case in NC, often cited for these rules:

Alienation of affection requires proof of malice, but not necessarily ill will.

Criminal conversation is strict liability; wife’s consent no defense.

Punitive damages require aggravating conduct, not mere finding of liability.

Reaffirmed evidentiary principles: courts allow marital correspondence to illustrate state of affection, but warn against risk of collusion.

1922 — Ham v. Norfolk & Western R. Co.

Facts

Plaintiff Ham was at the Norfolk & Western Railway station in Walkertown in March 1920 to purchase a ticket and take a train.
Plaintiff alleged that, while on the premises for that purpose, the station agent assaulted him with an insulator, inkwell, and iron poker, causing serious injuries.
Defendant railroad argued that Ham was not there as a passenger but as a loafer and nuisance, and that he insulted the agent in a manner calculated to provoke an assault.
Jury found for the plaintiff, awarding $2,000 in damages. Defendant appealed.

Key Issues

Was it error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that punitive damages could be awarded “in their discretion” without more?
What is the correct standard for awarding punitive (exemplary) damages?

Holding

Yes. It was reversible error to instruct that punitive damages may be awarded at the jury’s discretion.
Punitive damages are not automatic; they may only be awarded if the act causing injury involves malice, gross negligence, fraud, insult, rudeness, oppression, or reckless/wanton disregard of plaintiff’s rights.

Outcome

The North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial due to improper jury instructions on punitive damages.

Significance

The case continues to be cited in criminal conversation /AOA jurisprudence for the proposition that punitive damages must be tied to willful, malicious, or wanton conduct—not awarded at the unfettered discretion of the jury.

This case reaffirmed the legal standard for punitive damages in North Carolina: they are not compensatory and are allowed only where aggravating circumstances exist.

It cited earlier cases (Holmes v. R.R., 94 N.C. 318; Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426) and linked the principle directly to heart-balm torts (alienation of affection and criminal conversation).

1926 — State v. Jeffreys

Facts

Defendant was convicted of bigamous cohabitation.
To prove the second marriage, the State offered testimony that “the neighborhood report” was that the defendant and Mrs. Raeburn were married and lived together.
Witnesses repeated these rumors and neighborhood reports despite defense objections.
Defendant appealed, challenging admission of this hearsay evidence.

Key Issues

Is neighborhood reputation or rumor competent evidence to prove marriage or cohabitation in prosecutions for bigamy or criminal conversation?
Did the trial court err in admitting testimony about “general neighborhood reports” of marriage and cohabitation?

Holding

No. Rumors or neighborhood reports are not competent evidence in indictments for bigamy, bigamous cohabitation, or criminal conversation.

Outcome

The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence.
Conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered.

Significance

Demonstrates North Carolina courts’ insistence on reliable, first-hand evidence in CC/bigamy cases, limiting proof to direct or circumstantial evidence rather than community gossip.

Reinforced the principle that hearsay evidence is inadmissible in prosecutions for bigamy and civil criminal conversation actions, even though reputation evidence may be used in limited contexts to prove marriage (e.g., within a family).

Confirmed earlier precedent (Weaver v. Cryer, 12 N.C. 337; Jones v. Reddick, 79 N.C. 290) that made bigamy and criminal conversation exceptions to the usual rule allowing reputation evidence to establish marriage.

1929 — Townsend v. Holderby

Facts

Plaintiff, Mrs. Townsend, sued her husband’s stepfather and brother for alienation of affections.
Plaintiff and her husband married in 1915, had three children, and lived together happily until 1924.
In summer 1924, her husband suffered a severe mental and physical breakdown, developed a delusion that plaintiff was unfaithful, and entered a sanatorium.
Thereafter, he lived intermittently with the defendants (his relatives) and eventually resided in Georgia with them.
Plaintiff alleged the defendants maliciously alienated her husband’s affections and caused him to continue to live apart from her.
Evidence showed the husband’s estrangement was due to his mental condition and delusions, not defendants’ conduct.
Jury found for plaintiff, awarding damages. Defendants appealed.

Key Issues

Can a wife sue relatives of her husband (stepfather, brother) for alienation of affections without joining her husband as a co-plaintiff?
Was there sufficient evidence that defendants wrongfully and maliciously caused or maintained the separation?

Holding

Yes, a wife may sue alone for alienation of affections; joinder of husband is not required.
But plaintiff bears the burden to prove wrongful, malicious interference.

Outcome

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for plaintiff and ordered the action dismissed.
Court held the evidence showed the husband’s delusion and mental illness caused the separation, and the defendants merely allowed him to live with them. There was no proof of wrongful or malicious conduct by the defendants.

Significance

Protects family members acting in good faith from being unfairly drawn into heart-balm litigation.

Clarified that relatives (step-parents, siblings) may only be liable for alienation of affections if they act with malice or wrongful intent.

Reinforced that merely providing shelter, companionship, or support to a mentally ill or deluded spouse does not create liability.

Demonstrates the burden of proof on plaintiffs: they must connect the loss of affection to the defendants’ wrongful acts, not to other causes like mental illness.

1932 — Rouse v. Creech

Facts

Plaintiff husband sued defendant, a minister, for damages, alleging the minister used his persuasive personality and influence over plaintiff’s wife to have sexual intercourse with her in plaintiff’s home.
The complaint described the wife as “enchanted” and “unable to resist” defendant’s force of persuasion.
Defendant denied the allegations.
At trial, plaintiff sought to have his wife testify that defendant had intercourse with her.
The trial court excluded her testimony under C.S. § 1801 (law in effect during this time), which barred spousal testimony in criminal conversation cases. Plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit since he had no other evidence.

Key Issues

Does a complaint alleging overpowering persuasion by a minister state a cause of action for rape/ravishment or only criminal conversation?
Was the wife’s testimony admissible to prove adultery under C.S. § 1801?

Holding

The allegations did not amount to rape or ravishment, since there was no claim of force, drugs, violence, or intoxication.
The complaint therefore alleged only criminal conversation.
Under C.S. § 1801, the wife’s testimony was incompetent to prove criminal conversation.

Outcome

Judgment of nonsuit was entered; the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.

Significance

Reinforces the strict limits on spousal testimony in criminal conversation actions.
Establishes that “force of personality” or persuasion is not legally sufficient to convert adultery into rape or ravishment.
Reflects legislative concern over fraud and collusion if spouses were allowed to testify to adultery.
Demonstrates the high evidentiary burden plaintiffs faced in CC cases when spousal testimony was barred.

1932 — Hankins v. Hankins

Facts

Plaintiff Alexandra Hankins married James Hankins (defendants’ son) in 1923.
The couple initially lived in Boston, struggling financially; eventually, they moved to Winston-Salem in 1925 to live with James’s parents, J.R. and Minda Hankins.
Plaintiff testified that her father-in-law was hostile, calling her names, criticizing her, and even suggesting his son “knock her on the head.” He allegedly urged his son to end the marriage.
Plaintiff claimed this hostility destroyed her husband’s affection, leading to quarrels and abandonment.
Defendants countered that plaintiff was extravagant, quarrelsome, and unwilling to live within her husband’s means.
Jury awarded plaintiff $26,000 in compensatory and $12,000 in punitive damages against J.R. Hankins (nonsuit as to Minda).

Key Issues

What must a plaintiff prove to succeed in an alienation of affections claim?
Was much of the plaintiff’s evidence (about poor food, disrepair of the home, religious hostility, or an ex parte letter from her attorney) admissible?

Holding

To prove alienation of affections, a plaintiff must show:
(1) a genuine, loving marriage;
(2) alienation of that love and affection; and
(3) wrongful and malicious acts by defendant causing the alienation.
Many pieces of plaintiff’s evidence (home disrepair, food quality, religious beliefs, letter from her attorney) were incompetent because they were irrelevant or self-serving.
The trial court properly granted a new trial due to admission of incompetent evidence

Outcome

The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial.

Significance

This case set out the canonical elements of alienation of affections, still cited today.
It drew clear lines around competent vs. incompetent evidence in such cases: courts permit wide latitude on evidence of family relationships, but not irrelevant lifestyle critiques or self-serving documents.
The decision shows the tension between giving juries context about household life and limiting prejudice from collateral issues.
It reinforced that the cause of action requires proof of malicious interference, not merely an unhappy household situation.

1933 — Chestnut v. Sutton

Facts: Plaintiff husband sued defendant for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with his wife. Jury awarded $2,000.

Key Issue: Whether the wife could testify to refute charges made against her character (that she committed adultery with the defendant).

Holding: Yes. Under C.S. § 1801, the wife was competent to testify when her character was assailed in a CC case. The trial court erred in excluding her testimony where she would have denied adultery, denied that the defendant fathered her child, and contradicted other compromising testimony.

Outcome: New trial ordered.

Significance: The case established that when a husband sues for CC and, in doing so, assails his wife’s character, the wife may testify in defense of her own character—even though her testimony may aid the defendant. It carved a narrow statutory exception to the general rule that spouses were incompetent to testify for/against each other in CC cases.

1934 — Chestnut v. Sutton

Facts: On retrial, the jury again found for the plaintiff, awarding $1,200 compensatory and $400 punitive damages. Defendant appealed again.

Key Issues:

Whether the wife’s consent could be a defense (No).
Whether the husband’s alleged misconduct or ill-treatment of his wife should reduce damages.

Holding:

Wife’s consent is not a defense in alienation or CC.
Husband’s misconduct may be considered in mitigation of damages, but the defendant must specifically request jury instructions to that effect. The trial judge’s charge, in the absence of such a request, was sufficient.

Outcome: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

Significance: This case clarified that (i) consent of the spouse is never a defense to CC, and (ii) mitigating factors like the plaintiff’s misconduct must be raised through proper jury instructions.

1938 — Bryant v. Carrier

Facts

Plaintiff Curley Bryant sued defendant John Carrier for criminal conversation and alienation of affections.
Jury found no alienation, but did find that defendant had sexual relations with plaintiff’s wife.
Jury awarded $1,000 compensatory damages and $500 punitive damages.
Defendant had previously been adjudged insane and had a guardian appointed, but plaintiff contended he was sane and capable at the relevant times.
Defendant appealed, raising issues about evidence, instructions, and insanity defense.

Key Issues

Is an insane person civilly liable for criminal conversation?
May punitive damages be assessed against someone adjudged insane?
Is consent of the wife a defense to criminal conversation?
What proof is required for compensatory and prospective damages in CC?

Holding

Compensatory damages: An insane person remains civilly liable for compensatory damages.
Punitive damages: Insane persons cannot be held liable for punitive damages, since punitive awards require wrongful intent. However, here, the jury found defendant had mental capacity at the time, so punitive damages stood.
Consent: Wife’s consent is no defense in a criminal conversation action. The injury is to the husband’s marital rights.
Prospective damages: Jury could award present value of future loss if evidence showed ongoing or permanent harm.

Outcome

Supreme Court found no error; verdict and judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

Significance

Frequently cited with Cottle v. Johnson (1920) and Chestnut v. Sutton (1934) for core criminal conversation doctrines.

Reaffirmed criminal conversation’s strict-liability nature: a wife’s consent does not bar recovery.

Clarified liability of mentally impaired defendants: compensatory damages always available, punitive only if defendant had sufficient capacity to act with malice or wantonness.

Confirmed that prospective damages (future loss of consortium, humiliation, etc.) are recoverable if proven.

Shows criminal conversation’s broad damages scope: compensatory + punitive, present + future.

1938 — Johnston v. Johnston

Facts

Plaintiff (daughter-in-law) sued her mother-in-law for alienation of affections, alleging malicious interference that caused her husband to abandon her.
Evidence showed family conflict and interference by the defendant mother-in-law.
Jury found that defendant maliciously alienated the husband’s affections and caused his abandonment.
Jury awarded $10,000 compensatory damages but no punitive damages. Defendant appealed.

Key Issues

May a wife maintain an action for alienation of affections against her mother-in-law?
What standard applies to parents (or in-laws) in giving advice or intervening in their children’s marriages?
Were damages, including loss of support, properly awarded?

Holding

Yes. A spouse may sue a parent-in-law for alienation of affections.
While parents may counsel children in good faith, they become liable if their conduct is malicious or wrongful.
Loss of support or assistance is a valid element of damages in alienation cases.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the $10,000 compensatory damages award.

Significance

Frequently cited alongside Hankins v. Hankins (1932) and Townsend v. Holderby (1929) for the principle that family members are treated differently from strangers but remain liable when motivated by malice.

Reinforced that relatives (parents, in-laws) may be sued for alienation of affections if they act maliciously, even though they are generally privileged to advise children in good faith.

Clarified the line between permissible parental counsel and unlawful interference—the “quo animo” (motive) of the parent is key.

Demonstrated the significant damages juries could award in alienation cases, confirming that loss of support, affection, and society are compensable.

1955 — Hardison v. Gregory

Facts

Plaintiff Hardison sued the estate of Bonnie Gregory (deceased) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with his wife.
Plaintiff testified that on multiple occasions he discovered Gregory with his wife:
- Once at night in his own unlit home.
- Twice at cabins where Gregory and his wife were alone.
- Once through Gregory’s office window, seeing Gregory hugging and kissing her.
Plaintiff also described a high-speed chase after finding his wife leaving a cabin with Gregory, which ended in a confrontation where he struck Gregory with a hatchet.
Jury awarded plaintiff $10,000 damages. The estate appealed, challenging admissibility of testimony and sufficiency of evidence.

Key Issues

Could plaintiff testify about what he saw of Gregory’s conduct with his wife, despite G.S. § 8-51 barring testimony about “transactions or communications” with deceased persons?
Was the circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove criminal conversation?
Do alienation of affection and criminal conversation remain distinct torts?

Holding

Plaintiff’s testimony about what he personally observed (Gregory’s conduct and presence with his wife) was admissible because it described independent facts, not a personal transaction or communication with the deceased.
Circumstantial evidence (Gregory found in the house at night, private meetings at cabins, hugging/kissing, wife’s admissions) was sufficient for jury submission on criminal conversation.
Alienation of affections and criminal conversation are separate torts; physical intercourse is not required for AOA but is the gravamen of criminal conversation.

Outcome

Supreme Court affirmed the judgment: No error.
Some justices dissented in part, arguing the hatchet incident was a personal transaction barred by the statute, but found no prejudice since the wife corroborated the same events.

Significance

An important mid-20th-century case showing criminal conversation’s endurance in NC and refining evidentiary limits when estates are sued.

Reinforced that circumstantial evidence is enough to prove criminal conversation if it supports inference of intercourse.

Clarified application of the Dead Man’s Statute (G.S. 8-51): plaintiff may testify to independent observations of a deceased tortfeasor’s acts, but not to direct communications or personal transactions.

Left unresolved the broader question of whether CC/AOA claims survive the death of the tortfeasor, though the Court hinted at doubts.

1957 — Bishop v. Glazener

Facts

Plaintiff Bishop married defendant Glazener’s daughter in 1941. They lived with defendant (the father-in-law) for seven years, later moving into their own home where defendant continued to live with them.
Defendant contributed financially and materially to the household but often clashed with plaintiff, criticized him, and allegedly threatened, “I will ruin your home” when plaintiff told him to move out in 1954.
Plaintiff’s wife continued to visit her father daily and later moved with him after leaving plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant maliciously alienated his wife’s affections.
Trial court entered nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Plaintiff appealed.

Key Issues

What elements must be proven for alienation of affections?
Are parents liable on the same standard as strangers, or are they treated differently?
Was plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to withstand nonsuit?

Holding

Essential elements of alienation:
1. A valid marriage;
2. Loss of affection/consortium;
3. Wrongful and malicious conduct of the defendant as the controlling cause of the loss.
Parents are presumed to act in good faith and are only liable where actions stem from malice or improper motive.
Plaintiff’s evidence showed conflicts, threats, and wife’s choice to leave with her father, but no direct proof of wrongful or malicious acts by defendant that caused the separation.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed nonsuit.

Significance

Often cited with Brown v. Brown (1899), Townsend v. Holderby (1929), Hankins v. Hankins (1932), and Johnston v. Johnston (1938) as part of NC’s jurisprudence on family interference in marriage.

Reinforced the parental privilege doctrine: parents may advise, assist, and even house their married children without liability, absent clear proof of malicious intent.

Distinguished parents from unrelated third parties, who may be held liable for any unjustified interference.

Illustrated the heavy evidentiary burden on plaintiffs suing in-laws: mere family tension, threats, or continued association is insufficient without evidence of malicious causation.

1966 — Litchfield v. Cox

Facts

Plaintiff Bishop married defendant Glazener’s daughter in 1941. They lived with defendant (the father-in-law) for seven years, later moving into their own home where defendant continued to live with them.
Defendant contributed financially and materially to the household but often clashed with plaintiff, criticized him, and allegedly threatened, “I will ruin your home” when plaintiff told him to move out in 1954.
Plaintiff’s wife continued to visit her father daily and later moved with him after leaving plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant maliciously alienated his wife’s affections.
Trial court entered nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Plaintiff appealed.

Key Issues

What elements must be proven for alienation of affections?
Are parents liable on the same standard as strangers, or are they treated differently?
Was plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to withstand nonsuit?

Holding

Essential elements of alienation:
1. A valid marriage;
2. Loss of affection/consortium;
3. Wrongful and malicious conduct of the defendant as the controlling cause of the loss.
Parents are presumed to act in good faith and are only liable where actions stem from malice or improper motive.
Plaintiff’s evidence showed conflicts, threats, and wife’s choice to leave with her father, but no direct proof of wrongful or malicious acts by defendant that caused the separation.

Outcome

North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed nonsuit.

Significance

Reinforced the parental privilege doctrine: parents may advise, assist, and even house their married children without liability, absent clear proof of malicious intent.

Distinguished parents from unrelated third parties, who may be held liable for any unjustified interference.

Illustrated the heavy evidentiary burden on plaintiffs suing in-laws: mere family tension, threats, or continued association is insufficient without evidence of malicious causation.

1968 — Warner v. Torrence

Facts

Plaintiff, W.D. Warner, sued defendant Robert Torrence for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with his wife.
The couple had married in 1933. By 1953 they had begun to “drift apart” and their marriage deteriorated into constant bickering and fighting until final separation in 1966.
Plaintiff alleged defendant alienated his wife’s affections and committed adultery with her.
Sheriff McSwain testified that on June 29, 1966, around 1:00 a.m., he went to the Pine View Motel in Stanly County. A room was registered in defendant’s name.
- Defendant opened the door wearing undershorts and a t-shirt.
- Plaintiff’s wife was in one of the beds, covered up to her shoulders.
- Sheriff told defendant to stop keeping company with Mrs. Warner and leave the motel; defendant agreed.
Neither defendant nor plaintiff’s wife testified at trial.
Trial court granted nonsuit on both claims; plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to submit alienation of affections to the jury?
Was there sufficient evidence to submit criminal conversation to the jury?

Rule

Alienation of affections: Plaintiff must prove
1. A happy marriage with genuine love and affection;
2. Alienation and destruction of that love and affection;
3. That defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts caused the alienation. (Hankins v. Hankins, 202 N.C. 358 (1932)).
Criminal conversation: Plaintiff must prove adultery.
Direct proof is not required; circumstantial evidence from which the jury can reasonably infer guilt is sufficient (Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393 (1913)).

Analysis

Alienation of Affections:
- Evidence failed to show the marriage had genuine love and affection at the relevant time. Testimony revealed years of conflict, drifting apart since 1953, and eventual separation in 1966.
- Plaintiff could not prove defendant’s actions caused the loss of love and affection.
- Thus, nonsuit was proper for this claim.
Criminal Conversation:
- Motel incident strongly suggested sexual relations: defendant partially undressed, plaintiff’s wife in bed, late at night, room registered in defendant’s name.
- Jury could reasonably infer adultery from these circumstances.
- The absence of testimony by wife or defendant further bolstered inference (per Walker v. Walker).
- Trial court erred in granting nonsuit; jury should decide.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: Nonsuit affirmed (plaintiff failed to prove love/affection existed to be alienated).
Criminal conversation: Nonsuit reversed; new trial ordered.

Key Takeaways

Case illustrates that alienation and criminal conversation are distinct causes of action—one may succeed even if the other fails.

Alienation of affections requires proof of actual marital affection; if a marriage was already broken, defendant is not liable.

Criminal conversation can be proven by circumstantial evidence; motel-room scenarios with suggestive facts are enough for a jury to infer adultery.

Defendant/wife silence in face of serious charges can strengthen circumstantial case.

1969 — Sebastian v. Kluttz

Facts

Plaintiff (Lorene Sebastian) sued defendant (Daisy Kluttz) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Walter Sebastian.
Jury returned verdicts for plaintiff on both claims, awarding:
- Alienation: $15,000 actual + $2,500 punitive
- Criminal Conversation: $2,500 actual + $10,000 punitive
Defendant appealed.
Plaintiff and her husband married in 1940, had a grown son. They had experienced prior separations but reconciled.
By late 1967–early 1968, plaintiff testified her marriage was affectionate and relatively stable.
After defendant’s husband died (July 1967), plaintiff’s husband began visiting defendant at her home and was frequently seen staying overnight.
Plaintiff’s husband ultimately left her in April 1968 to live with defendant.
Defendant introduced a July 1968 separation agreement between plaintiff and her husband, releasing certain marital rights and providing property division and limited support payments. Defendant argued this barred recovery.
Trial court allowed jury’s awards to stand; defendant appealed on grounds of nonsuit, damages, and errors in jury instructions.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to submit alienation of affections and criminal conversation to the jury?
Did the trial court err in its instructions on damages and in treating the two claims as separate for compensatory/punitive awards?
Did the separation agreement bar or limit plaintiff’s recovery?

Rule

Alienation of affections: Requires (1) valid marriage; (2) love and affection; (3) wrongful and malicious conduct by defendant as controlling cause of loss (Bishop v. Glazener).
- Husband’s willingness to be seduced is not a defense (Powell v. Strickland).
Criminal conversation: Requires (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture. Proof may be circumstantial.
Damages:
- Alienation: present value of consortium, support, companionship, plus injury to feelings/reputation.
- Criminal conversation: humiliation, mental anguish, loss of consortium/support.
- Punitive damages available in both for willful/malicious conduct.
Separation agreements: Do not bar claims for tortious conduct accruing before the agreement.

Analysis

Alienation of affections: Evidence showed some continuing love and affection, reconciliations after earlier separations, and affection as late as early 1968. Defendant’s relationship was the controlling cause of final estrangement. Sufficient for jury.
Criminal conversation: Ample circumstantial evidence of adultery (husband frequently overnight at defendant’s home, ultimately left to live with her). Properly submitted.
Separation agreement: Executed after alienation and adultery had already occurred. Not a bar to plaintiff’s accrued claims, though it might affect damages related to support.
Damages/instructions: Trial judge erred by (i) failing to limit recovery of future losses to present cash value, (ii) not giving clear guidance on mortuary tables/life expectancy, (iii) submitting separate compensatory/punitive issues for each tort when the two were “intertwined.” Jury should have considered one combined award reflecting all legally protected marital interests.

Conclusion

Evidence was sufficient for both alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
However, errors in jury instructions on damages and overlapping causes of action required reversal.
New trial ordered.

Key Takeaways

This case emphasizes jury instruction precision—damages must be reduced to present cash value, mortuary tables are evidence but not conclusive, and overlapping claims require careful handling.

Alienation requires proof of some genuine affection—even if imperfect, it is legally protected unless destroyed by defendant’s conduct.

Husband’s consent to affair is not a defense; the wrong is against the spouse’s marital rights.

Separation agreements or divorce do not bar accrued tort claims, but may affect measure of damages.

Damages for alienation and criminal conversation overlap; courts should avoid double recovery by consolidating issues when both are tried together.

1973 — Golding v. Taylor

Facts

Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation arising between Sept. 1, 1971 and June 22, 1972.
Allegations: multiple adulterous acts (mostly NC, some GA/TN); on May 9, 1972, defendant induced plaintiff’s wife to leave NC to live with him in Atlanta; defendant “fled” NC on that date.
Process served in Georgia per Georgia law; defendant later answered, moved to quash, sought transfer/stay, and objected to most interrogatories, invoking the Fifth Amendment.
Trial court denied all defense motions and compelled answers to all interrogatories. Defendant appealed.

Issues

Did NC courts have personal jurisdiction over defendant and was service valid?
Did defendant waive his Fifth Amendment privilege by not objecting to interrogatories within Rule 33’s 10-day window?
What is the proper handling of self-incrimination objections to interrogatories in AOA/CC cases?

Rules

Long-arm (G.S. 1-75.4(3)): NC courts have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an action “claiming injury to person or property” arising from an act or omission within this State, when served pursuant to Rule 4(j).
AOA/CC are torts (ex delicto) and constitute “injury to person or property.”
Discovery (Rule 33): failure to timely object ordinarily waives objections; however, Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination cannot be forfeited by mere failure to object on time—waiver must be clear and is disfavored.

Analysis

Personal jurisdiction / service: The record showed (i) service effected in GA by a person authorized under GA law; (ii) defendant was an NC resident when the wrongful acts occurred; (iii) the acts complained of occurred in North Carolina; and (iv) defendant departed NC after the events. Because AOA/CC are torts causing “injury to person,” G.S. 1-75.4(3) applied. The findings supported jurisdiction and valid service; motion to quash/dismiss properly denied.
Fifth Amendment & interrogatories: Many interrogatories (e.g., asking whether defendant had sexual intercourse with plaintiff’s wife in Atlanta) were potentially incriminating. Although Rule 33 sets a 10-day objection window, that timing rule yields to the constitutional privilege. The trial court erred by compelling blanket answers and rejecting all Fifth objections based solely on untimeliness. The court must evaluate each interrogatory individually and require answers only where responses would not be self-incriminating.

Holding / Disposition

Personal jurisdiction/Service: Affirmed—NC court had jurisdiction; service valid.
Discovery order: Vacated in part and remanded for the superior court to conduct a hearing and rule question-by-question on the Fifth Amendment objections; compel answers only where no self-incrimination risk exists.
Otherwise, no error.

Key Takeaways

Practical litigation note in AOA/CC: expect defendants to invoke the Fifth on adultery-specific discovery; courts should tailor orders rather than compel blanket answers.

Alienation of affections / Criminal conversation = torts (ex delicto) that qualify as “injury to person,” supporting NC long-arm jurisdiction when the acts occur in NC, even if defendant later leaves the state.

Service out-of-state per the foreign state’s law + NC long-arm can establish personal jurisdiction where acts occurred here.

Fifth Amendment trumps Rule 33 timing: failure to object within 10 days does not waive the privilege; courts must assess each interrogatory for incrimination risk.

1982 — Scott v. Kiker

Facts

Plaintiff (Scott) sued defendant (Kiker) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Evidence: Before spring 1978, marriage described as close and loving with healthy sexual relations.
July 1978: Plaintiff found wife at defendant’s house; saw defendant nude and wife dressing; wife apologized and returned home.
Aug. 21, 1978: Parking-lot confrontation; plaintiff arrested; afterward, wife visited defendant nightly, later moved out (Dec. 1978), then into defendant’s house; divorce entered March 1980; wife married defendant.
Defense evidence: wife alleged plaintiff’s drinking and lack of sexual interest; both she and defendant denied pre-marital sex.
Verdict: $25,000 compensatory + $25,000 punitive.

Issues

Was plaintiff competent to testify about his ex-wife’s adultery and their private marital communications?
Did the court err by not expressly instructing “actual before punitive” damages?
Must compensatory damages be tied to pecuniary loss?
Were punitive-damages instructions proper in alienation (malice/aggravation)?
Does plaintiff’s own infidelity bar recovery for criminal conversation?
Sufficiency of the evidence to withstand directed verdict on both claims?
Is spousal consent a defense?

Rules

Competency (G.S. 8-56): Spouses are competent in civil cases; the adultery/criminal conversation exception bars testimony for or against the other spouse in such actions—but the spouse is not a party here, so testimony is allowed (Powell v. Strickland). Confidential marital communications privilege belongs to the non-witness spouse and is waived absent objection.
Damages framing: When AOA and CC are intertwined, court may submit one compensatory and one punitive issue (Sebastian v. Kluttz). Punitive requires compensatory, but omission is harmless if both are awarded.
Compensatory scope: Not limited to pecuniary loss—includes loss of consortium, humiliation, shame, mental anguish, loss of sexual relations, disgrace (Powell; Sebastian).
Alienation elements: Marriage; loss of affection; wrongful/malicious conduct as controlling/effective cause (Heist v. Heist).
Criminal conversation: Adultery; circumstantial proof allowed (Powell).
Punitive Damages in Alienation of Affections: Requires aggravation beyond malice implied by law (Heist).
Plaintiff’s infidelity: Not a bar; goes to mitigation of damages.
Consent: Wife’s consent is not a defense to either tort (Chestnut v. Sutton).

Analysis

Testimony/Privilege: Plaintiff could testify to wife’s adultery because she wasn’t a party; any bar to confidential communications was waived when defendant failed to object at trial.
Damages instructions: With a single compensatory and single punitive issue and the jury awarding both, failure to say “must find compensatory first” caused no prejudice.
No pecuniary prerequisite: Plaintiff’s higher post-divorce income doesn’t negate non-economic harms; denial of set-aside was proper.
Punitive standard: Court correctly told jurors punitive requires willful, wanton, aggravated conduct beyond implied malice.
Infidelity: Plaintiff’s past cheating doesn’t bar criminal conversation; it may reduce damages (jury was so instructed).
Sufficiency: Evidence of ongoing affection pre-interference plus defendant’s knowing facilitation of nightly visits supported AOA; motel-style incident (nude defendant, wife dressing) and subsequent pattern provided ample circumstantial proof of adultery for criminal conversation. Directed verdict properly denied.
Consent: Not a defense to either claim.

Conclusion

Affirmed—no error. Verdict of $25,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive stands.

Key Takeaways

Defenses: Consent of spouse is no defense; plaintiff’s own misconduct mitigates, doesn’t bar.

Evidence/Privilege: Plaintiff may testify to spouse’s adultery; marital-communications privilege must be timely invoked or it’s waived.

Damages: Non-economic harms drive valuation; one set of compensatory/punitive issues is proper when AOA and criminal conversation are intertwined. In other words, when a case includes both alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC) arising from the same relationship and facts, the jury should get just one compensatory damages question and one punitive damages question – not separate damage questions for each tort.

Liability Proof: Circumstantial evidence suffices for criminal conversation; AOA requires wrongful conduct as the effective cause of alienation.

1984 — Cannon v. Miller

Facts

Plaintiff (Haywood Cannon) and his wife married in 1975; had one child (1978).
Wife began working as deputy clerk in 1979; became acquainted with defendant, an attorney.
Plaintiff alleged defendant persuaded wife to engage in sex (Sept.–Oct. 1979), alienated her affection, and continued adultery through May 1981 (date of divorce).
Plaintiff sued defendant in 1982 for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, seeking $250,000.
Defendant moved to dismiss/for summary judgment, claiming the marriage was already broken, and challenging constitutionality/public policy of “heart balm” torts.
Evidence: Defendant/wife affidavits said marriage troubled since 1976, separation May 1979, and they didn’t date until 1980. Plaintiff countered with affidavits, letters, detective reports, alleging adultery and interference prior to Oct. 1979.
Trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding no genuine issue of fact before Oct. 15, 1979 (date of separation).
Plaintiff appealed. Defendant cross-appealed, urging abolition of alienation and criminal conversation actions.

Issues

Was summary judgment proper given plaintiff’s evidentiary forecast on AOA/CC claims?
Should the torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation be judicially abolished in North Carolina?

Rules

Alienation of affections: requires (1) happy marriage with genuine love/affection; (2) loss of such affection; (3) wrongful and malicious acts by defendant as controlling cause (Hankins v. Hankins; Heist v. Heist).
Criminal conversation: requires (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture (Sebastian v. Kluttz). Consent of spouse is not a defense (Chestnut v. Sutton; Bryant v. Carrier).
Summary judgment: only proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists (Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills).
Judicial power: courts may modify/abolish common-law actions when no longer justified (Rabon v. Hospital; Nicholson v. Hospital).

Analysis

Summary judgment on criminal conversation: Error to dismiss; separation does not bar CC, and defendant’s affidavits failed to deny intercourse during coverture (1979–81). Plaintiff’s evidence (witnesses, detectives, his own observations) raised triable issues.
Summary judgment on alienation of affections: Plaintiff’s affidavit and letters raised genuine factual issues as to affection and causation; defendant’s contrary affidavits created disputes best left for a jury. Thus, summary judgment should not have been granted on evidentiary grounds.
However: Court of Appeals undertook broad review of history and policy behind both torts. Found them rooted in outdated notions of spousal “property rights,” ill-suited to modern marriage, prone to abuse, extortion, blackmail, and inconsistent with spousal autonomy.
Cited national trend: many legislatures abolished “heart balm” actions; other state courts judicially abolished.
Concluded both torts no longer serve legitimate purpose, are based on faulty assumptions, and must be abolished judicially.

Conclusion

Held: Although summary judgment was erroneous under evidentiary standards, the court nonetheless affirmed judgment for defendant because it abolished both alienation of affections and criminal conversation in North Carolina.
Thus, plaintiff’s claims were extinguished as a matter of law.

Key Takeaways

Cannon v. Miller is a landmark NC Court of Appeals decision abolishing “heart balm” torts. However, note: This abolition was later reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1985, which reinstated both causes of action (Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)), holding that abolition was for the legislature, not the courts.

1984 — Chappell v. Redding

Facts

Plaintiff (Chappell) sued his wife’s employer (Redding) for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC).
Evidence: After wife returned from a Houston medical convention with defendant (her ophthalmologist employer), she became distant; defendant called her at home, spent increasing time with her at work; they were seen at lunch with legs touching and in a darkened office after hours. Wife moved from marital bed to couch; plaintiff asked her to “get him out of our personal life.”
Best criminal conversation proof: an early-1981 motorhome incident—lights dimmed ~1 hour while wife and defendant were inside alone, then they emerged. No direct intercourse evidence.
Jury: found AOA and CC; awarded $150k compensatory + $50k punitive.
Trial court denied JNOV/new trial; defendant appealed.

Issues

Alienation of affections: Was there sufficient evidence to go to the jury?
Criminal conversation: Was the evidence sufficient to reach the jury?
Damages framing: Was submitting one compensatory damages issue for both AOA and CC error?
Punitive (AOA): Was there evidence of aggravating circumstances beyond implied malice?
Various evidentiary/charge issues (reply “oversight,” tapes, spouse competency, hearsay).

Rules

AOA elements: (1) happy marriage/genuine affection; (2) alienation; (3) defendant’s wrongful/malicious acts as controlling/effective cause. Litchfield v. Cox; Scott v. Kiker.
“Malice” in alienation of affection = unjustifiable conduct causing the injury. Heist v. Heist.
Criminal conversation elements: (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse during coverture—may be circumstantial but must exceed conjecture. Sebastian v. Kluttz; Horney v. Horney.
Damages: When AOA and CC are intertwined, court may submit one compensatory and one punitive issue to the jury. Sebastian.
Punitive (AOA): Requires willful, aggravated, wanton conduct beyond the malice implied by law. Heist.
Evidentiary:
- Spousal competency (G.S. 8-56): spouse not a party—competent; offering spouse as defendant’s witness waives any objection.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2515 bars contents of illegal wiretaps; identification-only admission is permissible if contents aren’t introduced.
- Rule 8(d): Failure to reply = allegations deemed admitted (except damages); trial court correctly instructed despite calling it an “oversight.”

Analysis

Alienation of affections: Sufficient evidence—testimony of pre-Houston happy marriage; post-Houston behavioral changes; increased contact; intimate circumstances at work; plaintiff’s plea to wife to exclude defendant. Enough for a jury on causation and unjustifiable conduct.
Criminal conversation: Insufficient—no direct proof; motorhome/lights evidence was too conjectural to allow a reasonable inference of intercourse. Directed verdict should have been granted.
Damages framing: Submitting a single compensatory issue is proper only when both AOA and CC are in play. Because CC should have been directed out, the combined award risks double counting. Remand to re-try compensatory damages on AOA only.
Punitive (AOA): Record lacked aggravation beyond implied malice; should have been directed out. $50,000 punitive vacated.
Other points:
- Judge’s “oversight” remark about no reply—harmless; law and issues correctly stated.
- Tapes admitted only for identification; contents never played—no § 2515 violation.
- Defendant called wife—waived any G.S. 8-56 competency objection.
- Statement about being in Florida admitted for fact of utterance, not truth—proper limiting instruction.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: Affirmed on liability; remand for new trial on compensatory damages (AOA only).
Criminal conversation: Reversed—directed verdict for defendant should have been granted.
Punitive (AOA): Vacated—insufficient aggravation.

Key Takeaways

Procedural nuggets: Failure to reply = admissions (except damages); offering the spouse as your witness waives competency objections; identification-only admission of tapes is permitted if contents aren’t used.

Intertwined damages rule: One combined compensatory and punitive issue is fine only if both AOA and CC survive; otherwise, re-try damages on the surviving claim to avoid double recovery.

Criminal conversation proof bar: Circumstantial evidence must do more than suggest opportunity (e.g., being alone with dim lights); courts draw a line between inference and conjecture.

Punitive in alienation of affection: Need separate aggravation beyond implied malice (e.g., persistence after warnings, public flaunting, deceitful schemes). Mere time/contact ≠ enough.

1984 — Blount v. Blount

Facts

Parties married in 1962 under an ante-nuptial agreement.
In 1976, they entered a separation agreement, addressing property division and spousal rights.
The agreement included language where each spouse released “any and all property or interest in property real, personal, and mixed, now owned or hereafter acquired … just as if [they] had never been married.”
Agreement mentioned the marital home (tenancy by entirety), home furnishings, and wife’s car, but did not list husband’s extensive assets (over $1 million).
In 1982, plaintiff-wife filed for equitable distribution under N.C.G.S. § 50-20 following divorce.
Husband argued the 1976 separation agreement barred her claim; also challenged the constitutionality of § 50-20.
Trial court held:
1. 1962 ante-nuptial agreement not a bar to equitable distribution.
2. 1976 separation agreement barred equitable distribution.
3. Statute constitutional.
Both parties appealed.

Issues

Did the 1976 separation agreement bar plaintiff’s equitable distribution claim?
Was the 1962 ante-nuptial agreement a bar?
Is G.S. 50-20 unconstitutional?

Rules

N.C.G.S. § 52-10: spouses may enter separation agreements releasing/quitclaiming property rights acquired by marriage; such agreements are enforceable contracts.
Contract interpretation: plain/unambiguous terms enforced as written (Church v. Hancock; Goodyear v. Goodyear).
Prior separation agreements fully disposing of property rights bar later equitable distribution (Dean v. Dean; McArthur v. McArthur).
Courts avoid constitutional questions if the case is resolved on other grounds (Williams v. Williams).

Analysis

1976 separation agreement:
- Clear, unambiguous language released all rights in each other’s property.
- Although not itemized, general release provisions are enforceable; absence of detailed listing does not void agreement.
- Wife admitted validity and voluntariness; no coercion or public policy claim.
- Therefore, no marital property remained for equitable distribution in 1983 divorce.
1962 ante-nuptial agreement: did not fully dispose of marital rights, but issue moot since 1976 agreement was dispositive.
Constitutional challenge: unnecessary to decide once case resolved by contract law.

Conclusion

1976 separation agreement barred equitable distribution.
Summary judgment for defendant (husband) proper.
Trial court’s judgment affirmed.

Key Takeaways

Courts avoid reaching constitutional challenges when contract principles resolve the dispute.

A broad release clause in a valid separation agreement can extinguish future equitable distribution rights, even without detailed property listings.

Separation agreements are interpreted like contracts; plain terms enforced as written.

If a separation agreement fully disposes of property rights, equitable distribution is unavailable at divorce.

Lesson from Blount v. Blount

Rule in Blount: A clear and unambiguous separation agreement in which each spouse releases “any and all” rights in the property of the other spouse is enforceable and will bar future claims to property (e.g., equitable distribution), even if the agreement does not list every asset.

The court emphasized contract principles: separation agreements are contracts; plain language controls; courts won’t fabricate issues of fairness where the agreement is valid and voluntary.

Application to Criminal Conversation / AOA

Spousal Consent & Release:
- Just as a spouse can release property rights in a separation agreement, the question arises: can a spouse release tort rights (like criminal conversation or alienation of affections) in a contract?
- Example: If a separation agreement includes a clause waiving “all causes of action arising out of the marriage,” that might bar later CC/AOA claims.
- NC courts have allowed broad releases in marital contracts (see Blount). If the release language is clear enough, it could extend to tort claims.
Public Policy Limits:
- Unlike property division, courts may be more cautious about enforcing waivers of tort claims tied to adultery, since CC involves a third party (the lover).
- But AOA, which is between spouses and third parties, might be contractually released if the injured spouse agrees not to sue.
Timing & Drafting:
- Blount teaches that timing and wording are everything.
- If the release occurs before adultery (as in a general waiver), it may extinguish the claim.
- If the release occurs after adultery, it could operate like a settlement of the tort claim.
Litigation Strategy:
- A defendant in a CC/AOA case should check for a separation agreement or marital settlement that might include broad releases.
- Conversely, plaintiffs must be careful that their separation agreements don’t unknowingly waive tort claims they might later want to bring.

Takeaway for CC/AOA Practice

Blount’s principle of enforceable broad waivers in marital agreements can be applied to heart-balm torts.
Lawyers drafting separation agreements must be explicit:
- If the intent is to preserve CC/AOA claims, the agreement should say so.
- If the intent is to waive them, broad “all claims arising out of the marriage” language may suffice.
Courts, following Blount, are inclined to enforce clear contractual releases absent coercion or fraud.

⚖️ Bottom Line:
Blount v. Blount shows how contracts between spouses can bar future legal claims. That same logic, if applied to criminal conversation or alienation of affections, means a carefully worded separation agreement or release could wipe out those tort claims—making contract drafting a critical battlefield in CC/AOA litigation.

1988 — Darnell v. Rupplin

Facts

Plaintiff (Ann Darnell) sued defendant (Vivian Rupplin) for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC) involving her husband, Daniel Darnell.
Evidence: Husband and defendant’s relationship spanned four states: NC, VA, MD, and D.C.
- Sexual encounters occurred in NC (April 1984, Dec. 1984, Nov. 1985, and beyond), but also in MD, VA, and D.C.
- Defendant eventually moved to Maryland to live with husband.
NC is the only state recognizing AOA; the others bar the claim.
Trial: court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on CC, jury found for plaintiff on AOA, awarding $50,000 compensatory + $50,000 punitive.
Defendant appealed, arguing the jury should have been asked to decide where the tort occurred (lex loci delicti).

Issues

Did the trial court err in refusing to submit to the jury the factual issue of where the tort of AOA occurred, given multi-state conduct?
Did this error affect the damages verdict on both AOA and CC?

Rules

AOA elements: (1) happy marriage with genuine affection; (2) loss of affection; (3) wrongful and malicious acts of defendant as controlling cause (Chappell v. Redding; Litchfield v. Cox).
Active conduct required—mere passive receipt of affection is not enough; must be affirmative acts inducing alienation (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 683).
Lex loci rule: For transitory torts like AOA, substantive law is that of the state where the tortious injury occurred (Howle v. Express; Ingle v. Cassady). Lex loci delicti = “the law of the place of the wrong.”
If acts occur across multiple states, jury must decide where the alienation injury occurred if disputed.
Jury right (Rule 38): Parties are entitled to jury trial on all material issues of fact. Lex loci of tort = material fact.

Analysis

Defendant asserted most conduct occurred outside NC (MD, VA, D.C.), which do not recognize AOA.
Whether the alienation (loss of affection) occurred in NC or elsewhere was therefore a material fact tied directly to liability.
By not submitting that question to the jury, the trial court improperly decided a factual issue.
Because damages were awarded in a combined block for both AOA and CC, the appellate court could not separate what portion belonged to each tort.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: Verdict vacated; remanded for new trial, with jury to decide where tort occurred.
Criminal conversation: Liability stands (summary judgment proper), but damages vacated and remanded since compensatory award was intertwined with AOA.

Key Takeaways

Combined damages for AOA and CC are proper at trial (Sebastian v. Kluttz), but on appeal, if one claim is undermined, damages must be retried because they cannot be apportioned.

Alienation of affections is a transitory tort; liability depends on where the injury occurred, not where suit is filed.

In multi-state conduct cases, the jury must decide lex loci if disputed. In North Carolina (and most traditional jurisdictions), the substantive law governing a tort is the law of the state where the injury occurred, not where the lawsuit is filed. So, in a single-state case, the court just applies that state’s law. In a multi-state conduct case (for example, alienation of affections that includes trips and phone calls in NC, Maryland, and Virginia), however, there may be disagreement about where the injury (loss of affection) actually happened. If that fact is contested, it becomes a jury question (“an issue of fact”). The jury must decide which state is the lex loci of the tort. Once the jury decides where the alienation or injury occurred, the court then applies that state’s substantive law.

👉 Practical effect: In Darnell v. Rupplin, if the jury decided the injury occurred in Maryland, Virginia, or D.C., the claim would fail because those states don’t recognize alienation of affections. If they found it happened in North Carolina, the plaintiff could recover.

Alienation of affections requires active participation by defendant; mere mutual attraction is not enough.

1989 — Gray v. Hoover

Facts

Plaintiff (William Gray) sued defendant (Wallace Hoover) for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC) involving Gray’s wife.
Evidence showed:
- Gray believed they had a “wonderful marriage” (new home, farming together). After wife began working with defendant, she turned cold, refused trips, and said she loved defendant. Defendant told her to “take her part of what they owned and run,” sent gifts and notes, and made frequent late-night calls. Plaintiff twice caught defendant with his wife in compromising situations (at a trailer, at the lake). Defendant admitted in a phone call to plaintiff that he was having sex with plaintiff’s wife; plaintiff testified they lived together in Florida while still married.
- Defendant publicly flaunted the relationship, kissing and groping plaintiff’s wife in front of him.
Trial:
- Directed verdict for defendant on alienation of affections. Jury awarded $30,000 compensatory + $10,000 punitive for criminal conversation.
- Trial court granted JNOV for defendant, setting aside CC verdict.
Plaintiff appealed.

Issues

Was there sufficient evidence to submit AOA to the jury?
Was there sufficient evidence to uphold the CC verdict?
Were damages (compensatory & punitive) supported by evidence?
How to avoid double recovery when both AOA and CC are tried together?

Rules

AOA elements: (1) genuine love/affection; (2) alienation/destruction; (3) defendant’s wrongful/malicious acts as controlling cause (Chappell v. Redding).
CC elements: (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse during coverture. Proof may be circumstantial (Sebastian v. Kluttz).
Damages: Compensatory may include loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, injury to health, loss of support; punitive requires willful, malicious, wanton conduct (Sebastian).
Double recovery: Because AOA and CC damages overlap, any later AOA award must be reduced by amounts already awarded for CC (Sebastian; Dobbs, Remedies § 7.3).

Analysis

AOA: Even “marginal” testimony (that plaintiff thought marriage was wonderful, farming together, building home) plus wife’s later coldness, refusal to travel, admissions of loving defendant, and defendant’s gifts/calls/physical advances constituted more than a scintilla of evidence. Jury should have decided. Directed verdict reversed.
CC: Substantial circumstantial evidence — living together in Florida, overnight surveillance, admissions of sex, lack of rebuttal testimony by defendant/wife — was enough to sustain CC. JNOV was improper; jury verdict reinstated.
Damages: Plaintiff’s testimony supported loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation. Public acts (kissing, unbuttoning blouse in front of plaintiff) justified punitive damages.
Overlap: Because CC verdict already awarded $30,000 comp + $10,000 punitive, any subsequent AOA award must be reduced by those amounts to avoid double recovery.

Conclusion

Directed verdict on AOA reversed; claim remanded for new trial.
JNOV on CC reversed; jury’s $30,000 comp + $10,000 punitive reinstated.
On remand, any AOA damages must be reduced by the CC amounts to prevent double recovery.

Key Takeaways

Avoiding double recovery: When AOA and CC overlap, courts require offsets so plaintiff cannot be compensated twice for the same injury.

Alienation of affections proof threshold is low (“more than a scintilla”) — marginal evidence of a happy marriage plus evidence of wrongful interference suffices.

Criminal conversation can be proven circumstantially through cohabitation, admissions, and unrebutted testimony.

Punitive damages are justified where defendant flaunts adulterous acts in front of the spouse, showing willfulness and malice.

1990 — Johnson v. Ruark OB‑GYN

Facts

Plaintiffs: Barbara and Glenn Johnson, expectant parents.
Defendants: Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates and four physicians providing prenatal care.
Barbara Johnson received prenatal care from March to October 1983; repeatedly told pregnancy was normal.
On Oct. 3, 1983, she went into labor; monitoring revealed no fetal heart tones. The fetus was declared dead before delivery.
Plaintiffs alleged negligent prenatal care caused stillbirth.
Claims filed:
- Wrongful death of fetus (by Glenn Johnson, as administrator).
- Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims by both parents in their individual capacities (emotional distress of labor/delivery of dead child).
Trial court dismissed all claims (Rule 12(b)(6)).
Court of Appeals reversed, allowing wrongful death and NIED claims.
Supreme Court granted discretionary review (limited to NIED issues).

Issues

Can plaintiffs recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress without showing physical impact, physical injury, or physical manifestation?
Can plaintiffs recover for emotional distress based on concern for another person’s condition (here, their fetus)?
Did plaintiffs’ complaint allege sufficient facts to state NIED claims?

Rules

NIED elements: (1) negligent conduct by defendant; (2) foreseeability that conduct would cause plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) actual severe emotional distress proximately caused.
Severe emotional distress: any diagnosable mental disorder (e.g., neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia).
No physical injury requirement: Overruled earlier cases (Hinnant v. Power Co., Williamson v. Bennett) and several Court of Appeals decisions that required impact/injury/manifestation.
Concern for another: A plaintiff may recover if distress from concern for another is a foreseeable and proximate result of defendant’s negligence.
Foreseeability factors: (a) plaintiff’s proximity to negligent act; (b) relationship to victim; (c) whether plaintiff personally observed negligent act.

Analysis

Overruled restrictions: Court clarified that NIED does not require physical impact or injury; emotional harm is a compensable injury standing alone.
Concern for another: Parents may claim for emotional distress suffered due to harm to their unborn child, if foreseeable.
Complaint sufficiency: Allegations that both parents suffered severe emotional distress from enduring labor/delivery of a stillborn child, knowing it was dead, were sufficient to state a claim.
Foreseeability: Close parental relationship and presence during negligent care and stillbirth make distress foreseeable.
Result: Plaintiffs entitled to proceed with individual NIED claims.

Conclusion

Supreme Court of NC affirmed Court of Appeals.
Both parents’ NIED claims allowed to proceed.
Landmark holding: NIED in NC requires no physical injury or manifestation; distress from concern for another may be actionable if foreseeable and severe.

Key Takeaways

The case significantly broadened NIED recovery in NC, disapproving decades of restrictive precedent.

Johnson v. Ruark is the leading NC case on negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Physical injury/impact is not required — mental distress is independently compensable.

Parents can recover for emotional trauma from harm to their child (even an unborn child), if foreseeable.

Foreseeability is guided by proximity, relationship, and observation factors.

Johnson v. Ruark is a negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) case involving parents of a stillborn fetus. The NC Supreme Court held that:

Physical injury or physical manifestation is not required for NIED.
A plaintiff may recover for severe emotional distress caused by concern for another person (like a spouse or child) if it was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence.

The Connection to Criminal Conversation & Alienation of Affections

Historical overlap: Older NC cases discussing recovery for emotional distress often mentioned criminal conversation and alienation of affections as examples of intentional torts where damages for emotional distress are allowed.
In Johnson v. Ruark, the dissent even cited Cottle v. Johnson (1920) and Powell v. Strickland (1913) (both criminal conversation/alienation cases) as examples of how NC law had traditionally limited or allowed emotional damages.
Both heart-balm torts (CC/AOA) and NIED center on injuries to personal/familial relationships and the mental anguish caused by interference.
Thus, Johnson v. Ruark expanded the scope of recovery for emotional distress beyond the traditional torts (like CC/AOA) and into negligence, showing the NC courts’ willingness to treat emotional harm as a compensable injury in its own right.

⚖️ Bottom line:
Johnson v. Ruark isn’t itself a criminal conversation case, but it acknowledges and builds upon the same legal tradition that allowed recovery for emotional harm in CC/AOA. It broadened NC tort law so that mental anguish from negligence (not just adultery/affection cases) could support recovery.

1991 — Shaw v. Stringer

Facts

Plaintiff (Ernest Shaw) sued defendant (Preston Stringer) for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC) with Shaw’s wife.
Background:
- Plaintiff married Stringer’s ex-wife in 1985; she had three children by defendant. Shaw lived with her and the children, supporting and helping raise them.Defendant frequently visited the household—ostensibly to see his children—then began an affair with Shaw’s wife.
- Even after Shaw discovered the affair and demanded it stop, defendant continued visiting and having sexual relations with Shaw’s wife.
Jury verdict:
- AOA: liability found, but $0 compensatory damages. CC: liability found, $125,000 compensatory damages.
- Punitive damages (combined issue): $50,000 “for criminal conversation and/or alienation of affections.”
Defendant appealed, raising evidentiary, instructional, and damages issues.

Issues

Was there sufficient evidence to submit AOA to the jury?
Was evidence of defendant’s failure to support his children and plaintiff’s good relationship with them admissible?
Was there sufficient evidence to submit punitive damages to the jury?
Were there errors in jury instructions on punitive damages (application to criminal conversation, requirement of compensatory damages first)?
Was the verdict contradictory because punitive damages might have been awarded on AOA without compensatory damages?

Rules

AOA proof: Plaintiff need only show spouse had some genuine love and affection that was lost due to defendant’s wrongful interference; marriage need not be blissful (Chappell v. Redding; Sebastian v. Kluttz).
Punitive damages: Recoverable in alienation of affections and criminal conversation if defendant’s conduct is willful, aggravated, malicious, or wanton (Powell v. Strickland).
Evidence relevance: Conduct with children admissible to show affection between spouse and plaintiff.
Procedural rules: Failure to object contemporaneously to jury instructions waives appellate review (Rule 10(b)(2), N.C. R. App. P.).

Analysis

AOA: Testimony showed wife loved plaintiff “in a different way” and valued his care for her children; this was enough for jury submission. The fact she also still loved defendant did not negate affection for plaintiff.
Evidence of children: Relevant because wife testified she loved plaintiff for his relationship with her children. Properly admitted.
Punitive damages: Defendant persisted in affair after being warned, continued visiting marital home, and laughed when wife said plaintiff knew — sufficient aggravation for punitive damages.
Jury instructions: Defendant failed to object at trial to alleged defects (application to CC, requirement of actual damages). Issue waived.
Contradictory verdict claim: Not persuasive. Record did not show punitive damages tied to AOA; reasonable to infer all punitive damages applied to criminal conversation (where compensatory damages were awarded).

Conclusion

No error. Verdict of $125,000 compensatory (CC) + $50,000 punitive (CC and/or AOA) upheld.

Key Takeaways

Courts will harmonize verdicts where possible, assuming punitive damages flow from claims with compensatory awards.

Alienation of affection standard is modest: Plaintiff need only show some genuine affection existed and was lost due to defendant’s interference; the marriage need not be idyllic or perfect.

Evidence involving children can support alienation of affections claims by showing affection between plaintiff and spouse.

Punitive damages are available in both alienation of affections and criminal conversation if conduct is willful and aggravated.

Procedural preservation is critical: objections to jury instructions must be made before the jury retires.

1991 — In re Estate of Trogdon

Facts

Decedent: Calvin Trogdon, a quadriplegic after a motorcycle accident.
Surviving spouse: Patricia Trogdon (respondent).
Timeline:
- Couple remarried in 1983. In 1985, Patricia left the marital home, moved into an apartment. Shortly after, she cohabited with another man (“Cookie” Winfrey). She admitted to her son that they were “living together.” Cohabitation continued for at least two years before Calvin’s death. She filed for divorce; he filed for alimony; Calvin died before judgment.
- At hearing, Patricia invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned about her relationship with Winfrey.
Probate: Patricia applied for a spouse’s year’s allowance under N.C.G.S. § 30-15. The administrator (her son) objected, claiming she forfeited rights under N.C.G.S. § 31A-1 by living in adultery.
Trial court: found adultery and set aside the allowance.
Court of Appeals: reversed, holding there was proof of opportunity but not inclination.
NC Supreme Court: reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating trial court’s finding.

Issues

Was there sufficient evidence of adultery (opportunity + inclination) to support forfeiture of statutory rights?
Could the factfinder infer adultery from respondent’s refusal to testify (5th Amendment)?

Rules

N.C.G.S. § 31A-1(a)(2), (b)(4): a spouse who voluntarily separates and lives in uncondoned adultery forfeits rights, including year’s allowance.
Proof of adultery: may be established circumstantially by showing opportunity and inclination (Owens v. Owens).
Fifth Amendment inference: In civil cases, factfinder may infer that a witness’s refusal to testify would have been unfavorable.

Analysis

Evidence of inclination: Patricia cohabited with Winfrey for years, admitted they were “living together,” and continued until decedent’s death. This exceeded mere suspicion.
Fifth Amendment refusal: Her refusal to answer questions about the relationship supported inference of adultery.
Comparison to prior cases: Court distinguished cases like Horney v. Horney and Wallace v. Wallace where only “suspicious circumstances” existed. Here, ongoing cohabitation and admissions provided a stronger basis.
Policy: Under § 31A-15, statutes are to be construed broadly so “no person shall profit by his or her own wrong.”

Conclusion

Evidence sufficient to infer adultery; Patricia forfeited her right to year’s allowance.
Trial court’s judgment reinstated; Court of Appeals reversed.

Key Takeaways

The case reinforces how NC courts evaluate circumstantial evidence of adultery in both estate disputes and heart-balm torts.

Adultery in probate/estate law is proven under the same opportunity and inclination doctrine used in criminal conversation cases.

Invocation of the 5th Amendment can support an adverse inference in civil adultery-related proceedings.

Adultery = forfeiture of certain spousal inheritance rights (year’s allowance, etc.) under NC law.

In re Estate of Trogdon (1991) is not itself a criminal conversation lawsuit (it’s about whether a widow forfeited her statutory right to a year’s allowance because she “lived in adultery”). But the case directly uses criminal conversation doctrines — particularly the “opportunity and inclination” rule — to decide whether the wife’s conduct amounted to adultery.

Connection to Criminal Conversation

Proof of Adultery Standard:
- In both criminal conversation tort claims and estate forfeiture cases like Trogdon, adultery is almost always proven circumstantially because direct evidence is rare.
  - Trogdon reaffirms the opportunity + inclination doctrine: adultery may be inferred if there is evidence that the parties had:
    - Opportunity to engage in sexual intercourse; and Inclination or adulterous disposition toward one another.
Use of Precedent from CC Cases:
- The Court reviewed earlier criminal conversation and alienation of affection cases (e.g., Owens v. Owens, Horney v. Horney, Wallace v. Wallace) that wrestled with how much evidence is enough to infer adultery.
  - It concluded Patricia Trogdon’s cohabitation with another man for years, her admissions to her son, and her refusal to answer under the 5th Amendment went beyond “suspicion” and permitted a finding of adultery.
5th Amendment Inference:
- Like in CC cases such as Gray v. Hoover and Walker v. Walker, the Court said a civil factfinder may infer from a spouse’s refusal to testify that the answer would have been adverse. That inference applied here to adultery, just as in CC.

Why It Matters

Trogdon shows that the same evidentiary framework used in criminal conversation cases (circumstantial proof of adultery) governs other contexts where adultery is legally relevant (inheritance, alimony, forfeiture of statutory rights).
It confirms that NC law doesn’t require direct proof of sex—jurors and judges can infer adultery from cohabitation, admissions, suspicious circumstances, and silence.

✅ Bottom line: In re Estate of Trogdon applies the criminal conversation evidentiary standard (opportunity + inclination) to an estate case. It strengthens and reaffirms how NC courts handle proof of adultery, whether the claim is criminal conversation, alienation of affection, divorce/alimony, or estate forfeiture.

1994 — McLean v. Mechanic

Facts

Plaintiff, Russell McLean III (an attorney), sued defendant Phil Mechanic for:
1. Criminal conversation (adultery with McLean’s wife, Susie McLean),
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
3. Slander.
McLean and his wife had marital problems. Susie went on a trip to Aruba with Mechanic, telling her husband she was going to Myrtle Beach.
McLean later found condoms and spermicide in her belongings. Suspicious, he sent her underwear for DNA testing, which revealed semen matching Mechanic’s DNA with 99% certainty.
Mechanic retaliated by calling some of McLean’s law clients and falsely saying McLean was having a homosexual affair and had mishandled a mortgage foreclosure. Several clients left his firm.
Jury found:

Slander: $1,000 compensatory + $20,000 punitive (but punitive struck as sanction for improper pleading under Rule 8(a)(2));
Criminal conversation: Defendant liable, but jury awarded $0 compensatory/nominal damages and $10,000 punitive damages (trial court struck the punitive).
Result: Plaintiff prevailed but received only $1,000 total. Both parties appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court properly strike the punitive damages in the slander claim as a sanction for violating Rule 8(a)(2)?
Could punitive damages be upheld in the criminal conversation claim when the jury awarded no compensatory/nominal damages?
Was the DNA evidence properly admitted despite foundation/chain of custody objections?

Rule

Rule 8(a)(2), N.C. R. Civ. P.: Complaints may not demand a specific punitive damages amount over $10,000; must plead “in excess of $10,000.” Violation can be sanctioned, including dismissal.
Nominal Damages Principle (Hawkins v. Hawkins, 331 N.C. 743 (1992)): Once liability is proven, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages as a matter of law, which can support punitive damages even if jury fails to award them.
DNA Evidence: DNA testing is generally admissible with proper foundation; disputes over chain of custody or conflicting expert testimony go to weight, not admissibility.

Analysis

Slander punitive damages: Plaintiff pled “punitive damages in excess of $100,000,” violating Rule 8(a)(2). Court had authority to dismiss punitive damages as sanction. No error in striking them.
Criminal conversation punitive damages: Jury found liability but gave no compensatory or nominal damages. Court struck punitive award. Court of Appeals reversed, holding plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages by law once liability proven; that nominal award supported the $10,000 punitive award.
DNA evidence: Defendant waived objections by failing to object at depositions and trial. Conflicts between experts were jury questions. Chain of custody (underwear handled by several people before lab testing) went to weight, not admissibility. Admission upheld.

Conclusion

Affirmed trial court’s dismissal of punitive damages in slander case.
Reversed striking of punitive damages in criminal conversation case; remanded for entry of $10,000 punitive award.
Upheld admission of DNA evidence.

Key Takeaways

DNA in civil tort cases: Admissible and powerful evidence of adultery; chain of custody questions usually for jury.

Criminal conversation: Once liability is proven, plaintiff automatically gets nominal damages, which can sustain punitive damages even if jury fails to award them expressly.

Rule 8(a)(2): Over-pleading damages is sanctionable; plead carefully.

1996 — Brown v. Hurley

Facts

Plaintiff Charles Brown married Deborah Brown in 1985.
They separated on June 27, 1992, but continued seeing each other, exchanging “anniversary” cards, dining together, and vacationing at the beach.
In October 1992, Deborah presented Charles with a separation agreement, indicating she would not return to the marriage.
Shortly after, Charles observed Michael Hurley (defendant, a co-worker of Deborah’s) staying overnight at Deborah’s apartment, kissing her, and traveling with her. A private investigator confirmed further overnight stays and affectionate contact.
Plaintiff sued Hurley for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Defendant moved for dismissal/summary judgment, arguing no evidence of a relationship before separation. Trial court denied, but later granted Hurley’s motion in limine excluding post-separation conduct. Plaintiff conceded no pre-separation evidence; directed verdict entered for Hurley.
Plaintiff attempted appeal but abandoned it. Hurley then sought Rule 11 sanctions against Brown and his attorney, arguing the claims were frivolous. Trial court denied sanctions; Hurley appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court err in refusing to impose Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff for filing claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation without sufficient legal/factual basis?

Rule

Rule 11, N.C. R. Civ. P.: A pleading must be:
1. Well-grounded in law (existing law or a good-faith argument for change);
2. Well-grounded in fact (reasonable inquiry must support factual contentions);
3. Not interposed for an improper purpose (e.g., harassment).
Criminal conversation elements: Valid marriage + sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture (separation does not bar action). Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191 (1938).
Alienation of affections elements: Genuine love and affection existed, it was destroyed, and defendant’s wrongful acts caused the loss (Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724 (1989)).

Analysis

Well-grounded in law:
- Both claims were facially plausible.
- Criminal conversation can occur even if the spouses are separated, so long as marriage exists.
- Alienation of affections requires proof of genuine affection and its destruction by defendant; evidence suggested affection persisted post-separation, undermining Hurley’s claim that suit was legally baseless.
Well-grounded in fact:
- Plaintiff personally observed Hurley with Deborah.
- Private investigator documented overnight stays and kissing.
- Plaintiff reasonably inquired into facts before filing.
No improper purpose:
- Plaintiff deposed Hurley and Deborah, issued subpoenas for records, served discovery requests, and hired a private investigator.
- These were reasonable litigation steps, not harassment.

Conclusion

The trial court correctly denied Rule 11 sanctions. Plaintiff’s claims, while unsuccessful at trial, were grounded in law and fact and pursued for a proper purpose. Judgment affirmed.

Key Takeaways

Courts hesitate to impose sanctions when plaintiff conducted reasonable factual investigation (surveillance, depositions, subpoenas).

A claim may fail at trial yet still be Rule 11-compliant if it had a reasonable legal and factual basis when filed.

Separation does not automatically defeat a criminal conversation claim; sexual relations during marriage—even post-separation—can still support liability.

1996 — Coachman v. Gould

Facts

Plaintiff, Joseph Coachman, married Annie Jean Williams in 1988; they separated in 1991 and divorced in 1993.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant Willie Gould engaged in an affair with Annie Jean, causing alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Plaintiff’s “evidence” consisted of:
- Frequent phone calls between Gould and Annie Jean (15–45 minutes nightly),
- One ambiguous statement by Annie Jean (while medicated) that she had “been with” Gould,
- A single observation of Gould leaving in a car with Annie Jean.
Gould admitted to a prior intimate relationship with Annie Jean, but it ended before her marriage to Coachman.
Defendant moved for summary judgment; trial court granted it. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Did plaintiff present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on claims for criminal conversation and alienation of affections?

Rule

Criminal Conversation: Requires proof of (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture (Chappell v. Redding, 67 N.C. App. 397 (1984)). Proof must be more than mere conjecture.
Alienation of Affections: Requires (1) genuine love and affection in the marriage, (2) loss of such affection, and (3) defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts caused the alienation (Chappell).
Opportunity + Inclination Doctrine (In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. 143 (1991)): Adultery can be inferred circumstantially by showing both adulterous disposition and opportunity to act on it.

Analysis

Criminal Conversation:
- Plaintiff produced no direct evidence of intercourse.
- Circumstantial evidence (calls, ambiguous “been with” statement, one car ride) amounted to speculation.
- No sufficient proof of opportunity or inclination under Trogdon.
Alienation of Affections:
- The only potentially wrongful acts were Gould’s repeated phone calls.
- Defendant claimed calls were for business (janitorial contracts), which plaintiff did not refute.
- Plaintiff’s request that Gould stop calling did not render calls “malicious.”
- No evidence of threats, salacious talk, or overt attempts to alienate affection.
Both claims failed as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Summary judgment for defendant affirmed. Plaintiff failed to present evidence beyond mere conjecture on criminal conversation and failed to establish malicious conduct for alienation of affections.

Key Takeaways

This case reinforces the evidentiary rigor of the “opportunity + inclination” doctrine from Trogdon.

Conjecture is insufficient: Courts require concrete evidence of opportunity and inclination to infer adultery. Phone calls or ambiguous statements don’t meet the threshold.

Alienation of affections requires malicious acts: Mere phone calls, even against spouse’s wishes, are not enough absent proof they were intended to destroy marital affection.

1999 — Hutelmyer v. Cox

Facts

Plaintiff Dorothy Hutelmyer sued Margie Cox for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Joseph Hutelmyer.
Dorothy and Joseph married in 1978, had three children, and she described their marriage as a “fairy tale” until the early 1990s.
Cox began working as Joseph’s secretary in 1986. After her own separation in 1992, Cox became flirtatious, traveled with Joseph, dined and worked late with him, and neighbors observed Joseph’s car overnight at her house.
Coworkers saw the couple hold hands, brush lint off suits, and eat ice from the same cup in public.
By 1994, Joseph and Cox admitted to a sexual relationship. Joseph left Dorothy in 1996 and soon married Cox.
Jury awarded $500,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive damages. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to submit alienation of affections and criminal conversation to the jury?
Was there sufficient evidence to support punitive damages?
Were the damages awards excessive?
Should the torts themselves be abolished?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Plaintiff must show (1) a loving marriage, (2) loss of that love and affection, (3) defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts caused the loss (Chappell v. Redding).
Criminal Conversation: Requires proof of sexual intercourse between defendant and plaintiff’s spouse during marriage.
Punitive Damages (N.C.G.S. Ch. 1D): May be awarded for willful, wanton, or malicious conduct; capped at 3x compensatory or $250,000, whichever greater.
Damages: Include loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, injury to health, loss of income, support, and benefits.

Analysis

Alienation claim: Evidence showed Dorothy and Joseph had a strong marriage until Cox’s conduct; testimony supported that Cox’s acts were the controlling cause of alienation. Directed verdict/j.n.o.v. properly denied.
Criminal conversation: Evidence conclusive that Cox engaged in a sexual relationship with Joseph during marriage, supporting the claim.
Punitive damages:
- Alienation: Evidence of aggravating circumstances (public displays of affection, flaunting affair, Thanksgiving call, overnight visits) justified submission to jury.
- Criminal conversation: North Carolina law allows punitive damages based on the adultery itself; jury may award if intercourse proven.
Compensatory damages: Sufficient evidence of both financial and emotional loss (consortium, health, mental anguish, loss of benefits).
Amount: Punitive capped at $1.5M, so $500,000 award not excessive.
Abolishment: Court of Appeals lacked authority to abolish torts; only Supreme Court/legislature could.

Conclusion

No error. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Defendant held liable for $500,000 compensatory + $500,000 punitive damages.

Key Takeaways

NC Court of Appeals reaffirmed it cannot abolish these torts; they remain valid causes of action.

Public flaunting and prolonged affair can justify punitive damages in alienation of affections.

For criminal conversation, proof of intercourse during marriage supports both compensatory and punitive damages.

Damages include financial, emotional, and health-related injuries; punitive capped but large awards upheld.

1999 — Horner v. Byrnett

Facts

Plaintiff Robert Douthart (through his estate executrix after his death) sued defendant Jeffrey Byrnett for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Defendant admitted to a sexual relationship with plaintiff’s wife from August 1992 to June 1993.
Plaintiff filed suit in 1996. The court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff on criminal conversation because intercourse was admitted.
Jury trial proceeded:
- Awarded $1 compensatory damages (nominal) and $85,000 punitive damages for criminal conversation.
- Alienation of affections claim failed.
Defendant moved for JNOV/new trial, arguing punitive damages excessive and unjustified. Trial court denied; defendant appealed.

Issue

Can punitive damages be awarded in a criminal conversation action based solely on the proof of adultery?
Was the award of $85,000 punitive damages on $1 compensatory damages excessive?

Rule

Criminal Conversation Elements: Valid marriage + sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during marriage (Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191 (1938)).
Punitive Damages: The same sexual misconduct establishing criminal conversation may also support punitive damages; adultery itself is sufficient (Johnston v. Allen, 100 N.C. 131 (1888); Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393 (1913)).
Nominal Damages: Once liability established, plaintiff entitled to nominal damages as a matter of law, which can support punitive damages (Hawkins v. Hawkins, 331 N.C. 743 (1992)).
Standard for Punitive Damages: Awarded when conduct is willful, aggravated, malicious, or wanton (Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458 (1982)).

Analysis

Punitive Damages Justified:
- Defendant argued adultery alone was insufficient; court disagreed.
- North Carolina precedent (Powell, Johnston) allows punitive damages in criminal conversation without additional aggravating conduct.
- Here, defendant and wife even discussed the harm the relationship would cause before engaging — showing willful disregard of plaintiff’s rights.
Amount of Damages:
- Defendant claimed $85,000 punitive vs. $1 compensatory was excessive.
- Court held nominal damages are enough; punitive can greatly exceed compensatory.
- Jury discretion governs amount, as long as not “excessively disproportionate.”

Conclusion

No error: Punitive damages properly awarded; $85,000 punitive on $1 compensatory upheld.
Case reaffirms that adultery alone is sufficient to sustain punitive damages in criminal conversation.

Key Takeaways

Jury discretion on punitive amounts is broad; courts won’t reduce unless grossly disproportionate.

Adultery itself justifies punitive damages: No need for added aggravating acts if intercourse proven.

Nominal damages suffice: $1 award can sustain substantial punitive damages.

2000 — Ward v. Beaton

Facts

Plaintiff Patricia Ward sued Kristen Beaton for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
At trial, the judge granted directed verdicts for defendant on criminal conversation and IIED, leaving only alienation for the jury.
Evidence: Plaintiff testified she and her husband had a “perfect marriage.” After meeting defendant in 1998, her husband spent less time at home, moved in with defendant for two weeks, and a sexual relationship developed.
Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff: $52,000 compensatory damages and $43,000 punitive damages for alienation of affections.
Defendant appealed, challenging sufficiency of evidence, jury instructions, punitive damages, and trial court’s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion alleging fraud.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to support alienation of affections?
Did plaintiff properly plead and prove aggravating factors for punitive damages?
Was evidence of defendant’s assets admissible before compensatory damages were determined?
Did alleged fraud or reconciliation between plaintiff and her husband require relief from judgment?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Requires proof of (1) a marriage with genuine love and affection, (2) alienation and destruction of that affection, and (3) defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts were a controlling cause (Hankins v. Hankins; Chappell v. Redding).
Defendant need not lure or initiate; willing participation suffices (Heist v. Heist). Defendant’s acts need not be sole cause; only a controlling cause (Bishop v. Glazener).
Punitive Damages (Rule 9(k); G.S. § 1D-15): Plaintiff must specifically plead punitive damages and allege an aggravating factor (fraud, malice, willful/wanton conduct). Sexual relations plus additional aggravating acts justify punitive damages (Hutelmyer v. Cox; Jennings v. Jessen; Shaw v. Stringer).
Rule 60(b) Relief: Fraud is an affirmative defense; must be pled or tried by consent. Cannot be raised for first time post-trial.

Analysis

Alienation: Plaintiff’s testimony of a loving marriage + husband’s growing involvement with defendant and eventual move-in was sufficient for jury to infer alienation caused by defendant. No need to prove “luring.”
Punitive Damages: Plaintiff pled malice and willful/wanton conduct. Evidence of sexual relationship + aggravating circumstances (defendant accompanying husband when returning children, appearing at marital home, honking horn outside during visits) supported punitive damages.
Assets Evidence: Defendant did not request a bifurcated trial under § 1D-30. Thus, evidence of her net worth was admissible during plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
Rule 60(b) Fraud: Defendant argued collusion between plaintiff and her husband (filing child support waiver and later reconciling). Court held fraud was not pled and therefore waived.

Conclusion

Affirmed: Alienation of affections verdict and damages upheld.
$52,000 compensatory + $43,000 punitive damages for plaintiff sustained.

Key Takeaways

Failure to request bifurcation allows plaintiff to introduce evidence of defendant’s net worth before compensatory liability is decided.

Alienation claims do not require “luring”; passive participation that becomes a controlling cause suffices.

Defendant’s conduct need not be sole cause of alienation; it must be an effective cause.

Sexual relations + aggravating circumstances allow punitive damages in alienation cases.

Fraud as a defense must be pled early; cannot be raised post-trial. Fraud is an affirmative defense. Defendant never pled it in her Answer, and it was not a litigated issue at trial, and thus fraud could not be raised for the first time after the verdict in a post-trial motion.

2000 — Cooper v. Shealy

Facts

Plaintiff Christine Cooper (a North Carolina resident) sued Lisa Shealy (a South Carolina resident) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).
Plaintiff alleged:
- She and her husband had a loving marriage,
- Defendant wrongfully alienated his affections,
- Defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her husband,
- Defendant made telephone calls and e-mails into North Carolina to pursue the relationship.
Trial court denied defendant’s motions. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Does North Carolina have personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions?
Which state’s substantive law applies if the tortious acts occurred outside NC?

Rule

Long-Arm Jurisdiction (N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4):
- Jurisdiction exists if action claims injury to person or property in NC, even if act occurred outside NC.
- “Solicitation” within NC (calls, emails) that cause injury in NC satisfies statute.
Injury Definition: Alienation of affections and criminal conversation count as “injury to person or property” under § 1-75.4(3) (Sherwood v. Sherwood; Golding v. Taylor).
Due Process (International Shoe): Defendant must have “minimum contacts” with NC; jurisdiction must not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Choice of Law: Substantive law is that of the state where the tort occurred (Darnell v. Rupplin). If tort occurred in South Carolina (where such actions are abolished), claim cannot proceed.

Analysis

Personal Jurisdiction:
- Defendant’s phone calls/emails to plaintiff’s NC home were solicitations, alleged to have caused injury (destruction of marriage) in NC.
- North Carolina has strong policy interest in protecting marriage; plaintiff cannot bring claim in SC because the torts are abolished there.
- Travel burden minimal; defendant lives in a neighboring state.
- Therefore, both long-arm statute and due process satisfied.
Substantive Law:
- Plaintiff must ultimately prove tort occurred in NC for NC law to apply.
- If court later finds tort occurred entirely in SC, case must be dismissed since no cause of action exists there.

Conclusion

Court of Appeals affirmed denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
NC courts may hear case if plaintiff proves tort occurred in NC; otherwise, no substantive law applies.

Key Takeaways

Policy: NC courts emphasize protecting marriage and providing a forum when plaintiff would otherwise have no remedy.

NC Long-Arm Statute is broad: Even out-of-state acts (calls/emails) can create jurisdiction if injury is suffered in NC. Alienation & criminal conversation = injury to person under long-arm.

Choice of Law matters: Even if NC has jurisdiction, plaintiff must prove tortious acts happened in NC; otherwise the action fails if in a state like SC where these torts are abolished.

2001 — Anderson v. Anderson

Facts

Kent Anderson (husband) and Vicky Anderson (wife) married in 1987, had three children, and separated in 1997.
They executed a Marital Settlement Agreement resolving property and support matters.
Husband later sought absolute divorce; wife counterclaimed for equitable distribution of husband’s military retirement pension, arguing it wasn’t included in the settlement.
Trial court granted summary judgment for husband, finding the separation agreement barred her claim. Wife appealed.

Issue

Did wife waive the Rule 56 notice requirement by attending and participating in the summary judgment hearing?
Did the trial court err in dismissing her equitable distribution claim without an evidentiary hearing?
Did the trial court err in failing to deem her counterclaim admitted under Rule 8(d) because husband didn’t file a reply?

Rule

Rule 56 (Summary Judgment): Requires 10 days’ notice, but notice is procedural, not constitutional; waived if a party participates without objection (Raintree Corp. v. Rowe).
Separation Agreements (N.C.G.S. § 52-10; Hagler v. Hagler): Valid separation agreements are enforceable contracts; clear and unambiguous agreements bar later equitable distribution claims.
Rule 8(d): Failure to reply to a counterclaim deems it admitted—but issue must be raised at trial to be preserved for appeal.

Analysis

Notice Waiver: Wife participated fully, offered legal authority, and made no objection or request for continuance. She waived Rule 56 notice.
No Evidentiary Hearing Needed: Agreement was clear, unambiguous, and intended as final settlement. Courts interpret separation agreements as contracts; no factual disputes required evidentiary hearing.
- Agreement expressly referenced husband’s military retirement benefits in child support provisions, showing intent to include them.
Admissions Argument: Wife failed to raise Rule 8(d) issue at trial; under Rule 10(b)(1), it was not preserved for appeal.

Conclusion

Judgment affirmed.
Wife’s equitable distribution claim barred by separation agreement; procedural notice waived; Rule 8(d) issue not preserved.

Key Takeaways

Rule 56 notice can be waived by attending and participating without objection.
Clear, unambiguous separation agreements bar equitable distribution claims, including military pensions.
To preserve appellate issues, objections must be raised at trial.

Relation to Criminal Conversation / Lessons Learned

Lesson: Courts place heavy emphasis on the finality of agreements and strict adherence to procedure. In CC/AoA cases, this means defenses and objections must be raised promptly and pled with care — waiting until after trial to assert them is almost always too late.

Procedural Strategy Matters: Just like in criminal conversation cases (e.g., when challenging punitive damages pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2)), litigants must preserve objections early. Waiver principles apply across family tort and property disputes.

Importance of Agreements: Separation agreements can cut off later claims. In alienation/criminal conversation cases, defendants sometimes argue the marriage was already dead or legally resolved — Anderson shows courts enforce written agreements strictly.

Preservation of Claims: If fraud, collusion, or other defenses exist (as often alleged in alienation/criminal conversation defenses), they must be pled early or tried by consent; otherwise, they are waived.

2001 — Johnson v. Pearce

Facts

Plaintiff Kenneth Johnson married Rhonda Mitchell in 1991.
In 1997, after marital difficulties, Mitchell left the marital home.
She began dating defendant Dallas Pearce in December 1997.
Defendant and Mitchell engaged in sexual intercourse in January 1998, about five months after the separation, but before divorce.
Johnson sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Trial court granted directed verdict for Johnson on criminal conversation, awarding $3,000. Alienation claim failed.
Defendant appealed, arguing that post-separation conduct cannot support a criminal conversation claim.

Issue

Can a claim for criminal conversation be based solely on post-separation sexual intercourse between a spouse and defendant?

Rule

Criminal Conversation Elements:
1. Valid marriage, and
2. Sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture (Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377 (1996)).
Separation not a bar: The fact of separation does not defeat a claim for criminal conversation (Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191 (1938)).
1995 Amendments to Alimony Statutes (defining marital misconduct as pre-separation acts only) apply to divorce and alimony, not to the tort of criminal conversation.

Analysis

Defendant argued the 1995 amendments restricted actionable misconduct to pre-separation conduct.
Court rejected this, noting those amendments dealt only with divorce/alimony statutes, not tort law.
Alienation of affections claims must be based on pre-separation conduct (Pharr v. Beck), but criminal conversation is different: adultery is actionable so long as it occurs during coverture, even after separation.
Until the legislature or NC Supreme Court changes the rule, separation does not bar criminal conversation claims.

Conclusion

Affirmed: Criminal conversation claim can rest solely on post-separation sexual intercourse, so long as the marriage still legally exists.

Key Takeaways

Alienation vs. Criminal Conversation:
- Alienation: Must prove wrongful acts caused loss of affection before separation.
- Criminal Conversation: Only requires proof of marriage + intercourse before divorce; separation does not matter.
Legislative vs. Judicial Change: The Court of Appeals emphasized that only the NC General Assembly or Supreme Court can abolish or modify the tort.

Lesson

For criminal conversation cases, post-separation adultery is still actionable until divorce is final. Defendants cannot rely on separation alone as a defense. Lawyers must distinguish carefully between alienation (pre-separation proof required) and criminal conversation (separation irrelevant).

2001 — Pharr v. Beck

Facts

Plaintiff Ruby Pharr sued defendant Joyce Beck for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Walter Pharr.
Evidence showed Beck and Walter developed a close relationship in the early 1990s, running and spending time together.
Beck gave Walter gifts, shared a post office box with him, and let him remodel her home. Witnesses observed them acting affectionately pre-separation, including holding hands, hugging, and being found together in a bedroom.
Walter and Ruby separated on June 8, 1996. Beck admitted to sexual intercourse with Walter in December 1996, six months after separation.
Jury awarded plaintiff $86,250 for alienation of affections and $15,000 for criminal conversation.
Defendant appealed only the alienation of affections claim, arguing insufficient evidence and improper reliance on post-separation conduct.

Issue

Must an alienation of affections claim be based solely on pre-separation conduct?
Was there substantial evidence that defendant’s malicious acts caused the loss of Walter’s affection?

Rule

Alienation of Affections Elements: (1) valid marriage with genuine love and affection, (2) loss of that affection, and (3) defendant’s malicious acts were the controlling cause of the loss (Gray v. Hoover).
Malice: Any intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage; conclusively presumed if defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the spouse (Bishop v. Glazener).
Causation: Defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause, only the “controlling or effective” cause (Heist v. Heist).
Separation Rule: Alienation of affections must be based on pre-separation conduct; post-separation acts are admissible only to corroborate pre-separation evidence (Pharr v. Beck itself sets this modern rule).

Analysis

Defendant argued post-separation conduct could not be used. Court agreed in principle: alienation claims must be based on pre-separation misconduct, with post-separation evidence used only as corroboration.
Pre-separation evidence was substantial: gifts, affectionate looks, bedroom incident, use of PO box, remodeling her house, and phone card exchange.
Post-separation sexual intercourse corroborated this pre-separation relationship.
Jury could reasonably conclude defendant’s acts were the controlling cause of the loss of Walter’s affection.

Conclusion

No error. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Court clarified: alienation of affections requires pre-separation acts; post-separation conduct may only corroborate.

Key Takeaways

Separation cutoff: Alienation claims must rest on pre-separation conduct. Post-separation adultery can only support a criminal conversation claim.
Distinguishing Criminal Conversation vs. Alienation of Affections:
- CC: Separation does not bar liability (see Johnson v. Pearce).
- AoA: Separation does bar new liability; evidence after separation is only corroborative.
Malice presumption: Sexual intercourse creates a presumption of malice, but here intercourse was post-separation, so malice had to be inferred from other pre-separation conduct.

Lesson

In AoA cases, timing is critical: liability hinges on pre-separation acts. Post-separation adultery may corroborate but cannot independently establish alienation. Plaintiffs must build their case on evidence of pre-separation affection and defendant’s interference.

2001 — American Manufacturers v. Morgan

Facts

Martha Glidewell sued Elizabeth Morgan for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Pete Glidewell.
Defendant Morgan sought defense and indemnity from her homeowner’s insurance and personal catastrophe liability (PCL) endorsement policies.
Insurers filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing no duty to defend or indemnify because the claims arose from intentional conduct, not an “accident.”
Trial court agreed with insurers. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Did the insurers have a duty to defend or indemnify Morgan under her homeowner’s or PCL endorsement policies for claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation?

Rule

Insurance Coverage – Accidents: Coverage for an “occurrence” = “accident.” An act is not an accident if injury is intentional or substantially certain to result from intentional conduct (Russ v. Great Am. Ins. Cos.; Stox).
Criminal Conversation protects the right of exclusive sexual intercourse and loss of consortium; alienation of affections protects love, society, and companionship (Sebastian v. Kluttz).
Intent Inferred: When an insured engages in conduct sufficient to constitute alienation of affections or criminal conversation, intent to injure the marriage/spouse is inferred as a matter of law.
PCL Endorsements: Coverage depends on definitions of “personal injury” or “bodily injury” within the specific policy period.

Analysis

Homeowner’s Policy
- Required “occurrence” = accident.
- Defendant’s intentional sexual relationship with plaintiff’s husband was substantially certain to cause injury.
- Therefore, not an “accident” → no coverage.
1995–96 PCL Endorsement
- Covered “personal injury” including mental anguish, but trial court found plaintiff’s injuries occurred in 1997 (after policy expired).
- No coverage during that endorsement period.
1996–97 PCL Endorsement
- Defined “bodily injury” separately from “personal injury.”
- Plaintiff’s claims for humiliation, mental anguish, injury to feelings not within definitions of covered injuries.
- No duty to defend/indemnify.

Conclusion

Insurers had no duty to defend or indemnify Morgan for alienation of affections or criminal conversation.
Judgment affirmed.

Key Takeaways

No insurance coverage for alienation of affections or criminal conversation — these are intentional torts, not accidents.
Courts infer intent to injure from the very act of adultery or alienating affections.
Even broader “personal injury” endorsements won’t apply if the wrongful acts fall outside policy period or definitions.

Lesson

CC/AoA defendants cannot shift liability to insurance. These torts are deemed intentional harms to marriage, so insurance won’t defend or indemnify. Litigants must be prepared to face exposure personally — a fact that makes damages awards in these cases especially high-stakes.

2002 — Harris v. Stamey (unpub.)

Facts

Plaintiff Terry Harris married Marcia Harris on June 3, 1989.
They separated on September 16, 2000.
Defendant Mickey Stamey admitted in interrogatory responses that he first had sexual intercourse with Marcia Harris on September 27, 2000 (after separation, but before divorce).
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the criminal conversation claim.
Trial court granted summary judgment, holding no genuine issue of material fact, since marriage existed and intercourse occurred before divorce. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Can a claim for criminal conversation be maintained when the sexual intercourse occurred only after separation but before divorce?

Rule

Criminal Conversation Elements: (1) actual marriage, and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and plaintiff’s spouse during coverture (Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377 (1996)).
Separation is not a defense: Post-separation intercourse still supports liability, as long as spouses remain legally married (Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199 (2001)).

Analysis

Defendant argued no criminal conversation liability since all intercourse occurred after separation.
Court disagreed, relying on Johnson v. Pearce, which held post-separation conduct suffices to establish criminal conversation.
Since facts (marriage + admitted intercourse) were undisputed, plaintiff entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56.

Conclusion

Affirmed: Post-separation intercourse supports a criminal conversation claim so long as no divorce yet entered. Summary judgment for plaintiff proper.

Key Takeaways

Separation ≠ defense: Criminal conversation liability continues until divorce is final.
Plaintiffs may win on summary judgment if marriage and intercourse are undisputed.
Defendants cannot avoid liability by arguing sex occurred only after separation.

Lesson

For criminal conversation cases, post-separation sexual intercourse is enough to establish liability. Once admitted, defendants may face automatic summary judgment — underscoring the strict liability nature of criminal conversation in North Carolina.

2002 — Nunn v. Allen

Facts

Plaintiff Donald Nunn married Vickie Nunn in 1978; they had three children.
The marriage deteriorated in the mid-1990s. Vickie separated from plaintiff in April 1997, and the couple signed a separation agreement in September 1997. They divorced in August 1998.
Defendant Clay Allen worked with Vickie at Allen Brothers Timber Company. Evidence showed they spent time together before and after separation.
Plaintiff presented testimony that in September 1997, he and others observed Allen and Vickie kissing and engaging in oral sex. Defendant admitted to sexual intercourse with Vickie beginning in October 1997, after the separation but before the divorce.
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Jury awarded $50,000 compensatory and $50,000 punitive damages. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Should alienation of affections and criminal conversation be abolished as archaic torts?
Was there sufficient evidence of pre-separation conduct to support alienation of affections?
Can post-separation sexual intercourse sustain criminal conversation despite a separation agreement?
Were punitive damages properly awarded?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Requires (1) marriage with love/affection, (2) alienation of that affection, (3) defendant’s malicious acts were the controlling cause. Post-separation conduct is admissible to corroborate pre-separation conduct (Pharr v. Beck).
Criminal Conversation: Requires proof of marriage + sexual intercourse during coverture. Post-separation intercourse suffices (Johnson v. Pearce; Bryant v. Carrier).
Separation Agreement: Does not waive a spouse’s tort claim against third parties unless plaintiff consented to adultery. Consent defense requires proof plaintiff encouraged or approved the conduct (Cannon v. Miller).
Punitive Damages: May be awarded if conduct is willful, wanton, or malicious. Sexual relations + aggravating behavior (mocking plaintiff, disregard for effect on children) can support punitive damages (Shaw v. Stringer; Hutelmyer v. Cox).

Analysis

Abolishment: Court of Appeals lacked authority; only legislature or NC Supreme Court could abolish these torts.
Alienation: Sufficient evidence of pre-separation conduct (time spent together at work, social events, support from Allen’s company). Post-separation conduct corroborated this.
Criminal Conversation: Defendant admitted to sexual intercourse while Vickie was still legally married. Separation agreement didn’t bar claim; no evidence plaintiff consented to adultery.
Damages: Evidence of plaintiff’s mental anguish and humiliation supported compensatory damages.
Punitive damages: Defendant’s admitted sexual conduct, laughter at plaintiff, and disregard for children’s harm constituted aggravating factors justifying punitive damages.

Conclusion

No error. Verdict and damages for alienation of affections and criminal conversation affirmed .

Key Takeaways

Torts upheld: CC and AoA remain valid in NC; appellate courts cannot abolish them.
Alienation: Must be grounded in pre-separation conduct; post-separation acts only corroborate.
Criminal Conversation: Post-separation sex supports liability; separation agreements do not immunize defendants absent clear consent.
Punitive damages: Sexual misconduct plus aggravating circumstances (mockery, harm to children) sustains awards.

Lesson

Nunn underscores how NC courts strictly apply CC/AoA rules: separation doesn’t shield defendants, and punitive damages are available if conduct shows aggravation. For defense, the only viable shield is consent — and it must be explicit and provable.

2002 — Teague v. Teague (unpub.)

Facts

Plaintiff Jeanette Teague sued her husband, Paul Teague, Sr., for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and his mistress, Robin Berry Danner (later Teague), for criminal conversation.
Evidence showed decades of abuse: children testified that Paul Sr. regularly assaulted Jeanette (punching, jerking her hair, hospitalizing her).
Psychiatric testimony indicated Jeanette’s schizophrenia was likely genetic but her condition and inability to live a normal life were worsened by her husband’s abuse.
From 1988–1991, Paul Sr. engaged in multiple affairs, culminating in an affair with Danner.
Jury verdict (1994):
- Against Paul Sr. (IIED): $500,000 compensatory, $100,000 punitive.
- Against Danner (criminal conversation): $1 nominal, $10,500 punitive.
Defendants filed post-trial motions but failed to pursue them for years. Appeal process dragged on due to repeated procedural errors.

Issue

Did the trial court err in allowing the IIED and criminal conversation verdicts to stand?

Rule

Criminal Conversation: Requires proof of marriage + sexual intercourse during coverture. Nominal damages may be awarded, and punitive damages are available if aggravating circumstances exist (Horner v. Byrnett; Hutelmyer v. Cox).
Appellate Rules: N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5) requires appellants to cite legal authority in support of arguments. Failure to comply can result in dismissal of appeal.

Analysis

On appeal, defendants raised multiple arguments (jurisdiction, admission of old misconduct evidence, improper jury arguments, prejudicial verdict, insufficiency of evidence).
However, the Court of Appeals never reached the merits:
- Defendants repeatedly violated appellate rules — failing to cite authority, failing to properly brief issues, and even formatting the brief incorrectly.
- This was their second attempt after their first appeal had been dismissed.
Given the procedural violations, the Court dismissed the appeal outright.

Conclusion

Appeal dismissed for flagrant noncompliance with appellate rules.
Jury verdicts (including CC damages) stood.

Key Takeaways

Even a CC defendant found liable for only nominal damages can still face punitive damages.
Courts may uphold punitive damages even when compensatory damages are minimal.
Procedural compliance is critical: appellate courts will dismiss appeals for failure to cite authority or follow briefing rules.

Lesson

Teague shows that criminal conversation claims can survive and yield punitive damages even with minimal compensatory evidence. For defendants, sloppy appeals risk losing any chance of review — reinforcing that procedure can be just as decisive as substance in CC/AoA litigation.

2003 — Oddo v. Presser

Facts

Plaintiff Thomas Oddo married Debra Tyson in 1988; they had three children.
By 1999, Debra was unhappy in the marriage. She reconnected with Jeffrey Presser, a former boyfriend.
They communicated by phone, letters, and email; in March 1999 they met in Charlotte and had sexual intercourse in a hotel while Debra was still married.
Soon after, Debra told Oddo she was in love with someone else and wanted a separation. The couple separated in April 1999 and later divorced.
Oddo sued Presser for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
Jury verdict: $910,000 compensatory + $500,000 punitive.
Defendant appealed.

Issue

Did trial court err in jury instructions on alienation of affections?
Was evidence of plaintiff’s lost income and tuition benefits improperly admitted as damages?
Was submission of punitive damages proper?
Was the punitive award excessive?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Requires proof of a loving marriage, destruction of that affection, and defendant’s wrongful acts as the controlling cause.
Damages: Compensatory damages limited to loss of consortium, support, and mental anguish — not speculative future benefits (Sebastian v. Kluttz; Hutelmyer v. Cox).
Punitive Damages: Recoverable where defendant’s conduct is willful, wanton, or malicious (N.C.G.S. § 1D-15); sexual relations often sufficient to submit to jury (Ward v. Beaton; Shaw v. Stringer).
Punitive Cap: N.C.G.S. § 1D-25 — capped at 3x compensatory or $250,000, whichever greater.

Analysis

Jury Instructions: Defendant waived issue — objections at trial were limited to a recorded phone call, not the alienation instruction itself.
Damages Evidence:
- Lost income from investment advising and Davidson coaching admissible; supported by expert testimony and jury could weigh credibility.
- Tuition benefit evidence (worth $282,122.87) too speculative (children ages 3, 7, 10; no proof Davidson program would still exist). Admission was error; new trial required on compensatory damages.
Punitive Damages: Properly submitted; evidence showed defendant engaged in sex with plaintiff’s wife pre-separation.
Punitive Amount: Not excessive; $500,000 well below cap of $2.7 million (3x compensatory). Award could stand even if compensatory retried, since nominal damages suffice to support punitives (Horner v. Byrnett).

Conclusion

Reversed in part: new trial on compensatory damages due to speculative tuition evidence.
No error as to liability, punitive damages submission, or amount.
NC Supreme Court (2004) affirmed in part and reversed in part, largely agreeing on compensatory retrial but upholding punitive award.

Key Takeaways

Speculative damages (e.g., lost tuition benefits years in the future) are inadmissible in CC/AoA cases.
Lost income tied to emotional distress may be recoverable if supported by expert testimony.
Punitive damages stand strong: sex + wrongful conduct → jury can punish, even if compensatory retried or reduced.
Large verdicts are possible — jury here awarded $1.41M total, later trimmed only on compensatory side.

Lesson

Oddo v. Presser shows both the power and limits of CC/AoA damages. Plaintiffs can pursue large verdicts, including lost income, but must avoid speculative future claims. Defendants cannot rely on separation or “private” affairs as shields — punitive damages are almost inevitable once sex is proven.

2005 — McCutchen v. McCutchen (COA)

Facts

Plaintiff Patricia McCutchen married Byron McCutchen in 1968.
They separated on 9 September 1998 and divorced in 2002.
Defendant Deborah McCutchen (no relation before marriage) was a church member who began a sexual relationship with Byron in September 1998, after the separation.
Byron later married Deborah.
Plaintiff sued Deborah in April 2003 for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Trial court:
- Granted summary judgment for plaintiff on criminal conversation (liability established; damages reserved).
- Granted summary judgment for defendant on alienation of affections, holding it was barred by statute of limitations.
Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Was plaintiff’s alienation of affections claim barred by the statute of limitations?
Could the Court of Appeals hear the appeal even though it was interlocutory (damages not yet decided for CC)?

Rule

Statute of Limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5)): 3 years for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Accrual of Alienation Claims: Must be based on pre-separation conduct; post-separation conduct is only admissible to corroborate (Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268 (2001)).
Substantial Right Exception: Interlocutory appeals are allowed if denial would affect a substantial right — here, damages for AoA and CC are intertwined and cannot be separately calculated (Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201 (1969)).

Analysis

Plaintiff conceded that the complained-of acts occurred before separation in 1998.
Suit was filed in 2003 — more than three years after the pre-separation acts.
Under Pharr, alienation claims cannot be based on post-separation conduct. Thus, the cause accrued no later than the date of separation.
Because the claim accrued in 1998 and was filed in 2003, it was time-barred.
Appeal allowed because damages issues in CC and AoA are intertwined and must be considered together.

Conclusion

Summary judgment for defendant on alienation of affections affirmed — claim barred by statute of limitations.
Criminal conversation liability already established; damages to be determined separately.

Key Takeaways

Alienation of affections must be based on pre-separation conduct; the statute of limitations begins running no later than the date of separation.
Criminal conversation remains viable for post-separation intercourse until divorce.
Damages for CC and AoA are so intertwined that interlocutory appeals may be heard if one claim is dismissed but the other remains.

Lesson

McCutchen solidifies the 3-year statute of limitations rule for alienation of affections and ties accrual to pre-separation acts. Plaintiffs must act quickly; waiting years after separation bars recovery. In contrast, criminal conversation can still be pursued for post-separation adultery so long as the marriage exists.

2006 — Fox v. Gibson

Facts

Plaintiff Mary Beth Fox sued Tracy Gibson for alienation of affections.
Plaintiff alleged Gibson made improper advances toward her husband, Skip Fox, and caused the breakdown of their marriage.
Defendant Gibson resided in Georgia, while plaintiff and her husband resided in North Carolina.
Gibson moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing she had no significant contacts with NC.
Plaintiff countered with affidavit evidence from her husband that:
- He engaged in sexual relations with Gibson in North Carolina during his marriage.
- Gibson sent him emails into North Carolina.
- They had numerous phone conversations while he resided in NC.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss; Gibson appealed.

Issue

Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an alienation of affections action, where her alleged acts included phone calls, emails, and sexual intercourse in NC?

Rule

Long-Arm Statute (N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3)): Jurisdiction exists for injuries arising out of acts committed in NC.
Due Process Clause: Requires “minimum contacts” such that exercising jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (International Shoe).
Alienation/CC as Injury to Person: NC recognizes alienation of affections and criminal conversation as “injury to person” under long-arm jurisdiction (Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729 (2000)).

Analysis

Statutory Authority
- Emails and phone calls into NC, and sexual intercourse in NC, constitute “acts” within NC under § 1-75.4(3).
- These acts directly related to the alleged injury (loss of marital affection).
Due Process / Minimum Contacts
- Quantity/Nature of Contacts: Multiple communications + in-state sexual intercourse sufficient.
- Connection to Claim: Direct link between contacts and alleged alienation.
- NC’s Interest: Strong interest in protecting marriages; especially relevant because Georgia abolished AoA and CC, leaving plaintiff with no remedy there.
- Convenience: Witnesses and marriage evidence located in NC; Gibson’s residence in neighboring state minimized travel burden.
Findings Supported
- Court struck one finding (cell phone ownership, hearsay), but remaining findings provided sufficient basis for jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Affirmed: NC courts properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Gibson for alienation of affections.

Key Takeaways

Personal jurisdiction exists over out-of-state lovers if there are sufficient NC contacts (sex in NC, emails, phone calls).
NC courts emphasize protecting its citizens’ marriages, particularly where the defendant’s state has abolished the tort.
Jurisdiction analysis balances statutory reach, due process fairness, and state policy interests.

Lesson

Fox v. Gibson shows that out-of-state defendants cannot easily evade liability in AoA/CC cases by living elsewhere. Even minimal but direct contacts with NC (calls, emails, or a sexual encounter here) are enough for NC courts to assert jurisdiction.

2006 — McCutchen v. McCutchen (Supreme Court)

Facts

Plaintiff Patricia McCutchen married Byron McCutchen in 1968; they separated in September 1998 and divorced in 2002.
Byron began a sexual relationship with defendant Deborah McCutchen around the time of separation. They later married.
Plaintiff alleged that Byron repeatedly expressed a desire to reconcile, they continued joint counseling through February 2001, purchased a car together, and managed finances jointly even after separation.
Plaintiff filed suit in April 2003 for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Trial court:
- Granted summary judgment for plaintiff on criminal conversation (damages reserved).
- Granted summary judgment for defendant on alienation of affections, holding it was time-barred.
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling alienation claims accrue no later than the date of separation.
NC Supreme Court granted review.

Issue

Does a claim for alienation of affections accrue, as a matter of law, on or before the date of separation, or only when the alienation of love and affection is complete?

Rule

Statute of Limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5)): 3 years for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Accrual of Alienation Claim: A cause of action accrues when the alienation is complete — i.e., when the spouse’s love and affection is destroyed or seriously diminished.
Separation ≠ automatic cutoff: Separation may be strong evidence, but not determinative. Jury decides when alienation was complete.

Analysis

Court emphasized policy of protecting marriage: Forcing parties to sue at separation would punish spouses who attempt reconciliation.
Pharr v. Beck (2001) was expressly overruled in part: post-separation conduct may play a role, and alienation need not be confined to pre-separation acts.
Plaintiff’s evidence (joint counseling, financial ties, Byron’s statements through 2001) created a genuine issue of fact whether alienation occurred after separation.
Thus, her 2003 filing could still be timely if the jury found alienation complete in 2001.

Conclusion

Affirmed in part: interlocutory appeal proper since AoA and CC damages must be decided together.
Reversed in part: summary judgment for defendant on alienation of affections improper; jury should decide when alienation was complete.
Case remanded for trial.

Key Takeaways

Alienation of affections accrual = when love is destroyed, not automatically at separation.
Jury question: Determining when alienation occurred is generally for the fact finder.
Pharr v. Beck overruled in part: separation is not a bright-line bar.
This decision broadened the potential timeframe for bringing alienation claims, giving plaintiffs more flexibility.

Lesson

McCutchen is a landmark case: it restored flexibility in alienation suits by rejecting separation as a bright-line accrual date. Plaintiffs may rely on evidence of continued affection or reconciliation attempts after separation, making it easier to survive statute of limitations defenses.

2006 — Stann v. Levine

Facts

Plaintiff Frederick Stann married Allison Stann in 1991. They lived in NC for several years but moved to South Carolina in 1996.
In 2003, Allison began corresponding with defendant Jeffrey Levine, a Tennessee resident, via email, phone, and instant messaging. Their communications turned romantic.
They met in person in September 2003, after the Stanns separated, and later engaged in sexual relations in multiple states, including NC.
Plaintiff filed suit in NC for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and emotional distress.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (plaintiff resided in SC, defendant in TN).
Trial court dismissed; plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a Tennessee resident in an AoA/CC case where plaintiff resided in SC, but some acts and sexual relations occurred in NC?

Rule

NC Long-Arm Statute (§ 1-75.4): Jurisdiction exists if injury to person/property arises out of (3) a local act by the defendant, or (4) a local injury from a foreign act plus solicitation in NC.
Alienation of Affections: Injury accrues when affection is destroyed (can be gradual); liability based on acts that cause alienation.
Criminal Conversation: Requires (1) valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse during coverture; separation not a defense (Johnson v. Pearce).
Due Process: Defendant must have “minimum contacts” with NC, such that jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play (International Shoe).

Analysis

Procedural Posture: Appeal dismissed due to multiple Appellate Rules violations (formatting, lack of grounds for appellate review, vague assignment of error). Majority followed Viar (2005) and dismissed outright.
Dissent (Judge Geer):
- Would have reached merits.
- Alienation claim: Emails/calls mainly from TN to SC; injury occurred outside NC → no jurisdiction.
- Criminal conversation claim: Defendant admitted to sexual relations in NC post-separation; that constitutes a local act sufficient under § 1-75.4(3).
- Found sufficient minimum contacts for CC claim: deliberate travel into NC, multiple encounters in NC, and direct connection to the cause of action.

Conclusion

Majority: Appeal dismissed for procedural defects; trial court dismissal of claims stands.
Dissent: Would uphold dismissal of AoA but reverse dismissal of CC, finding NC had jurisdiction.

Key Takeaways

Procedural compliance is critical: appellate courts will dismiss appeals for rule violations, even in potentially meritorious cases.
Alienation vs. Criminal Conversation jurisdiction:
- AoA: injury often traced to out-of-state conduct if parties live elsewhere → no NC jurisdiction.
- CC: if intercourse occurs in NC, that’s enough for jurisdiction.
Confirms forum-shopping risks: NC courts scrutinize residency when both parties live in states where torts are abolished.

Lesson

Stann v. Levine highlights both substance and procedure: (1) NC jurisdiction is easier to establish for criminal conversation (sex while in NC) than AoA, and (2) appeals can collapse entirely if procedural rules are not followed.

2006 — Misenheimer v. Burris (Supreme Court)

Facts

Plaintiff Donald Misenheimer married in 1971. Defendant Burris was a family friend and later employee who visited often.
Defendant began an affair with plaintiff’s wife in 1991; it continued until 1994 or 1995.
Plaintiff suspected but did not confirm until July 1997, during counseling, when his wife admitted to the affair.
Plaintiff filed suit for criminal conversation on April 12, 2000.
Jury awarded $100,001 compensatory + $250,000 punitive damages.
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the three-year statute of limitations barred the claim because it began at the last act of adultery (1995).
NC Supreme Court granted review.

Issue

Does the discovery rule (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16)) apply to criminal conversation, tolling the statute of limitations until the injured spouse discovers or should have discovered the affair?

Rule

Statute of Limitations: 3 years for criminal conversation (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5)).
Discovery Rule (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16)): Cause of action for personal injury accrues when injury becomes apparent or should reasonably have become apparent; subject to 10-year statute of repose.
Application: Discovery rule applies to torts involving latent injuries, including criminal conversation.

Analysis

The Court found the statute ambiguous: “personal injury” can include both bodily harm and invasion of personal rights.
Criminal conversation is a personal injury in the sense of invading the right to exclusive marital intercourse.
Allowing discovery rule prevents rewarding clandestine affairs that remain hidden past the normal 3 years.
Plaintiff did not confirm the affair until 1997, so the 2000 filing was within 3 years.
Damages for emotional distress are recoverable even if not an element of CC.
The Court rejected defendant’s argument that the explicit listing of CC in § 1-52(5) excluded it from the discovery rule. Statutes must be read together; the discovery rule modifies the limitations period.

Conclusion

Discovery rule applies: 3-year SOL runs from when the spouse discovers or should have discovered the affair.
Claim still subject to 10-year repose limit.
Jury verdict reinstated. Case reversed and remanded.

Key Takeaways

Criminal Conversation accrual = discovery of adultery, not date of last act.
3-year statute of limitations tolled until discovery; 10-year outer limit still applies.
Protects injured spouses from losing claims due to deceit or secrecy.
Expands potential liability window for defendants who conceal affairs.

Lesson

Misenheimer v. Burris is a landmark case: it makes CC claims far more powerful by tying accrual to discovery of the adultery, not the conduct itself. Defendants cannot escape liability simply by hiding affairs until the 3-year period expires.

2007 — Misenheimer v. Burris (COA)

Facts

Plaintiff Donald Misenheimer married Rebecca in 1971. Defendant Burris was a family friend and employee.
Burris and Rebecca had an affair from about 1991–1994/95.
Plaintiff suspected but did not confirm until July 1997, during a counseling session, when Rebecca admitted to an affair.
Plaintiff filed suit in April 2000 for criminal conversation and alienation of affections.
Jury awarded $100,001 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages.
Defendant appealed, raising statute of limitations and evidentiary privilege issues.
NC Supreme Court (2006) held the discovery rule applies to criminal conversation and remanded to COA for remaining issues.

Issue

Did the trial court err by limiting testimony under the clergy–communicant privilege (N.C.G.S. § 8-53.2) to a single counseling session, preventing defendant from proving plaintiff discovered the affair earlier?

Rule

Clergy–Communicant Privilege (§ 8-53.2): Communications made in confidence to clergy for spiritual counsel are privileged.
- The privilege is absolute unless waived by the communicant in open court.
- Waiver may be limited to specific communications.
Discovery Rule (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16)): Criminal conversation accrual begins when the affair is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered (per NC Supreme Court ruling).

Analysis

Plaintiff waived the privilege only for the July 1997 counseling session.
Defendant sought access to records/testimony from other sessions to argue plaintiff discovered the affair earlier.
Trial court conducted in camera review of minister’s records, finding no support for earlier discovery.
Plaintiff could assert privilege for other sessions; waiver need not extend beyond the July 1997 date.
Defendant could have called Rebecca herself to testify about when she told plaintiff; thus, no prejudice.

Conclusion

No error.
Trial court properly enforced clergy–communicant privilege; no evidence supported earlier discovery.
Jury verdict for plaintiff (including damages) stood.

Key Takeaways

Privilege is absolute: clergy–communicant privilege cannot be overridden by judicial discretion.
Limited waiver allowed: plaintiff can waive privilege for one session without opening all counseling records.
Discovery rule reinforced: affair discovered in 1997; 2000 filing was timely.
Practical strategy: Defendants should seek testimony directly from the spouse, not clergy, if privilege is invoked.

Lesson

On remand, Misenheimer shows that strict evidentiary privileges (like clergy–communicant) can insulate discovery evidence. Defendants must develop alternative proof of early knowledge; otherwise, the discovery rule + privilege protections make criminal conversation claims more plaintiff-friendly.

The biggest takeaway from the two Misenheimer cases (NC Supreme Court 2006 + COA on remand 2007) is this:

1. Discovery Rule Applies to Criminal Conversation

The NC Supreme Court (2006) held that the 3-year statute of limitations for CC is tolled until the aggrieved spouse discovers (or reasonably should discover) the affair, not when the last act of adultery occurred.
This makes CC a latent-injury tort: hidden affairs don’t extinguish claims just because they stayed secret for more than 3 years.
However, claims remain subject to the 10-year statute of repose, so discovery can’t revive very old affairs indefinitely.

2. Clergy–Communicant Privilege Strictly Enforced

On remand (2007), the COA held that the clergy–communicant privilege is absolute unless waived in open court.
A spouse may waive privilege for one session without opening the door to all counseling records.
This prevented the defendant from proving the plaintiff had earlier knowledge of the affair.

Big Picture Impact

Plaintiff-friendly shift: The discovery rule makes criminal conversation claims much harder for defendants to escape on limitations grounds. A wronged spouse can sue years later if they can show they didn’t know until recently.
Privilege protections: Key discovery evidence (e.g., marital counseling sessions) may be shielded from the defense, further tilting the field toward plaintiffs.

✅ One-line takeaway:
Misenheimer transformed CC into a discovery-based tort with a long liability window and reinforced that evidentiary privileges (like clergy–communicant) can block defendants from using counseling records to show earlier discovery.

2008 — Boileau v. Seagrave (unpub.)

Facts

Plaintiff Pamela Boileau married Paul Boileau in 1977.
In 2003–2004, Paul began a sexual relationship with defendant Ann Seagrave, a fellow church member and friend of the Boileaus.
Affair discovered in June 2004; plaintiff moved out.
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Defendant counterclaimed for defamation (libel and slander).
Jury verdict (2006):
- Alienation of affections: $1 compensatory, $5,000 punitive.
- Criminal conversation: $1 compensatory, $105,000 punitive.
- Slander (against plaintiff): $1 compensatory, $100,000 punitive.
- Libel (against plaintiff): Not liable.
- Net result: Plaintiff awarded $10,001.
Both parties appealed.

Issues

Did trial court err in excluding evidence of defendant’s prior affair (the “Boyer evidence”) from 30 years earlier?
Did trial court err in jury instructions (punitive damages, compensatory damages, defamation)?
Were the damages awards inconsistent, inadequate, or the result of passion/prejudice?

Rule

Rule 403 (N.C. Evid. Code): Court may exclude relevant evidence if prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.
Punitive Damages (N.C.G.S. § 1D-35): Jury may consider existence/frequency of similar past conduct, but only if supported by admissible evidence.
Damages in AoA/CC: Limited to loss of support, consortium, companionship, mental anguish, reputation (Hutelmyer; Oddo). Speculative losses (like attorney’s fees in divorce, presumptive loss of half the marital estate) not allowed.
Nominal Damages Principle: Once liability proven, plaintiff entitled to at least nominal damages, which may support punitive damages.
Defamation per se: False accusations of serious crimes are slander per se; malice and damages presumed.

Analysis

Boyer Evidence:
- Prior affair was 30 years earlier.
- Court held remoteness made it more prejudicial than probative. Properly excluded under Rule 403.
- Without it, no jury instruction on “similar past conduct” warranted.
Damages Instructions:
- Plaintiff barred from arguing divorce-related legal fees and presumptive loss of property as damages — too speculative (pending in separate ED/alimony action).
- Jury instructed only on legally recognized AoA/CC damages.
Verdict Consistency:
- Nominal damages ($1) consistent with liability; punitive damages may stand alone (Horner v. Byrnett).
- Punitive damages ($105,000 against defendant; $100,000 against plaintiff for slander) not excessive, bore rational relationship to punishment/deterrence.
Defamation Claim:
- Plaintiff admitted making statements accusing defendant of poisoning, forgery, kidnapping, and murder.
- These are crimes of moral turpitude → slander per se. Liability and punitive damages upheld.

Conclusion

No error.
Jury’s mixed verdicts upheld; trial court rulings affirmed.

Key Takeaways

Old prior misconduct (30 years) is too remote; can’t use it to prove pattern or aggravating factors.
Speculative divorce-related damages (fees, presumptive property loss) not recoverable in AoA/CC.
Nominal damages rule ensures liability always produces at least nominal damages, supporting punitive awards.
Defamation risk: Spouses must avoid retaliatory accusations; wild allegations can trigger slander liability with heavy punitive awards.

Lesson

Boileau is a cautionary case: AoA/CC plaintiffs may win liability but get only nominal damages, while reckless counter-accusations can expose them to defamation liability with substantial punitive damages, reducing or even outweighing their net recovery.

Boileau v. Seagrave is best flagged as a “mixed outcome case” because, although the plaintiff proved liability for both criminal conversation and alienation of affections, her recovery was largely neutralized by the defendant’s successful defamation counterclaim. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1 in compensatory damages plus $5,000 in punitive damages for alienation of affections, and $1 in compensatory damages plus $105,000 in punitive damages for criminal conversation. But the jury also found the plaintiff liable for slander, awarding the defendant $1 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. After setoff, the plaintiff netted only $10,001. The case demonstrates that even a technical win in CC/AoA litigation can become a practical draw if the plaintiff exposes herself to defamation liability, underscoring the risks of retaliatory accusations and the potential for split verdicts that leave both sides with partial victories.

2009 — Jones v. Skelley

Facts

Plaintiff Rebecca Jones and husband Phil Jones married in 1974 and lived in South Carolina since 1979.
Defendant Susan Skelley lived in North Carolina part of the time during 2003–2004.
Plaintiff alleged defendant carried on an affair with Phil Jones, involving phone calls, clandestine meetings, and sexual encounters in both South Carolina and North Carolina.
Plaintiff was diagnosed with genital herpes in May 2003; defendant was prescribed Valtrex around the same time.
Evidence showed:
- Summer 2003: Plaintiff found defendant hiding in a closet at a job site; husband admitted sexual touching in NC.
- June 2004: Defendant and Phil took a weekend trip to Wilmington and New Bern, NC, where they admitted to having sexual intercourse.
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in NC.
Trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning the couple resided in SC and SC abolished AoA and CC. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Did NC courts have jurisdiction over the alienation of affections claim where acts occurred in both NC and SC?
Was plaintiff entitled to judgment as a matter of law on criminal conversation based on admitted intercourse in NC during the marriage?

Rule

Lex loci delicti: Substantive law of the state where the tort occurred controls.
Alienation of Affections: Must prove marriage, genuine love/affection, loss of that affection, and wrongful/malicious acts by defendant. Claim can include pre- and post-separation conduct (McCutchen). Tortious injury occurs where alienating acts happen (Darnell v. Rupplin).
Criminal Conversation: Requires valid marriage + sexual intercourse with spouse during marriage. A single act in NC suffices, even post-separation (Johnson v. Pearce). Separation agreements do not bar claims against third parties (Nunn v. Allen).

Analysis

Alienation:
- Evidence showed wrongful conduct in NC (secret calls, meetings, sexual acts in summer 2003, NC trip in June 2004).
- Whether the alienation occurred in NC or SC is a factual issue; cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
Criminal Conversation:
- Defendant admitted sexual intercourse with Phil Jones in NC in June 2004, while still married.
- NC law: one act is sufficient; separation does not bar claim.
- Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on CC.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: Reversed and remanded — material fact issue whether alienation occurred in NC.
Criminal conversation: Reversed — trial court should have granted summary judgment for plaintiff; liability established as a matter of law.

Key Takeaways

Jurisdiction depends on where the acts occurred: If any wrongful acts took place in NC, NC law applies even if the spouses lived in SC.
CC is strict liability: A single act of intercourse in NC during marriage suffices, regardless of separation or residence.
AoA is broader and fact-intensive: Alienation can occur gradually across states; juries decide where injury occurred.

Lesson

Jones v. Skelley underscores NC’s expansive reach over AoA/CC claims: acts in North Carolina, even involving nonresident spouses, can ground liability. Plaintiffs gain a powerful tool if they can prove even one encounter in NC, while defendants cannot escape liability by arguing the couple resided elsewhere.

2010 — Heller v. Somdahl

Facts

Plaintiff Walter Heller sued defendant Mary Jones for alienation of affections.
Heller alleged Jones encouraged, enabled, and even coerced his wife, Barbara Heller, into an adulterous relationship with co-defendant Russell Somdahl.
Evidence showed:
- Hellers had a loving marriage: affection, intimacy, family activities, daily communication during plaintiff’s military deployment.
- After Barbara’s affair, relationship became strained: shorter calls/emails, no sexual intimacy, loss of trust.
- Defendant Jones allegedly facilitated and encouraged Barbara’s affair: moving phones to prevent marital communication, hosting parties with alcohol, threatening Barbara, interfering with communication, and even controlling gifts (a ring) from Somdahl.
Jury found for plaintiff and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant appealed, arguing her directed verdict motion should have been granted.

Issue

Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the alienation of affections claim?

Rule

Alienation of Affections Elements (Litchfield v. Cox):
1. Valid marriage with genuine love and affection,
2. Love and affection was alienated/destroyed, and
3. Defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts caused the alienation.
Malice = intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage (Jones v. Skelley).
Defendant’s conduct need only be a controlling or effective cause, not the sole cause (Nunn v. Allen).

Analysis

Genuine marriage: Testimony showed the Hellers were affectionate, loving, sexually active, and maintained close contact even during deployments.
Loss of affection: Affair caused relationship breakdown, loss of intimacy, distance, and strain.
Defendant’s wrongful acts: Evidence showed Jones actively facilitated and encouraged the affair, interfered with Barbara’s marriage, threatened her, and manipulated circumstances to keep her away from plaintiff.
Viewing evidence in plaintiff’s favor, more than a scintilla of proof existed for each element.

Conclusion

No error: Directed verdict properly denied. Jury verdict for plaintiff upheld.

Key Takeaways

Alienation claims can be based on facilitation or encouragement of an affair — defendant need not be the lover.
Conduct such as enabling, coercing, or interfering with marital communications can qualify as wrongful acts.
Malice is inferred from intentional conduct likely to damage the marital relationship.

Lesson

Heller v. Somdahl illustrates that third-party enablers — not just lovers — can be liable for alienation of affections if they encourage or facilitate an affair. Plaintiffs can succeed by proving interference and malicious acts, even when the defendant was not the spouse’s direct partner.

2011 — Carsanaro v. Colvin

Facts

Plaintiff Joseph Carsanaro married Jacqueline Carsanaro in 1989.
In early 2009, defendant John Trevor Colvin began sending Jacqueline emails expressing his attraction.
Despite plaintiff’s warning, defendant engaged in a sexual relationship with Jacqueline from April–September 2009.
Plaintiff contracted genital herpes in May 2009 and alleged it was transmitted through his wife from defendant.
Plaintiff sued Colvin for:
1. Criminal conversation,
2. Negligent infliction of a sexually transmitted disease (NISTD),
3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED),
4. Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
Trial court dismissed NISTD claim but allowed others to proceed. Plaintiff appealed; defendant cross-appealed.

Issue

Can a plaintiff maintain a claim for negligent infliction of a sexually transmitted disease against a third party (the lover of the spouse)?
Was the trial court correct in denying dismissal of the other tort claims?

Rule

Negligent Exposure of Infectious Disease: Recognized in NC since Crowell v. Crowell (1920). Liability arises if one negligently exposes another to a contagious disease.
Duty of STD Carriers: “[A] person who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain from sexual conduct or, at the minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or she expects to have sexual relations of his or her condition.” (Mussivand v. David, Ohio 1989).
This duty extends not only to the immediate sexual partner, but also to the spouse of the partner, if known or reasonably foreseeable.

Analysis

Duty: Court adopted reasoning from other states: an infected person owes a duty not only to their sexual partner but also to foreseeable third parties (e.g., the partner’s spouse).
Foreseeability: It is foreseeable that an STD may be transmitted to the spouse of a lover.
Intervening Cause: If the adulterous spouse knew or should have known they were infected, they could be considered an intervening cause, but plaintiff’s complaint did not allege such knowledge.
Criminal Conversation: Injury to health (STD transmission) may be compensable under CC, but that does not preclude a separate negligence claim for NISTD.
Other Claims: IIED and NIED were allowed to proceed; defendant’s cross-appeal dismissed as interlocutory.

Conclusion

Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of NISTD claim; plaintiff may proceed on negligence theory.
Defendant’s cross-appeal dismissed as interlocutory.

Key Takeaways

NC recognizes liability for negligent transmission of STDs to third-party spouses, expanding exposure for defendants in CC cases.
Plaintiffs can recover under both criminal conversation and NISTD negligence, as damages overlap but are distinct.
Adulterous spouses may be considered intervening causes if they knowingly transmit an STD, but absent that, the lover remains liable.

Lesson

Carsanaro v. Colvin expands CC litigation into the realm of health-related damages: plaintiffs can sue not only for loss of consortium but also for negligent STD transmission by a spouse’s lover. This greatly increases the potential exposure for defendants.

2014 — Shackelford v. Lundquist (unpub.)

Facts

Plaintiff Cynthia Shackelford married Allan Shackelford in 1972.
Plaintiff alleged defendant Anne Lundquist engaged in an affair with Allan beginning as early as 2004 while the Shackelfords were still married.
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in Guilford County.
Defendant, a New York resident, was served but did not retain counsel, missed deadlines, and failed to appear at hearings and trial.
Case went to trial in March 2010 without defendant present or represented.
Jury awarded plaintiff $5,000,000 compensatory and $4,000,000 punitive damages.
Defendant later moved to vacate the judgment or obtain a new trial, claiming constitutional issues, lack of notice, and clerical errors. Trial court denied. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Were North Carolina’s alienation of affections and criminal conversation laws unconstitutional, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction?
Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance?
Did the trial court err in denying defendant’s Rule 52, 59, and 60 motions to set aside judgment or grant a new trial?

Rule

Constitutionality: Only the NC Supreme Court or legislature can abolish AoA/CC (Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324 (1985)). Lower courts lack authority to declare them unconstitutional.
Continuances: Granted only for good cause, showing due diligence. Trial courts have broad discretion; rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Relief under Rules 52, 59, 60: Requires showing lack of notice or excusable neglect. Failure to act diligently bars relief.

Analysis

Constitutionality: Defendant’s argument that AoA/CC are unconstitutional was dismissed; even if true, it would not remove subject matter jurisdiction.
Continuance: Defendant repeatedly failed to follow procedures, ignored advice to seek counsel, and missed hearings despite receiving notice. Court found no due diligence; denial proper.
Rule Motions: Defendant’s claim of lack of notice was undermined by her own inaction. Courts stressed that pro se status and financial hardship do not excuse neglect.

Conclusion

No error.
Multi-million-dollar judgment for plaintiff upheld.

Key Takeaways

Failure to participate in litigation or obtain counsel will not excuse neglect or overturn judgments.
AoA and CC remain constitutionally valid torts in NC unless abolished by the legislature or NC Supreme Court.
Large verdicts can stand by default if defendants fail to defend themselves.

Lesson

Shackelford v. Lundquist shows the high stakes of default in criminal conversation / alienation of affection litigation: defendants who fail to participate can face devastating verdicts, and appellate courts will not rescue them absent extraordinary circumstances.

2017 — Malecek v. Williams

Facts

Plaintiff Marc Malecek married Amber Malecek.
In 2015, Amber began a sexual relationship with defendant Dr. Derek Williams, a physician at the hospital where she worked.
Plaintiff sued Dr. Williams for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing both torts were facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (freedom of speech, association, and substantive due process rights).
Trial court agreed and dismissed the claims. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Are North Carolina’s common law torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Plaintiff must show (1) genuine love/affection between spouses, (2) that love was alienated, and (3) defendant’s wrongful acts caused it (Darnell v. Rupplin).
Criminal Conversation: Plaintiff must show (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture (Johnson v. Pearce).
Facial Challenges: A law is facially unconstitutional only if no set of circumstances exists under which it is valid (Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs).

Analysis

Substantive Due Process
- Defendant argued Lawrence v. Texas (2003) created a fundamental right to private, consensual sexual intimacy.
- Court disagreed: while Lawrence recognized liberty interests, it did not establish a fundamental right.
- The state has a legitimate interest in protecting marriage, enforcing fidelity, deterring adultery, and compensating injured spouses.
- Under rational basis review, the torts survive because they protect personal and societal interests beyond mere moral disapproval.
Free Speech/Expression
- Defendant claimed sexual activity is expressive conduct.
- Court agreed it may involve expression but held the torts are content-neutral restrictions.
- Like U.S. v. O’Brien (1968), incidental burdens on expression are valid if tied to substantial state interests unrelated to content.
- These torts target the harm caused by breaking marital vows, not the content of speech or expression.
Freedom of Association
- Court noted countless ways to associate with a married person without incurring liability.
- Liability arises only when conduct causes destruction of marital love/affection.
Facial vs. As-Applied
- Court emphasized it was addressing only a facial challenge.
- Recognized some applications (e.g., advising a friend to leave an abusive marriage) might be unconstitutional, but the torts have valid applications too.

Conclusion

Reversed and remanded.
North Carolina’s torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation are not facially unconstitutional under the First or Fourteenth Amendments.

Key Takeaways

NC appellate courts continue to uphold AoA and CC as valid torts.
Court acknowledged the torts have roots in outdated policy but stressed their survival under rational basis review.
Some as-applied challenges may succeed in future cases, but facial invalidation was rejected.

Lesson

Malecek v. Williams is the leading modern constitutional defense of alienation of affections and criminal conversation: while criticized as archaic, the court reaffirmed them as constitutionally valid, emphasizing the state’s strong interest in protecting marriage and compensating injured spouses.

2018 — Rodriguez v. Lemus

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda Lemus Rodriguez married Andres Jimenez in December 2007.
Defendant Liliana Lemus, a family friend, frequently spent time with the couple.
In 2011–2012, Plaintiff noticed changes in her marriage:
- Phone records showed over 120 contacts in one month between Defendant and Jimenez.
- Credit card bills revealed hotel charges on weekdays when Jimenez was supposed to be working.
- On March 21, 2012, Plaintiff learned Jimenez was staying at a hotel with an unidentified woman.
On April 8, 2012, Jimenez told Plaintiff the relationship was over and moved out.
Plaintiff gave birth to their first child later that month. Jimenez refused reconciliation in 2013, moved in with Defendant, and had a child with her in October 2013.
Plaintiff and Jimenez divorced in September 2014.
Trial court (bench trial, 2016) found Defendant liable for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, awarding $65,000 in damages. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence of pre-separation sexual conduct to support liability for alienation of affections and criminal conversation under N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a), which limits these torts to acts before permanent separation?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: (1) Valid marriage with love and affection, (2) loss of that affection, (3) caused by defendant’s wrongful acts (Nunn v. Allen).
Criminal Conversation: Requires (1) marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and plaintiff’s spouse during the marriage (Coachman v. Gould).
N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a) (2009): No cause of action arises from acts occurring after spouses physically separate with intent that separation be permanent.
Post-separation conduct: Cannot independently support liability but may corroborate pre-separation acts (Pharr v. Beck; McCutchen).
Proof of adultery/CC: Usually circumstantial; opportunity + inclination sufficient (In re Estate of Trogdon; Coachman).

Analysis

Plaintiff produced evidence of pre-separation misconduct:
- Frequent phone/text communications (over 120 in a month).
- Hotel receipts in January and March 2012, with inference that Defendant was the woman with Jimenez.
Post-separation evidence (living together, child in 2013, Defendant’s admissions) corroborated the pre-separation relationship.
Defendant argued findings were too vague (“legal separation” could mean later events), but court held the only separation date was April 8, 2012, when Jimenez moved out — making the hotel encounter in March 2012 pre-separation.

Conclusion

Evidence sufficient to support trial court’s findings.
Judgment for Plaintiff affirmed.

Key Takeaways

Since 2009 statutory reform (§ 52-13), liability for AoA/CC arises only for acts before separation.
Post-separation evidence may still be admissible to corroborate pre-separation misconduct.
Courts reaffirm that adultery and CC are often proven circumstantially, with opportunity + inclination being enough.

Lesson

Rodriguez v. Lemus clarifies the post-2009 statutory limits: plaintiffs must prove pre-separation misconduct, but can use post-separation evidence to corroborate. It reinforces that opportunity and inclination evidence (calls, hotel stays, secrecy) remains critical for proving CC/AoA today.

2020 — Estes v. Battiston

Facts

Plaintiff Jonathan Estes sued defendant John Battiston, Jr. in 2018 for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, alleging defendant intentionally sabotaged his marriage.
Defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss, including a claim that the torts were facially unconstitutional, and moved to have the constitutional issue referred to a three-judge panel under N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1.
Trial court denied, holding the statute applies only to acts of the General Assembly, not common law torts like AoA/CC.
Defendant appealed.

Issue

Was the trial court required to transfer defendant’s constitutional challenge to alienation of affections and criminal conversation to a three-judge panel under § 1-267.1?

Rule

N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1: Requires facial constitutional challenges to the validity of an act of the General Assembly to be decided by a three-judge panel in Wake County.
AoA and CC are common law torts, not statutory enactments; thus, § 1-267.1 does not apply.
Constitutional challenges to common law torts can be raised by motion to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6)) in regular superior court (Malecek v. Williams, 255 N.C. App. 300 (2017)).
Interlocutory appeals are generally barred unless affecting a substantial right (Veazey v. Durham).

Analysis

Defendant argued § 1-267.1 applied because common law torts were “codified” under § 4-1.
Court rejected: codification didn’t convert them into legislative acts.
Since the Court of Appeals had already upheld the constitutionality of AoA/CC in Malecek v. Williams, even if the issue went to a three-judge panel, the result would be the same.
Appeal dismissed as interlocutory, since denial of referral did not affect a substantial right.

Conclusion

Appeal dismissed.
Trial court properly held that § 1-267.1 does not require referral of constitutional challenges to common law torts.

Key Takeaways

Alienation of affection and criminal conversation are common law torts, not statutes — constitutional challenges to them do not go to three-judge panels.
Defendants must litigate such defenses in the trial court; appeals are not permitted mid-case unless a substantial right is impacted.
Reinforces Malecek: Alienation of affection and criminal conversation are not facially unconstitutional. The Court pointed out that in Malecek, it had already rejected the argument that AoA/CC are facially unconstitutional. Thus, even if a three-judge panel had heard the case, it would have been bound by Court of Appeals precedent to reject the constitutional challenge.

Lesson

Estes v. Battiston confirms that challenges to the constitutionality of alienation of affections and criminal conversation must be raised in the normal trial process — defendants cannot force referral to a three-judge panel. This keeps constitutional attacks on these torts contained within ordinary superior court proceedings.

2021 — Hull v. Brown

Facts

Plaintiff Ehren Hull sued defendant Tony Brown for:
1. Alienation of affections and criminal conversation (together, “covenant claims”), and
2. Intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress (together, “emotional distress claims”).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to transfer the case to a three-judge panel in Wake County under N.C.G.S. § 1-267.1 and Rule 42(b)(4), arguing the statute codifying AoA/CC, N.C.G.S. § 52-13, is facially unconstitutional.
The trial court denied both motions and defendant appealed immediately.

Issue

Was defendant entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal and transfer of the constitutional challenge to a three-judge panel under Rule 42(b)(4) and § 1-267.1?

Rule

N.C.G.S. § 52-13 (2009): Limits AoA/CC liability to pre-separation conduct, imposes a 3-year statute of limitations, and restricts claims to natural persons. N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a) provides: “No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action for alienation of affection or criminal conversation that occurs after the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s spouse physically separate with the intent of either the plaintiff or plaintiff’s spouse that the physical separation remain permanent.”
Rule 42(b)(4) and § 1-267.1: Facial constitutional challenges to acts of the General Assembly must eventually be transferred to a three-judge panel, but only after all other matters in the action are resolved.
Appealability: Interlocutory appeals generally dismissed unless they affect a substantial right (Goldston v. AMC).

Analysis

Premature Appeal
- Defendant’s appeal was interlocutory; the trial court had not resolved all issues.
- The statute and rules allow transfer only after non-contingent matters (like other tort claims, damages, etc.) are resolved.
Substantial Right
- Defendant argued he had a substantial right to venue before a three-judge panel.
- Court disagreed: right to transfer was not yet triggered, since the trial court still had live issues (including IIED/NIED).
Future Transfer Still Available
- Defendant’s constitutional challenge was preserved.
- If the case survives summary judgment, defendant could renew his challenge and have it transferred later, before entry of final judgment.

Conclusion

Appeal dismissed as interlocutory.
Defendant not deprived of any substantial right; his constitutional challenge could still be raised at the appropriate time.

Key Takeaways

AoA/CC codification (§ 52-13) survives yet another constitutional attack; trial courts retain jurisdiction to proceed until all other claims are resolved.
Rule 42(b)(4) transfer is conditional and deferred — only after other claims/issues are fully resolved can the facial constitutionality of § 52-13 be sent to a three-judge panel. Rule 42(b)(4) requires that all other claims and issues in the case (like IIED/NIED) be resolved before a constitutional challenge to § 52-13 (the statute codifying alienation of affections and criminal conversation) can be transferred.
Procedurally, defendants cannot short-circuit litigation by demanding immediate transfer/appeal.

Lesson

Hull v. Brown reinforces that criminal conversation (and alienation of affections) claims remain procedurally robust: constitutional attacks on their statutory codification (§ 52-13) must wait until the end of the case. This ensures criminal conversation claims move forward in trial courts despite ongoing challenges.

✅ Remember: Since 2009, criminal conversation claims are limited to acts of adultery that happened before the spouses permanently separated. Post-separation acts alone cannot support a criminal conversation claim, though they may corroborate what was happening before separation.

2021 — Clark v. Barrett

Facts

Plaintiff Elizabeth Clark married Adam Clark in 2010.
Their marriage endured difficulties, including Plaintiff’s brief affair in 2010–11, but they reconciled, had children, and continued their relationship.
In 2016, Adam Clark met Defendant Kimberly Barrett, an Army physician. They began a sexual relationship, including time together at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and later conceived a child through IVF while Adam was still married.
Plaintiff discovered explicit texts and photos, as well as Defendant’s involvement in online harassment (“revenge porn,” fake profiles, and degrading posts).
Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, IIED, and related torts.
Jury found for Plaintiff on alienation of affections and IIED, awarding $450,000 compensatory damages. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the alienation of affections claim because alleged acts occurred outside NC?
Was there sufficient evidence of alienation of affection and IIED?
Did the trial court err in jury instructions or damages awards?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Requires (1) marriage with genuine love/affection, (2) loss of love/affection, (3) caused by defendant’s wrongful acts (Nunn v. Allen).
Criminal Conversation: Marriage + sexual intercourse during coverture. Proof of sex pre-separation required for punitive damages (Oddo v. Presser).
Jurisdiction: Alienation is a transitory tort; jurisdiction proper if wrongful acts occurred in NC (Hayes v. Hayes).
IIED: Requires extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.
Damages: Mental distress is the gravamen; juries have wide discretion (Hutelmyer v. Cox).

Analysis

Jurisdiction
- Plaintiff presented evidence of acts in North Carolina: explicit photo taken in marital home, texts discovered there, and contact while Adam lived at home.
- Defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment on questions of sex in North Carolina permitted adverse inference. Jurisdiction upheld.
Alienation Evidence
- Plaintiff testified to ongoing love/affection and attempts at reconciliation.
- Evidence showed Barrett knew Adam was married, carried on affair, conceived child via IVF, and exchanged explicit messages.
- Sufficient evidence of love, alienation, and wrongful causation.
IIED Evidence
- Plaintiff experienced anxiety, hyperventilation, hospitalization, humiliation from online harassment linked to Defendants.
- Conduct (affair + degrading online campaign) deemed extreme and outrageous.
Damages
- Compensatory award of $450,000 upheld; supported by loss of financial support, military benefits, emotional distress, hospitalization, and loss of reputation.
- Trial court did not err by denying punitive damages instruction for AoA (pre-separation sex not proven), though punitive damages were available under IIED.

Conclusion

No error. Affirmed.
Plaintiff’s verdict for alienation of affections and IIED, with $450,000 in damages, was upheld.

Key Takeaways

Jurisdiction in AoA cases exists if some wrongful acts occur in NC, even if affair spans states.
Love and affection need only be slight evidence; not a perfect marriage.
Punitive damages in CC require pre-separation sex, but IIED allows punitive recovery for other outrageous conduct.
Online harassment tied to the affair can strengthen an IIED claim alongside AoA/CC.

Lesson

Clark v. Barrett illustrates how modern AoA/CC cases intertwine with online harassment and IIED claims. The case affirms that alienation of affections remains alive, actionable, and adaptable to contemporary marital and digital disputes. Plaintiffs can succeed even with imperfect marriages, as long as some affection existed, and damages can include lost financial support and emotional harm.

2023 — Bassiri v. Pilling

Facts

Plaintiff Kiarash Bassiri married his wife in 2010. They lived together in North Carolina in what he described as a “happy and loving marriage.”
In 2019, Defendant Wade Pilling (a dentist from out of state) began a friendship with Bassiri’s wife that evolved into a romantic and intimate relationship.
Defendant admitted that all in-person meetings (California, Nevada, Utah) occurred outside North Carolina, though he and Bassiri’s wife exchanged extensive texts, emails, Facebook, and Snapchat messages while she was in NC.
Plaintiff filed claims for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and IIED in NC.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
Trial court granted dismissal, reasoning no acts occurred in NC, so NC courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court err by dismissing the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the alleged wrongful acts occurred outside NC but communications occurred while plaintiff’s wife resided in NC?

Rule

Subject-matter jurisdiction = the court’s power to hear the kind of action (N.C.G.S. § 7A-240).
AoA/CC are transitory torts: Substantive law is that of the state where the injury occurred (Darnell v. Rupplin; Jones v. Skelley).
Jurisdiction vs. Choice of Law: Whether NC law applies is a choice-of-law question, not a subject-matter jurisdiction question (Clark v. Barrett, Church v. Carter).

Analysis

The trial court conflated subject-matter jurisdiction with choice-of-law.
NC trial courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over AoA/CC claims, even if conduct occurred elsewhere, because § 7A-240 gives them general jurisdiction over civil claims of that type.
The real issue is whether NC substantive law applies — a merits question to be resolved under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).
Importantly, Utah (where one meeting occurred) still recognizes alienation of affections, so choice-of-law could support the claim. If only California/Nevada conduct controlled, then claim would fail under substantive law (since those states abolished AoA/CC).

Conclusion

Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
NC courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over AoA/CC claims; the question of where the tort occurred and what substantive law applies goes to the merits.

Key Takeaways

AoA/CC are still valid in NC, and NC courts always have jurisdiction to hear them.
Whether the conduct occurred in a state that recognizes the tort is a choice-of-law issue, not a jurisdictional bar.
If the tort occurred in NC (or another state that still recognizes AoA/CC, like Utah), claims may proceed. If only in states that abolished the tort, they will fail on the merits.

Lesson

Bassiri v. Pilling underscores that defendants cannot dodge NC AoA/CC suits by framing them as jurisdictional challenges. Courts will hear the claims; the real battle is proving that the wrongful conduct occurred in NC (or another recognizing state) to apply the right substantive law.

2024 — Beavers v. McMican

Facts

Plaintiff David Beavers married Alison Beavers in 2004.
In January 2016, he discovered sexually explicit text messages on his wife’s phone with someone saved as “Bestie.” Messages referenced sexual activity, but the identity of “Bestie” was unknown.
Alison later admitted to sexual acts (but denied intercourse) with “Bestie,” and told Beavers the man’s name was “Dustin,” a coworker. Beavers never confirmed who “Bestie/Dustin” was.
The Beaverses separated in December 2016.
In April 2017, Alison began openly dating Defendant John McMican, a coworker she had known since 2011. They admitted to becoming sexually involved only after the separation.
Plaintiff sued McMican for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in 2018.
Trial court granted summary judgment for defendant (no pre-separation proof).
Court of Appeals reversed (citing Rodriguez v. Lemus, allowing post-separation evidence to corroborate).
NC Supreme Court granted appeal.

Issue

Does N.C.G.S. § 52-13(a) bar liability for post-separation acts in alienation of affections and criminal conversation?
Can post-separation evidence corroborate pre-separation evidence when the pre-separation evidence is weak or uncertain?
Did plaintiff produce enough evidence tying defendant to pre-separation sexual activity with his wife?

Rule

§ 52-13(a): “No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action for alienation of affection or criminal conversation that occurs after the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s spouse physically separate with the intent… that the separation remain permanent.”
Rodriguez v. Lemus (2018): Post-separation acts may be considered to corroborate pre-separation conduct, but only if the pre-separation evidence itself rises above mere conjecture.
Criminal Conversation Elements: (1) valid marriage, (2) sexual intercourse during marriage. Proof often circumstantial (In re Estate of Trogdon).

Analysis

The Court reaffirmed Rodriguez: post-separation evidence can be used as corroboration, but cannot substitute for pre-separation proof.
Plaintiff’s evidence: texts/photos with “Bestie,” Alison’s vague admissions, suspicion that “Dustin” was a pseudonym, and Alison’s later relationship with McMican.
Problem: No evidence identifying McMican as Bestie/Dustin before separation.
Mere suspicion/inference ≠ more than conjecture (Coachman v. Gould).
Without credible pre-separation proof tying McMican to the affair, there’s no basis for CC or AoA claims.

Conclusion

NC Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.
Reinstated trial court’s summary judgment for defendant.
Holding: Evidence of post-separation conduct may corroborate, but cannot cure, lack of pre-separation evidence linking defendant to adultery.

Key Takeaways

§ 52-13(a) firmly limits liability to pre-separation conduct.
Post-separation evidence (dating, cohabitation, child, etc.) can support an inference, but only if there is already some competent pre-separation evidence of a relationship with the same defendant.
Plaintiffs must produce concrete pre-separation evidence tying the defendant to the spouse; vague admissions or suspicions are insufficient.

Lesson

Beavers v. McMican strengthens the statutory bar on post-separation acts: alienation and criminal conversation claims live or die on proof of pre-separation conduct. Plaintiffs cannot rely solely on suspicions or post-separation dating to connect the dots — there must be solid pre-separation evidence that the defendant was the spouse’s paramour.

✅ Bottom Line:
Today, criminal conversation and alienation of affections in NC hinge on proving pre-separation conduct with more than mere conjecture. Post-separation affairs, children, or cohabitation may strengthen the case, but cannot substitute for proof.

Current status of Criminal Conversation (CC) law in North Carolina with N.C.G.S. § 52-13 in place:

1. Core Definition of Criminal Conversation

A strict liability tort: plaintiff must prove only:
1. Valid marriage between plaintiff and spouse, and
2. Sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during the marriage.
Malice or intent does not matter. One proven act of intercourse establishes liability.

2. Effect of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 (2009 Reform Law)

The legislature narrowed and codified CC (and Alienation of Affections). The statute provides:

§ 52-13(a):
- No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action for alienation of affection or criminal conversation that occurs after the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s spouse physically separate with the intent of either spouse that the separation remain permanent.
  ➝ Pre-separation cutoff: Liability exists only for acts before permanent separation.
§ 52-13(b):
- A cause of action must be brought within 3 years of the last act giving rise to the claim.
  ➝ 3-year statute of limitations (subject to discovery rule if affair hidden, Misenheimer v. Burris).
§ 52-13(c):
- Claim may only be brought against a natural person.
  ➝ No lawsuits against employers, companies, or institutions.

3. Evidence Standards

Direct proof of sex is rare.
Courts accept circumstantial evidence showing:
1. Inclination (affectionate or romantic behavior), and
2. Opportunity (being alone in circumstances suggesting sex).
In re Estate of Trogdon (1991): adultery usually proven circumstantially, because affairs are secretive.

4. Role of Post-Separation Conduct

Cannot create liability under § 52-13.
But per Rodriguez v. Lemus (2018) and reaffirmed in Beavers v. McMican (2024):
- Post-separation acts may be considered to corroborate pre-separation conduct.
- Example: if there is some pre-separation evidence (calls, hotel receipts), later cohabitation or having a child together can strengthen the inference that intercourse also occurred before separation.
- If pre-separation evidence is weak or speculative (“mere conjecture”), post-separation conduct cannot save the claim.

5. Statute of Limitations & Discovery

3 years from last wrongful act.
Misenheimer v. Burris (2006): SOL runs from the date of discovery of the affair (if hidden), with an outer 10-year limit (statute of repose).

6. Damages

Compensatory: mental anguish, humiliation, injury to health, loss of consortium/support, reputational harm.
Nominal damages: awarded automatically if liability proven, even without proof of actual loss.
Punitive damages: available if malice, willfulness, or wantonness shown. Adultery itself generally sufficient (see Horner v. Byrnett).

7. Jurisdiction / Choice of Law

Criminal conversation is a transitory tort: governed by the law of the state where the acts occurred.
NC recognizes the claim, but if all acts occurred in a state that has abolished CC (like SC, CA, NV), the claim fails.
Bassiri v. Pilling (2023): NC courts always have subject-matter jurisdiction over CC suits, but choice-of-law analysis decides whether NC law applies.

8. Constitutional Challenges

Defendants have repeatedly attacked CC and AoA as unconstitutional under First & Fourteenth Amendments (privacy, speech, association).
Malecek v. Williams (2017): CC and AoA are not facially unconstitutional — state has legitimate interest in protecting marriage.
Estes v. Battiston (2020) & Hull v. Brown (2021): constitutional challenges must be raised in trial court and cannot short-circuit cases through procedural tricks (e.g., demanding three-judge panel review).
Bottom line: the tort survives constitutional attacks — only legislature or NC Supreme Court could abolish it.

Current State of Criminal Conversation in NC (2025)

Still valid and actively litigated.
Strict liability if proven — adultery = automatic liability.
Limited to pre-separation acts by § 52-13.
Post-separation acts admissible only to corroborate pre-separation evidence (Rodriguez; Beavers).
3-year SOL from last act or discovery, with 10-year repose (Misenheimer).
Jurisdiction exists in NC, but substantive law depends on where acts occurred (Bassiri).
Punitive damages available, even with nominal compensatory damages.
Not unconstitutional, despite ongoing challenges (Malecek; Hull).

✅ Bottom Line:
In North Carolina today, Criminal Conversation remains a potent cause of action but is tightly cabined by § 52-13. Plaintiffs must prove specific pre-separation sexual conduct with more than speculation. Post-separation evidence helps, but cannot substitute for pre-separation proof. Defendants cannot rely on constitutional challenges to avoid trial; the tort is firmly entrenched until repealed by the legislature.

Recap and Conclusion

Criminal Conversation remains alive and well in North Carolina, but it is no longer the broad, open-ended tort it once was. The 2009 enactment of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 significantly reshaped its contours, imposing clear limits and procedural guardrails:

Pre-separation cutoff: Liability only attaches to acts of adultery occurring before the spouses physically separate with the intent that the separation remain permanent.
Post-separation evidence: Subsequent affairs, cohabitation, or even children born of a later relationship cannot themselves create liability. They may, however, corroborate credible pre-separation evidence, but only if that evidence rises above mere conjecture (Rodriguez v. Lemus; Beavers v. McMican).
Statute of limitations: Claims must be brought within three years, running from discovery of the affair, subject to a ten-year repose period (Misenheimer v. Burris).
Jurisdiction: North Carolina courts retain subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims, though choice-of-law rules mean the tort must have occurred in NC or in another state that still recognizes it (Bassiri v. Pilling).
Damages: Once liability is proven, plaintiffs are entitled to at least nominal damages, which can support substantial punitive awards. Mental anguish, humiliation, reputational harm, and loss of consortium remain compensable.
Constitutionality: Despite repeated challenges, appellate courts continue to uphold Criminal Conversation as constitutional (Malecek v. Williams; Hull v. Brown). The tort stands until the General Assembly or the Supreme Court says otherwise.

In short, Criminal Conversation in North Carolina is still potent, but it is tightly circumscribed. Plaintiffs must prove pre-separation sexual conduct with more than suspicion, and courts will carefully scrutinize evidence to ensure it clears that bar. Post-separation misconduct may add weight, but it cannot substitute for proof. For defendants, procedural or constitutional attacks offer no easy escape — the tort persists as part of North Carolina’s family law landscape, a reminder that the state continues to treat marriage as an institution worthy of legal protection.

Adkins Law, PLLC is located in Huntersville, North Carolina and primarily serves Mecklenburg County and the counties surrounding Lake Norman. If you need to speak with an experienced family law attorney in Huntersville regarding a heartbalm tort in NC such as criminal conversation or alienation of affection, please contact Adkins Law to arrange for a consultation.

Chris Adkins

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4 responses to “What is Criminal Conversation in North Carolina?”

Understanding Alienation of Affection in North Carolina

September 14, 2025 at 9:51 pm

[…] love and affection once existing between husband and wife. Unlike the closely related action for criminal conversation, which requires proof of sexual intercourse, Alienation of Affection is broader. It targets the […]

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Understanding Criminal Conversation Law in North Carolina

September 15, 2025 at 12:20 pm

[…] Carolina is one of the few states that still recognizes Criminal Conversation (CC), a strict-liability civil action for adultery. Alongside Alienation of Affection (AoA), it […]

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September 26, 2025 at 7:31 am

[…] nearly alone in continuing to recognize two of the most controversial “heart-balm” torts: criminal conversation and alienation of […]

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When Social Media Meets the Law: Inside North Carolina’s $1.75 Million Alienation of Affection Verdict – LKN Law

November 21, 2025 at 1:32 pm

[…] This is more than a legal story. It is a window into the new terrain of modern relationships — a world where every moment can become evidence, every post can be interpreted through a legal lens, and every digital interaction has the power to reshape the outcome of a lawsuit. […]

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