Upset woman in Huntersville NC sitting on a couch and looking at her husbands phone realizing he has been unfaithful

Understanding Alienation of Affection Law in North Carolina

A woman with curly hair wearing a denim jacket and holding a smartphone looks concerned while standing near a man lying on a couch appearing distressed — By Christopher Adkins Adkins Law PLLC is a family law and civil litigation law firm located in Huntersville NC Contact Adkins Law PLLC to arrange a consultation with an experienced alienation of affections attorney in Huntersville NC

Part I. Introduction & Historical Background

Definition and Scope

Alienation of Affection is one of the most controversial and enduring torts in American law. At its core, it allows one spouse to sue a third party — most commonly a lover, but sometimes an interfering relative, counselor, or friend — who is alleged to have wrongfully and maliciously intruded into the marriage and destroyed the love and affection once existing between husband and wife. Unlike the closely related action for criminal conversation, which requires proof of sexual intercourse, Alienation of Affection is broader. It targets the destruction of marital companionship, fidelity, and emotional connection, regardless of whether the defendant engaged in physical relations with the spouse.

In theory, then, a defendant might never touch the alienated spouse and still be liable if their actions poisoned the marriage. As North Carolina courts often put it, the gravamen of the claim is the malicious interference with the marital relationship (Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622 (1966)). While adultery is the most common fact pattern, it is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own; the tort turns on whether the defendant’s wrongful acts were the controlling cause of the alienation.

Common Law Roots in Enticement

The origins of Alienation of Affection lie deep in English common law, where it developed from the action of “enticement” or “criminal conversation.” At that time, marriage was viewed not primarily as a romantic union but as an economic and proprietary one. The husband had a legally recognized right to his wife’s “services” — her domestic labor, sexual relations, and childbearing. A man who lured away another man’s wife deprived the husband not only of companionship but also of a form of property.

The earliest American cases were candid in these assumptions. In Barbee v. Armstead (32 N.C. 530 (1849)), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld an action by a husband against a third party who enticed his wife away, stressing that contracts or arrangements designed to harbor another man’s wife were void as against public policy. Similarly, Maxwell v. McBrayer (61 N.C. 527 (1868)) reiterated that such actions survived the upheaval of the Civil War and Reconstruction, reinforcing the husband’s legal right to his wife’s fidelity and presence.

It was only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that courts began to soften the proprietary rhetoric, shifting from property-loss language to the idea of protecting consortium — the intangible package of love, companionship, services, and society spouses owe each other. Still, the gendered assumptions remained: it was usually the husband suing a rival for stealing away his wife.

Transition to a Gender-Neutral Tort

As American family law modernized, the tort gradually became gender-neutral. Wives as well as husbands were permitted to bring actions, and the theoretical underpinning shifted again. Instead of the husband’s “property right” in his wife, courts began to frame Alienation of Affection as a means of protecting the marital relationship itself — the affection and companionship of both spouses, treated as a joint right.

This evolution is visible in early 20th-century cases like Cottle v. Johnson (179 N.C. 426 (1920)), where the court described damages not only in terms of lost economic support but also mental anguish and humiliation. By mid-century, in cases such as Bishop v. Glazener (245 N.C. 592 (1957)), North Carolina courts emphasized that even parents could be held liable if their interference with a marriage was malicious, though parents were generally presumed to act in good faith.

The transition also coincided with a broader movement in tort law away from formal property concepts and toward recognition of dignitary and relational interests. Alienation of Affection became, in theory, less about ownership and more about vindicating emotional harm — though critics argue that the old proprietary undertones were never fully erased.

North Carolina’s Unique Survival

By the mid-20th century, Alienation of Affection and other heart-balm torts (including breach of promise to marry and seduction) came under attack. Reformers, particularly in the 1930s through 1950s, argued that such actions were subject to abuse and blackmail. Jilted lovers and estranged spouses could use the threat of litigation to extort settlements. Many legislatures responded by abolishing heart-balm actions wholesale.

By the 1980s, more than 40 states had eliminated Alienation of Affection. Today, only a tiny handful still recognize it: North Carolina, Mississippi, South Dakota, Utah, New Mexico (to a limited extent), and Hawaii (though no appellate case has recognized it in decades).

What makes North Carolina exceptional is not only that it retains Alienation of Affection, but that the tort is robustly enforced. Juries here have awarded some of the largest verdicts in the nation:

Hutelmyer v. Cox (133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)): Secretary’s public affair with boss yielded a $1 million judgment.
Shackelford v. Lundquist (233 N.C. App. 787 (2014)): $9 million verdict, one of the most widely publicized modern cases.
Puryear v. Puryear (233 N.C. App. 787 (2014)): A $30 million default judgment, perhaps the largest in NC history.

Far from being a vestigial relic, Alienation of Affection is alive and well in North Carolina courtrooms. Family law practitioners regularly use it as leverage in divorce negotiations, and it remains a source of national fascination.

Policy Debates and Constitutional Critiques

The survival of Alienation of Affection provokes fierce policy debate.

Arguments for Abolition:

Archaic Origins: Critics emphasize its sexist and proprietary roots. As the Court of Appeals itself remarked in Malecek v. Williams (804 S.E.2d 592 (2017)), the tort originated in a time when women were treated as property.
Abuse and Misuse: Many argue the action is weaponized in divorce cases, used for leverage rather than genuine compensation.
Chilling Rights: Scholars like Bruton (The Questionable Constitutionality of Curtailing Cuckolding – 2016) argue that the tort chills First Amendment rights of association and Fourteenth Amendment rights of sexual autonomy, punishing private consensual conduct between adults.
Outlier Status: With nearly all states abolishing the tort, NC’s continued recognition is seen as an anachronism.

Arguments for Retention:

Protection of Marriage: Defenders argue that marriage is a state-sanctioned institution deserving of protection. If the law protects business contracts from interference, why not marriage vows?
Compensation: Plaintiffs genuinely suffer economic losses (support, benefits) and emotional trauma (humiliation, reputational harm) when marriages are destroyed.
Deterrence: Even if not perfect, the tort may deter flagrant affairs, particularly when defendants risk multimillion-dollar judgments.

Judicial and Legislative Stalemate:
In Cannon v. Miller (71 N.C. App. 460 (1984)), the Court of Appeals attempted to abolish Alienation of Affection, calling it an outdated relic. The Supreme Court swiftly reversed, not on the merits but on the ground that only it could overrule its precedents — effectively reinstating the tort. In Malecek, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the tort’s misogynistic history but upheld it under rational-basis review, deferring to the legislature to abolish it if desired.

Despite repeated legislative proposals, including as recently as 2025, the General Assembly has never eliminated Alienation of Affection. In fact, in 2009 it codified N.C.G.S. § 52-13, which limited the tort by barring liability for post-separation conduct but otherwise preserved it. This demonstrates the state’s ambivalence: willing to narrow, but not ready to abandon.

Thus, Alienation of Affection stands at a peculiar crossroads of history and policy. Born of English property law, reshaped into a gender-neutral tort, and abolished nearly everywhere else, it persists in North Carolina with surprising vigor. It reflects both the enduring desire of the law to protect the marital relationship and the tension between traditional values and modern constitutional norms. Whether seen as a safeguard of marriage or an archaic relic, it continues to define North Carolina family law in ways unmatched elsewhere in the United States.

Part II. Elements of the Tort

To prevail on a claim for Alienation of Affection in North Carolina, the plaintiff must prove three essential elements:

A marriage with genuine love and affection
Alienation or destruction of that affection
Wrongful and malicious acts by the defendant that were the controlling cause of the loss

While the structure is simple, the doctrine is nuanced, and North Carolina case law has filled in important contours over the last century.

1. Marriage with Genuine Love and Affection

The first element requires proof that the spouses shared some genuine love and affection at the time of the alleged interference.

Not a Perfect Marriage Standard: Courts emphasize that the marriage need not have been blissful or free of discord. What matters is that affection existed “in some degree.” Even strained marriages can support a claim. In Shaw v. Stringer (101 N.C. App. 513 (1991)), the wife admitted she “loved both” her husband and her lover. The court still found enough evidence of affection in the marriage for the jury to consider.
Plaintiff’s Testimony Alone May Suffice: The injured spouse’s testimony describing the marriage as loving is usually sufficient, unless completely contradicted by objective facts. In Litchfield v. Cox (266 N.C. 622 (1966)), the plaintiff’s description of a previously affectionate marriage, coupled with love letters typed by the defendant to the wife, was enough to survive nonsuit.
Illustrative Example: In Scott v. Kiker (59 N.C. App. 458 (1982)), the husband walked in to find his wife nude in the defendant’s home. The court noted that even though the marriage was troubled, the plaintiff’s testimony of continued affection met the threshold.
Underlying Policy: This requirement distinguishes viable cases from suits over marriages that were already completely dead. If no affection remains to be alienated, the claim fails (Warner v. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384 (1968)).

2. Alienation or Destruction of Affection

Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s acts led to the alienation, diminishment, or destruction of love and affection.

Partial Alienation Is Enough: The law does not require proof that the marriage ended or that all affection was destroyed. Any substantial loss suffices. In Ward v. Beaton (141 N.C. App. 44 (2000)), the jury found alienation even though the marriage was already under stress; defendant’s involvement was enough to tip the scales.
Evidence of Change in Spousal Behavior: Courts look to evidence that the alienated spouse withdrew emotionally, physically, or socially from the marriage. Testimony often centers on sudden coldness, avoidance of intimacy, unexplained absences, or outright declarations of love for the defendant. In Gray v. Hoover (94 N.C. App. 724 (1989)), the wife told her husband she loved the defendant and not him — clear evidence of alienation.
Post-Separation Conduct Rules:
- Before 2009, plaintiffs often introduced post-separation conduct (affairs, cohabitation, children born out of wedlock) to corroborate pre-separation alienation.
- In McCutchen v. McCutchen (2006), the Court of Appeals clarified that alienation can occur even after separation if reconciliation efforts continued, rejecting a strict “separation cuts off liability” rule.
- In response, the legislature enacted N.C.G.S. § 52-13 (2009), which now bars claims based on acts occurring after a physical separation with the intent to remain apart permanently. However, post-separation conduct can still be admitted as corroborative evidence of pre-separation misconduct (Rodriguez v. Lemus, 257 N.C. App. 493 (2018)).
Illustrative Example: In Rodriguez, phone records, hotel bills, and the fact that the defendant later had a child with the plaintiff’s husband supported the inference that affection had already been alienated before separation.

3. Wrongful and Malicious Acts of the Defendant

The third element requires proof that the defendant engaged in wrongful and malicious acts that were the controlling cause of the alienation.

Definition of Malice: Malice does not mean personal hatred. It is defined broadly as conduct that is intentional, unjustifiable, and likely to harm the marital relationship. Courts presume malice where adultery is proven (Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)).
Proximate Cause Standard:
- Defendant’s acts must be the controlling or effective cause, though not the exclusive cause, of alienation.
- If the marriage was already disintegrating, liability may still attach if the defendant’s actions hastened or deepened the alienation (Ward v. Beaton).
Acts That Qualify:
- Sexual affairs and cohabitation (classic fact patterns).
- Persistent phone calls, letters, and emails that nurtured romantic attachment (Coachman v. Gould, 122 N.C. App. 443 (1996) — although phone calls alone without more were insufficient here).
- Public displays of affection, financial support, travel together.
- Encouragement of estrangement, including malicious advice to leave a spouse.
Acts That Do Not Qualify:
- Mere friendship or innocent contact.
- Acts of relatives advising in good faith. In Bishop v. Glazener (1957) and Townsend v. Holderby (1929), the Court recognized a presumption that parents act out of concern, not malice. Liability requires proof of improper motive.
Illustrative Example: In Hutelmyer, the defendant secretary flaunted her relationship with her boss (the plaintiff’s husband), publicly touching him, taking trips together, and calling the marital home. These brazen acts satisfied the malice requirement and justified $1 million in damages.

Synthesis

The three elements together — love in the marriage, alienation of that love, and wrongful acts as the effective cause — form the backbone of Alienation of Affection. Each prong is fact-sensitive and often turns on circumstantial proof. Courts consistently stress that juries, not judges, are best suited to weigh evidence of affection, alienation, and motive. Thus, many cases survive summary judgment and reach the jury even on modest evidence.

Part III. Evidentiary Standards

Alienation of Affection cases almost always turn on the quality and weight of the evidence. Unlike criminal cases, which require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Alienation of Affection is a civil action decided under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Plaintiffs must produce more than a scintilla of evidence on each element — just enough to allow a jury to reasonably find in their favor. Once that low threshold is met, North Carolina courts are clear that issues of affection, alienation, and causation belong to the jury.

1. Testimony of the Plaintiff or Spouse

Plaintiff’s Own Testimony: The plaintiff’s description of the marriage — that it was loving, affectionate, and supportive — is often enough to establish the first element. In Litchfield v. Cox (266 N.C. 622 (1966)), the husband’s testimony about his once-happy marriage, bolstered by love letters typed on the defendant’s typewriter, carried the day.
Alienated Spouse’s Testimony: Ironically, the alienated spouse (often the one who strayed) is not the plaintiff but may be called as a witness. Their admissions — of love lost, of intimacy with the defendant, of declarations of affection — can be devastating evidence. In Gray v. Hoover (94 N.C. App. 724 (1989)), the alienated wife admitted she no longer loved her husband but loved the defendant, which the Court of Appeals deemed sufficient for a jury to infer alienation.
Competency Rules: Historically, spousal testimony was barred in cases “in consequence of adultery” (Rouse v. Creech, 203 N.C. 378 (1932)). That bar has since been eroded, and today spouses are generally competent to testify, though hearsay rules and credibility challenges remain key battlegrounds.

2. Circumstantial Evidence

Because direct evidence of intent or affection is rare, Alienation of Affection cases rely heavily on circumstantial proof. Courts repeatedly affirm that juries may infer alienation from patterns of behavior. Common categories include:

Love Letters, Emails, and Messaging Apps: Written communications are classic evidence. In Litchfield v. Cox (266 N.C. 622 (1966)), love letters typed on the defendant’s typewriter to the plaintiff’s wife proved both affection and wrongful interference. Today, juries increasingly see emails, text messages, and messaging app logs (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Snapchat, Instagram DMs) playing the same role. A midnight text saying “I love you” or a string of intimate messages can serve as the modern equivalent of love letters — candid, often timestamped admissions of affection and wrongful interference.
Phone Records and Call Logs: Repeated, lengthy, or late-night calls are probative of alienation. In Rodriguez v. Lemus (257 N.C. App. 493 (2018)), hundreds of calls between the wife and the defendant, combined with hotel records, proved opportunity and inclination. Conversely, in Coachman v. Gould (122 N.C. App. 443 (1996)), frequent calls without further proof of intimacy were held insufficient. Modern litigation often pairs phone records with location data or app screenshots to show not just calls, but patterns of constant communication.
Social Media Posts and Digital Footprints: Courts now routinely admit screenshots of Facebook status updates, Instagram photos, or TikTok videos that reveal an ongoing relationship. Publicly posting vacation photos, changing relationship statuses, or tagging each other in affectionate posts can strongly support a finding of alienation. In some recent North Carolina trials, evidence of secret “private” Facebook groups, Snapchat streaks, and Instagram DMs have become decisive in showing wrongful conduct. Unlike letters that can be destroyed, social media often leaves a digital trail that plaintiffs can subpoena.
Hotel Records and Travel Receipts: Reservations, room charges, flight tickets, and eyewitness accounts of spouses entering or leaving hotels with defendants provide strong circumstantial evidence. In Warner v. Torrence (2 N.C. App. 384 (1968)), testimony from a sheriff who found the defendant in a motel room with the plaintiff’s wife was sufficient to prove criminal conversation and support the alienation claim. Today, online booking confirmations, Uber receipts, or shared Airbnb stays provide the same kind of corroboration.
Financial Support and Gifts: Evidence that the defendant gave the spouse gifts, paid expenses, or otherwise supported them is probative of wrongful interference. In Hutelmyer v. Cox (133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)), evidence that the secretary lavished attention and financial benefits on her boss was part of what persuaded the jury to award $1 million. Modern cases add credit card statements, Venmo or Cash App transfers, and Amazon order histories as ways of showing financial entanglement.
Public Displays of Affection: Holding hands, kissing, or flaunting a relationship in public supports a finding of malice. In Hutelmyer, the defendant was seen straightening her boss’s tie, eating from his cup, and traveling with him — behavior that went beyond private indiscretion into public flaunting. In the social media era, “public display” can also mean photos posted online, tagged together on trips, or videos showing physical affection.
Cohabitation Evidence: Moving in together or setting up a household is near-conclusive proof of alienation. In Jennings v. Jessen (103 N.C. App. 739 (1991)), the alienated wife’s cohabitation with the defendant and his audacious phone calls to the marital home supported punitive damages even when compensatory damages were vacated. Today, shared leases, joint utility bills, co-signed rental agreements, or shared Wi-Fi accounts often serve as cohabitation evidence.

3. Opportunity and Inclination

North Carolina courts often analogize to the opportunity and inclination doctrine developed in criminal conversation cases. Because direct proof of sexual intimacy is rare, juries may infer it where:

There is evidence of an inclination toward an adulterous relationship (romantic words, affection, flirting, gifts); and
There is opportunity to consummate that inclination (private meetings, overnight trips, hotel stays).

In Gray v. Hoover, testimony of intimate conduct (holding, kissing, admissions) and opportunity (living together in Florida, motel stays) sufficed to send both Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation claims to the jury. By contrast, in Coachman v. Gould, evidence of frequent phone calls without opportunity for physical contact was insufficient.

While Alienation of Affection does not require sexual intercourse, the opportunity-and-inclination framework is still highly persuasive for juries in evaluating whether wrongful interference was the controlling cause of alienation.

4. Burden of Proof and Standard

More Than a Scintilla: Plaintiffs need only provide a minimal quantum of evidence — more than a scintilla — on each element to reach the jury. Courts emphasize that judges should not usurp the jury’s role in weighing affection and alienation. As the Court of Appeals put it in Ward v. Beaton (141 N.C. App. 44 (2000)), “the existence of affection is a question for the jury.”
Preponderance of the Evidence: At trial, the plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that (1) love existed, (2) it was lost, and (3) defendant’s acts caused the loss. This is far lower than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which explains why Alienation of Affection claims often survive on circumstantial proof.
Jury-Centric Doctrine: Appellate courts frequently stress deference to juries in this area. In Gray v. Hoover, the Court of Appeals reversed a directed verdict against the plaintiff, reminding that the “presence or absence of affection is a quintessential question of fact.”

5. Illustrative Contrasts

Cases Where Evidence Was Enough:
- Gray v. Hoover (admissions of love + cohabitation + motel evidence = sufficient).
- Hutelmyer v. Cox (public flaunting, trips, calls, physical affection = sufficient).
- Rodriguez v. Lemus (phone records, hotel receipts, post-separation child as corroboration = sufficient).
Cases Where Evidence Was Not Enough:
- Coachman v. Gould (calls alone = insufficient).
- Norris v. Alexander (443 phone calls, but no kissing, no sex, no direct proof = insufficient).
- Warner v. Torrence (no genuine love left in marriage = AOA claim failed, though CC survived).

The evidentiary standards in Alienation of Affection cases reflect a balance between the recognition of deeply private harms and the practical reality that few will admit to interfering in a marriage. Plaintiffs need not show a perfect marriage, nor direct proof of adultery. Instead, courts accept circumstantial evidence — letters, phone logs, hotel records, gifts, financial support, public displays — as sufficient if it suggests that the defendant’s acts were the controlling cause of alienation.

Ultimately, the law’s low evidentiary threshold and its reliance on juries reflect a consistent judicial philosophy: the existence of love, the reality of alienation, and the motive of interference are questions of human relationships best left to community judgment.

Part IV. Defenses

While Alienation of Affection is often described as a “plaintiff-friendly” tort — with a low evidentiary threshold and juries predisposed to view marriage sympathetically — defendants do have several potential defenses. Some are explicitly recognized in statute, others developed in case law, and some rarely succeed but are nonetheless argued. The availability and scope of defenses is one reason Alienation of Affection litigation in North Carolina is so distinctive.

1. Statute of Limitations

The primary defense in Alienation of Affection actions is the statute of limitations.

Three-Year Limitation: Under N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5), plaintiffs must file within three years of the last act of alienation. This is not from discovery of the affair, but from the defendant’s last wrongful act that contributed to the alienation.
Discovery Rule and Repose: In Misenheimer v. Burris (360 N.C. 620 (2006)), the Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to criminal conversation and, by analogy, to Alienation of Affection. If the affair was concealed, the statute runs from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known, subject to a ten-year statute of repose. This softened the harshness of earlier rulings that cut off claims three years after the affair began, even if the plaintiff was deceived.
Separation Date as a Cutoff: The 2009 amendment in N.C.G.S. § 52-13 added a substantive limit: no cause of action may be based on acts after the date of physical separation with intent to remain apart permanently. Thus, even if the affair continues, damages must be pegged to pre-separation conduct. Cases like Rodriguez v. Lemus (257 N.C. App. 493 (2018)) show how post-separation cohabitation can still corroborate pre-separation alienation, but cannot create new liability.
Illustrative Example: In McCutchen v. McCutchen (2006), the Court of Appeals allowed an Alienation of Affection claim where reconciliation efforts continued after separation, holding that affection was not conclusively destroyed at separation. The legislature later abrogated that rule via § 52-13. Today, defense counsel will scrutinize dates carefully, arguing that alleged wrongful acts occurred outside the limitations window.

2. Ignorance of Marriage

Another defense is the defendant’s lack of knowledge that the alienated spouse was married.

Affirmative Defense: Ignorance of marriage is treated as an affirmative defense. If the defendant can prove they reasonably did not know the lover was married, liability does not attach.
Practical Challenges: This defense is difficult in practice. Many cases involve coworkers, neighbors, or friends where marital status is obvious. Moreover, even if the defendant initially did not know, continued involvement after discovery of the marriage is actionable.
Illustrative Example: In Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Morgan (147 N.C. App. 438 (2001)), the Court of Appeals emphasized that Alienation of Affection is an intentional tort — knowledge of the marriage is generally presumed once wrongful acts occur. Although the case was about insurance coverage, its reasoning underscores why “I didn’t know she was married” rarely succeeds in front of a jury.

3. Consent or Connivance of the Plaintiff

Perhaps the most colorful defense is consent or connivance — the idea that the plaintiff knowingly encouraged, permitted, or acquiesced in the affair.

Plaintiff’s Consent Is a Defense: If the plaintiff explicitly or tacitly agreed that their spouse could pursue extramarital relationships (e.g., in an “open marriage”), recovery is barred. This is rooted in the equitable doctrine that one cannot complain of an injury they invited.
Not the Alienated Spouse’s Consent: Critically, it is the plaintiff’s consent that matters, not the alienated spouse’s. In Bryant v. Carrier (214 N.C. 191 (1938)), the Supreme Court held that even if the wife willingly participated in the affair, the defendant was still liable to the husband. The injured spouse’s lack of consent preserves the claim.
Connivance vs. Forgiveness: Courts distinguish between active connivance (approval or arrangement of adultery) and mere forgiveness (acceptance after discovery). In Nunn v. Allen (154 N.C. App. 523 (2002)), the Court clarified that a separation agreement authorizing spouses to “live as if unmarried” did not bar Alienation of Affection claims against third parties unless there was proof the plaintiff consented beforehand.
Illustrative Example: Imagine a couple who agrees to an open marriage. If the husband sues his wife’s lover, the defense can argue that the husband’s prior agreement bars recovery. But if the wife alone consented (by willingly having the affair), her consent is irrelevant.

4. Fraud or Procedural Defenses

Fraud is occasionally raised as a defense, though rarely successful.

Intrinsic Fraud: In Hooks v. Eckman (159 N.C. App. 681 (2003)), the plaintiff, after winning a judgment, brought a new fraud suit alleging the defendant had hidden assets and perjured himself. The Court of Appeals rejected it, holding that perjury was “intrinsic fraud” and must be raised in the original case or on appeal. This illustrates how defendants may argue that subsequent fraud claims cannot relitigate Alienation verdicts.
Rule 60 Motions: Defendants sometimes seek relief from Alienation of Affection judgments under N.C. Rule of Civil Procedure 60, arguing excusable neglect or fraud. These are rarely granted, as courts emphasize the need for finality.

5. “No Love to Alienate”

Another defense is that there was no genuine love or affection in the marriage to begin with.

Warner v. Torrence (2 N.C. App. 384 (1968)): The court held that because the marriage had been deteriorating for decades, with no genuine love left by the time of the affair, there was nothing for the defendant to alienate.
Practical Defense: Defendants often introduce evidence of marital discord — prior separations, abuse, affairs, or counseling records — to show that the marriage was already dead.

6. Miscellaneous Defenses

First Amendment & Constitutional Challenges: Defendants increasingly argue Alienation of Affection violates rights of association and intimacy. In Malecek v. Williams (804 S.E.2d 592 (2017)), the Court of Appeals acknowledged the tort’s misogynistic origins but upheld it under rational-basis review. While not a true “defense” at trial, this remains an avenue for appellate challenge.
Insurance Coverage Exclusions: Defendants sometimes look to homeowners’ or umbrella insurance to pay judgments. But in Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Morgan (2001), the Court held that Alienation of Affection is an intentional tort, excluded from coverage. Thus, defendants generally face personal financial exposure.

Defenses in Alienation of Affection cases are limited but strategically significant. The statute of limitations and separation-date cutoff are the most potent; ignorance of marriage and plaintiff’s connivance are possible but rarely persuasive. Claims that the marriage was already dead can sway juries, while fraud and constitutional arguments are more effective on appeal than at trial.

Ultimately, the doctrine reflects North Carolina’s commitment to protecting marriages: unless a defendant can show the marriage was devoid of affection, the plaintiff consented, or the claim is time-barred, juries are generally empowered to weigh the facts and award damages.

Part V. Remedies and Damages

Alienation of Affection occupies a fascinating space in North Carolina’s civil justice system: a tort that is both antiquated in origin and yet capable of producing some of the largest verdicts in state history. Unlike routine negligence cases, damages in AOA suits are inherently emotional, subjective, and often symbolic. They reflect not only pecuniary loss but also society’s judgment about the sanctity of marriage and the audacity of outsiders who interfere with it.

North Carolina law recognizes two broad categories of damages: compensatory and punitive. Compensatory damages aim to make the plaintiff whole for tangible and intangible losses, while punitive damages punish and deter particularly egregious conduct.

1. Compensatory Damages

Compensatory damages in Alienation of Affection are expansive, covering both economic losses and intangible injuries. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that damages cannot be calculated with mathematical precision but are left largely to the jury’s discretion.

Pecuniary (Economic) Losses
- Lost support: the income, benefits, or financial contributions of the alienated spouse.
- Insurance and retirement benefits: a spouse may lose access to health coverage, life insurance, or pension rights.
- Household services: the value of labor, companionship, and domestic partnership lost.
- Example: In Cottle v. Johnson (179 N.C. 426 (1920)), the Court acknowledged pecuniary loss as a proper category of damages, noting that jurors could consider the support and benefits the husband lost when his wife’s affections were alienated.
Non-Pecuniary (Emotional) Losses
- Humiliation and shame: the public disgrace of being abandoned or betrayed.
- Mental anguish: the emotional trauma of losing companionship and intimacy.
- Loss of consortium: the intangible but profound deprivation of love, society, and marital comfort.
- Example: In Hutelmyer v. Cox (133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)), the jury awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages for the plaintiff-wife’s humiliation and emotional harm after her husband’s secretary flaunted their affair.
Proof and Jury Considerations
Jurors often hear testimony about:
- The length and quality of the marriage before interference.
- The plaintiff’s emotional suffering (sleep loss, depression, therapy).
- Public embarrassment — e.g., coworkers, family, or church members discovering the affair.
- Changed behavior in the alienated spouse — coldness, withdrawal, or outright declarations of love for the defendant.

Because these harms are inherently subjective, verdicts can vary wildly. Two plaintiffs with similar fact patterns may receive dramatically different awards depending on jury composition, local attitudes, and the defendant’s behavior in court.

2. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages in Alienation of Affection are where the tort truly flexes its cultural power.

Legal Standard
Punitive damages are authorized under Chapter 1D of the North Carolina General Statutes. To award them, a jury must find an aggravating factor — fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct — by clear and convincing evidence.
- Malice is usually presumed in adultery cases.
- Additional aggravating conduct — flaunting, deceit, reckless disregard — can bolster punitive claims.
Purpose
Unlike compensatory damages, which remedy loss, punitive damages punish egregious misconduct and deter others. They also serve a symbolic function: juries express community outrage at the defendant’s interference.
Key Cases
- Jennings v. Jessen (103 N.C. App. 739 (1991)): The defendant cohabited with the plaintiff’s wife and even called the marital home. Jury awarded $300,000 punitive damages despite vacated compensatories, because punitive can survive if nominal damages exist.
- Hutelmyer v. Cox (1999): Defendant’s public flaunting of her affair justified $500,000 punitive damages, later upheld on appeal.
- Shackelford v. Lundquist (233 N.C. App. 787 (2014)): Jury awarded $4 million punitive damages after a $5 million compensatory award, even though the defendant did not appear at trial.
- Puryear v. Puryear (233 N.C. App. 787 (2014)): A staggering $20 million punitive award in a default judgment — one of the largest in North Carolina history.
Factors Juries Consider
- Defendant’s conduct: Was it discreet or brazen? Public or private?
- Defendant’s attitude: Remorseful or mocking?
- Impact on the plaintiff: Was the harm aggravated by humiliation in front of children, family, or the community?
- Defendant’s financial status: Punitive awards often scale with ability to pay, a controversial feature that makes wealthy defendants lightning rods for high damages.

3. The Interplay between Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation

Alienation of Affection (AOA) and Criminal Conversation (CC) are often described as “sister torts.” Both arise out of the same injury — wrongful interference with the marital relationship — but they differ significantly in scope, elements, and proof. Because they are complementary, plaintiffs almost always plead them together, and juries often return verdicts on both counts.

a. Different Standards of Proof

Criminal Conversation as Strict Liability
Criminal Conversation is sometimes called the “strict liability adultery tort.” It requires only proof of:
1. A valid marriage between plaintiff and spouse; and
2. Sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture.
No showing of malice, intent, or alienation of love is required. Once intercourse is proven — by direct evidence, circumstantial proof of “opportunity and inclination,” or even the spouse’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment (In re Estate of Trogdon, 330 N.C. 143 (1991)) — liability attaches automatically.
Alienation of Affection as Fault-Based
By contrast, AOA demands more: proof of genuine love and affection in the marriage, its loss, and that the defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts were the controlling cause. This makes AOA more fact-intensive, requiring juries to weigh marital dynamics, motive, and causation.

b. Rule of Merger in Damages

Because AOA and CC often overlap factually, North Carolina courts apply a rule of merger to prevent “double recovery.” Plaintiffs may plead and prove both torts, and juries may return verdicts on both, but plaintiffs may recover only once — the larger of the two awards.

Chappell v. Redding (67 N.C. App. 397 (1984)) is the classic illustration. The jury awarded damages under both torts. On appeal, the court held that because there was insufficient evidence of intercourse to sustain CC, damages had to be retried on AOA alone. The case underscores both the overlap in damages and the need for careful jury instructions.
Practical Implication: Plaintiffs cannot “stack” damages. If an AOA verdict awards $500,000 and CC awards $300,000, only the $500,000 stands.

c. Strategic Pleading and Litigation Function

For plaintiffs, pleading both torts is a way to maximize recovery and hedge risks:

AOA as the Emotional Narrative: Alienation of Affection allows plaintiffs to tell the full story of betrayal — the decline of a once-loving marriage, the humiliation, the malicious acts of the outsider. It resonates with juries on a moral and emotional level, often leading to high compensatory and punitive damages.
CC as the Safety Net: Criminal Conversation offers a lower evidentiary bar. If adultery is proven, liability is automatic. Even if jurors doubt whether genuine affection still existed in the marriage, CC provides a strict liability fallback.
Defendant’s Strategy: Defense counsel often focuses on undermining CC (denying or disputing proof of intercourse) while simultaneously portraying the marriage as already “dead” to defeat AOA. If they succeed on CC, they remove the plaintiff’s safety net. If they succeed on AOA, they blunt emotional damages.

d. Jury Dynamics

Juries often return verdicts on both torts, especially when evidence of sexual intercourse is clear. But the emotional impact is carried more heavily by AOA. For example:

In Hutelmyer v. Cox (133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)), the jury awarded $500,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive damages, anchored not only on proof of adultery but on the secretary’s public flaunting of the relationship — the kind of malicious conduct central to AOA.
In Rodriguez v. Lemus (257 N.C. App. 493 (2018)), the court emphasized that post-separation evidence could corroborate pre-separation misconduct, bolstering both AOA and CC claims together.

e. Symbolic Role of the Pairing

Together, AOA and CC reinforce each other. AOA speaks to the emotional and social wrong of destroying marital affection. CC, by contrast, embodies the moral and physical wrong of sexual betrayal. When pled side by side, they present juries with both the heart and the body of the marital injury.

In practice, this pairing has proven effective: plaintiffs gain a powerful narrative arc (AOA) and an evidentiary backstop (CC), while courts ensure fairness by merging damages to prevent unjust enrichment.

4. Landmark Verdicts in North Carolina

North Carolina has become famous — or infamous — for Alienation of Affection verdicts. These verdicts illustrate the range of compensatory and punitive damages juries are willing to impose:

Hutelmyer v. Cox (1999): $1 million total ($500k compensatory, $500k punitive).
Shackelford v. Lundquist (2014): $9 million ($5 million compensatory, $4 million punitive).
Puryear v. Puryear (2014): $30 million default judgment ($10 million compensatory, $20 million punitive).
Clark v. Barrett (2021): $1.2 million, affirming modern juries still award seven figures.
Fish v. Stetina (2025): $1.3 million ($804k compensatory, $500k punitive), notable for relying heavily on GPS app data and deleted text evidence.

5. Jury Psychology and Cultural Dimensions

Alienation of Affection damages are never simply a matter of adding up receipts or lost wages. Unlike auto accidents or contract disputes, the harm in these cases is bound up with betrayal, humiliation, and community values. In North Carolina, where marriage and family retain strong cultural and religious weight, juries often approach Alienation of Affection cases as moral referenda. The courtroom becomes a stage where jurors express not just sympathy for the plaintiff, but condemnation of the defendant’s conduct.

Factors That Drive High Damages

Public Flaunting of the Affair
Jurors react most strongly when defendants flaunt their relationship in public. In Hutelmyer v. Cox (133 N.C. App. 364 (1999)), the defendant secretary straightened her boss’s tie, ate ice from his cup, and traveled with him openly. These gestures, seemingly small, struck the jury as brazen disrespect for the marriage — resulting in a $1 million verdict. Public humiliation magnifies damages because it wounds not only the spouse but also their standing in family, church, and community.
A Sympathetic Plaintiff
Long, faithful marriages resonate deeply with jurors. Plaintiffs who can portray themselves as loyal spouses blindsided by betrayal often receive generous awards. In Shackelford v. Lundquist (233 N.C. App. 787 (2014)), Cynthia Shackelford emphasized her decades-long marriage and the defendant’s callous disregard. The jury’s $9 million award reflected both her sympathetic posture and the defendant’s absence from trial.
Wealth or Arrogance of the Defendant
North Carolina juries, like those elsewhere, are sensitive to wealth disparities. When defendants appear arrogant, affluent, or dismissive, jurors may tailor punitive damages to “teach a lesson.” This dynamic was on full display in Puryear v. Puryear (2014), where a defaulting defendant faced a $30 million judgment — not only to compensate, but to send a message.
Symbolic Value of the Marriage
Juries elevate damages when a marriage has deep symbolic value: decades of partnership, children raised together, or prominent community involvement. The longer and more established the marriage, the more jurors feel its alienation represents an injustice deserving of heavy sanction.

Factors That Depress Damages

Preexisting Marital Discord
Defendants often highlight marital troubles predating their involvement. If jurors believe the marriage was already “dead,” awards shrink or vanish. In Warner v. Torrence (2 N.C. App. 384 (1968)), the plaintiff failed to prove genuine love remained; the AOA claim collapsed. Jurors do not reward plaintiffs for marriages they perceive as already hollow.
Plaintiff Perceived as Vengeful
Sympathy evaporates if jurors see plaintiffs as using Alienation of Affection for spite or money rather than genuine harm. A plaintiff who appears bitter, controlling, or focused on financial gain risks alienating the jury themselves. Jurors often balance the dignity of the plaintiff’s presentation against their anger at the defendant.
Remorseful or Sympathetic Defendants
Defendants who appear genuinely contrite, apologetic, or even manipulated can blunt jury anger. A tearful defendant explaining they fell in love sincerely, without intent to harm, may sway jurors away from harsh damages. Contrast this with defendants who skip trial (as in Shackelford), where absence is read as arrogance — a costly mistake.

The Cultural Weight of Marriage in North Carolina

The persistence of Alienation of Affection in North Carolina reflects not only doctrine but culture. This is a state with strong church traditions, conservative family values, and a deep sense that marriage is more than a private contract. Juries here often see themselves as guardians of the marital institution.

Community Morality: AOA verdicts often mirror sermons heard on Sundays in Huntersville, Charlotte, or Greensboro — that vows are sacred, and those who break or intrude upon them must be held accountable.
Generational Influence: Older jurors, especially those married for decades, may be particularly harsh on defendants, reflecting their own life experiences of endurance and fidelity.
Small-Town Dynamics: In smaller counties, where reputations matter, jurors may see an AOA case as protecting community standards. The humiliation of public scandal weighs heavily when “everybody knows everybody.”

Why These Verdicts Endure

Alienation of Affection damages endure because they channel community outrage. To jurors, a defendant’s interference is not just a private wrong — it is an affront to social order. Unlike other torts, AOA verdicts allow juries to articulate moral boundaries: marriage is sacred, betrayal is wrong, and outsiders who meddle must pay dearly.

Thus, while appellate courts and scholars debate constitutional issues, jury psychology ensures Alienation of Affection remains potent. Verdicts are not just about compensating plaintiffs; they are about broadcasting values in a state where marriage still carries profound cultural weight.

6. The Unpredictable Nature of Damages

Ultimately, Alienation of Affection damages are highly unpredictable. Unlike auto accidents or contract disputes, there are no clear formulas. Juries decide based on emotional resonance, cultural values, and perceptions of fairness. This explains why some plaintiffs win modest sums (tens of thousands) while others walk away with life-changing verdicts in the millions.

As one commentator put it: “Alienation of Affection damages are as much about punishing betrayal as about compensating loss.”

Damages in Alienation of Affection are where the tort exerts its lasting power. Compensatory awards validate the plaintiff’s suffering, while punitive awards punish brazen outsiders who wreck marriages. The merger with Criminal Conversation ensures plaintiffs maximize their chances, and the staggering verdicts — from $1 million in Hutelmyer to $30 million in Puryear — guarantee that Alienation of Affection will remain part of the North Carolina legal landscape.

It is not just law; it is theater, morality play, and cultural judgment all rolled into one.

Part VI. Constitutional and Policy Challenges

Alienation of Affection may be one of the most hotly debated torts in North Carolina. Its endurance raises fundamental questions: Should the law protect marriage through tort liability? Is the remedy a necessary deterrent or an outdated relic? These questions have played out not only in the courtroom but also in the legislature, the academy, and the public square.

1. Cannon v. Miller — The Attempted Abolition

The most dramatic moment in Alienation of Affection history came in the mid-1980s. In Cannon v. Miller (71 N.C. App. 460 (1984)), the Court of Appeals took the extraordinary step of abolishing both Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation. The panel called them relics of a bygone era, rooted in the proprietary idea of wives as property and prone to abuse.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the torts:

Encouraged blackmail and extortion.
Had misogynistic origins.
Served no legitimate deterrent purpose in modern society.
Contradicted trends in nearly every other jurisdiction, which had abolished “heart balm” actions.

But the victory for reform was short-lived. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily reversed (313 N.C. 324 (1985)), holding that the Court of Appeals lacked authority to overrule Supreme Court precedent. Importantly, the Supreme Court never reached the merits — it reinstated the torts on procedural grounds. Still, the symbolic message was clear: only the legislature or the Supreme Court itself could end Alienation of Affection.

For practitioners today — including family law firms like Adkins Law, PLLC in Huntersville — Cannon remains a reminder of how close North Carolina once came to abolition, and how entrenched the tort remains in precedent.

2. Malecek v. Williams — Constitutional Challenges

Fast forward three decades, and defendants turned to constitutional arguments. In Malecek v. Williams (804 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017)), a physician sued for Alienation of Affection argued that the tort violated:

The First Amendment right of association.
The Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and intimate sexual conduct (citing Lawrence v. Texas).

The Court of Appeals acknowledged the tort’s “misogynistic” origins and the criticism that it often functions as leverage in divorce cases. But the court upheld Alienation of Affection under rational basis review. The reasoning:

The state has a legitimate interest in protecting marriage as a social institution.
The tort compensates injured spouses for real harms (economic and emotional).
The law is content-neutral and does not specifically target speech.

The court suggested, however, that the legislature remained free to abolish the tort if it wished — subtly inviting reform while refusing to take that step itself. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, leaving Malecek as the governing precedent.

3. Free Association and Sexual Autonomy

Critics argue Alienation of Affection violates modern constitutional rights:

First Amendment Association: Adults should be free to associate with whom they wish, including intimate partners. Tort liability chills that freedom.
Fourteenth Amendment Autonomy: Following Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558 (2003)) and Obergefell v. Hodges (576 U.S. 644 (2015)), courts increasingly recognize sexual intimacy and marriage as areas of fundamental liberty. Alienation of Affection, by punishing consensual adult intimacy between non-married partners, arguably conflicts with this jurisprudence.

Law review commentary, such as Bruton’s The Questionable Constitutionality of Curtailing Cuckolding (Duke L.J., 2016), contends that Alienation of Affection is uniquely vulnerable. It punishes private adult relationships through state-enforced judgments, often with punitive damages in the millions.

4. Arguments for Abolition

Archaic Roots: The tort originated when wives were legally subordinate to husbands. Even if modern doctrine is gender-neutral, the historical baggage remains.
Weaponization in Divorce: Scholars like Cary & Scudder (Elon L. Rev., 2012) argue Alienation of Affection prolongs bitter divorces, giving angry spouses a tool of revenge. Instead of promoting healing, it deepens wounds.
Extortion Risks: As noted in Cannon, heart-balm torts have long been linked to blackmail. The threat of public litigation often coerces settlements.
Chilling Effects: By penalizing association and intimacy, Alienation of Affection arguably restricts freedoms recognized as constitutional in other contexts.
Outlier Status: With 45+ states abolishing the tort, North Carolina looks increasingly like an anachronism.

5. Arguments for Survival

Despite the criticisms, many defend Alienation of Affection, especially in a state where traditional values and community ties remain strong.

Protection of Marriage: Supporters argue marriage is more than a private contract — it is a state-sanctioned institution with public consequences (children, property, inheritance). The state has a legitimate interest in protecting it from wrongful interference.
Analogy to Business Torts: Courts often note that if the law protects contracts from tortious interference, why should it not protect marriage vows? McCutchen v. McCutchen (2006) reaffirmed this logic, stressing the contractual and relational aspects of marriage.
Compensation for Real Harm: Betrayed spouses suffer economic loss (lost income, insurance, pensions) and emotional devastation (humiliation, reputational harm). Alienation of Affection provides a civil remedy for these injuries.
Deterrence: Even if not perfect, the possibility of multimillion-dollar judgments may deter some would-be interlopers. Cases like Hutelmyer v. Cox ($1 million verdict), Shackelford v. Lundquist ($9 million), and Puryear v. Puryear ($30 million) demonstrate the law’s teeth.

6. The Role of the Legislature

Repeated attempts have been made to abolish Alienation of Affection legislatively. Bills have been introduced in the General Assembly, including in 2025, but none have passed. Instead, in 2009, the legislature narrowed the tort by enacting N.C.G.S. § 52-13, which:

Barred claims based on post-separation conduct.
Limited suits to natural persons (not corporations).
Set a three-year statute of limitations.

This partial reform shows ambivalence: lawmakers recognized abuses but stopped short of abolition, reflecting North Carolina’s cultural commitment to marriage.

7. Jury Verdicts as Cultural Statements

Alienation of Affection verdicts often serve as community referenda on morality. Juries in Guilford, Wake, and Mecklenburg Counties have delivered headline-grabbing awards, reflecting outrage not just at adultery but at betrayal and public humiliation.

In Shackelford, the jury punished a New York defendant who never even showed up for trial, awarding $9 million.
In Puryear, Judge Carl Fox in Wake County entered a $30 million judgment after default.
In Clark v. Barrett (2021), a modern jury awarded $1.2 million after hearing evidence of IVF pregnancy and malicious online conduct.

Attorneys in family law practice, whether in Charlotte, Raleigh, or smaller communities like Huntersville, know that jurors often see these cases as moral theater as much as legal disputes.

8. The National Spotlight

Alienation of Affection in North Carolina has an almost magnetic pull on the national media. Every time a jury returns a seven- or eight-figure verdict, stories ripple far beyond the courthouse steps in Raleigh, Charlotte, or Greensboro. Newspapers, cable news anchors, and even late-night comedians seize upon these cases with a mixture of curiosity and disbelief.

Media Coverage as Legal Theater

Major outlets like The New York Times, CNN, USA Today, and The Washington Post have repeatedly profiled Alienation of Affection, often under headlines that frame the tort as a bizarre Southern relic. The typical tone is one of astonishment: “Wait — you can sue your spouse’s lover in North Carolina and win millions?”
Regional papers also devote special coverage, highlighting the local color of trials: church communities testifying to a plaintiff’s faithful marriage, small-town juries punishing big-city paramours, and attorneys explaining 19th-century doctrines to 21st-century jurors.
Television networks sometimes emphasize the human drama — the betrayed spouse fighting for dignity, the defendant lover avoiding cameras, the jurors who must weigh private intimacy as if it were public evidence.

Why North Carolina?
Commentators consistently ask the same question: Why here? The fascination arises because:

Legal Precedent: North Carolina courts have refused to abandon Alienation of Affection, even when other states jettisoned it. Cannon v. Miller (1984) nearly abolished the tort, but the Supreme Court’s reversal entrenched it.
Legislative Caution: The General Assembly has toyed with reform — such as the 2009 statute limiting post-separation claims — but has never abolished the tort outright. This selective pruning, not uprooting, shows hesitation to defy cultural attitudes toward marriage.
Cultural Values: The state’s religious and traditional roots shape juror psychology. Marriage is seen not only as a personal contract but as a moral covenant worth defending. Verdicts are not just about compensating plaintiffs; they are about reinforcing communal standards.

The Global Oddity Factor
North Carolina’s position as one of only a handful of states to retain Alienation of Affection gives it a global oddity factor. Legal scholars in Europe and Canada sometimes cite North Carolina as a curiosity: a modern American jurisdiction where Victorian “heart-balm” suits are alive and well. International news outlets covering Shackelford v. Lundquist ($9 million verdict) or Puryear v. Puryear ($30 million judgment) portrayed them as distinctly “American,” tied to culture-war debates about marriage.

Symbolic Power of Big Verdicts
Each multimillion-dollar verdict becomes a cultural Rorschach test (inkblot test). To critics, the judgments symbolize revenge, misuse of courts, and retrograde moralizing. To defenders, they are proof that communities still value marriage enough to sanction those who tear it apart. Either way, the numbers — $1 million in Hutelmyer, $9 million in Shackelford, $30 million in Puryear — ensure headlines and astonishment.

Pop Culture and Satire
Alienation of Affection has even bled into pop culture:

Stand-up comedians joke about “getting rich if your spouse cheats in North Carolina.”
Television dramas have incorporated fictionalized lawsuits as plot devices.
Online forums and social media buzz with commentary every time a new verdict hits the wires — with equal parts mockery and envy.

Impact on Practice
For family law attorneys, including firms like Adkins Law, PLLC in Huntersville, these national spotlights have a practical effect: clients increasingly ask about Alienation of Affection after seeing a headline or news clip. Sometimes expectations are unrealistic — not every case yields millions — but the publicity reminds clients that North Carolina provides remedies unavailable in most of the country.

Conclusion: Public Fascination Endures
Ultimately, Alienation of Affection cases endure in the national spotlight because they combine law, morality, and spectacle. They dramatize the collision between private intimacy and public judgment. They highlight North Carolina’s role as both an outlier and a bellwether — a state where the bonds of marriage are still treated as worthy of civil protection, even at the cost of national ridicule.

Conclusion

Despite relentless criticism, Alienation of Affection refuses to die in North Carolina. Attempts at abolition have come and gone: the Court of Appeals tried in Cannon v. Miller (1984), only to be overruled; constitutional arguments were pressed in Malecek v. Williams (2017), only to be rebuffed. Scholars continue to denounce the tort as archaic, extortionate, and constitutionally suspect, while defenders maintain it is one of the few civil remedies that holds outsiders accountable for tearing apart families.

What explains its survival? A unique mix of precedent, legislative caution, and cultural values. The law here still treats marriage not just as a private contract but as a covenant with social consequences — one worth protecting through liability. Juries in North Carolina, animated by community standards and moral outrage, have returned some of the largest Alienation of Affection verdicts in American history, from Hutelmyer’s $1 million to Shackelford’s $9 million to Puryear’s staggering $30 million. Each verdict echoes far beyond the courtroom, shaping national headlines and fueling debates in classrooms, legislatures, and living rooms.

Thus, North Carolina stands alone: an outlier, yes, but also a bellwether of how law can reflect enduring cultural commitments. Whether Alienation of Affection is seen as a weapon of revenge or a safeguard of marriage, it continues to shape divorce strategy, guide settlement negotiations, and serve as a lightning rod for debate. For family law practitioners — including firms like Adkins Law, PLLC in Huntersville — it remains both a practical litigation tool and a powerful reminder that, in this state at least, the law still seeks to place a tangible value on the bonds of love, loyalty, and family.

If you need to speak with an experienced civil litigation attorney in regards to an alienation of affections or criminal conversation matter, please contact Adkins Law, PLLC to arrange a consultation.

Case Law: Chronological Digest Table

Year	Case & Citation	Holding / Rule	Memorable Fact	Lesson Learned
1849	Barbee v. Armstead, 32 N.C. 530	Agreements to harbor spouse void; AOA actionable	Husband sued for wife enticed away	Early recognition of AOA
1868	Maxwell v. McBrayer, 61 N.C. 527	Enticement claims survive	Husband alleged wrongful harboring	Heart-balm torts persisted after Civil War
1912	Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N.C. 392	Neglect mitigates damages, but claim stands	Marriage imperfect	Imperfect marriages still protected
1913	Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283	Parents liable for malicious interference	Wife’s father hid child	Family interference compensable
1913	Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393	Circumstantial evidence sufficient	Defendant refused to testify	Consent irrelevant; circumstantial proof valid
1920	Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426	Punitive requires aggravation beyond malice	Jury gave punitives without sex proof	Framework for damages
1925	Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120	Consortium loss compensable only in intentional torts	Wife sued after husband’s death	Reinforces AOA’s intentional tort role
1929	Townsend v. Holderby, 197 N.C. 550	Burden on wife to prove malice in family interference	Husband mentally ill, delusions	Family aid ≠ malice
1932	Hankins v. Hankins, 202 N.C. 358	Parental presumption of good faith	In-law insults, urging son to leave	Parents shielded unless malice proven
1932	Rouse v. Creech, 203 N.C. 378	Spouse’s testimony barred in adultery cases	Wife’s testimony excluded	Strict spousal incompetency rule
1938	Johnston v. Johnston, 213 N.C. 255	Parents liable if malicious	Daughter-in-law sued mother-in-law	Parental advice privilege not absolute
1938	Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191	Wife’s consent not defense	Affair continued despite consent	Consent irrelevant
1944	Barker v. Dowdy, 224 N.C. 742	Gifts/visits suffice for AOA	Landlord kissed tenant-wife	Circumstantial proof accepted
1947	Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682	Hearsay confessions inadmissible	Wife testified about husband’s admissions	Must prove adultery independently
1949	Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173	Children cannot sue for alienation	Kids sued mother’s lover	AOA strictly spousal
1955	Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N.C. 324	Observation testimony admissible vs. estate	Wife left cabins with defendant	Dead Man’s Statute no bar
1957	Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592	Parents presumed good faith	Father-in-law interfered	Malice required for parental liability
1966	Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622	Letters, gifts enough for jury	Love letters typed by defendant	Cohabitation after alienation ≠ bar
1968	Warner v. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384	CC proven; AOA failed (no love left)	Wife found in motel	Must show genuine affection
1969	Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201	Separation agreements don’t bar AOA	Defendant cohabited with husband	Consent irrelevant
1976	Sherwood v. Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112	Abandonment = injury under long-arm	Wife sued husband in Delaware	Jurisdiction parallels AOA
1979	Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296	No alienation of child’s affection	Plaintiff-parent tried to sue	Strictly limited to spousal
1980	Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521	Malice shown without sex; punitive vacated	30-year marriage ended	Punitive requires aggravation
1982	Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458	Consent irrelevant; circumstantial proof OK	Husband found wife nude with defendant	Spouse’s testimony allowed if not a party
1984	Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460	COA abolished torts; Supreme Court reinstated	Key policy flashpoint	Near-abolition of AOA
1986	Morris v. Bruney, 78 N.C. App. 668	No alienation of child’s affection	Neighbor “hypnotized” son	Reinforces spousal-only
1988	Darnell v. Rupplin, 91 N.C. App. 349	Lex loci controls	Affair spanned 4 states	Multi-state choice-of-law crucial
1988	Gunn v. Hess, 90 N.C. App. 131	Sufficient evidence for jury	Affair multi-state	Transitory tort recognized
1989	Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724	Testimony + admissions = sufficient	Defendant admitted sex on phone	Plaintiff’s testimony can suffice
1991	Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739	Punitive upheld despite compensatory reversed	Defendant phoned plaintiff’s home	Punitive stands with nominal damages
1991	Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C. App. 513	Imperfect marriages still protected	Wife loved both men	Some affection suffices
1993	Peake v. Shirley, 109 N.C. App. 591	Admissions + hotel = strong proof	Defendant apologized	Direct/circumstantial proof accepted
1993	Sharp v. Teague, 113 N.C. App. 589	SOL strict; malpractice if missed	Lawyer missed AOA filing	Filing deadlines critical
1996	Coachman v. Gould, 122 N.C. App. 443	Calls alone insufficient	Hundreds of calls not enough	Suspicion ≠ proof
1996	Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377	Some affection during separation suffices	Marriage partially intact	Separation doesn’t bar claim
1999	Horner v. Byrnett, 132 N.C. App. 323	Evidence sufficient	Affair proven circumstantially	Jury decides
1999	Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364	Large verdict upheld	Secretary flaunted affair	Public flaunting = punitive liability
2000	Mercier v. Daniels, 139 N.C. App. 588	Employer not liable	U-Haul manager affair	AOA is personal tort
2000	Ward v. Beaton, 141 N.C. App. 44	Willing participation enough	Husband moved in with defendant	No “luring” required
2000	Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729	NC has jurisdiction for AOA vs. SC resident	Phone/email solicitations	Forum-shopping limited
2001	Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Morgan, 147 N.C. App. 438	No insurance coverage	Defendant sought coverage	Intentional tort, no indemnity
2001	Oddo v. Presser, 146 N.C. App. 126	Punitive upheld despite speculative compensatory	Affair rekindled at funeral	Punitive can stand independently
2001	Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268	Pre-separation acts only	Affair admitted after separation	Narrow rule later overruled
2002	Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523	Post-sep acts admissible to corroborate	Defendant laughed at plaintiff	Separation agreements ≠ defense
2002	Norris v. Alexander, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 2351	Calls/visits not enough	443 calls, “compromising” but clothed	Speculation barred
2003	Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, 159 N.C. App. 355	Dismissed for no NC contacts	Affair elsewhere	No forum-shopping
2003	Hooks v. Eckman, 159 N.C. App. 681	Intrinsic fraud must be raised in case	Plaintiff alleged perjury	New suits barred
2003	Carson v. Brodin, 160 N.C. App. 366	AOA = “injury to person”	Out-of-state affair	Long-arm reach
2005/06	Misenheimer v. Burris, 169 N.C. App. 539; 360 N.C. 620	Discovery tolling applies	Affair concealed for years	Discovery doctrine applies
2006	Fox v. Gibson, 176 N.C. App. 554	NC jurisdiction if sex/calls in NC	Sex in NC	NC nexus sufficient
2006	Stann v. Levine, 180 N.C. App. 1	Clarified damages instructions	Claims intertwined	Procedural clarity needed
2009	Jones v. Skelley, 195 N.C. App. 500	Jury decides situs (lex loci)	Affair SC/NC	Jury resolves situs
2010	Brown v. Ellis, 206 N.C. App. 93	NC jurisdiction via calls/emails	$600k default	Phone/email = sufficient contacts
2010	Heller v. Somdahl, 206 N.C. App. 313	Facilitators can be liable	Third party arranged affair	Non-lovers liable
2011	Bell v. Mozley, 716 S.E.2d 868	No NC jurisdiction for out-of-state affair	Affair in SC only	Tangential contacts insufficient
2012	Miller v. Szilagyi, 221 N.C. App. 79	Contract jurisdiction, not AOA	Out-of-state contracts	Contrasts with AOA jurisdiction
2012	Smith v. Drumm, 224 N.C. App. 225	Jurisdiction proper if NC nexus	Affair in Charlotte hospital	Real NC nexus required
2012	Rushing v. Barron, 222 N.C. App. 317	No AOA beyond spouses	Daughter sued family	Reinforces limits
2013	Quackenbush v. Steelman, 230 N.C. App. 410	Single NC stop insufficient	NJ/FL affair	Need real NC connection
2014	Puryear v. Puryear, 233 N.C. App. 787	$30M default judgment upheld	Lover defaulted	Defaults yield huge verdicts
2014	Shackelford v. Lundquist, 233 N.C. App. 787	$9M verdict upheld	NY defendant defaulted	Landmark modern verdict
2015	Willis v. Willis, 242 N.C. App. 385	Jurisdiction proper if calls/emails in NC	140 calls in 40 days	Communications suffice
2016	Hayes v. Waltz, 246 N.C. App. 438	Phone records + NC travel enough	Affair started at Cancun trip	Out-of-state conduct admissible
2016	Hedden v. Isbell, 792 S.E.2d 571	Personal service in NC confers jurisdiction	Served in Buncombe County	Service alone enough
2016	Vonfeldt v. Grapsy, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169537	Adultery not 1A-protected	Defendant argued free association	Constitutional defenses rejected
2017	Malecek v. Williams, 804 S.E.2d 594	AOA/CC constitutional under rational basis	Doctor-lover challenged tort	Survives scrutiny
2018	Rodriguez v. Lemus, 257 N.C. App. 493	Post-sep acts corroborate pre-sep	Hotel receipts, child born	Corroboration rule
2019	Dipasupil v. Neely, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 948	No NC jurisdiction for DC/VA affair	Affair in DC	NC nexus required
2020	Estes v. Battiston, 247 N.C. App. 1	No interlocutory appeal for constitutional referral	Defendant sought 3-judge panel	Must wait until final judgment
2020	Ponder v. Been, 275 N.C. App. 626	Jurisdiction battle over phone/financial contacts	400+ calls debated	Forum fights continue
2021	Hull v. Brown, 279 N.C. App. 570	Premature appeals dismissed	Defendant challenged statute	Constitutional claims delayed
2021	Clark v. Barrett, 280 N.C. App. 403	$1.2M verdict upheld	Affair produced IVF pregnancy	Large verdicts continue
2021	Sprinke v. Johnson, 278 N.C. App. 684	Verdict vacated for lack of notice	$2.29M default	Due process protects absent defendants
2021	Warren DSS v. Garrelts, 278 N.C. App. 140	Lex loci governs parentage/choice of law	Artificial insemination paternity	Confirms NC choice-of-law
2023	Bassiri v. Pilling, 278 N.C. App. 538	NC jurisdiction proper if multi-state with nexus	Affair NC/Utah	Confirms broad reach
2023	Chagaris v. Harden, 2023 N.C. App. LEXIS 316	Circumstantial evidence suffices	Ashley Madison affair	Jury can infer from circumstantial proof
2025	Little v. Clay, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 277	Jurisdiction proper if NC nexus	Workplace contacts in NC	Forum open to NC ties
2025	Fish v. Stetina, 913 S.E.2d 236	GPS, calls sufficient for AOA	Life360 app showed affair	Tech evidence proves alienation
2025	Ponder v. Been, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 419	Jurisdiction still litigated	Phone + money links	Jurisdictional disputes ongoing

Alienation of Affections: NC Case Law

Barbee v. Armstead, 32 N.C. 530 (1849)

Facts

John Q. Barbee sued Westwood Armstead and his wife (the mother of Barbee’s wife) for enticing and detaining his wife.

Marriage Breakdown: In August 1841, Barbee’s wife left him with the encouragement of her mother (living with Armstead). She claimed Barbee was lazy and did not provide for his family, and she did not want her daughter to “perish” under his care.
The Written Agreement: By 1842, Barbee and Armstead entered into a written contract (brokered by neighbors) allowing Armstead to harbor Barbee’s wife and child. The contract promised Armstead would raise and support the child, treating it as an heir. Barbee retained the right to visit his wife and child for a few days at a time.
Continued Contact: Barbee occasionally visited and even admitted Armstead could care for the child better. At one point, Barbee said he did not wish his wife to return, despite her possible desire to reconcile. Barbee was known to live itinerantly and was described as a poor provider.
Revocation Attempt: In 1845, Barbee demanded his wife and child back. Armstead refused, saying he could return them “with a word” but would not, because Barbee had “advertised” his wife.
Trial Court: The judge held the contract valid, ruled that only acts of detention before 1842 were time-barred, and told the jury no cause of action arose after the contract. Jury ruled for defendants.

Issue

Could a husband sue for alienation of affection / enticement when he had previously entered into a contract permitting his wife and child to remain with another man? Was the contract valid or void as against public policy?

Rule

A husband may maintain an action against a third party for enticement or harboring of his wife.
Contracts that authorize a third party to retain and support a spouse are contrary to public policy and void.
A parol license (oral agreement) to harbor a wife can be revoked at any time by demand of the husband.

Analysis

Contract Invalid: The court stressed that unlike England, where deeds of separation had sometimes been upheld, informal contracts allowing a wife to remain with another man undermined the obligations of marriage and were void.
Public Policy: Marriage is a sacred institution; agreements that weaken marital duties “loosen another screw in the machinery of married life.” Allowing informal separation agreements without the wife as a legal party would expose women to abandonment and strip them of rights.
Right to Reclaim: Even if Barbee had initially consented to Armstead harboring his wife and child, his later demand revoked the license. Refusal to return them made Armstead a wrongdoer.
Procedural Note: Earlier acts (before June 1842) were barred by the statute of limitations, but the wrongful detention after Barbee’s demand supported liability.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. Barbee’s claim was valid despite the earlier contract, because the agreement was void as against public policy and his demand for his wife’s return revoked any prior consent.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Foundational Case: Barbee v. Armstead is one of the earliest North Carolina decisions recognizing an action for enticing away or harboring a spouse.
Marriage Above Contract: Private contracts cannot override public policy protecting marriage. Informal separation arrangements are void unless legally formalized (and in later law, only by statute or court order).
Revocation Principle: Even if a spouse temporarily consents to harboring, that license can be revoked; refusal thereafter creates liability.
Moral Undertones: The court’s language reveals 19th-century views of marriage as a social institution that courts had a duty to guard.
Analogy for Modern Readers: Imagine a spouse informally agreeing that their partner live with someone else to “be better cared for.” If they later demand their return, the third party has no right to refuse.

Maxwell v. McBrayer, 61 N.C. 527 (1868)

Facts

Parties: L.E. Maxwell, a woman, sued H.J. McBrayer for breach of a marriage contract (a “promise to marry”).
Procedure: Instead of filing a normal complaint, Maxwell attempted to start the lawsuit through an original attachment proceeding — a process designed to seize property of absconding debtors or wrongdoers at the outset of litigation.
Statement of Claim: When required by the court to specify her cause of action, Maxwell said she sought “unliquidated damages for a breach of marriage contract.”
Trial Court Ruling: The judge dismissed the case, holding that an original attachment could not be used for such a claim. Maxwell appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Issue

Can a plaintiff use the attachment procedure to recover damages for a breach of promise to marry — i.e., are such damages considered a “debt” under the attachment statute?

Rule

The attachment law (Rev. Code, ch. 7) provided attachment for debts or for torts committed by absconding wrongdoers.
A claim for unliquidated damages from a promise to marry is not a “debt.”
Following Minga v. Zollicoffer (1 Ire. 278), uncertain claims for damages (like trespass or assault) were not considered “debts” for attachment purposes.

Analysis

The Court emphasized that breach of promise damages are inherently uncertain — a jury must decide how much emotional, social, or financial harm was caused.
Because damages could not be fixed or sworn to as a definite sum, they did not qualify as a “debt.”
While the legislature had later amended the statute to cover torts by absconding wrongdoers (Rev. Code, ch. 7, §§16–17), it had not created any provision for breach of marriage promises.
Maxwell could have sued in trespass on the case for the wrong, or by a regular action once the defendant was served, but not by attachment.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. An attachment cannot be used for a breach of promise to marry, because such damages are not a “debt” within the statute.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Procedural History of Heart-Balm Actions: Maxwell shows how early breach of promise suits (a “heart-balm” action like Alienation of Affection) were treated procedurally — as claims for unliquidated damages, not debts.
Unliquidated vs. Liquidated Damages: A claim that requires jury valuation of harm (emotional distress, social embarrassment) cannot be treated as a fixed debt. This principle still matters in Alienation of Affection, where damages are inherently subjective.
Attachment Limits: Plaintiffs cannot misuse debtor remedies (like attachment) to secure leverage in tort-based marriage claims.
Broader Context: Breach of promise to marry was once widely recognized (and closely related to Alienation of Affection in the “heart-balm” family of torts). Maxwell demonstrates how courts wrestled with fitting these relational claims into standard categories of debt and tort.
Analogy for Today: Just as Maxwell tried to stretch debtor law to cover a relationship-based claim, modern plaintiffs sometimes try to stretch Alienation of Affection into new contexts (e.g., suing employers or therapists). Courts remain cautious about expanding remedies beyond traditional bounds.

Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N.C. 392, 76 S.E. 244 (1912)

Facts

Parties: Causey Allred (husband/plaintiff) sued J. Wesley Kirkman (defendant) for criminal conversation and alienation of his wife’s affections.
Allegations: Allred claimed Kirkman had engaged in sexual relations with his wife and enticed her affections away from the marriage.
Trial Evidence:
- The plaintiff attempted to prove intercourse, but the jury ultimately answered “No” to whether Kirkman had carnal knowledge of Allred’s wife.
- The defendant attempted to introduce testimony from a witness, Mary Nixon, that plaintiff and his wife “did not get along well together.” The question went unanswered, and the record did not reflect an exception.
- Defendant also tried to introduce evidence suggesting unhappy domestic relations and neglect by Allred as mitigation of damages.
- The defendant was impeached as a witness but sought to corroborate himself with prior consistent statements he had made before trial. The court allowed this.
Jury Verdict: The jury answered the first issue (“Did the defendant carnally know the wife of the plaintiff?”) in the negative. They never reached the second issue on damages. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
Appeal: Plaintiff appealed, arguing errors in evidentiary rulings.

Issue

Was there reversible error in excluding or admitting certain evidence when the jury had already decided the essential issue against the plaintiff?

Rule

A plaintiff must prove sexual intercourse to recover for criminal conversation.
In Alienation of Affection, evidence of unhappy domestic life or neglect may be admissible in mitigation of damages.
An unanswered question is not objectionable error. Assignments of error must be based on exceptions taken during trial.
A witness may corroborate his own testimony with prior consistent statements made before trial.

Analysis

Unanswered Question: Because the witness’s statement that plaintiff and his wife “did not get along” was never answered, no error was preserved. The Court emphasized that new issues cannot be introduced for the first time on appeal.
Corroboration: It was proper to allow the defendant to bolster his credibility with prior consistent statements. The Court cited State v. Whitfield and Hooks v. Houston for this principle.
Mitigation Evidence: Even if admitting unhappy-marriage evidence was error, it was harmless because the jury never reached the damages issue; they resolved liability against the plaintiff at the first step.
Outcome: The Court found “no error.” The verdict for the defendant stood.

Conclusion

Judgment for the defendant was affirmed. Because the jury found no sexual intercourse, the plaintiff failed on criminal conversation, and without liability, questions of damages were irrelevant.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Proof of Intercourse Is Crucial: For criminal conversation, the threshold question is whether sex occurred. Without it, the case collapses, regardless of circumstantial evidence of affection or discord.
Alienation vs. Criminal Conversation: Alienation claims allow more nuance, but criminal conversation is binary — either sex occurred or it did not. Allred illustrates the difficulty plaintiffs face when relying solely on suspicion without proof.
Mitigation of Damages: Defendants can introduce evidence of unhappy domestic relations to reduce damages. If the marriage was already strained, damages may be mitigated even if liability attaches.
Evidentiary Technicalities Matter: An unanswered question is not reversible error, and appeals must rest on objections properly preserved at trial. Procedural missteps can doom appeals.
Analogy for Modern Cases: Like plaintiffs today who fail to secure phone logs, hotel receipts, or digital messages, Allred’s inability to prove the central fact of intercourse meant his case could not survive. The jury’s “No” answer shut the door on damages entirely.

Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913)

Facts

Parties: G.C. Howell (plaintiff, the father) sued his former wife, Edith Howell, and her father, G.A. Briggs.
Background:
- G.C. Howell and Edith Howell agreed, after their marriage collapsed, that their young daughter Lucy would live with Edith at the home of Edith’s father (Briggs) until she turned six. At that point, Lucy was supposed to be returned to G.C. Howell.
- Soon after the agreement, G.C. Howell obtained a divorce from Edith on the grounds of her adultery. The divorce decree left custody of Lucy open for further order of the court.
The Dispute:
- Just before Lucy’s sixth birthday, Edith, allegedly with Briggs’s active assistance, spirited the child away out of North Carolina to an unknown location.
- Howell claimed this concealment caused him “great and agonizing distress both of mind and body.”
- Howell sought (1) return of the child, (2) damages against Briggs for abetting the abduction, and (3) a rule compelling Briggs to disclose Lucy’s whereabouts.
Trial Court: The case was dismissed at the pleading stage, with the judge holding that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

Issue

Does a father have a civil cause of action for damages against his ex-wife’s father when the father aids in abducting and concealing the child, thereby depriving him of custody and causing emotional distress?

Rule

A father has a recognized interest in the custody, companionship, and upbringing of his children.
Civil actions for damages may be maintained for wrongful abduction or concealment of a child.
Public policy no longer limits such claims to loss of “services” (an outdated fiction), but recognizes parental emotional injury and loss of household integrity as legitimate grounds for damages.

Analysis

Historical Context: At English common law, abduction of a child was not always actionable, and some courts restricted claims to the eldest son/heir. But North Carolina had already recognized broader parental rights in cases like Harris v. Harris (115 N.C. 587 (1894)) and Scarlett v. Norwood (115 N.C. 284 (1894)).
Modern Approach: Chief Justice Clark rejected the “outworn fiction” of requiring proof of lost services. Instead, the real injury is the emotional devastation, disruption of family bonds, and wrongful deprivation of custody.
Wrongful Conduct by Briggs: If Briggs actively assisted in concealing Lucy and preventing G.C. Howell from even knowing her location, this was a wrongful interference with his custodial rights and a proper subject for damages.
Procedural Posture: Because the case had been dismissed on the pleadings, the Supreme Court assumed Howell’s allegations were true. Taken as true, they clearly stated a cause of action.
Comparative Authority: The Court cited cases from Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, Indiana, and elsewhere where damages had been awarded for wrongful abduction of children, including recovery for mental anguish and punitive damages.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the dismissal, holding that Howell had stated a valid cause of action. If proven, Briggs’s conduct in abetting the abduction justified damages for the father’s mental anguish and loss of companionship.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Beyond Spousal Claims: While most Alienation of Affection cases involve interference in marriage, Howell v. Howell broadened the principle to parent-child relationships, recognizing abduction/concealment as actionable.
Abandoning the “Loss of Services” Fiction: Early tort law often required parents to prove economic loss (services of the child). Howell helped modernize the doctrine, allowing recovery for emotional suffering and disruption of family ties.
Public Policy in Family Law: Courts emphasize protecting family bonds and condemning interference, even when done by relatives like grandparents. Briggs’s family connection did not insulate him from liability.
Analogy to Alienation of Affection: Just as outsiders may not wrongfully interfere in marriages, outsiders may not wrongfully interfere in parent-child relationships. Both protect the relational interests at the heart of family life.
Practical Lesson: Today, Howell supports modern claims involving intentional interference with custody or parental rights. It shows North Carolina’s early willingness to recognize emotional and relational harms as compensable injuries.

Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 79 S.E. 872 (1913)

Facts

Parties: N.P. Powell (plaintiff/husband) sued A.T. Strickland (defendant) for criminal conversation (adultery with Powell’s wife) and alienation of affections.
Allegations: Powell alleged that Strickland, a married man with a poor reputation, seduced Powell’s wife, leading her to abandon him and their children.
Evidence Presented:
- Strickland was observed at Powell’s home in Powell’s absence, with his hand “familiarly” on Powell’s wife.
- Strickland visited Powell’s wife repeatedly, staying for long periods.
- Powell’s wife was seen going to Strickland’s store after work hours and leaving with him through the back door.
- Powell’s wife later declared she no longer loved him, abandoned her family, and refused to live with him.
- The plaintiff testified himself as to his wife’s suspicious conduct.
- Strickland refused to take the stand to explain or deny these circumstances. Plaintiff’s counsel highlighted his silence to the jury.
Jury Verdict: Jury found for Powell, awarding damages.
Appeal: Strickland appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, competency of testimony, and availability of punitive damages.

Issue

Was the husband competent to testify about his wife’s conduct in an adultery/alienation action?
Can adultery and alienation be proven by circumstantial evidence, or is direct proof required?
Is the wife’s consent a defense?
Are punitive damages recoverable in Alienation/CC cases?

Rule

Competency of Testimony: A husband may testify about his wife’s conduct in an action against a third party for alienation/CC, since the wife is not a party and has no legal interest in the outcome.
Evidence of Adultery: Adultery can be established by circumstantial evidence if the facts reasonably support that inference. Direct proof is unnecessary.
Consent Defense: The wife’s consent to adultery is not a defense, because the tort protects the husband’s marital rights, honor, and domestic peace, not just the wife’s chastity.
Damages: Plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for humiliation, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and invasion of marital rights. Punitive (exemplary) damages may also be awarded for willful or wanton conduct.

Analysis

Competency: Though statutes excluded spousal testimony “for or against each other” in adultery-related actions, the Court clarified this only applied when the spouse was a party. Since Powell’s wife was not a party, his testimony about her conduct was competent.
Circumstantial Proof: The evidence of late-night visits, physical familiarity, secret meetings, and the wife’s abandonment was more than sufficient to let the jury infer adultery and alienation. Strickland’s refusal to testify further strengthened that inference, as silence in the face of incriminating circumstances is a “pregnant circumstance.”
Consent No Defense: Even if Powell’s wife willingly participated, Strickland was liable. The wrong was against Powell — his marital rights, his domestic peace, and his honor.
Damages: Powell suffered mental suffering, humiliation, loss of conjugal fellowship, and disgrace. Punitive damages were warranted because of Strickland’s brazen and reckless conduct.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court found no error and upheld the verdict. Powell was entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Circumstantial Evidence Is Enough: Direct proof of intercourse is rarely available; suspicious conduct and opportunity suffice.
Spousal Testimony Allowed Against Third Parties: Husbands can testify about wives’ behavior when suing outsiders, since the wife is not legally bound by the verdict.
Consent of Spouse Irrelevant: A spouse’s willingness to cheat is no defense — the wrong is against the innocent partner.
Punitive Damages Confirmed: Juries may punish egregious interlopers, adding punitive damages to compensate for the dishonor inflicted.
Modern Analogy: Just as text messages or GPS data might today prove suspicious conduct, testimony about clandestine visits and public familiarity sufficed in 1913. The principles endure: circumstantial proof plus silence equals liability.

Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 102 S.E. 769 (1920)

Facts

Parties: J.D. Cottle, Jr. (plaintiff/husband) sued W.B.F. Johnson (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with his wife.
Marriage & Separation: Cottle and his wife married in 1913 and reportedly lived happily until July 1918. Plaintiff claimed Johnson enticed her to leave him, and since then she had lived apart.
Plaintiff’s Story:
- Plaintiff alleged Johnson had seduced his wife and carried on an improper and criminal relationship.
- Evidence included conversations between Cottle and his wife before separation and letters exchanged between them showing their marital bond.
Defendant’s Story:
- Johnson denied enticing her. He claimed she left voluntarily because of her husband’s mistreatment.
- Defendant said the wife later lived in his home, not as his mistress, but as a boarder, paying for her stay, and as a companion to his own wife.
Trial Court Charge: The judge instructed the jury that compensatory damages should be “reasonable compensation” for the injury, which could not be calculated like buying corn or a horse. The jury was told they could also, at their discretion, add punitive damages if they felt it appropriate.
Jury Verdict:
1. Did defendant alienate the affections of plaintiff’s wife and cause separation? Yes.
2. Did defendant seduce and carnally know plaintiff’s wife? No.
3. Damages: $8,000.
Appeal: Johnson appealed, challenging evidentiary rulings and the damages instruction, particularly the broad authorization of punitive damages.

Issue

When may punitive damages be awarded in alienation of affection cases?
Was it error for the trial judge to instruct the jury they could impose punitive damages without explaining the standards for such an award?
Were conversations and letters between husband and wife admissible?

Rule

Malice Requirement: Malice (actual or implied) is required to recover for alienation of affections. Malice does not require ill will but includes wrongful conduct injurious to another without justification.
Punitive Damages: Allowed only when conduct involves fraud, oppression, recklessness, insult, or other aggravating circumstances beyond implied malice. They are discretionary, but must be tied to aggravating facts.
Evidence: Conversations and letters between spouses may be admitted, not as direct proof against the defendant, but to show the state of the marriage before and after alleged alienation (res gestae).

Analysis

Compensatory Damages: The Court affirmed that compensatory damages include the loss of society, affection, and assistance of the wife, plus humiliation and mental anguish. The jury’s $8,000 compensatory award was supported by evidence.
Punitive Damages Instruction: The trial judge erred in telling the jury they could award punitive damages “if they saw fit” without explaining the limits. The Court stressed punitive damages cannot be automatic; they require willful, wanton, or oppressive conduct. Because the jury may have misunderstood, a partial new trial on damages was ordered.
Conversations and Letters: Properly admitted to show the emotional relationship between husband and wife. However, the trial court should carefully instruct jurors not to use them as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt, to avoid collusion risks.
Alienation Without CC: Jury found alienation but not sexual intercourse. This shows that criminal conversation is not required for liability; wrongful enticement alone suffices.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a partial new trial on damages because of the erroneous instruction on punitive damages. The finding of liability for alienation stood.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA Does Not Require Proof of Adultery: A plaintiff can win for alienation of affection even if no sexual relationship is proven.
Punitive Damages Require Aggravation: Punitive damages are not automatic. The judge must explain that they require willful, wanton, or oppressive conduct.
Compensatory Damages Are Broad: Juries may award for lost companionship, affection, and humiliation — not just economic harm.
Evidence of Marriage State Matters: Letters and conversations between spouses may be admitted to show the pre- and post-affection state of the marriage.
Lesson for Practitioners: Always press the court for proper jury instructions separating compensatory and punitive damages to avoid retrial.
Modern Analogy: Just as private texts or social media messages today may show affection or discord, in 1920, letters and conversations between spouses played the same role in painting the picture of the marriage.

Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925)

Facts

Accident: On August 25, 1920, W.T. Hinnant, a motorman for Tide Water Power Company, was fatally injured when two company electric rail cars collided on a trestle near Wrightsville Beach. He died the next morning.
Wrongful Death Suit: His personal representative sued Tide Water and won damages for wrongful death. That judgment was paid.
Wife’s Separate Claim: While that case was pending, Florence L. Hinnant (his widow) filed her own suit against Tide Water Power Company. She alleged:
- She suffered nervous shock and permanent impairment to her health.
- She endured mental anguish over the loss of her husband, describing seeing him “broken, mashed and bruised.”
- She now had to support and care for three children alone, without her husband’s “society, love, affection, counsel, and advice.”
Trial Court Instruction: The judge told the jury they could award damages for:
- Plaintiff’s mental anguish, and
- Plaintiff’s loss of consortium (society and companionship of her husband) from the time of injury until his death.
Verdict: Jury awarded damages to Florence.
Appeal: Tide Water appealed, arguing she had no right to such damages because her husband’s administrator had already recovered under wrongful death statutes.

Issue

Can a widow bring an independent action for damages for mental anguish and loss of consortium caused by her husband’s fatal injuries, when the administrator has already recovered for wrongful death?

Rule

At common law, no civil action existed for wrongful death (following Baker v. Bolton).
Recovery for wrongful death exists only by statute (Lord Campbell’s Act and its North Carolina counterpart, C.S. § 160).
While a spouse may sue for direct, intentional interference with consortium (e.g., alienation of affection, criminal conversation), there is no independent cause of action for loss of consortium due to negligent injury and death when damages have already been recovered by the estate.
Mental anguish alone, unrelated to a recognized cause of action, does not create liability.

Analysis

Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Wrongs:
- Direct Interference: Alienation of affection, criminal conversation — actionable by the spouse.
- Indirect/Consequential Loss: Mental anguish from a negligent injury to the other spouse — not actionable, because recovery belongs to the injured party (or their estate in wrongful death).
Statutory Scheme: The administrator had already recovered damages under the wrongful death statute. Allowing the widow to sue separately for consortium and anguish would double-compensate the family.
Public Policy: Court noted earlier expansions of consortium claims, but emphasized most jurisdictions did not recognize loss of consortium for negligence-based spousal injuries, especially after statutory wrongful death recovery.
Precedent: Distinguished from cases like Cottle v. Johnson (1920), where consortium was directly invaded by alienation or adultery. Here, the wrong was indirect and already addressed by wrongful death action.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held it was error to instruct the jury they could award damages for consortium or mental anguish. Florence Hinnant had no separate claim. The wrongful death judgment for the estate was the exclusive remedy.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Consortium Claims Limited: Spouses can sue for direct invasions (alienation, adultery), but not for indirect loss of companionship when wrongful death damages already cover the injury.
Mental Anguish Alone Insufficient: Emotional suffering, without a recognized cause of action, cannot sustain a lawsuit.
Preventing Double Recovery: Wrongful death statutes centralize recovery through the estate to avoid multiple overlapping lawsuits.
Contrast With AOA: This case helps distinguish Alienation of Affection — a valid, independent action for intentional interference with the marital relationship — from negligence-based consortium claims, which are barred.
Modern Lesson: Plaintiffs must carefully frame claims: where alienation involves intentional misconduct, recovery is possible; where the loss flows from an accident or negligence, recovery belongs to the estate alone.

Townsend v. Holderby, 197 N.C. 550, 149 S.E. 855 (1929)

Facts

Parties: Mrs. C.R. Townsend (plaintiff/wife) sued her husband’s stepfather (J.C. Holderby) and brother (Murrill Holderby) for alienation of affections.
Marriage: Plaintiff and her husband married in 1915, had three children, and lived happily until 1924. The husband was successful in business, a devoted father, and an affectionate husband.
Health Decline: In summer 1924, plaintiff’s husband suffered a breakdown in health — both physical and mental. At her urging, he entered a sanatorium in Richmond, Virginia. He developed a delusion that his wife was unfaithful, a belief admitted by all to be baseless and the result of his mental illness.
Events After Hospitalization:
- While at the sanatorium, the husband contacted the defendants, his stepfather and brother, who visited him and brought him back to North Carolina for treatment at another hospital.
- After release, he stayed with Murrill and his wife, later traveling widely and eventually residing with Murrill in Georgia.
- Defendants regularly associated with him, but there was no evidence they counseled him to separate from his wife or acted maliciously toward her.
Plaintiff’s View: Mrs. Townsend admitted the initial estrangement was due to her husband’s mental state, but she believed the Holderbys were the “cause of his staying away.”
Defendants’ View: They denied causing any separation or alienation, asserting they simply cared for a mentally ill relative.
Additional Complication: When Mrs. Townsend learned her husband justified his absence by accusing her of infidelity, she swore out a warrant against him for slander. Learning of this, he left the state and never returned, avoiding arrest.
Trial: Jury found for plaintiff, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants appealed.

Issue

Can a wife recover for alienation of her husband’s affections against his stepfather and brother when the husband’s separation was due to his mental delusions and the only “evidence” of alienation was that the relatives allowed him to live in their home?

Rule

A wife may maintain an action for alienation of her husband’s affections against third parties.
Parents and close relatives are presumed to act in good faith when advising or housing a spouse, unless malicious intent is proven (Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8 (1897); Powell v. Benthall, 136 N.C. 145 (1904)).
Burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show the defendants maliciously caused the alienation. Mere association or support is not enough.

Analysis

Presumption of Good Faith: Relatives are entitled to a presumption of acting in the best interest of their kin. To overcome this, plaintiff needed to show malice or wrongful interference.
Lack of Evidence of Malice: The record showed no evidence that defendants encouraged separation. They simply gave him a place to stay and visited him in hospitals. Their conduct was “altogether consistent with a purpose on their part to aid him.”
Cause of Separation: Plaintiff herself admitted the estrangement stemmed from her husband’s mental illness and delusion, not from anything the Holderbys said or did.
Law Will Not Infer Malice: Allowing him to live with them was not wrongful. The law does not impute a purpose to injure a wife from the mere fact that relatives provide shelter or companionship.
Error at Trial: The trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury; there was insufficient evidence of alienation caused by defendants.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed. Judgment should have been entered for the defendants because no evidence showed they maliciously alienated the husband’s affections.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Relatives Are Different: Parents, siblings, and close kin are presumed to act in good faith when intervening in a marriage, unlike strangers. Liability requires proof of malicious interference, not just presence or care.
Mental Illness as Cause: When a spouse’s alienation is clearly caused by mental illness or delusion, outsiders cannot be held liable for simply accommodating them.
Burden on Plaintiff: The wife bore the burden of proving the Holderbys caused the separation. Suspicion and opinion (“I think they are the cause of his staying away”) are not enough.
Shield for Good-Faith Relatives: The case reinforces the rule that family members can counsel, house, or assist without risking liability, so long as they are not acting out of malice.
Modern Analogy: Just as today, a spouse’s mental health crisis or delusions cannot be blamed on third parties who provide medical help or housing, courts in 1929 refused to stretch Alienation of Affection to cover relatives acting in good faith.

Hankins v. Hankins, 202 N.C. 358, 162 S.E. 766 (1932)

Facts

Marriage: Alexandra B. Hankins (plaintiff) married James Hankins in 1923 while he was studying law at Harvard. They lived in Boston for two years, both working modest jobs. A baby was born, and financial struggles mounted.
Move to North Carolina: In 1925, the couple moved into the Winston-Salem home of James’s parents, J.R. Hankins and Minda Hankins (defendants). James got work at Reynolds Tobacco Company. Plaintiff was pregnant with their second child.
Allegations Against Father-in-Law:
- Plaintiff testified she received a “cold reception.”
- Her father-in-law was described as stingy and domineering, critical of her spending habits, and quick to quarrel over petty matters like dripping faucets.
- He called her a “dirty pig” and accused her of theft for wasting water.
- He mocked her religious views and, at one point, called her an “old fool” for disagreeing.
- He allegedly told his son to “pick up a stick of wood and knock her on the head.”
- He inquired whether there was “any way to upset the marriage” and advised James to “throw her out of his life.”
Breakdown of Marriage: Plaintiff claimed this hostility poisoned her husband’s affections, making him cross and quarrelsome. James eventually told her she would have to “get to hell away from there.” By March 1930, with four children, she left and returned to Boston.
Defendants’ Evidence: They portrayed plaintiff as extravagant, hot-tempered, unwilling to budget, and prone to arguments. J.R. Hankins had accumulated wealth through hard work and thrift, and they claimed he resented plaintiff’s wasteful habits.
Procedural History:
- Plaintiff sued both in-laws for alienation.
- Nonsuit was granted as to the mother-in-law, Minda.
- Jury found J.R. Hankins maliciously alienated his son’s affections, awarding $26,000 compensatory and $12,000 punitive damages.
- Superior Court judge sustained 19 defense exceptions (evidentiary errors), ordered a new trial. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Was the jury verdict sustainable where much of the plaintiff’s evidence involved incompetent or irrelevant material (house disrepair, poor food, religious beliefs, attorney’s letter), and did the trial court properly order a new trial?

Rule

Plaintiff in an alienation suit must prove:
1. Genuine love and affection existed in the marriage.
2. The love and affection were destroyed or diminished.
3. Defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts caused the alienation. (Brown v. Brown, Cottle v. Johnson, Townsend v. Holderby).
Evidence must be relevant to show malice or wrongful intent. Courts warn against straying into collateral attacks on a defendant’s religion, lifestyle, or general character unless directly tied to animus toward the marriage.

Analysis

Evidence Problems: Plaintiff offered proof about poor food (“half-cooked cowpeas and collards”), disrepair in the house, the father-in-law’s hostility to church, and even his intent to be cremated in his will. The Supreme Court deemed this irrelevant and prejudicial, not probative of malicious interference.
Attorney’s Letter: A letter from plaintiff’s attorney listing grievances against the father-in-law was self-serving and incompetent.
Proper Scope: The relationship between father-in-law, son, and daughter-in-law was a proper subject of inquiry, but irrelevant details (food, house repairs, gifts to daughters) were inadmissible.
Jury Instruction & Verdict: Because of the volume of incompetent evidence admitted, the new trial was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Conclusion

The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order granting a new trial. While the plaintiff had some evidence of hostility and interference, the trial was tainted by the admission of too much irrelevant, prejudicial material.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Core Elements Still Apply: Alienation requires proof of affection, destruction, and malicious interference. Without showing all three, no recovery.
Relatives Held to a Stricter Standard: Family members like parents or in-laws are presumed to act in good faith. To win, plaintiffs must show clear malice.
Evidence Must Stay Focused: Courts guard against collateral smears. Food quality, religion, or estate plans don’t prove malice toward a marriage.
Punitive Damages Require Aggravation: The jury awarded $12,000 punitive, but courts stressed punitive damages only apply with wanton or oppressive conduct.
Modern Lesson: Just as today courts scrutinize Facebook rants or personal quirks to ensure relevance, in 1932 the Supreme Court refused to let tangential lifestyle evidence decide a marriage tort case.

Rouse v. Creech, 203 N.C. 378, 166 S.E. 174 (1932)

Facts

Parties: C.H. Rouse (plaintiff/husband) sued J.M. Creech (defendant), a longtime minister, for damages alleging that Creech had sexual intercourse with Rouse’s wife.
Complaint Allegations:
- Plaintiff and his wife continued living together, but plaintiff alleged his wife had become “obsessed” and “enchanted” by Creech’s religious doctrines and “extraordinary powers of divination.”
- According to plaintiff, Creech used his personality and persuasions to overbear his wife’s resistance in the marital home, eventually seducing and debauching her despite her initial protests.
- The complaint painted Creech as exploiting his spiritual influence, persisting until she “was unable to resist his influence.”
Defendant’s Answer: Creech denied everything, stressing his standing as a minister of the gospel for twenty-seven years.
Trial Proceedings:
- Plaintiff’s only available witness to prove adultery was his own wife.
- She would have testified that Creech had sexual intercourse with her at their home, against her husband’s marital rights.
- Defendant objected. The court excluded her testimony under C.S. § 1801, which barred husbands and wives from testifying for or against each other in actions “in consequence of adultery” or “for criminal conversation.”
- Plaintiff, left with no admissible evidence, took a voluntary nonsuit (dismissal).
Appeal: Plaintiff appealed, arguing his wife’s testimony should have been admitted because the case alleged coercion akin to ravishment, not merely adultery.

Issue

Can a wife testify to prove adultery in her husband’s civil action against a third party minister where the allegations frame the intercourse as the product of “overpowering persuasion,” not physical force?

Rule

Under C.S. § 1801, a husband or wife is incompetent to testify “in any action or proceeding in consequence of adultery, or in any action or proceeding for or on account of criminal conversation.”
Allegations of mere persuasion, personality, or influence do not convert adultery into rape or ravishment. To fall outside the statute, the pleading must allege physical force, violence, drugs, or intoxication sufficient to constitute nonconsensual intercourse.

Analysis

Classification of the Claim: Although Rouse tried to frame the conduct as coercion by “spiritual enchantment” and personality, the Court held the allegations described criminal conversation (adultery), not rape.
Comparison to Other Jurisdictions: Court cited Hirdes v. Ottawa Circuit Judge (Mich.), where a wife’s testimony was admissible because the defendant supplied her alcohol until she was too intoxicated to resist, making the act rape. But here, there were no allegations of physical force or intoxication.
Statutory Bar: Because the claim was classified as criminal conversation, the statute barred the wife’s testimony. The legislature had enacted this rule to avoid fraud and collusion in adultery cases.
Result: With no other evidence, plaintiff’s case necessarily failed.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the nonsuit. The plaintiff could not prove his case without his wife’s testimony, and her testimony was legally incompetent under the adultery/CC statute.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Spousal Incompetency Rule Strictly Applied: In the early 20th century, North Carolina law flatly barred a spouse’s testimony in alienation/CC cases to prevent collusion, even when it left plaintiffs with no viable evidence.
Persuasion ≠ Rape: Overbearing personality or persistent persuasion does not elevate adultery to ravishment in civil law. Only physical force or incapacitation (e.g., intoxication) might.
Danger of Narrow Proof: Rouse’s entire case hinged on one witness — his wife. When excluded, the lawsuit collapsed. Modern plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evidence (texts, hotel records) precisely to avoid this trap.
Religious/Clerical Defendants: The case highlights community sensitivity when a minister is accused. The Court applied the statute rigidly, refusing to open a door for spousal testimony even against a clergyman accused of exploitation.
Modern Analogy: Just as today’s courts require objective corroboration (digital records, eyewitnesses), early courts insisted on more than a spouse’s say-so to prove adultery.

Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 198 S.E. 619 (1938)

Facts

Parties: Curley Bryant (plaintiff/husband) sued John Carrier (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Bryant’s wife. J. Harvey Carpenter, Carrier’s guardian, was also named because Carrier had previously been adjudged insane.
Marital Context: Bryant alleged that his wife had been enticed away and that Carrier had engaged in sexual relations with her.
Evidence at Trial:
- Jury found no alienation of affections but did find that Carrier had “immoral relations” (sexual intercourse) with Bryant’s wife.
- Witnesses testified about Carrier’s behavior and his interactions with Bryant’s wife.
- Carrier’s mental capacity was contested: although he had been declared legally insane before, plaintiff introduced testimony suggesting he was capable of wrongful intent at the relevant times.
Jury Verdict:
1. Alienation of affections? No.
2. Criminal conversation? Yes.
3. Compensatory damages: $1,000.
4. Mental capacity to act with wrongful intent? Yes.
5. Punitive damages: $500.
Appeal: Defendants appealed, arguing errors in admitting/excluding evidence, jury instructions, and the award of punitive damages against a man adjudged insane.

Issue

Can an insane person be held civilly liable for criminal conversation?
If previously adjudged insane, may punitive damages still be awarded?
Was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and damages?

Rule

Civil Liability of Insane Persons: An insane person is liable for compensatory damages for his torts, but not for punitive damages because punitive damages require culpable intent.
Consent of Wife Not a Defense: In criminal conversation, the wife’s consent is no defense — adultery itself is the invasion of the husband’s marital rights.
Evidence of Sanity: When punitive damages are sought, plaintiff may introduce evidence showing defendant’s legal capacity at the time of the acts.
Future Damages: Juries may award the present value of future losses if evidence shows estrangement will continue.

Analysis

Sanity and Liability: Carrier’s prior adjudication of insanity did not automatically bar the claim. The jury heard testimony from witnesses who observed him and concluded he had sufficient mental capacity at the time of the wrongful acts. Thus, he could be held responsible.
Punitive Damages: Generally, punitive damages are unavailable against an insane person, but here the jury expressly found Carrier had the capacity to act with wrongful intent. That finding supported the $500 punitive award.
Consent Argument: Carrier could not defend by claiming Bryant’s wife consented. The court reiterated the longstanding rule that adultery with a consenting wife is still actionable by the husband.
Evidence Challenges:
- Defendants objected to testimony that Carrier had been arrested or tried previously, but the court allowed it as relevant to witness knowledge of his mental condition.
- Exclusion of testimony about the character of another woman with whom plaintiff was alleged to have had improper relations was harmless since similar evidence came in elsewhere.
Jury Instructions: The trial judge’s instructions were upheld, including the rule that estrangement damages can include future losses.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court found no error. Carrier was liable for $1,000 compensatory and $500 punitive damages.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Insane Defendants: Even those adjudged insane can be held liable for torts like criminal conversation, though punitive damages hinge on proof of legal capacity at the time of the acts.
Consent of Wife Irrelevant: In criminal conversation, the wrong is to the husband’s marital rights; a willing spouse does not absolve the outsider.
Evidence of Sanity Matters: When punitive damages are sought, plaintiffs may present detailed evidence of defendant’s conduct to show sufficient mental capacity for malicious intent.
Future Damages Allowed: Juries may compensate for permanent estrangement, awarding present value of future harm.
Modern Analogy: Just as today courts may parse mental health evidence and credibility in intentional torts, Bryant shows early grappling with how mental illness intersects with accountability for adultery and marital torts.

Johnston v. Johnston, 213 N.C. 255, 195 S.E. 807 (1938)

Facts

Parties: Anne B. Johnston (plaintiff/daughter-in-law) sued her mother-in-law, Alexandria G. Johnston (defendant), for alienation of affections.
Claim: Plaintiff alleged that her mother-in-law maliciously interfered with her marriage, alienating her husband’s affections and causing him to abandon her.
Evidence: The record (not fully detailed in the opinion) showed a pattern of family discord and interference. Plaintiff contended the defendant acted with hostility toward her and induced the son to leave his wife.
Jury Verdict:
1. Did defendant alienate the affections of plaintiff’s husband? Yes.
2. Did defendant act with ill will, wantonness, or reckless indifference? Yes.
3. Compensatory damages: $10,000.
4. Punitive damages: None.
Appeal: Defendant mother-in-law appealed, challenging sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions (especially damages), and the size of the verdict.

Issue

Can a daughter-in-law maintain an alienation of affections action against her mother-in-law?
What standard governs parental advice/intervention in a child’s marriage?
Were damages properly instructed and supported by the evidence?

Rule

Parental Privilege: Parents may advise or counsel their child about marital issues if done in good faith.
Malice Threshold: If a parent acts with malice, ill will, or reckless indifference, the parent may be held liable for alienation.
Damages: Loss of support and assistance may be an element of recovery, but there must be evidence of value. Excessive verdicts are reviewed only for abuse of discretion or error of law.

Analysis

Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court held that there was enough testimony of malicious interference to submit the case to the jury.
Parental Role: The Court drew a sharp line: parental advice out of affection or concern is permitted, but “officious intermeddling and malicious interference” crosses into liability. The jury was tasked with deciding whether Mrs. Johnston’s conduct stemmed from parental concern or malice.
Damages Instruction: Although the charge mentioned loss of support as an element of damages, the Court noted there was no reference to future loss, so the omission of a “present value” instruction was not prejudicial.
Verdict Size: $10,000 was large for 1938, but the Court emphasized that excessiveness is for the trial judge to control unless an error of law appears. No abuse of discretion was found.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment. The daughter-in-law recovered $10,000 against her mother-in-law for malicious alienation of affections.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Parents Have a Limited Privilege: They can advise their married children in good faith, but liability arises when advice turns into malice or intentional disruption.
Alienation Actions Reach Family Members: These torts are not limited to outside lovers; even relatives (e.g., in-laws) can be liable.
Damages Can Include Support Loss: A spouse deprived of a partner’s support and society may recover those losses if supported by evidence.
Jury Decides Intent: Whether parental conduct is “good faith” or “malicious” is a jury question.
Practical Implication: Courts respect parental involvement but enforce a boundary — once motive becomes hostile, liability attaches.

Barker v. Dowdy, 122 N.C. App. 50, 468 S.E.2d 288 (1996)

Facts

Parties: Mr. Barker (plaintiff/husband, age 47) sued Mr. E.P. Dowdy (defendant, age 48) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Barker’s wife (age 45). The Barkers had been married since 1918 and had 12 children, 11 surviving at the time.
Marital Context: Until 1941 the Barkers lived in apparent harmony. In 1941 they moved as tenants to Dowdy’s farm near Sanford, NC, while Mr. Barker temporarily worked at Fort Bragg. Later, Barker moved with most of the children to Moore County, while his wife and some children stayed on Dowdy’s farm during 1942. Husband and wife never resumed cohabitation afterward.
Defendant’s Circumstances: Dowdy was a married man with 9 children, a market, farm, slaughterhouse, grocery business, and office in Sanford.
Evidence at Trial (Plaintiff’s side):
- Mrs. Barker’s attitude toward her husband and children changed markedly after moving to Dowdy’s farm.
- Dowdy frequently visited the home “without business” and was often seen alone with Mrs. Barker.
- He gave gifts (cow, pig, apples, chewing gum).
- Daughter Dorothy May (age 18) testified she saw Dowdy kiss Mrs. Barker and saw them holding hands.
- Trips: Mrs. Barker sometimes took children to a movie in Sanford, then left them and reappeared after the show riding alone with Dowdy.
- They were observed together in his office and car.
- Barker testified he remonstrated with Dowdy, telling him to stop “going on” with his wife.
Defense Evidence:
- Dowdy and Mrs. Barker denied impropriety. Trips were explained as farm business, sometimes at plaintiff’s request.
- Dropping the wife/children short of the home was explained by muddy roads.
- Both denied Dorothy May’s testimony.
- They asserted plaintiff’s marital problems stemmed from an earlier domestic quarrel (August 1941) where wife was physically injured.
- Both plaintiff and defendant presented character witnesses supporting their good reputations.
Jury Verdict:
1. Alienation of affections? Yes.
2. Criminal conversation? Yes.
3. Were wrongful acts malicious? Yes.
4. Compensatory damages: $5,000 (reduced by consent to $4,000).
5. Punitive damages: $2,500 (reduced to $1,500).
Appeal: Dowdy appealed, arguing insufficiency of evidence for both claims and errors in instructions/damages.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence of wrongful alienation of the wife’s affections by Dowdy?
Was there sufficient evidence to support a verdict for criminal conversation (sexual intercourse)?
Did defendant’s testimony explaining suspicious circumstances overcome inferences against him?
Was a new trial required due to jury instructions combining the two claims?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Requires proof of marriage with affection, loss of that affection, and defendant’s wrongful/malicious conduct causing the loss.
Criminal Conversation: Requires proof of a valid marriage and sexual intercourse between the defendant and plaintiff’s spouse. Circumstantial evidence must go beyond suspicion.
Inference Rule: A defendant’s failure to testify may allow adverse inference; if he testifies and explains circumstances, the inference is removed.

Analysis

Alienation: Evidence of affection prior to moving to Dowdy’s farm, followed by Mrs. Barker’s coldness and increasing association with Dowdy, plus testimony of gifts and intimate behavior (kissing, holding hands), was enough for the jury to find alienation.
Criminal Conversation: The Court held the evidence did not sufficiently prove adultery. Although suspicious, the conduct (rides, gifts, hand-holding, alleged kiss) did not establish opportunity and inclination strong enough to infer intercourse. Unlike other CC precedents, there was no motel, overnight stay, or unambiguous intimacy.
Defendant’s Testimony: Dowdy testified, explaining the suspicious events as business-related. This neutralized any inference that might have arisen from silence.
Combined Issues: Because the trial court submitted both claims together, the insufficient evidence on criminal conversation tainted the damages verdict. A new trial was required on alienation, and the CC claim was reversed outright.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: New trial ordered.
Criminal conversation: Reversed — evidence insufficient.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Alienation vs. Criminal Conversation: The evidentiary threshold for criminal conversation is higher; suspicion or impropriety is not enough — juries need clear circumstantial evidence of intercourse.
Defendant’s Testimony Matters: By testifying and offering explanations, a defendant can remove the negative inference that arises from silence.
Procedural Lesson: When claims are tried together and one fails as a matter of law, damages must be retried.
Marriage Not Perfect: Evidence of some affection is enough for alienation, even if the couple had quarrels or discord.
Practical Implication: Plaintiffs must carefully distinguish between alienation (emotional/affectional loss) and criminal conversation (physical adultery) and develop stronger evidence for the latter.

Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947)

Facts

Parties: Mrs. Frances C. Knighten (plaintiff/wife) sued Mrs. Viola McClain (defendant) for criminal conversation with her husband and alienation of his affections.
Claim: Plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in an illicit relationship with her husband, resulting in loss of his affection and consortium.
Trial Evidence:
- Plaintiff testified, recounting statements her husband allegedly made admitting his relationship with defendant.
- Other testimony and circumstances supported the inference of improper relations.
Jury Verdict: For the plaintiff on both alienation and criminal conversation.
Appeal: Defendant challenged the legal basis of the action (arguing a wife could not sue), and also the admission of the husband’s out-of-court statements.

Issue

Can a wife maintain an action for criminal conversation and alienation of affections against another woman?
Are a husband’s declarations to his wife, admitting adultery or an improper relationship with the defendant, competent evidence in such an action?

Rule

Marital Equality: Under North Carolina law, either a husband or wife may sue for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. (Citing Hinnant v. Power Co.)
Spousal Competency Statute (G.S. 8-56): A spouse cannot testify for or against the other in cases involving adultery or criminal conversation. Husband’s declarations of adultery are inadmissible against the defendant.
Exception: Only in a husband’s action where the wife’s character is attacked may the wife testify to refute such charges.

Analysis

Right of Action: The Court reaffirmed that wives, as well as husbands, may sue for intentional invasions of marital rights. This reflects modern marital equality and consortium principles.
Evidentiary Error: The trial court admitted the plaintiff’s testimony recounting her husband’s statements about his affair. This was error. The statute explicitly bars spousal testimony in criminal conversation actions, and prior precedents (Grant v. Mitchell; McCall v. Galloway) held such declarations inadmissible.
Result: Because the jury may have relied on incompetent hearsay evidence, the verdict could not stand.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a new trial. While affirming the wife’s right to sue, the Court excluded the husband’s declarations as incompetent evidence.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Wives Have Equal Standing: A wife can sue for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, just like a husband.
Strict Evidence Rules: A spouse’s out-of-court statements confessing adultery are inadmissible against a defendant. Plaintiffs must prove through independent evidence (circumstantial or otherwise).
Spousal Competency Doctrine (Pre-1970s): At the time, spouses were incompetent to testify in adultery-based proceedings except in narrow statutory exceptions.
Trial Strategy Lesson: Reliance on the uncorroborated statements of the adulterous spouse is legally insufficient; plaintiffs must gather stronger, admissible evidence of inclination and opportunity.

Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949)

Facts

Parties: William Harold Henson and Dolores Elaine Henson (minors), by next friend (their father, William M. Henson), sued Cecil Thomas.
Claim: Children sought damages for defendant’s criminal conversation with and alienation of the affections of their mother, Estelle Henson.
Allegations:
- Family lived happily in a new home.
- Defendant persistently courted the mother, induced her to leave home on trips to other cities, and engaged in illicit relations with her.
- Defendant’s conduct alienated the mother’s affections, goaded the father to leave home, and caused the children to lose the companionship, guidance, and care of both parents, bringing them disgrace.
- Complaint did not allege that the mother abandoned the children or no longer lived with them.
Procedure: Defendant demurred (failure to state a claim). Trial court overruled the demurrer. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Do minor children have a cause of action against a third party for disrupting the family circle by criminal conversation with, and alienating the affections of, their mother?
Should North Carolina courts recognize such a claim absent statutory authorization?

Rule

Common law in force (G.S. 4-1): Only so much of the common law not abrogated by statute applies.
No common-law cause: There is no common-law right for children to sue a third person for loss of parental affection/companionship due to interference with the marriage.
Judicial role: Courts declare existing law; creating new causes of action is for the Legislature, not the judiciary.
Related principles:
- Spouses historically could sue outsiders for AOA/CC, but those actions were grounded in husband’s proprietary marital rights at common law.
- Children cannot sue parents in tort (Small v. Morrison).
- If a third party seduces the mother and causes the father to leave, any claim lies with the father, not the children.
- If the mother is guilty of nonsupport, remedy is by statute (and exclusive).

Analysis

No statutory basis: North Carolina has enacted no statute creating a child’s claim for interference with parental consortium.
No common-law precedent: The common law did not recognize a child’s action for loss of parental affection or society—those interests were treated as social, not legal, rights.
Causation & responsibility: The harms alleged (loss of maternal affection, guidance, care) stem from the mother’s withdrawal of those incidents of family life; the law imposes no tort duty on the mother to provide love/affection enforceable by damages, so a third party who allegedly induced her cannot incur greater liability.
Separation of powers: Expanding tort law to recognize a child’s consortium claim would be a matter of policy for the General Assembly; the Court declines to “engage in judicial empiricism.”
Jurisdictional survey: Majority aligns with jurisdictions rejecting such claims; acknowledges contra authorities (Daily v. Parker; Johnson v. Luhman) but notes those courts candidly created a new cause of action—something this Court will not do.
Dissent (Seawell, J.; Ervin, J., concurring): Would recognize the children’s claim as within elastic common-law principles, emphasizing social need, analogies to existing torts, and the impropriety of letting a stranger benefit from parental immunity doctrines.

Conclusion

Reversed. Children cannot maintain an action against a third party for criminal conversation with and alienation of the affections of their mother; the complaint fails to state a cause of action.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

No Child’s Consortium Claim (AOA/CC): In North Carolina, minors have no tort claim against third parties for loss of a parent’s affection/companionship arising from interference in the parents’ marriage.
Legislative, Not Judicial, Creation: The Court refuses to create new causes of action in this arena; any change must come from the General Assembly.
Remedies Lie Elsewhere: Claims for marital interference belong to the spouse (AOA/CC). Issues of child support/non-support are addressed by specific statutes.
Doctrinal Boundaries Matter: The decision preserves the traditional limits of consortium-type claims and avoids extending family-relation torts beyond spousal actions.
Use in Practice: When representing children alleging harm from a parent’s affair, tort damages against the paramour are unavailable under current NC law; explore domestic relations remedies and any statutory support avenues instead.

Hardison v. Gregory, 242 N.C. 324, 88 S.E.2d 96 (1955)

Facts

Parties: H.F. Hardison (plaintiff/husband) sued the co-administrators of the estate of Bonnie M. Gregory (deceased) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Hardison’s wife, Nellie.
Posture: Jury found Gregory (decedent) (1) alienated Nellie’s affections, (2) had “immoral relations” with her, and (3) awarded $10,000 in damages. Judgment entered; administrators appealed.
Key Evidence (Plaintiff’s testimony admitted over objection):
- “Unlighted house” incident (Nov. 1949): Hardison returned at ~8:30 p.m., lights off; turned them on and found Bonnie Gregory standing in the living room near the bedroom door; the bedroom door was locked.
- Roxboro Road cabin (Mar. 1949): Saw Gregory’s car by a farm cabin; later saw Nellie and Gregory leaving together in Gregory’s Cadillac; chased but lost them.
- Massey cabin + pursuit (Jan. 3, 1952): Responding to a tip, Hardison saw Gregory’s Cadillac at the remote Rat Massey cabin; later saw Nellie and Gregory exit the cabin and drive off; high-speed chase; at a dead-end road Hardison used a hatchet to break the car windows, struck Gregory, saw Nellie on the floorboard; Gregory fled to a creek.
- Office window (1948): Hardison testified he saw Gregory hugging and kissing Nellie through Gregory’s office window.
Wife’s admissions (on cross, called by defendants):
- During the unlighted house event she was in the bedroom “fixing to dress.”
- After leaving the Massey cabin, she knew her husband was pursuing “by virtue of her relationship” with Gregory; Gregory accelerated; she later left her husband.
Defense theory: Invoke G.S. 8-51 (dead man’s statute) to exclude Hardison’s testimony as a “personal transaction” with the deceased; argue insufficiency for CC.

Issue

Evidence/Dead Man’s Statute: Was Hardison’s testimony about seeing Gregory with Nellie (house/cabins/office) and the hatchet incident barred by G.S. 8-51 as a “personal transaction or communication” with the deceased?
Sufficiency (Criminal Conversation): Did the circumstantial evidence allow the jury to infer intercourse?
Torts Distinction: Must physical debauchery be shown to prove alienation of affections?

Rule

AOA vs. CC: They are distinct torts; physical debauchment not required for AOA.
G.S. 8-51 applies to torts. But it does not bar an interested party’s testimony to independent facts observed—acts and conduct of the deceased—when knowledge is not derived from a personal transaction/communication with the deceased.
CC Proof: Direct proof not required; circumstantial evidence suffices if a jury can reasonably infer intercourse (opportunity + inclination).

Analysis

Admissibility under G.S. 8-51:
- Court surveys precedent and treats Hardison’s account of what he saw (Gregory’s presence in the dark house, the couple alone in remote cabins, public embracing/kissing) as independent observations, not barred personal transactions—thus competent.
- The Court is evenly divided (one Justice not sitting) on whether Hardison’s testimony about assaulting Gregory with the hatchet is a barred “personal transaction”; concurrence would exclude it, but deems any error harmless given the wife’s corroborating testimony.
Sufficiency for CC:
- Combined circumstances—secret meetings in cabins, unlighted house late at night, public affection, and wife’s admissions (“fixing to dress”; acknowledging pursuit due to her relationship with Gregory)—carry all the earmarks of guilty intercourse, warranting submission of CC to the jury.
- Defendants’ reliance on Barker v. Dowdy is unavailing; evidence here is stronger and includes damaging admissions by the wife.
Survival (Quaere): Court flags but does not decide whether AOA/CC survive the tortfeasor’s death (since action proceeded against the estate’s administrators).

Conclusion

No error. Verdict for plaintiff affirmed: evidence properly admitted (except close question on hatchet testimony), and circumstantial proof sufficient to sustain criminal conversation alongside alienation of affections.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Independent-facts carve-out to G.S. 8-51: In suits against a decedent’s estate, a party may testify to what they observed the decedent do (acts/conduct/locations) even in intimate contexts; barred only when it’s a personal transaction/communication.
CC via Circumstantial Proof: Cabins + secrecy + compromising context + spouse admissions can clear the opportunity/inclination bar without direct proof.
AOA ≠ CC: Don’t conflate them; AOA doesn’t require intercourse, CC does (but via inference is fine).
Trial strategy: Secure admissions from the spouse (timing, dress, awareness of pursuit, nature of relationship). Such admissions can transform “suspicion” into jury-sufficient inference.
Estate defendants: Be prepared to litigate G.S. 8-51 line-drawing; exclude true transactions, but expect observational testimony to come in.
Open question: Survivability of AOA/CC against a deceased tortfeasor remains unresolved in this opinion—note for briefing when estates are involved.

Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957)

Facts

Parties: Frantz S. Bishop (plaintiff/husband) sued his father-in-law, E.A. Glazener (defendant), for alienation of affections.
Living arrangement/history:
- Bishop married defendant’s daughter in 1941; two children.
- Couple lived ~7 years in defendant’s Rosman home; later (1949) moved to Brevard where Bishop built a house and invited defendant to live with them.
- Defendant lived with them five years, contributed money/materials (basement concrete, furnace, screening, deep freeze, coal, utilities) and some furniture; Bishop paid most bills.
Frictions: Persistent “clashes of opinion” between Bishop and father-in-law: cursing in front of children; loud radio; yard/trash disputes; noise during Bishop’s day sleep after night shift. Bishop objected to defendant “running” the house.
The break: In July 1954 Bishop told defendant to leave; defendant replied, “I will go, but I will ruin your home.” Defendant moved to an apartment.
Aftermath:
- Wife visited her father nearly daily while still living with Bishop.
- Within weeks, wife filed for alimony while still in the marital home; on Sept. 17, 1954 she left with the children to live where her father stayed.
- Separation agreement followed: Bishop sold the marital home to his wife for $4,000, which her father paid; later wife, children, and father moved back into that house; wife eventually moved to S.C. with children/father for her teaching certification.
- Statements: Wife told Bishop (and Bishop’s sister), “If my father cannot live here, I won’t.”
Procedural posture: Trial court granted involuntary nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Bishop appealed.

Issue

Did plaintiff’s evidence permit a reasonable jury finding that the father-in-law’s wrongful and malicious conduct caused the alienation of the wife’s affections?
How does the parental-privilege/good-faith presumption affect sufficiency in an alienation claim against a parent?

Rule

Alienation of Affections (AOA) elements: (1) Valid marriage; (2) loss of affection/consortium; (3) wrongful and malicious conduct by defendant that is the controlling or effective cause of the loss (need not be sole cause).
Malice standard (no adultery alleged): Need not be express; can be implied from intentional, unjustifiable, wrongful conduct.
Parents are different: A parent is presumed to act in good faith for the child’s welfare. Liability attaches only upon proof of malice or improper motive overcoming that presumption. The quo animo (state of mind) controls; “the rights of parents end at the border of good faith.”

Analysis

Causation/control: The record shows friction between son-in-law and father-in-law and the wife’s volitional choice to prioritize living with her father (“If my father can’t stay here, I won’t”). But no evidence showed acts by defendant effectuating his “I will ruin your home” threat or conduct that actually caused the wife to separate or lose affection.
Parental presumption: Daily visits and later co-residence with her father, standing alone, are insufficient to overcome the good-faith presumption afforded a parent.
Other contributing factors: Evidence suggests alternative causes—marital friction over household control, support disputes (alimony/support filings), and the wife’s personal preference to live with her father—none tied to wrongful procurement by defendant.
Resulting sufficiency: Even viewed most favorably to plaintiff, the proof fails on the wrongful/malicious conduct + controlling cause prongs required against a parent.

Conclusion

Affirmed. Involuntary nonsuit stands. Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to show that the father-in-law, acting with malice, controlled or effectively caused the alienation of the wife’s affections.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Higher bar vs. parents: Suing an in-law for AOA requires clear proof overcoming the good-faith parental presumption; mere influence, visits, or co-living isn’t enough.
Causation is king: Defendant’s conduct must be the controlling/effective cause of alienation; statements like “I will ruin your home,” without acts implementing it, won’t carry the day.
Implied malice demands facts: In non-adultery AOA claims, implied malice must rest on intentional, unjustifiable interference—not on ordinary family friction or the spouse’s independent choices.
Practical tip: Against relatives, build a record of specific directives, inducements, or machinations (e.g., urging separation, financing/leverage tied to leaving, disparagement aimed to sever the bond) that causally connect to the separation.

Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622, 146 S.E.2d 641 (1966)

Facts

Parties: Claude Davis Litchfield (plaintiff/husband) sued William Harvey Cox (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.
Procedural posture: By stipulation, the criminal conversation claim was withdrawn at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. The trial court granted nonsuit on alienation of affections; plaintiff appealed.
Marriage background: Litchfield married his wife in 1952; they lived together in Engelhard, NC. Plaintiff worked as a commercial fisherman and was absent for long stretches in 1962–64. Before 1962, he had no doubts about his wife’s loyalty.
Evidence:
- Testimony from plaintiff’s mother that the marriage had been a happy, affectionate family unit.
- Plaintiff testified: “We had a happy home. She seemed to love the children and to love me. In 1962 and 1963 she became very cold … casting me aside … things got worse as time went on.”
- Letters: In 1964, plaintiff found three letters, postmarked Aug. 1963, addressed to “Mrs. Harvey Banks” (his wife under an alias) at St. Simons, GA; return address “J.H. Banks, Morehead City.” Handwriting expert testified the letters were typed on defendant’s typewriter. Wife admitted they came from defendant.
- Letter excerpts: Defendant wrote of their intimate meetings: “Those nights were all so nice … I could not pick the best … they were all so perfect. I wish I were able to put on these pages the satisfaction it gives me to know that I care for you and of being reasonably sure that it is being returned … I am waiting and loving you.”
- Plaintiff testified defendant also supplied his wife with liquor until she developed a drinking problem.
Defendant’s position: Denied alienating affections; pointed out plaintiff and wife still lived together.

Issue

Was plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to submit his claim for alienation of affections to the jury, or was nonsuit proper?

Rule

To prove alienation of affections, plaintiff must show:

A valid marriage with genuine love and affection;
Loss of that love and affection;
Wrongful and malicious acts of defendant were the controlling cause of the loss. (Hankins v. Hankins, Ridenhour v. Miller).

Analysis

Element 1: Evidence (mother’s testimony, plaintiff’s testimony) showed a happy, affectionate marriage pre-1962.
Element 2: Plaintiff testified to wife’s cooling attitude, indifference, and estrangement during 1962–63.
Element 3: Defendant’s letters expressing love and past intimacy, coupled with supplying liquor, support a jury finding of wrongful/malicious conduct directly causing alienation.
Living together: The fact that plaintiff and wife continued living together was relevant only to credibility, not sufficiency. The jury must decide whether genuine love and affection had been destroyed.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of North Carolina held the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. The nonsuit was reversed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA survives nonsuit with circumstantial + documentary proof: Love letters and behavioral changes suffice to establish prima facie alienation.
Living together ≠ bar to claim: Cohabitation does not negate alienation; affection can be destroyed even while spouses reside under the same roof.
Wrongful conduct beyond adultery: Supplying liquor, emotional manipulation, and written declarations of love can demonstrate malice.
Expert evidence helps: Forensic typewriter testimony tied the letters to defendant, bolstering authenticity and wrongful attribution.
Practical strategy: In AOA suits, collect corroborating evidence of letters, gifts, habits, and third-party testimony showing decline in affection linked to defendant’s interference.

Warner v. Torrence, 2 N.C. App. 384, 163 S.E.2d 90 (1968)

Facts

Parties: W.D. Warner (plaintiff/husband) sued Robert Torrence (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Warner’s wife.
Marriage background: Warner married in 1933. By his own testimony, the couple “began to drift apart” by 1953, and “things just gradually got worse and worse” until their final separation in 1966. Their relationship was marked by constant bickering and fighting.
Procedural history: At trial, after plaintiff presented his case, the court granted defendant’s motion for nonsuit on both causes of action. Plaintiff appealed.
Evidence for AOA: Plaintiff offered little proof of any genuine love or affection remaining in the marriage before defendant’s alleged interference. The record showed long-term discord predating Torrence’s involvement.
Evidence for CC:
- Sheriff testimony: On June 29, 1966, Sheriff McSwain went to the Pine View Motel around 1:00 a.m. The room was registered in the defendant’s name. After knocking, the door opened; Torrence appeared in shorts and a t-shirt. Plaintiff’s wife was in bed, under covers up to her shoulders.
- The sheriff told Torrence he’d received complaints about Torrence keeping company with Mrs. Warner and that it had to stop; Torrence said he would clear out of the motel.
- Neither Torrence nor Mrs. Warner testified to deny or explain these events.

Issue

Was plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to withstand nonsuit on alienation of affections?
Was the circumstantial evidence sufficient to submit criminal conversation to the jury?

Rule

Alienation of Affections (AOA): Plaintiff must show (1) a valid marriage with genuine love and affection, (2) loss of that affection, and (3) that defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts were the controlling cause of the loss (Hankins v. Hankins).
Criminal Conversation (CC): Proof of sexual intercourse is required, but direct evidence is not necessary; circumstantial evidence of opportunity and inclination is sufficient (Powell v. Strickland).
Pleadings: It is not error to join AOA and CC together in one complaint and request damages in a lump sum without differentiating.

Analysis

Alienation claim: Plaintiff failed to prove a baseline of genuine love and affection to be alienated. The marriage had deteriorated over many years, and evidence showed no affection remained before defendant’s involvement. The nonsuit was proper.
Criminal conversation claim: The sheriff’s testimony placed defendant and plaintiff’s wife alone in a motel room after midnight, with defendant partially undressed and the wife in bed. Neither testified to rebut the inference. The circumstances strongly supported an inference of intercourse. As in Walker v. Walker, silence in the face of such accusations can weigh as a “silent admission.” Thus, nonsuit was improper on this claim.
Procedural posture: Because both causes were pleaded together and damages were intertwined (as in Barker v. Dowdy), a new trial was ordered on CC so that damages could be properly considered.

Conclusion

Alienation of affections: Affirmed (nonsuit proper).
Criminal conversation: Reversed and new trial ordered.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Proof of affection required for AOA: Without showing genuine love existed, a plaintiff cannot recover for alienation. A broken marriage before interference defeats the claim.
CC easier to prove: Adultery can be established by circumstantial evidence—midnight motel rendezvous, undress, and failure to rebut can be enough.
Pleading practice: Plaintiffs may join AOA and CC in one count and request damages together, though courts may separate liability findings.
Trial strategy: Even if alienation is weak, CC can survive if there is clear opportunity + inclination evidence.
Silence matters: When accused spouses/paramours fail to testify, courts may treat silence as corroborating circumstantial evidence.

Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104 (1969)

Facts

Parties: Lorene Sebastian (plaintiff/wife) sued Daisy M. Kluttz (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Walter Sebastian.
Marriage history: Married in 1940, one son. The couple separated twice before (1963, 1964) but reconciled and lived together until April 1968, when Walter left.
Evidence (Plaintiff):
- Testified her relationship with husband was affectionate around Christmas 1967 and Feb. 1968.
- Defendant’s husband died July 1967; soon after, Walter began visiting defendant’s home frequently, seen there mornings and evenings.
- Neighbors testified Walter stayed overnight at defendant’s home and left early in the mornings.
- Evidence showed Walter and defendant appeared together often in public.
- Though Walter had prior infidelities and drinking problems, plaintiff had forgiven him before defendant’s involvement.
- Plaintiff said differences with husband were always resolved until defendant entered the picture.
Evidence (Defendant):
- Introduced a separation agreement dated July 29, 1968, releasing mutual marital rights and providing property division and temporary support. Plaintiff acknowledged signing it, saying husband had already moved in with defendant.
Jury Verdict:
- Alienation: Yes, $15,000 compensatory + $2,500 punitive.
- Criminal conversation: Yes, $2,500 compensatory + $10,000 punitive.
Appeal: Defendant argued nonsuit should have been granted, separation agreement barred recovery, and trial court erred in jury instructions on damages.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to support plaintiff’s claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation?
Did the July 1968 separation agreement bar or limit recovery?
Were damages instructions proper, particularly regarding loss of support, life expectancy, and present cash value of future damages?
Should damages for both torts have been combined instead of separated?

Rule

AOA elements: (1) Valid marriage, (2) loss of affection/consortium, (3) wrongful and malicious conduct of defendant as controlling cause. Malice = unjustifiable conduct.
CC elements: (1) Valid marriage, (2) sexual intercourse with spouse during coverture; alienation not required.
Consent of spouse not a defense.
Separation agreements: Do not bar AOA/CC actions that accrued before execution; may affect damages if support rights are waived.
Damages:
- AOA: Present value of lost support, consortium, and other marital interests + injury to health, feelings, reputation.
- CC: Humiliation, mental anguish, loss of consortium, injury to health, and support.
- Future losses must be reduced to present cash value.
- Mortuary tables admissible but only advisory on life expectancy.
Punitive damages: Allowed in both AOA and CC when conduct is willful, wanton, malicious, or aggravated.
Pleading/damages overlap: When both claims are proven and intertwined, damages issues should be combined.

Analysis

Sufficiency: Unlike Warner v. Torrence (1968), here there was evidence of affection continuing into 1967–68 and reconciliation after earlier separations. Plaintiff’s testimony and neighbors’ observations supported both AOA and CC claims.
Separation agreement: Did not bar claims because the wrongful acts (and accrual of torts) occurred before July 1968. The agreement only limited marital rights going forward, not tort liability of third parties.
Damages instructions: Trial court erred by:
- Failing to instruct jury to limit future losses to present cash value.
- Failing to properly instruct on how to consider mortuary tables (life expectancy as one factor).
- Giving vague instructions on support as an element of damages.
- Not clearly applying law to facts in its charge on CC compensatory damages (violating G.S. 1-180).
Damages overlap: Court held there should have been only one compensatory and one punitive issue, since AOA and CC damages were “so connected and intertwined.”

Conclusion

New trial ordered. While evidence was sufficient for jury consideration of both AOA and CC, errors in damages instructions and separation of issues required retrial.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA + CC may coexist, but damages overlap: When both are proven, courts prefer single compensatory and punitive damage issues to avoid duplication.
Separation agreement no bar: A separation agreement doesn’t extinguish liability for tortious conduct before its execution.
Spousal consent irrelevant: A spouse’s willingness to stray cannot be used as a defense.
Evidence standard: Even with prior marital discord, if some affection still exists, interference that is the controlling cause can establish liability.
Damages must be precise: Future losses must be reduced to present value; mortuary tables are evidence, not conclusive. Jury charges must apply law to facts under G.S. 1-180.

Sherwood v. Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112, 223 S.E.2d 509 (1976)

Facts

Parties/Claim: Wife (Betty E. Sherwood) filed an alimony action under G.S. 50-16, alleging the husband abandoned her in Wayne County on 11 Sept. 1973 and then moved to Delaware.
Service: Copies of summons/complaint were mailed to husband in Delaware by certified/registered mail (Rule 4(j)(9)(b)); later contempt materials were personally served by a Delaware sheriff.
Defense Motion: Husband moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process/service, and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Trial Court: Denied the motion without findings. Husband appealed.

Issue

Did NC courts acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident husband in an alimony (abandonment) action via registered-mail service?
Does the case fit G.S. 1-75.4(1) (domicile) or 1-75.4(3) (“local act or omission”—injury to person or property)?
Is exercising jurisdiction consistent with due process/minimum contacts?

Rule

Presumptions when no findings: If findings aren’t required/requested, appellate courts presume the trial court found facts supporting its order.
Service outside NC: Rule 4(j)(9)(b) permits service by registered mail on a party outside NC if grounds for jurisdiction exist under G.S. 1-75.4.
Long-arm grounds:
- § 1-75.4(1)(b) – person domiciled in NC at time of service.
- § 1-75.4(3) – action claiming injury to person or property arising out of an act/omission within NC.
Alimony/abandonment as “injury”: An alimony action based on abandonment qualifies as injury to the person under § 1-75.4(3).
Due process: Jurisdiction is proper if defendant has minimum contacts with NC such that suit doesn’t offend fair play and substantial justice.

Analysis

Domicile route foreclosed: Plaintiff’s own notice stated defendant was “not an inhabitant” of NC; “inhabitant” ≈ domicile, so § 1-75.4(1)(b) doesn’t apply.
Local act/omission satisfied: Complaint alleges husband resided with wife in NC and abandoned her in NC—a local act causing personal injury (loss of marital support/companionship). Prior cases treat similar domestic-relations torts (e.g., alienation/CC) as injury under § 1-75.4(3).
Service proper: With § 1-75.4(3) satisfied, registered-mail service under Rule 4(j)(9)(b) confers PJ.
Due process: Defendant’s contacts—cohabiting in NC, abandoning wife in NC, then fleeing—meet International Shoe’s minimum contacts; haling him into NC to answer an alimony claim stemming from those acts is fair and foreseeable.
Procedural presumptions: No findings were required; thus, the appellate court presumes the trial court properly found the predicate facts supporting jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Affirmed. North Carolina properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the nonresident husband in the alimony-by-abandonment action via registered-mail service, under G.S. 1-75.4(3) and consistent with due process.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Abandonment = “injury” for long-arm: Alimony claims based on abandonment in NC fall within § 1-75.4(3) (“local act or omission”).
Registered mail works (with grounds): Rule 4(j)(9)(b) service by mail on an out-of-state spouse is valid if a § 1-75.4 ground exists.
Domicile not required: Even when the defendant is no longer domiciled in NC, PJ can rest on in-state wrongful acts tied to the claim.
Minimum contacts met: Cohabitation in NC + abandonment in NC provides constitutionally sufficient contacts for PJ.
Practice tip: If you don’t request findings on a PJ motion, appellate courts presume findings supporting the order—ask for them if you’ll need a detailed record on appeal.

Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296, 259 S.E.2d 11 (1979)

Facts

Parties/ posture: Wade Lapsley Edwards (plaintiff/husband) sued Jo Meredith Shelton Edwards (defendant/wife) for absolute divorce based on one-year separation (filed 10 July 1978). A Deed of Separation had been executed 12 Oct 1977 dividing property.
Defenses/counterclaims (wife):
- Alleged plaintiff abandoned her in July 1977.
- Alleged plaintiff committed adultery both before and after separation (recrimination).
- Alleged plaintiff procured the separation agreement by fraud (he denied seeing another woman).
- Third defense & counterclaim: alleged plaintiff alienated the affections of the parties’ adopted son, Gary.
Motions: Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)) and summary judgment (Rule 56); submitted an affidavit from the son denying any alienation. Defendant filed affidavits re: adultery and examples of the son’s hostility; also made an oral motion to amend her pleadings at the hearing.
Trial court: Denied leave to amend; struck defendant’s answer/counterclaim for failure to state a claim; granted plaintiff’s motions. Defendant appealed.
Disposition: Affirmed.

Issue

Is recrimination a valid defense to an absolute divorce based on one-year separation for actions filed after 31 July 1977?
Did defendant’s allegations about fraud in procuring the separation agreement state a cognizable counterclaim in this divorce action?
Can one parent sue the other for alienation of the affections of their child?
Did the court abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s oral motion to amend?

Rule

G.S. 50-6 (1977 amendments): For absolute divorce based on separation, recrimination is not a bar (“A plea of … recrimination … shall not be a bar…”), effective Aug. 1, 1977 (not affecting pending cases).
Pleading amendments (Rule 15(a)): Leave to amend is discretionary; denial reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
Parent–child alienation: No cause of action at common law or by statute for a parent to recover from the other parent for alienating a child’s affections (compare Henson v. Thomas (children cannot sue for loss of parental consortium); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699).
Recrimination doctrine: Historically barred some divorce actions; no longer available post-1977 for G.S. 50-6 actions.

Analysis

Recrimination barred: Action filed 10 July 1978 → post-amendment; recrimination unavailable regardless of whether alleged adultery occurred before or after separation. The statute eliminates the defense without carving out exceptions.
Alleged “fraud” as counterclaim: The “fraud” paragraph alleged misrepresentation to induce the separation agreement and sought damages, not alimony/custody/support. It does not state a statutory family-law counterclaim cognizable in this divorce action; substantively it repackages recrimination, which is barred.
Alienation of child’s affections: Court follows the majority rule: no parental consortium claim between parents absent seduction/abduction statutes. The marital consortium rationale for AOA does not extend to the parent-child relationship.
Leave to amend: Record lacked the content of the proposed amendment; with no showing of prejudice or abuse, denial was within the trial court’s discretion.

Conclusion

Affirmed. Recrimination is not a defense in post-7/31/1977 G.S. 50-6 actions; the “fraud” allegations did not state a valid counterclaim; a parent cannot sue the other parent for alienation of a child’s affections; and denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Post-1977 divorce practice: In absolute-divorce-by-separation cases filed after July 31, 1977, recrimination is out—don’t plead it.
Counterclaims must fit Chapter 50: Allegations tied to marital misconduct or “fraud” around separation agreements must be framed as proper family-law claims (e.g., setting aside agreement, alimony, etc.), not tort-style damages within the divorce action.
No “child-alienation” tort between parents: NC does not recognize parental claims for alienation of a child’s affections.
Appellate posture on amendments: Without a clear proffer showing the amendment’s content and relevance, denials under Rule 15(a) will be upheld.

Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 265 S.E.2d 434 (1980)

Facts

Parties/Posture: Kathryn G. Heist (plaintiff/wife) sued Sara W. Faircloth Heist (defendant/paramour) for alienation of affections (filed 18 Oct 1974). Defendant counterclaimed for defamation. Jury (May 1979) found for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive; found against defendant on her counterclaim.
Post-trial: Defendant moved for directed verdicts at close of plaintiff’s case and at the close of all evidence (Rule 50(a)), later JNOV (Rule 50(b)) and new trial (Rule 59). Trial court set aside punitive damages but let compensatory stand. Both sides appealed.
Relationship history: Plaintiff and husband married in 1937, two adult children; witnesses described a long-standing happy marriage until the “other situation.”
Conduct/evidence:
- Plaintiff observed a change in husband (coolness, lies, refusal of intimacy).
- Husband frequented defendant’s apartment/home; after confrontation, husband cursed and abused plaintiff (“I need Sara… I can’t stand living with you”).
- Despite plaintiff’s protests, defendant continued to see husband regularly from April 1970 until he left January 1972.
- An incident where plaintiff found husband’s car at defendant’s; later assault by husband; when plaintiff refused to drop charges, he moved out that day.
- No proof of sexual intercourse; claim sounded only in AOA.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence to submit alienation of affections to the jury (and to withstand JNOV), particularly on malice and controlling cause when no sexual misconduct was shown?
Were compensatory damages properly supported?
Did the trial court err by setting aside punitive damages?

Rule

AOA elements: (1) Happy marriage with genuine love/affection; (2) alienation/destruction of that affection; (3) wrongful and malicious acts of defendant were the controlling/effective cause (need not be sole cause).
Malice (no sexual defilement): “Unjustifiable conduct causing the injury,” including reckless indifference to marital rights.
Rule 50(a) specificity: Grounds should be stated, but courts may review when the basis is obvious (sufficiency).
Damages (AOA): Present value of support, consortium, and other legally protected marital interests, plus injury to health/feelings/reputation.
Punitive damages (AOA): Require aggravating circumstances in addition to the malice implied by the tort.

Analysis

Directed verdict/JNOV (sufficiency):
- Element 1—Affection: Testimony from plaintiff and multiple witnesses established a long, affectionate marriage before defendant’s involvement.
- Element 2—Alienation: Clear decline in affection and ultimate separation after defendant’s relationship with husband intensified.
- Element 3—Malice/causation: Even accepting plaintiff could be argumentative, for 30 years the marriage functioned; defendant knowingly allowed and facilitated husband’s regular, frequent presence at her residence over plaintiff’s protests, with knowledge it produced marital discord—sufficient to show unjustifiable conduct and that defendant’s conduct was the controlling/effective cause of the alienation.
- Thus, submission to the jury and denial of JNOV on compensatory damages were proper.
Compensatory damages proof: Plaintiff showed pecuniary losses (income, life/health insurance, stock and pension benefits) and non-pecuniary harms (consortium, mental anguish), satisfying the measure of damages.
Punitive damages: Record did not show aggravation beyond the malice inherent in the AOA conduct; trial court properly set aside the punitive award.

Conclusion

Compensatory judgment affirmed (sufficient evidence; no error in denying DV/JNOV).
Punitive damages properly set aside for lack of additional aggravating circumstances.
Overall affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

No sex needed for AOA — but malice is: Without criminal conversation, plaintiff must prove malice via unjustifiable or recklessly indifferent conduct that effectively causes the alienation.
Facilitation can be “wrongful conduct”: Repeatedly permitting access and association, knowing it harms the marriage and ignoring protests, can satisfy malice/causation.
Damages mix: AOA compensatory damages cover support + consortium + other marital interests, plus emotional/ reputational harm; show pecuniary losses where possible.
Punitive threshold is higher: Need aggravating factors beyond the malice implied by the tort itself.
Rule 50 pragmatism: Even if a directed-verdict motion lacks specific grounds, appellate courts may review when the sufficiency challenge is obvious.

Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458, 297 S.E.2d 142 (1982)

Facts

Parties/Claims: Billy Wyatt Scott (plaintiff/husband) sued William L. Kiker, III (defendant) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Scott’s wife.
Marriage & Deterioration: Married in 1957; plaintiff testified to a close, loving marriage and healthy sex life until spring 1978.
Key Incidents:
- July 1978 (house incident): Plaintiff found wife’s car at defendant’s house; broke a window; saw defendant nude running from the bedroom and his wife getting dressed. Defendant allegedly handed plaintiff a shotgun and said, “If you don’t believe we’re in love, shoot me.” Wife apologized; plaintiff forgave her.
- Aug 21, 1978 (parking lot): Plaintiff saw wife park beside defendant at work; he rammed defendant’s car with his truck and attacked with a bat; arrested. After this, wife visited defendant nightly.
- Separation/Aftermath: Wife moved to an apartment in Oct 1978, returned for a day in Dec, then moved into defendant’s house (she and defendant claimed separate apartments and no sex until marriage). Plaintiff and wife divorced in March 1980; she later married defendant.
Defenses/Evidence:
- Wife testified plaintiff had a drinking problem and diminished sexual interest post-Korea; claimed no sexual relations with defendant before marriage.
- Defendant likewise denied pre-marital sex; said kissing began Oct 1978.
- Plaintiff later earned more income post-divorce (new job + retirement).
Trial Result: Jury awarded $25,000 compensatory and $25,000 punitive. Defendant appealed on evidentiary, instruction, and sufficiency grounds. Disposition: No error.

Issue

Was plaintiff’s testimony about his ex-wife’s adultery barred by G.S. 8-56?
Was testimony about confidential marital communications admissible absent objection?
Were the jury damages instructions (single compensatory/punitive issues; need to find actual before punitive) proper?
Must compensatory damages be tied to pecuniary loss?
Did the court properly charge malice/punitive standards for AOA?
Does plaintiff’s own infidelity bar CC recovery?
Was there sufficient evidence to withstand directed verdict on AOA and CC?
Is the spouse’s consent a defense to AOA/CC?

Rule

Spousal competency (G.S. 8-56): Spouses are generally competent; the bar applies to testifying for or against the spouse in actions “in consequence of adultery/criminal conversation.” Where the spouse is not a party, the plaintiff may testify to adultery.
Confidential communications: The nonwitness spouse holds the privilege; it is waived if not timely asserted (failure to object).
Damages structure: When AOA and CC are intertwined, the court may submit one compensatory and one punitive issue; punitive requires compensatory, but omission of an explicit sequencing instruction is harmless if both are found.
Compensatory scope: Not limited to pecuniary loss; includes loss of consortium, humiliation, shame, mental anguish, loss of sexual relations, and disgrace.
AOA elements: Marriage with affection; alienation; wrongful/malicious acts as the controlling/effective cause.
Criminal conversation proof: Adultery; may be proven by circumstantial evidence (opportunity + inclination).
Infidelity of plaintiff: Not a bar to CC; it may mitigate damages.
Consent of spouse: Not a defense to either AOA or CC.

Analysis

Adultery testimony: Proper—ex-wife was not a party, so G.S. 8-56 did not bar plaintiff’s testimony about her adultery (consistent with Powell v. Strickland; Golding v. Taylor).
Confidential conversation: Any marital-communications privilege was waived by defendant’s failure to object at trial (App. Rule 10(b)(1)).
Damages instructions: Submitting a single compensatory and single punitive issue was proper given the intertwined claims (Sebastian v. Kluttz). Because the jury actually awarded both, the lack of an explicit “compensatory-first” instruction caused no prejudice.
Compensatory not purely pecuniary: Plaintiff’s increased post-divorce income does not negate non-pecuniary harms; the court correctly refused to set aside the verdict on that ground.
Punitive standard charge: Court correctly instructed that punitive requires aggravating circumstances beyond implied malice (tracking Heist v. Heist).
Plaintiff’s infidelity: Goes to reduction of damages; does not bar CC recovery; the jury was properly told to reduce if the marriage was already strained.
Sufficiency:
- AOA: Evidence of a loving marriage until defendant’s involvement; defendant knowingly allowed nightly visits, aware it would impact the marriage—sufficient for malice and causation.
- CC: July 1978 nude encounter and wife dressing; subsequent nightly visits—ample circumstantial evidence to infer intercourse.
Consent defense: Properly rejected; consent of the spouse is no defense to either tort (Chestnut v. Sutton).

Conclusion

No error. Verdict (compensatory and punitive) for plaintiff on alienation of affections and criminal conversation stands; evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and sufficiency determinations were proper.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Testifying to adultery: In AOA/CC, a plaintiff may testify to the spouse’s adultery when the spouse is not a party; confidential-communication privilege must be timely asserted or it’s waived.
Damages palette is broad: Compensatory damages in AOA/CC are not limited to dollars—emotional and relational harms count; higher income post-divorce doesn’t erase them.
Infidelity mitigates, not bars: Plaintiff’s own misconduct may reduce damages, but doesn’t defeat CC.
Opportunity + inclination can win CC: Clear compromising circumstances (e.g., nude in bedroom, nightly visits) suffice without direct proof.
Consent no shield: The willing participation of the spouse does not insulate the defendant in either AOA or CC.

Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984)

Facts

Parties/Claims: Haywood A. Cannon (plaintiff/husband, pro se) sued Jeffrey L. Miller (defendant/attorney) for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with Cannon’s wife, seeking $250,000 in damages.
Marriage history: Cannon married Rachel Beaman in 1975; they had one child in 1978. They separated in Jan. 1980 and divorced in May 1981.
Plaintiff’s allegations: Defendant met wife in summer 1979 (while she worked at the courthouse). By Sept./Oct. 1979, defendant allegedly persuaded her to have sex, causing her to lose affection for plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged repeated adultery through May 1981.
Defendant’s evidence: Affidavits from defendant and wife claimed the Cannons had already separated in May 1979, lived apart after Oct. 1979, and that defendant did not date wife until Feb. 1980. They cited court orders in the divorce case documenting separations.
Plaintiff’s response: Filed affidavit contradicting these claims, alleging photos, movies, detective reports, and witnesses proving ongoing marriage affection until defendant’s interference. Listed specific dates/locations of alleged adultery through 1981.
Trial court: Granted summary judgment for defendant on both claims. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant cross-appealed, asking for abolition of AOA/CC torts.

Issues

Did plaintiff’s forecast of evidence raise genuine issues of fact on criminal conversation and alienation of affections?
Should alienation of affections and criminal conversation be judicially abolished in North Carolina?

Rule

Alienation of Affections: Plaintiff must prove (1) a marriage with genuine love/affection; (2) alienation of that affection; (3) wrongful and malicious conduct by defendant was the controlling cause. (Hankins v. Hankins, Heist v. Heist).
Criminal Conversation: Requires (1) a valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture. Consent of the spouse is not a defense (Chestnut v. Sutton).
Summary Judgment Standard: Granted only if no genuine issue of material fact exists. Courts cannot weigh credibility or resolve factual disputes.

Analysis

Criminal Conversation:
- Plaintiff alleged and forecast evidence (detective reports, personal observations, witnesses) of sexual acts between defendant and wife between Sept. 1979 and May 1981.
- Defendant did not rebut with specific denials of intercourse during this period.
- Mere separation does not bar CC claims; intercourse before divorce is actionable (Bryant v. Carrier).
- → Summary judgment improper.
Alienation of Affections:
- Plaintiff alleged a previously affectionate marriage until defendant’s interference; affidavits, letters, and evidence contradicted defendant’s claim of no affection.
- Conflicting forecasts of evidence made summary judgment inappropriate—jury issue.
- Plaintiff also alleged aggravating factors (knowledge of marriage, child, persisting after warnings), raising punitive damages issue.
- → Summary judgment improper.
Judicial Abolition:
- Court reviewed history: origins in proprietary notions of wives as chattel, concerns over bloodlines, and old enticement actions.
- Criticisms: encourage blackmail, extortion, scandal; based on outdated assumptions of passive spouses; don’t deter adultery; punitive, not restorative; inconsistent with modern autonomy of marriage.
- Noted majority of states abolished or restricted them legislatively; some abolished judicially.
- Concluded: spousal love/affection not property, consent of spouse ignored, actions counterproductive to harmony.
- → Abolished both alienation of affections and criminal conversation in NC.

Conclusion

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the facts.
But Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for defendant because it abolished the torts of AOA and CC altogether.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Forecast of Evidence Rule: On summary judgment, courts cannot dismiss when affidavits squarely conflict—credibility is for the jury.
AOA & CC before 1984: Required proof of marriage affection + malicious interference (AOA) or intercourse (CC).
Judicial Abolition (1984): Court of Appeals declared both torts abolished, citing property-based origins, susceptibility to abuse, lack of deterrent effect, and conflict with modern marital autonomy.
Later History: The NC Supreme Court (in Cannon v. Miller, 1985) later reversed on procedural grounds, holding the Court of Appeals lacked authority to abolish torts, so AOA and CC survived.

Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985) (N.C. Supreme Court)

Facts

Posture: After the Court of Appeals’ published opinion in Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460 (1984), held that (a) plaintiff’s evidentiary forecast created jury issues on both alienation of affections and criminal conversation but (b) nevertheless judicially abolished both torts and thus affirmed summary judgment for defendant, the plaintiff sought further review.
Core dispute below: Whether plaintiff’s forecast raised triable issues (it did), and whether North Carolina courts should abolish AOA/CC (the Court of Appeals said yes).

Issue

Did the North Carolina Court of Appeals have authority to abolish the common-law causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation?
What is the proper disposition of the case once that abolition ruling is set aside?

Rule

The Court of Appeals is bound by North Carolina Supreme Court precedent and lacks authority to overrule or abolish established common-law causes of action recognized by the Supreme Court. Any such change must come from the N.C. Supreme Court or the General Assembly.

Analysis

The Supreme Court emphasized hierarchical stare decisis: intermediate appellate courts may not depart from controlling Supreme Court decisions that have long recognized AOA and CC in North Carolina.
Because the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority by abolishing the torts, that portion of its opinion could not stand.
With abolition vacated, the Court of Appeals’ separate determination—that summary judgment was improperly granted because plaintiff’s forecast created triable issues—remained the operative merits ruling. The cause was remanded for proceedings consistent with the continued viability of the torts.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ abolition of alienation of affections and criminal conversation, holding the intermediate court lacked authority to abolish those torts.
The torts remain recognized in North Carolina. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals’ analysis that summary judgment for defendant was erroneous on the evidentiary record.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Alienation of affections & criminal conversation survive (1985): The N.C. Supreme Court reinstated their viability after the Court of Appeals’ attempted abolition.
Appellate hierarchy matters: Only the N.C. Supreme Court (or the General Assembly) can abolish entrenched common-law causes.
Practical effect in Cannon: Plaintiff’s claims were revived for trial because the summary-judgment record presented genuine issues on both AOA and CC.
Modern practice note: North Carolina continues to recognize both torts (later subject to statutory limits like venue/limitations), and plaintiffs must still prove the classic elements (AOA: affection + alienation + defendant’s wrongful/malicious controlling cause; CC: valid marriage + intercourse during coverture).

Morris v. Bruney, 78 N.C. App. 668, 338 S.E.2d 561 (1986)

Facts

Jennie B. Morris, mother of four (three by first husband Roy Thomas Morris, one by second husband), lived next door to neighbor James R. Bruney, who was married with three teenage step-children. The families socialized; the kids spent time together. Jennie’s son Derrick turned 16 on October 9, 1983.

Beginning around August 1983, Derrick spent 20–25 hours/week with Bruney. Bruney had conducted prior hypnosis sessions with various people, including Jennie, and—per Jennie—without her consent attempted to exercise “mind control” over Derrick via closed sessions. Afterward, Derrick allegedly became hostile and obstinate toward Jennie, refused chores, and called her unreasonable. Jennie told Derrick to stay away from Bruney’s home and raised concerns with Bruney and his wife.

Jennie alleges Bruney told Derrick she was unreasonable, immature, and unintelligent, and that Bruney could be the father Derrick needed. Derrick’s behavior and school performance declined. He refused a car gifted by Jennie for his 16th birthday because Bruney had convinced him Jennie’s rules were unreasonable. Derrick left home; Bruney tried to persuade Derrick’s father to initiate custody proceedings.

Jennie says she found notes in Bruney’s handwriting in Derrick’s room stating Bruney had controlled Derrick’s mind, and repeating a rumor that Jennie married because she was pregnant and later left her husband for another man. Jennie further alleged Bruney encouraged Derrick to be sexually overactive and to refuse communication with her.

Slander allegations: Bruney disparaged Jennie’s parenting and fitness (“unreasonable,” “immature,” “unintelligent,” “could not raise a sixteen-year-old,” “did not act like a mother,” “attempted to bribe her son,” “mental ability of a 5-year-old”). One item came through Ellen (Jennie’s daughter): at her request, Bruney told her his wife had heard a rumor at work that Jennie married because she was pregnant.

Jennie sued for (1) alienation of the affections of her son and (2) slander, seeking $100,000 compensatory and $150,000 punitive. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bruney on the parent-child alienation claim and nonsuited/directed verdict on slander at the close of Jennie’s evidence.

Issues

Can a parent maintain a tort claim for “alienation of the affections” of a child (absent seduction or abduction)?
Did Jennie present sufficient evidence of slander actionable per se (or with special damages) to reach the jury?
- (a) Rumor of premarital pregnancy → crime of moral turpitude / unchastity?
- (b) Statements impugning parenting/fitness → slander per se as to trade/occupation (nursery-school employee)?

Rules

Parent–child “alienation of affections”: Not recognized in NC absent seduction or abduction, and not provided by statute. Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296; Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173. Consortium loss is unique to marriage (AOA between spouses); no analogous right in parent–child.
Abduction (civil): Must allege child was taken or carried away, actually or constructively, by defendant. Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283 (abduction actionable); Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413 (inducement to leave + spirited away = abduction). Mere persuasion causing a teen to leave home, without taking/carrying away, is insufficient.
Slander framework:
- Actionable per se categories: (1) crime involving moral turpitude; (2) words that impeach in trade/business/profession; (3) loathsome disease. (Tallent v. Blake, 57 N.C. App. 249).
- If per quod (needs context) or outside per se categories → special damages required. (Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755; Stutts v. Duke Power, 47 N.C. App. 76).
- Repeal of former G.S. 99-4 (1975) removed “unchastity of a woman” as its own per se category.
- Repetition of a rumor as a rumor and as opinion does not assert fact and is typically not actionable per se.

Analysis

(1) Parent–child alienation / Abduction
The Court reiterates: NC does not recognize a stand-alone tort for alienation of a child’s affections. Historical cases allowing recovery involved seduction or abduction, where taking/carrying away occurred (e.g., mother “spirited child away” out of state; 16-year-old driven “by the back way” and whisked to SC for marriage). Jennie’s allegations show Derrick left home “with the aid of” Bruney’s criticisms of Jennie’s character and parenting, but no taking or carrying away by Bruney. Treating persuasion/criticism that leads a teen to leave as “abduction” would open tort liability anytime outside pressures influence a child’s choice to leave. Summary judgment proper.

(2) Slander

Rumor of premarital pregnancy: Ellen asked; Bruney said his wife heard a rumor at work that Jennie married because she was pregnant. Presented as a rumor, not as fact; thus no categorical slander per se as “crime of moral turpitude” (fornication) and no revived “unchastity” per se after repeal of G.S. 99-4.
Parenting/fitness insults while Jennie works at a nursery school: Terms like “unreasonable,” “immature,” “unintelligent,” “can’t raise a sixteen-year-old,” etc., are general character/competence insults. To be per se under the business/profession category, the words must touch the plaintiff in her business relation and be necessarily hurtful in that trade (e.g., specific dishonest or professional-ability accusations tied to the work). Here, the statements are not per se; Jennie offered no special damages (pecuniary loss). Therefore, directed verdict for Bruney was proper.

Conclusion

Alienation of a child’s affections: No cause of action in NC; abduction theory fails without allegations of taking/carrying away.
Slander: Plaintiff failed to prove statements actionable per se and offered no special damages; nonsuit proper.
Judgment affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

No “AOA of child” in NC. Unless you can plead seduction or abduction with taking/carrying away, claims framed as “alienation of a child’s affection” will be dismissed.
Abduction requires more than influence. Persuasion or criticism that convinces a teenager to leave home is not abduction without actual or constructive taking.
Mind-control/hypnosis allegations do not substitute for the taking element. You still need facts showing removal from the parent’s custody by the defendant.
Slander per se is narrow.
- Rumors repeated as rumors/opinions are often not actionable per se.
- Professional/occupation category requires statements directed at and necessarily harmful to the person in their work role—generic insults won’t do.
- With no per se category, you must prove special damages (pecuniary loss).
Unchastity per se is gone in NC (G.S. 99-4 repealed 1975). Don’t rely on it.
Litigation posture: On defense, move early for summary judgment on parent-child “alienation” and for Rule 50 on slander lacking per se words or special damages. On plaintiff side, reframe to viable torts (e.g., IIED, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with custody if supported by facts/statutes) and plead damages meticulously.

Darnell v. Rupplin, 91 N.C. App. 349, 371 S.E.2d 743 (1988)

Facts
Ann L. Darnell sued Vivian Rupplin for criminal conversation (CC) and alienation of affections (AOA) arising from Rupplin’s relationship with Ann’s husband, Daniel R. Darnell (a G.E. Information Services employee). Daniel and Rupplin met while assigned to G.E.’s Greensboro, NC office (Jan. 1984). Their relationship escalated to sexual intercourse in Winston-Salem, NC on April 4, 1984, with two additional NC sexual encounters between April 5–13, 1984.

After Daniel’s Greensboro stint ended, he returned to his family home in Virginia, but he and Rupplin kept contact via phone and mail, arranging meetings across four jurisdictions:

Virginia: 31 May 1984, 1 June 1984, and Aug. 1984 (meetings).
Washington, D.C.: July/Aug. 1984 (meeting).
Maryland: July, Oct., Nov., Dec. 1984 (meetings with sexual relations).
North Carolina: Multiple additional visits, including Dec. 27, 1984–Jan. 1, 1985 when Daniel stayed at Rupplin’s Winston-Salem home; later visits in Nov. 1985 and beyond with resumed sexual relations.

On Dec. 27, 1984, Daniel left Ann and the children, stayed with Rupplin in NC until Jan. 1, 1985, then relocated to Gaithersburg, Maryland. Through 1985–mid-1986, Daniel and Rupplin regularly traveled between NC and MD, engaging in sexual relations. In Aug. 1985, Daniel attempted a reconciliation with Ann in Virginia but left again in Sept. 1985 and soon after renewed the affair (including MD meetings and a Nov. 1985 NC visit with sex). In July 1986, Rupplin moved to Gaithersburg, MD where Daniel lived. The divorce between Ann and Daniel finalized in April 1987; Rupplin and Daniel remained together at trial.

Procedural posture: The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on criminal conversation, sent alienation of affections to the jury, and the jury awarded $50,000 compensatory (for CC + AOA) and $50,000 punitive. Defendant moved for JNOV/new trial on AOA and damages; motions denied. Defendant appealed.

Issues

In a multistate AOA case, where did the tort occur (i.e., where did the alienation injury happen) — and is that a jury question?
Given a general damages award covering both CC and AOA, must CC damages be retried if AOA is vacated?

Rules
AOA elements: (1) genuine love/affection between spouses; (2) alienation/destruction of that affection; (3) wrongful and malicious acts by defendant produced the alienation. Chappell v. Redding; Litchfield v. Cox.

Active conduct required: Liability arises only with active participation/encouragement that substantially induces the loss; mere passive receipt of affection is insufficient. (Lee, § 207; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 683 cmt. g).

Transitory tort & choice of law: AOA is transitory; substantive law is that of the state where the injury occurred (lex loci delicti). If that state does not recognize AOA, the claim cannot be tried in NC. Howle v. Express; Ingle v. Cassady; Charnock v. Taylor.

Jury trial right on material fact issues: Under Rule 38, issues of material fact arising from the pleadings and determinative of the parties’ rights are triable as of right by a jury.

AOA viability in NC: Despite other jurisdictions abolishing AOA, NC retains it; the Court of Appeals’ attempted abolition in Cannon v. Miller was reversed per curiam by the NC Supreme Court.

Analysis
The affair unfolded across NC, VA, MD, and D.C. Only North Carolina recognizes AOA. Defendant specifically pled that her acts occurred primarily outside NC, making where the injury occurred a material, disputed fact because it determines the substantive law (and thus viability) of AOA. Under Rule 38, with a general jury demand, defendant was entitled to have the state of injury decided by the jury. The Court acknowledges that alienation injury is nebulous and may result from one or successive acts, but that difficulty doesn’t justify withholding the issue from jurors. Failure to submit where the tort occurred to the jury was prejudicial error; AOA verdict vacated and remanded for jury determination of lex loci and retrial as needed.

The jury returned a single compensatory award covering both CC and AOA, plus a single punitive award. Because the AOA verdict is vacated, the appellate court cannot parse what portion of damages belonged solely to CC. Therefore, damages on CC must also be retried. (Liability on CC via summary judgment stands unaddressed; the remand is on damages due to intertwinement.)

Conclusion
AOA: Vacated & remanded — the place of injury (lex loci) is a jury question where disputed and material.
CC damages: Remanded for a new trial on damages because the original award commingled CC and AOA amounts.
Other assignments of error: Not addressed as unlikely to recur.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Choice of law can be case-dispositive in alienation of affections. When conduct spans states, the jury must decide where the alienation injury occurred. If the jury finds the injury in a non-AOA state (e.g., VA/MD/D.C.), the claim fails even in an NC forum.
Plead & prove lex loci. Plaintiffs should marshal evidence tying the loss of affection to North Carolina (e.g., turning-point acts, moves, separations, counseling failures in NC). Defendants should highlight out-of-state acts and timing of alienation.
AOA requires active wrongdoing. Build or attack the record on affirmative conduct that substantially induced alienation, not mere mutual attraction.
Damages strategy: Avoid general lump-sum awards that mix CC and AOA; request separate verdict lines (compensatory & punitive by claim) to protect CC if AOA is later disturbed.
Trial management: Where lex loci is disputed, request a special interrogatory: “In which state did plaintiff’s injury (alienation of affections) occur?” followed by contingent verdict questions and claim-specific damages.
The biggest lesson from Darnell v. Rupplin is that in multistate alienation of affection cases, the jury must decide where the tortious injury actually occurred because the place of injury (lex loci delicti) controls which state’s substantive law applies.
Since only a handful of states (like North Carolina) recognize alienation of affection, if the jury finds that the injury arose in a state that does not recognize the tort (e.g., Virginia, Maryland, D.C.), the claim fails outright.
Takeaway: Alienation of affection is uniquely vulnerable to choice-of-law attacks. Plaintiffs must frame the decisive alienation acts as happening in North Carolina, while defendants should highlight out-of-state conduct to cut off liability.

Gunn v. Hess, 90 N.C. App. 131, 367 S.E.2d 399 (1988)

Facts
Debra Anne Gunn sued Lora L. Hess for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with her husband, Robert J. Gunn, Jr. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant filed a verified answer on May 13, 1987, generally denying the allegations.

Plaintiff then served 21 interrogatories. Several questions sought details of sexual activity between defendant and Robert Gunn, including:

Interrogatory 14: State the date and location of the first instance of sexual intercourse between you and Robert J. Gunn, Jr.
Interrogatory 15: State the date and location of each instance of sexual intercourse between you and Robert J. Gunn, Jr.

Defendant objected, asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because adultery and fornication are misdemeanors under N.C.G.S. § 14-184. Plaintiff moved to compel. The trial court ordered defendant to answer. Defendant appealed.

Issue
Did defendant waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by filing a verified answer of general denial, thereby requiring her to answer interrogatories about sexual conduct?

Rule

The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination in civil as well as criminal cases whenever answers might subject a party to criminal liability. Johnston County Nat’l Bank v. Grainger.
Waiver of the privilege must be express or specific; mere participation in litigation or filing an answer does not automatically waive it. Golding v. Taylor.
Fornication and adultery remain criminal acts in North Carolina (§ 14-184). Questions asking directly about sexual conduct with a married person are inherently incriminating.

Analysis
The Court of Appeals noted this was a first impression issue in North Carolina. Other jurisdictions (e.g., Schermerhorn v. Contardi [Wash. App.], Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding [N.Y.]) held that filing a verified denial does not waive the right to assert the privilege.

Here, interrogatories 14 and 15 directly sought admissions of conduct that would constitute adultery/fornication, crimes under NC law. Defendant had the right to refuse. Moreover, punitive damages were also sought, so her answers could expose her to greater liability.

The Court rejected plaintiff’s waiver argument, holding that a verified answer is not a waiver. Since interrogatories showed on their face why answers would be incriminating, compelling responses was error.

Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the trial court’s order compelling defendant to answer interrogatories about sexual intercourse with plaintiff’s husband. Defendant properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

In NC, defendants in AOA/CC cases can invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid answering discovery questions about sexual conduct, since adultery and fornication remain criminal misdemeanors.
Filing a verified answer does not waive the privilege. Waiver must be clear and specific.
For plaintiffs, this means direct discovery into sexual acts may be blocked; they must rely more heavily on circumstantial evidence (opportunity and inclination) to prove criminal conversation.
For defendants, this case provides a powerful shield in discovery — strategic invocation of the privilege can prevent damaging admissions while avoiding criminal exposure.

Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724, 381 S.E.2d 472 (1989)

Facts
William L. Gray sued Wallace Neil Hoover for alienation of affections and criminal conversation with his wife. At trial, Gray was the only witness. The court directed a verdict against him on AOA and, despite a jury verdict in his favor for CC ($30,000 compensatory, $10,000 punitive), the court granted JNOV for the defendant. Gray appealed.

Gray testified he and his wife had a “wonderful marriage,” having built a new home and managed farming together. After Hoover began working with Gray’s wife, her behavior changed: she grew cold, refused a trip to Europe, rejected going anywhere with him, and said she loved Hoover instead.

Gray also described Hoover’s conduct: telling Gray’s wife to “take her part and run,” sending her gifts and notes, frequent late-night calls, and being found twice physically clinging to her. Hoover admitted in a phone call he was having sex with Gray’s wife. Gray and a private investigator observed Hoover and the wife cohabiting in Florida. Hoover even kissed her and fondled her blouse in front of Gray, boasting he would take Gray’s business.

Issue
Did Gray offer sufficient evidence to withstand (1) a directed verdict on alienation of affections, and (2) JNOV on criminal conversation?

Rule

Alienation of affections: Plaintiff must show (1) a genuine, loving marriage; (2) alienation and destruction of affection; and (3) defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts produced the alienation (Chappell v. Redding). Malice means unjustifiable conduct causing the injury.
Criminal conversation: Requires (1) a valid marriage, and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during the marriage. Direct proof not required; circumstantial evidence and admissions suffice. (Warner v. Torrence).
Damages: May include loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, and punitive damages for willful, aggravated, or wanton conduct (Sebastian v. Kluttz).

Analysis
Gray presented at least a scintilla of evidence on all three elements of AOA: he and his wife shared a loving marriage, her affections were destroyed after involvement with Hoover, and Hoover’s wrongful acts (gifts, calls, romantic advances, encouragement to leave husband) actively contributed. The directed verdict was improper.

On CC, multiple pieces of evidence supported intercourse: Gray twice caught Hoover with his wife; they were seen living together in Florida; Hoover admitted in a call he was having sex with her; neither Hoover nor the wife testified to deny it. Under Warner v. Torrence, silence in the face of adultery allegations can be treated as tacit admission. Evidence also showed damages: loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, and intentional public displays of intimacy. Hoover’s boastful calls and public fondling demonstrated malice, justifying punitive damages.

Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed:

Alienation of affections: Sufficient evidence; remanded for trial.
Criminal conversation: Jury verdict reinstated ($30,000 compensatory, $10,000 punitive).
In retrial on AOA, any damages must be offset by the CC award to avoid double recovery.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Even marginal evidence of a happy marriage can satisfy the first AOA element if taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Defendant’s words, gifts, and presence with a spouse may suffice as “malicious acts.”
Direct proof of sex is unnecessary; admissions, cohabitation, and circumstantial evidence can sustain criminal conversation.
Silence by the accused lover at trial can strengthen the inference of guilt.
Damages in CC/AOA extend beyond economics to emotional and relational harm, and egregious public acts can support punitive damages.

Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739, 407 S.E.2d 264 (1991)

Facts
Plaintiff Maneola Jennings sued defendant Heloisa Jessen for alienation of affections. After Jessen repeatedly failed to comply with discovery (no-shows for deposition despite orders), the court struck her answer and entered default under Rules 37(b)(2), 37(d), then held Rule 55(b)(2) hearings (which Jessen also skipped) and awarded $200,000 compensatory and $300,000 punitive. A prior appeal resulted in a Supreme Court per curiam remand for “new findings, new conclusions, and a new order.” On remand, without reopening the evidence, the trial judge made additional findings and reinstated the same awards. Jessen appealed again.

Issue
Whether the trial court (1) had to reopen evidence on remand; (2) properly awarded $200k compensatory; (3) properly awarded $300k punitive; and (4) abused discretion in qualifying plaintiff’s damages expert.

Rule

Discovery sanctions / default: Trial courts have broad discretion to strike pleadings and enter default for discovery abuses; may bar the offending party from offering evidence. Rule 37(b)(2)(b), (c).
Alienation of affections damages: Compensatory includes present value of support, consortium, health, feelings, reputation, but plaintiff must prove loss of support and its value. Sebastian v. Kluttz.
Punitive damages (for AOA): Allowed where conduct is willful, aggravated, malicious, or wanton. Powell v. Strickland. Nominal damages suffice to support punitive once the cause of action is established. Hawkins v. Hawkins.
Experts: Qualification turns on whether testimony will help the trier of fact; wide trial-court discretion (Rule 702).

Analysis

No reopening required: Given the default for discovery abuse, the judge could refuse new evidence on remand and proceed to new findings/conclusions on the existing record. Doing otherwise would gut Rule 37.
Compensatory vacated: Plaintiff’s affidavit detailed expenses/income, but did not show any income/support actually lost due to defendant’s conduct. Without proof of value of lost support, the $200k award lacked evidentiary support.
Punitive affirmed: Findings showed sexual intercourse, cohabitation (weeks in the marital condo), international/domestic travel together, and brazen calls to plaintiff’s home seeking the husband — ample aggravating, willful, malicious conduct. Because default established liability, plaintiff was at least entitled to nominal damages, which can support punitive damages even when compensatory is vacated.
Expert upheld: The finance professional’s 35 years’ experience and consulting background were enough; his role was to present-value figures provided — helpful to the court. No abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

Punitive damages ($300,000): Affirmed.
Compensatory damages ($200,000): Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Denial to reopen evidence & expert qualification: Affirmed.
Dissent (Greene, J.): Would also vacate punitive damages, reasoning punitive and compensatory are interrelated and should be reassessed together.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Discovery abuse can cost you your defense. A Rule 37 default can bar you from presenting evidence later — even after a Supreme Court remand.
Prove the dollars. In AOA, you must show actual loss of support and its value to sustain compensatory damages.
Punitive can stand on nominal. Once liability is established (e.g., by default), punitive damages may be affirmed even if compensatory is vacated.
Aggravation matters. Sex, cohabitation, and audacious conduct (e.g., calling the spouse’s home) can justify substantial punitive awards.
Experts need to help, not be perfect. Practical finance experience that helps quantify loss can meet Rule 702.

Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C. App. 513, 400 S.E.2d 101 (1991)

Facts
Plaintiff Ernest A. Shaw married a woman previously married to defendant Preston E. Stringer (they had three children together). After Stringer abandoned her (1983), he later introduced her to Shaw, who married her in June 1985. The couple lived in her house with the three children; Shaw helped support and care for them. Stringer frequently visited—sometimes to see the children, sometimes socially—and eventually began sexual intercourse with Shaw’s wife inside the marital home. After Shaw discovered the affair, he had his wife tell Stringer to stop; Stringer persisted in visiting and continuing the affair until Shaw separated. At trial the jury answered “Yes” to liability on alienation of affections and criminal conversation; awarded $0 compensatory on AOA, $125,000 compensatory on CC, and $50,000 punitive “for criminal conversation and/or alienation of affections.” Judgment was entered on the verdict.

Issues
Whether the court erred by (1) submitting AOA to the jury; (2) admitting evidence about Stringer’s failure to support his children and Shaw’s positive relationship/support; (3) submitting punitive damages and instructing on them (including applicability to CC and need for actual damages per claim); and (4) entering judgment on a verdict allegedly contradictory because punitive might relate to AOA with no compensatories there.

Rules
AOA submission standard: Plaintiff need show only that before defendant’s wrongful interference, the spouse had some genuine love and affection for plaintiff, and that defendant’s wrongdoing caused its loss; marriage need not be idyllic, and spouse may have affection for others.
Relevance: Evidence tending to show spouse’s affection for plaintiff (including how he treated and supported her children) is admissible.
Punitive damages: Available in AOA/CC upon willful, malicious, aggravated conduct; objections to instructions must be timely and specific (Rule 10(b)(2)).
Verdict integrity: Where punitive is framed as “for CC and/or AOA,” and AOA compensatories are zero, the verdict is not facially contradictory if punitive can be attributed to CC.

Analysis
AOA: Testimony showed the wife loved both men “in different ways,” and both spouses testified to genuine mutual affection before Stringer’s interference; whether she had affection for Shaw was for the jury, not the court. Submitting AOA was proper (and any error would be harmless given $0 compensatories).
Child-support/relationship evidence: Properly admitted as it bore directly on whether the wife had love and affection for Shaw (she testified she loved him “for all the things he was to the children”).
Punitive damages: Evidence of willful/aggravated conduct—continuing visits and sexual relations after being told to stop, and laughing when told Shaw knew—supported submission and instruction on punitive damages. Defendant’s additional complaints (pretrial order scope; instruction that punitive requires actual damages per claim) were not preserved by specific, timely objections and are unavailing.
Verdict consistency: Not contradictory. Record does not show that punitive were awarded for AOA; it is at least as likely all $50,000 punitive were for CC, which had $125,000 compensatories.

Conclusion
No error: AOA properly went to the jury; evidentiary rulings were correct; punitive submission/instruction stands; objections not preserved; verdict/judgment affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA threshold is low: Plaintiff need only show some genuine spousal affection pre-interference and loss due to defendant’s wrongdoing; perfection isn’t required.
Family-context proof matters: Evidence of the plaintiff’s positive role with stepchildren can help prove the spouse’s affection.
Punitive survives on egregious conduct: Persisting in the affair after being told to stop supports malice/willfulness.
Protect the record: Specific, timely objections to jury instructions are essential; without them, appellate arguments waive out.
Mixed-claim verdicts: Punitive tied to “CC and/or AOA” isn’t inherently inconsistent where CC carries compensatories and AOA does not.

Peake v. Shirley, 109 N.C. App. 591, 427 S.E.2d 885 (1993)

Facts
Plaintiff Susan G. Peake married Dr. Dean Peake in 1967. They lived together until Feb. 18, 1989, when Dr. Peake left; divorce was granted in April 1990. Plaintiff testified their marriage had been happy and affectionate: vacations, football trips, beach outings, and a regular sex life.

In summer 1988, she noticed changes: her husband left the office at lunch, stayed out at night, and drank at defendant Beverly Shirley’s father’s house. She observed suspicious conduct — Dr. Peake and Shirley left hospital visits together; Shirley appeared at plaintiff’s home when she was supposed to be away; Shirley knew the layout of the home despite never being invited; and plaintiff caught her husband and Shirley spending extended time together.

On May 4, 1989, a private investigator observed Dr. Peake and Shirley meet at a Red Roof Inn, remain in a room for over four hours, and later embrace and kiss in the parking lot. Plaintiff confronted Shirley, who said: “Please forgive me. I am so sorry I have done this to you.”

Defendant presented evidence of long-standing marital troubles: disputes about discipline, plaintiff’s friendship with another man, and Dr. Peake’s alleged alcohol abuse.

A jury awarded plaintiff $5,000 for alienation of affections. Defendant appealed, arguing for directed verdict/JNOV.

Issue
Whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of genuine love and affection and wrongful acts by defendant to sustain a claim for alienation of affections.

Rule

To withstand directed verdict on AOA, plaintiff must show:
(1) genuine love and affection between spouses;
(2) that affection was destroyed;
(3) wrongful and malicious acts of defendant caused the loss (Shaw v. Stringer; Gray v. Hoover).
Liability requires active participation or encouragement; merely being the object of affection is insufficient (Darnell v. Rupplin).

Analysis
Plaintiff testified she and her husband shared a loving marriage. Defendant countered with evidence of dysfunction, but that merely created a factual issue for the jury. Affection need not be perfect — only “some genuine love and affection” pre-interference.

Evidence of alienation was undisputed. The key was causation. Plaintiff offered direct evidence of defendant’s active participation: visiting when she knew plaintiff was absent, spending hours with Dr. Peake in a motel, and admitting wrongdoing afterward. Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a jury could reasonably find Shirley’s conduct produced the alienation.

Conclusion
The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence supported all elements of AOA. The trial court properly denied motions for directed verdict and JNOV. No error.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Affection need not be perfect: Plaintiff need only show genuine affection existed pre-interference, not a flawless marriage.
Conflicting marital evidence is for the jury: Allegations of drinking or disputes do not bar AOA claims if some affection is shown.
Active wrongdoing is critical: Visiting in secret, arranging motel meetings, and admitting fault demonstrated active participation in alienating affection.
Admissions matter: Defendant’s apology reinforced causation.
Even small verdicts confirm the tort’s viability — juries may award damages even when compensatory harm appears modest.

Sharp v. Teague, 113 N.C. App. 589, 439 S.E.2d 792 (1993)

Facts
Plaintiff Linda R. Sharp retained attorney D. Keith Teague and his P.A. (June 22, 1984) to handle all domestic matters from her separation/divorce, including potential alienation of affection claims, alimony, ED, custody, fees, and protections under Chapter 50. Teague withdrew of record July 3, 1989; plaintiff hired new counsel in 1989.
Plaintiff sued (June 1992) for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging: failure to file AOA; failure to warn of AOA limitations; bad advice leading to a Nov. 7, 1984 consent decree waiving alimony/inheritance rights and awarding fees; waiver of discovery (June 2, 1988 decree) enabling suppression of evidence; failure to prevent dissipation of assets; and fee irregularities. The trial court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

Issue
Whether plaintiff’s claims survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion given statutes of limitations/repose for legal malpractice and the sufficiency/particularity of alleged fraud/constructive fraud.

Rule
Malpractice timing (N.C.G.S. § 1-15(c)): three-year limitations and four-year repose, both measured from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim; discovery extension possible but never beyond four years (unless injury discovered within two years, then one-year discovery period, floor of three years).
“Continuous representation” doctrine: Open question in NC; if recognized, accrues at earlier of (a) cessation of professional service as to the matter at issue, or (b) when client knew/should have known of negligence. Allegations must show continued representation on the same matter—withdrawal of record ≠ per se end date.
AOA limitations: underlying AOA tort has three-year limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5)); accrues at loss of affection.
Fraud pleading: Must be pled with particularity (Rule 9(b)); constructive fraud requires facts showing breach of fiduciary duty with specificity; conclusory labels are treated as negligence.

Analysis
Plaintiff framed multiple grievances as negligence/contract “malpractice” tied to discrete dates (e.g., 11/7/84 consent decree; 6/2/88 discovery waiver). Even assuming some injuries were “not readily apparent,” the four-year repose bars claims filed June 1992 for acts in 1984 and pre-June 1988; acts 6/8/88–12/13/88 also fail because new counsel in 1989 meant the negligence should have been discovered within two years—thus the three-year limitation applies and expired by Dec. 14, 1991.
Failure to file AOA: if the AOA accrued before June 22, 1984, its three-year limit required filing by June 23, 1987; any malpractice for not filing was likewise out of time under § 1-15(c) (no filing by June 23, 1991).
“Continuous representation”: Even assuming NC recognizes it, the complaint does not allege continued representation on the domestic matters at issue through 7/3/89; it merely states the withdrawal date. Because attorney-client relations can end before withdrawal of record, the doctrine does not save the claims on these pleadings.
Fraud/constructive fraud: The complaint recites reliance on “misrepresentation, misinformation, erroneous advice” without who/what/when/where/how particulars; constructive-fraud allegations collapse into negligence. Under Rule 9(b), both counts were properly dismissed.

Conclusion
All malpractice-type claims (negligence/contract) are time-barred under § 1-15(c); the complaint fails to plead facts necessary to invoke continuous representation; fraud/constructive fraud are insufficiently particular and reduce to negligence. Dismissal affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Date it or lose it: For legal malpractice in NC, track the last negligent act—§ 1-15(c)’s four-year repose is unforgiving.
Continuous representation isn’t automatic: You must plead ongoing representation on the same matter, not just a later withdrawal date.
Plead fraud like you mean it: Conclusory “bad advice” ≠ fraud; Rule 9(b) demands specifics.
Bundle claims wisely: Re-labeling malpractice as “contract” or “fiduciary breach” won’t escape § 1-15(c) if the gravamen is professional services.
AOA interplay: When alleging malpractice for failing to file AOA, remember AOA’s own 3-year clock—if that lapsed, malpractice timing likely has too.

Coachman v. Gould, 122 N.C. App. 443, 470 S.E.2d 560 (1996)

Facts
Joseph T. Coachman married Annie Jean in Oct. 1988; they separated Aug. 1991 and divorced Mar. 1993. Coachman suspected an affair with Willie Gould after overhearing many evening phone calls (15–45 minutes) to the marital home. Gould said calls were business-related (janitorial contracts between his company and Annie Jean’s). In May 1990, Coachman told Gould to stop calling; Gould allegedly continued unless Annie Jean asked him to stop. Coachman observed one daytime instance of Annie Jean leaving with Gould in a car but could not provide details. Annie Jean once said she had not “been with” Gould in six or seven months while in a “medicated stupor”; Coachman took that to mean prior sex. Gould admitted a prior intimate relationship with Annie Jean that ended by 1987/88 (pre-marriage or at most overlapping early 1988). Coachman sued in 1993.

Issues
Whether plaintiff forecast sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on (1) criminal conversation (sexual intercourse during the marriage) and (2) alienation of affections (malicious/wrongful acts causing loss of spousal affection).

Rule
Criminal conversation: must prove (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during the marriage; circumstantial proof must rise above mere conjecture and typically uses the opportunity + inclination doctrine.
Alienation of affections: must show (1) genuine love/affection, (2) its destruction, and (3) wrongful, malicious acts by defendant producing the loss; “malicious” = unjustifiable conduct.
Limitations: AOA/CC subject to three-year statute (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5)); pre-1988 conduct was time-barred for this 1993 suit.

Analysis
Criminal conversation: No direct proof of intercourse; circumstantial proof (frequent calls, one car ride, ambiguous “been with” remark while sedated) did not establish opportunity in the Trogdon sense (e.g., cohabitation, overnights, secluded stays). Without credible opportunity + inclination, evidence was mere conjecture; summary judgment proper.
Alienation of affections: The only potentially “wrongful” conduct was phone calls. Given the acknowledged business relationship, plaintiff had to rebut business purposes and show unjustifiable intent. He did not. Calls were not shown to be harassing, salacious, or scheming. Even ignoring plaintiff’s request to stop calling did not elevate them to malicious conduct. With no actionable wrongdoing, AOA failed as a matter of law.
Time-bar: Gould’s admitted prior affair (ending by 1987/88) could not support liability—outside the three-year window relative to the 1993 filing and (largely) pre-marital.

Conclusion
Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence beyond conjecture for intercourse (CC) and failed to show malicious acts (AOA). Summary judgment affirmed on both claims.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Phone calls ≠ malice without proof they were unjustified or aimed at breaking up the marriage.
Opportunity matters: CC usually needs concrete opportunity + inclination; vague interactions won’t do.
Old affairs don’t count: Time-barred and/or pre-marital conduct is legally irrelevant to current AOA/CC claims.
For plaintiffs, assemble specifics (times/places/overnights, admissions, surveillance). For defendants, show legitimate purposes and attack opportunity and malice.

Brown v. Hurley, 124 N.C. App. 377, 477 S.E.2d 234 (1996)

Facts
Charles Allen Brown married Deborah Brown in 1985. She left the marital residence in June 1992 but continued an affectionate post-separation relationship with Charles (monthly “anniversary” cards, dinners, beach trips). On 8 Oct. 1992 she presented a separation agreement (later executed 28 Jan. 1993, effective 27 Jun. 1992). Brown discovered Michael Hurley (a co-worker) at Deborah’s apartment on 23 Oct. 1992. Brown sued Hurley for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC). Hurley admitted a sexual relationship beginning after the separation. Before trial, the court granted a motion in limine excluding post-separation evidence; Brown then lacked pre-separation proof, and a directed verdict issued for Hurley. Hurley sought Rule 11 sanctions; the trial court denied them, finding Brown’s pleadings well-grounded in law and fact and not improper. Hurley appealed the denial of sanctions.

Issues
Whether the trial court erred in finding Brown’s AOA and CC pleadings were (1) well-grounded in law, (2) well-grounded in fact, and (3) not interposed for an improper purpose under Rule 11.

Rule
Rule 11 requires pleadings be warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument to extend it, factually supported after reasonable inquiry, and not filed for an improper purpose. CC elements: a valid marriage and sexual intercourse during coverture; separation does not bar CC for post-separation acts prior to divorce (Bryant v. Carrier). AOA elements: genuine marital affection, its loss, and defendant’s wrongful/malicious acts; a separation does not automatically negate genuine affection (Shaw v. Stringer; Cannon/Miller line).

Analysis
Legal grounding: CC was facially plausible: marriage existed and Brown alleged intercourse during coverture even if post-separation (per Bryant). AOA was facially plausible: evidence supported ongoing affection after separation and deterioration shortly after involvement with Hurley; separation alone doesn’t defeat the claim. The separation agreement’s “effective date” did not conclusively bar reliance on later conduct, especially where Brown preserved AOA/CC claims and conduct didn’t show the parties treated the agreement as effective before signing.
Factual grounding: Brown personally observed Hurley overnighting at Deborah’s apartment, kissing her, and traveling with her; he hired a private investigator who documented and photographed similar conduct. That inquiry was reasonable and supplied a factual basis.
Improper purpose: Record showed routine litigation steps—depositions of Hurley and Deborah, subpoenas for phone/credit/hotel records, requests for admissions, motions to compel, and PI work—consistent with vindicating rights, not harassment.

Conclusion
The trial court properly denied Rule 11 sanctions: Brown’s CC/AOA pleadings were legally plausible, factually supported after reasonable inquiry, and not filed for an improper purpose. Affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

CC survives separation: Intercourse after separation but before divorce can support CC.
AOA can persist despite separation: Continued affection post-separation keeps AOA viable if defendant’s later conduct causes the final rupture.
Rule 11 is objective: Plausible legal theory + documented factual inquiry + standard discovery = no sanctions, even if plaintiff later loses on evidentiary rulings.
Preserve claims in agreements: Express reservation language can blunt “effective date” arguments against tort claims.

Horner v. Byrnett, 132 N.C. App. 323; 511 S.E.2d 342 (1999)

Facts
Plaintiff Robert Douthart (now by executrix Karen Horner) sued Jeffrey W. Byrnett for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Defendant admitted an adulterous affair with plaintiff’s wife from August 1992 to June 1993 (brief break Nov–Dec 1992) while the marriage was ongoing. Before becoming intimate, defendant and the wife met several times and discussed the harm their sexual relationship would cause, but proceeded anyway. Partial summary judgment entered for plaintiff on criminal conversation; alienation and damages issues went to a jury, which awarded $1 compensatory on each tort and $85,000 punitive on criminal conversation. Defendant moved for JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial on punitive damages; both were denied.

Issues
Whether punitive damages could be submitted and sustained on criminal conversation based on the evidence, and whether $85,000 punitive on $1 compensatory required a new trial as excessive or lacking a rational relationship.

Rule
Punitive damages punish willful, aggravated, malicious, or wanton conduct. Historically in NC, the same sexual misconduct establishing criminal conversation can support punitive damages (Johnston v. Allen; Powell v. Strickland). Nominal damages may support punitive damages once the tort is established (Hawkins v. Hawkins), and a large punitive award relative to compensatory, standing alone, does not mandate a new trial. JNOV standard: deny if more than a scintilla supports each element for the nonmovant.

Analysis
Evidence was undisputed that defendant had sexual intercourse with plaintiff’s wife during the marriage; the pair deliberated about the harm beforehand but willfully proceeded. That proof sufficed to submit punitive damages with criminal conversation under long-standing precedent; Gray and Shaw did not abrogate those authorities—they merely identified additional aggravating conduct in those records. On excessiveness, the jury’s $1 compensatory satisfied Hawkins’s threshold for punitive damages; assessing the punitive amount lies within the jury’s discretion and need not track compensatory dollars. No abuse of discretion occurred in denying a new trial.

Conclusion
The trial court properly denied JNOV and a new trial. Punitive damages were supported by the same conduct establishing criminal conversation, and the $85,000 punitive award on $1 compensatory stands. No error.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Adultery proved = punitive in play: In NC, proof of criminal conversation generally suffices to reach the jury on punitive damages.
Deliberate wrongdoing aggravates: Contemporaneous awareness of harm and proceeding anyway strengthens punitive exposure.
Nominal supports punitive: A $1 compensatory award is enough to uphold substantial punitive damages.
JNOV bar is low for plaintiff: More than a scintilla on each element defeats JNOV; punitive sizing rests largely with the jury.

Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 514 S.E.2d 554 (1999)

Facts
Dorothy Hutelmyer married Joseph Hutelmyer in 1978; they had three children and, through the early 1990s, what she described as a “fairy tale marriage” (family travel, joint church/community work, active intimacy; romantic poems and gifts from Joseph). Defendant Margie Cox began working as Joseph’s secretary in 1986. After Cox separated from her husband (1992), coworkers observed marked changes: flirtatious conduct, late nights alone with Joseph, dining alone, coordinated arrivals, and new business trips together. Beginning in 1993, neighbors and coworkers frequently saw Joseph’s car at Cox’s home overnight and “at all hours.” The pair publicly displayed familiarity at work (hand-holding, straightening ties, close physical proximity, sharing ice from his drink). Dorothy testified Joseph’s interest in marital intimacy declined from 1992, ceased by 1994; he spent less time with the family and stopped taking her on trips (claiming policy changes). Cox admitted a sexual relationship with Joseph beginning in 1994 and continuing during the marriage. Joseph gave Cox an engagement ring on Jan. 1, 1996, left the marital home Jan. 5, 1996, moved in with Cox; he later married Cox (May 1997). A jury found Cox liable for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC); awarded $500,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive. Post-trial motions (JNOV, new trial, remittitur) were denied.

Issues
Whether evidence was sufficient to submit AOA to the jury; whether punitive damages were properly submitted and sustained for AOA and CC; whether $500,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive were supported; and whether AOA/CC should be abolished.

Rule
AOA requires: (1) genuine love/affection; (2) its alienation/destruction; (3) wrongful, malicious acts by defendant that were the controlling/effective cause (active participation required; perfection not required). Punitive damages: available for willful, aggravated, malicious, or wanton conduct; for CC, proof of intercourse during marriage is generally sufficient to send punitive to the jury, and aggravating circumstances further support it. Damages for AOA/CC include loss of support/consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, injury to health, and related pecuniary losses. Under Chapter 1D, punitive amounts consider factors in §1D-35 and are capped at 3× compensatory or $250k, whichever is greater (§1D-25(b)). The Court of Appeals cannot overrule Cannon v. Miller retaining AOA/CC.

Analysis
Evidence, viewed favorably to Dorothy, showed a loving marriage pre-1993, followed by Cox’s active participation: conspicuous workplace intimacy, frequent overnights, travel, and persistent access to Joseph despite foreseeable harm to wife/children. That evidence supplied more than a scintilla on each AOA element and supported denial of directed verdict/JNOV. For punitive (AOA), additional aggravation existed beyond the acts establishing liability (public flaunting of intimacy, welcoming overnights “at all hours,” travel together, a Thanksgiving call to locate him), warranting submission. For punitive (CC), conclusive proof of sexual intercourse during the marriage, plus aggravation, overwhelmingly supported the award, consistent with Horner v. Byrnett. On compensatory, the record showed both pecuniary losses (income, life insurance, pension benefits) and substantial non-economic harm (loss of consortium, mental anguish, humiliation, health impacts), supporting $500,000. On punitive, the jury’s $500,000 (well below the $1.5M maximum—3× compensatory) reflected factors in §1D-35; no abuse of discretion. Abolition arguments are foreclosed at the intermediate appellate level.

Conclusion
Verdict and judgments affirmed: AOA and CC properly submitted; $500,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive sustained; requests to abolish AOA/CC rejected as beyond the Court of Appeals’ authority.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Active participation matters: overt workplace displays, overnights, and travel can prove the “malicious acts” and causation for AOA.
Punitive on CC is readily available once intercourse during marriage is proved; added aggravation only strengthens the case.
Big numbers can stand: robust evidence of pecuniary and emotional harm supports large compensatories; punitive need only fit Chapter 1D’s factors and cap.
Appellate posture: NC Court of Appeals applies, not abolishes, AOA/CC—Cannon controls.
Practice tip: To preserve punitive on AOA, develop aggravating circumstances beyond the baseline affair (public flaunting, intrusion into the marital sphere, duration, awareness of harm).

Mercier v. Daniels, 139 N.C. App. 588; 533 S.E.2d 877 (2000)

Facts
William and Nancy Mercier married (1969), separated (1992), reconciled (1994), and lived together until 29 Dec 1997. They ran Auto Specialists in Wilmington and added a U-Haul dealership in 1997. Gilbert W. Daniels, a U-Haul area field manager supervising ~30 dealers, helped them with onboarding and operations; the relationship turned friendly. After a marital argument (29 Dec 1997), Nancy left; she soon moved in with Daniels (permanently after early Jan 1998). William sued Daniels for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation, and sued U-Haul on a vicarious-liability theory for AOA. The trial court granted summary judgment to U-Haul; case against Daniels proceeded to verdict (no appeal from that).

Issue
Whether U-Haul could be held liable for AOA based on (1) scope-of-employment/respondeat superior or (2) ratification of Daniels’s conduct.

Rule
A principal is liable for an agent’s torts when: (1) expressly authorized; (2) committed within scope of employment and in furtherance of the principal’s business; or (3) ratified with knowledge of all material facts and intent to adopt the act. Acts pursuing an employee’s personal, lascivious purpose are outside scope. Ratification requires proof of the principal’s knowledge and affirmation (words or conduct).

Analysis
Scope of employment: Daniels’s romantic involvement with Mrs. Mercier was a personal deviation, not in furtherance of U-Haul’s business. Even though his job required frequent dealer contact and goodwill, courting a dealer’s spouse is not accomplishing company duties. North Carolina harassment cases analogize: on-duty sexual advances are outside scope; likewise here.
Ratification: The complaint did not allege facts showing U-Haul’s knowledge/intention to ratify, and the summary-judgment record forecast no evidence of either. Plaintiff’s affidavit mentioned “U-Haul business” meals or trips, a dog-sitting anecdote, and dealership finances, but nothing showing U-Haul knew of the affair pre-January 1998 or affirmed it. U-Haul’s VP denied knowledge; plaintiff offered no rebuttal evidence.

Conclusion
Because Daniels’s conduct was outside the scope and there was no evidence of ratification, an essential element of employer liability was missing. Summary judgment for U-Haul affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Personal affairs ≠ company business: Romantic conduct by an employee is a deviation from scope unless uniquely tied to duties (rare).
Ratification demands proof: You must show the employer knew the material facts and intended to adopt the conduct; “business context” alone is insufficient.
Plead and prove the employer link: Conclusory scope/ratification labels won’t survive Rule 56 without concrete facts showing furtherance or knowledge + affirmation.
Strategy: In AOA/CC suits targeting employers, develop emails, reports, complaints, HR knowledge, or directives—otherwise the claim will likely fail at summary judgment.

Ward v. Beaton, 141 N.C. App. 44; 539 S.E.2d 30 (2000)

Facts
Patricia Ward sued Kristen Beaton for alienation of affections (AOA), criminal conversation (CC), and IIED. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the court directed a verdict for defendant on CC and IIED, but sent AOA to the jury. Evidence (viewed for plaintiff) showed Patricia and her husband had what she called a “perfect marriage” before early 1998; after meeting Beaton through police responses to domestic calls, the husband began missing meals, spending increasing time with Beaton, receiving invitations to her home (including at work), and ultimately moved into Beaton’s home on 4 July 1998 for about two weeks. A sexual relationship developed. Jury verdict: AOA liability with $52,000 compensatory and $43,000 punitive. Post-trial: JNOV/new trial denied. Defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion alleging “fraud” based on a same-day bed-and-board consent order (filed when the AOA suit was filed) was denied.

Issues
Whether evidence supported sending AOA to the jury; whether punitive damages on AOA were properly pleaded and supported; whether the punitive instructions were proper; whether admitting defendant’s asset evidence before compensatory liability was determined was error without bifurcation; whether Rule 60(b) “fraud” relief should have been granted; and whether an unobjected-to future-damages instruction was reviewable.

Rule
AOA requires (1) marriage with love/affection; (2) alienation/destruction; (3) defendant’s wrongful, malicious acts as a controlling/effective cause. Defendant need not “lure” or initiate—being a willing participant who creates occasions suffices, and conduct need not be the sole cause. Fraud is an affirmative defense and must be specially pleaded (Rule 8(c)) or tried by consent; otherwise waived. Punitive pleading must specifically state the demand and aver the aggravating factor(s) (Rule 9(k)); aggravation for AOA requires circumstances beyond baseline malice (e.g., sexual relations, public flaunting, intrusion into the marital sphere). Pattern punitive instructions consistent with Chapter 1D are proper. Evidence of a defendant’s net worth is relevant to punitive amount (§1D-35(i)), but exclusion until after compensatory liability/amount requires a defense motion to bifurcate (§1D-30). Unobjected jury-instruction issues are waived (App. R. 10(b)(2)).

Analysis
Evidence supported each AOA element: plaintiff’s testimony of a loving marriage; a marked shift in husband’s behavior contemporaneous with Beaton’s involvement; and Beaton’s active participation (frequent invitations, contacting him at work, appearing at the station intoxicated and insisting on a ride, husband moving into her home with ensuing sexual relationship). “Luring” isn’t required; Beaton’s conduct needed only to be an effective cause despite any preexisting strain. Rule 60(b) “fraud” was not preserved—never pleaded as an affirmative defense nor tried by consent; raising it post-verdict cannot revive it. Punitive demand complied with Rule 9(k) by pleading malice and willful/wanton; proof was sufficient: evidence of sexual relations at least twice plus aggravating circumstances (accompanying husband when returning children to plaintiff, appearing unannounced at plaintiff’s door seeking “friendship,” horn-honking in the driveway during visitation) warranted submission. The punitive instruction tracked pattern instructions and Chapter 1D. Asset evidence was admissible where defendant did not move to bifurcate; §1D-30’s safeguard is activated only on defendant’s motion. Challenge to future-damages instruction was waived for lack of contemporaneous objection.

Conclusion
Verdict and judgment affirmed: AOA properly submitted; punitive damages properly pleaded, tried, and instructed; asset evidence admissible absent bifurcation request; Rule 60(b) “fraud” relief properly denied; unpreserved issues waived.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA causation is flexible: Defendant need only be a willing participant whose acts are a controlling/effective cause; “luring” or sole causation isn’t required.
Preserve defenses early: Fraud must be affirmatively pleaded or tried by consent; Rule 60(b) won’t rescue an unpleaded theory.
Punitive setup: Plead malice/willful-wanton per Rule 9(k); sexual relations + aggravation (public intrusion, brazen contact with the marital home/children) typically suffice to reach the jury on AOA punitives.
Bifurcate or bust: To keep net-worth evidence out until after compensatory liability, move to bifurcate under §1D-30.
Appellate hygiene: Pattern instructions aligned with Chapter 1D are safe; unobjected charge issues are waived.

Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729, 537 S.E.2d 854 (2000)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Christine Stalas Cooper (NC resident) sued Defendant Lisa Shealy (SC resident).
Background: Plaintiff alleged Shealy engaged in criminal conversation (adultery) with her husband and caused alienation of affections. Plaintiff also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Jurisdiction Issue: Defendant lived in South Carolina, where heart-balm torts are abolished. Plaintiff alleged her injury—the loss of her marriage—occurred in NC. Defendant allegedly telephoned and emailed Plaintiff’s husband at their NC home to entice him.
Procedural Posture: Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). Trial court denied her motion, finding the calls/emails were solicitations under NC’s long-arm statute. She appealed.

Issue

Does North Carolina have personal jurisdiction over a South Carolina resident in an alienation of affections and criminal conversation case when the only contacts were telephone calls and emails into the state?

Rule

North Carolina’s long-arm statute (N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4)(a)) permits jurisdiction for injury to person or property in NC caused by acts outside NC if solicitations were carried on within NC. Due process requires sufficient minimum contacts so jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (International Shoe). Alienation of affections is a transitory tort; substantive law depends on where the tort occurred.

Analysis

The long-arm statute was satisfied because Plaintiff alleged injury (loss of marital affection) in NC and Defendant’s phone calls/emails qualified as solicitations. NC precedent (Sherwood, Golding) recognizes alienation of affections and criminal conversation as “injury to person or property.”
Minimum contacts existed: even minimal contacts like a single phone call can support jurisdiction in tort cases. Plaintiff’s injury was suffered in NC, NC has a strong interest in protecting its residents, and Plaintiff could not sue in SC because that state has abolished these torts. The burden on Defendant to travel from SC to NC was minimal.
Choice of law remains open: Plaintiff must prove the torts occurred in NC for NC law to apply. If the acts are deemed to have occurred in SC, the case would be dismissed since SC does not recognize these causes of action.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. NC courts could exercise jurisdiction because the injury occurred in NC, Defendant’s contacts were sufficient, and jurisdiction comported with due process. Substantive law will depend on proof of where the torts occurred.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Phone calls and emails into NC are sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction in alienation of affections and criminal conversation cases.
NC interprets “injury to person or property” broadly, extending to harms to marriage and consortium.
Plaintiffs cannot sue in states like SC that have abolished heart-balm torts, making NC a vital forum.
Even minimal targeted contacts are enough for personal jurisdiction in tort cases.
Plaintiffs must still prove the tort occurred in NC for NC law to apply.
The case illustrates NC’s protective stance toward marriage and its willingness to extend jurisdiction to protect residents’ relationships.

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 147 N.C. App. 438, 556 S.E.2d 25 (2001)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiffs—American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company (insurers). Defendant—Elizabeth W. Morgan (later Elizabeth W. Glidewell). Underlying claimant—Martha Glidewell, married to Powell “Pete” Glidewell since 1967.
Background: Martha sued Morgan (then Elizabeth Wooten Morgan) in Oct. 1997 for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, alleging Morgan had a sexual relationship with Pete that destroyed Martha’s marriage. Morgan admitted she knew Pete was married and that she and Pete had sexual relations in Dec. 1996. Morgan and Pete later married on 15 Oct. 1998.
Insurance tender: After being served, Morgan demanded defense/indemnity from her homeowners policy and two Personal Catastrophe Liability (PCL) endorsements (1995–96 and 1996–97). Insurers denied and filed a declaratory judgment action.
Trial court: After a bench trial, the court held the insurers owed no duty to defend or indemnify under the homeowners policy or either PCL endorsement. Morgan appealed.

Issue

Do the homeowners policy and/or the 1995–96 or 1996–97 PCL endorsements create a duty to defend or indemnify the insured (Morgan) against claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation arising from her intentional sexual relationship with a married man?

Rule

Homeowners—Coverage applies to damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by an “occurrence,” defined as an “accident.” An “accident” does not include injury intended or substantially certain to result from intentional acts; intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law from certain intentional conduct (Stox; Russ; Henderson; Abernethy; Eubanks).

Duty to defend—Measured by the pleadings; if allegations fall outside coverage and the insurer has no contrary knowledge, no duty to defend (Waste Management).

PCL 1995–96—Defines “personal injury” broadly (includes mental anguish, humiliation, defamation, etc.), but coverage must attach during the endorsement period.

PCL 1996–97—Separates “bodily injury” (bodily harm incl. mental anguish arising therefrom) from “personal injury” (limited to offenses like false arrest, libel, invasion of privacy). Claims must fit the listed offenses or fall within “bodily injury” as defined.

Analysis

Homeowners policy: Morgan’s conduct was intentional and volitional—intentional sexual acts with knowledge Pete was married. For heart-balm torts, the protected interest is the marital relationship (exclusive intercourse, consortium, companionship). Injury to the non-consenting spouse is substantially certain to result from such conduct; the court infers intent to injure as a matter of law. Therefore, the injury was not caused by an “occurrence/accident,” defeating both indemnity and defense.

PCL 1995–96: Although “personal injury” is broad, the endorsement period ran 14 Nov. 1995–14 Nov. 1996. The trial court found (with competent evidence) that Martha did not know of the affair until 1997 and the complaint didn’t allege injury during the 95–96 period. No triggering injury within the policy period → no duty to defend/indemnify. Morgan’s argument about renewal notice/reduction in coverage failed; the record showed valid notice.

PCL 1996–97: This endorsement narrowed “personal injury” to specific offenses (false arrest, libel/slander/defamation, invasion of privacy/wrongful entry/eviction). Martha’s claims (alienation of affections, criminal conversation) do not arise from any listed offense. As to “bodily injury,” the court found the alleged humiliation, mental anguish, and injury to feelings/health tied to heart-balm torts did not qualify as “bodily injury” under the endorsement’s definition. Thus, no duty to defend/indemnify.

Conclusion

Affirmed. The insurers owed no duty to defend or indemnify under the homeowners policy or either PCL endorsement for alienation of affections and criminal conversation claims against Morgan.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Intentional heart-balm conduct (adultery/alienation) allows courts to infer intent to injure the spouse; resulting harm is not an “accident/occurrence,” defeating standard homeowners coverage.
Duty to defend rises and falls with the pleadings; when allegations plainly fall outside coverage, no defense is owed.
Policy period matters: even broad “personal injury” coverage (older PCL forms) won’t attach without alleged injury during the endorsement window.
Later PCL forms often narrow “personal injury” to enumerated offenses; alienation/criminal conversation typically don’t fit and “bodily injury” definitions may not capture purely emotional/marital harms.
For defense tenders in AOA/CC suits, expect carriers to deny under both “occurrence” and offense-listing grounds; timing and policy wording are decisive.

Oddo v. Presser, 158 N.C. App. 360, 581 S.E.2d 123 (2003)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Thomas C. Oddo; his wife, Debra Tyson (VP at Bank of America); Defendant Jeffrey L. Presser (Debra’s former boyfriend). The Oddos married in 1988 and had three children. Plaintiff worked primarily as an investment advisor (~$32k/yr) and also as Davidson College wrestling coach (salary grew from $2k in 1985 to ~$24k by 1999).
Relationship timeline: In Feb. 1999 Debra, unhappy in the marriage, reconnected with Presser (calls and a letter to her workplace). Debra called Presser in March 1999; they met in Charlotte three times between March 18–20 and had sexual intercourse at a hotel during the marriage. They continued emailing. On March 29, 1999 Debra told Oddo she was in love with someone else and wanted separation; the couple physically separated in April 1999 and later divorced.
Lawsuit & verdict: Oddo sued Presser (amended complaint filed Jan. 19, 2000) for alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC), seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Jury (April 2001) found for Oddo: $910,000 compensatory; $500,000 punitive. Trial court entered judgment. Presser appealed, challenging jury instructions, admissibility of damages evidence (lost income from investment clients; Davidson coaching income/retirement; tuition benefits for children), and submission/amount of punitive damages.

Issue

Were the jury instructions on alienation of affections erroneous (and preserved)?
Did the court err by admitting plaintiff’s damages evidence (lost investment-advisor income; Davidson coaching income/benefits; children’s tuition benefits)?
Was submission of punitive damages on AOA proper?
Was the punitive award excessive as a matter of law?

Rule

Appellate preservation requires specific, timely objections stating grounds (N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)). Damages in AOA/CC include present-value loss of marital interests and mental distress; consequential damages proximately caused by the tort may be recovered if proved with reasonable certainty—not sheer speculation (King v. Britt; Di Donato; Bahl). Punitive damages require willful, wanton, or malicious conduct beyond that necessary for compensatory liability (G.S. § 1D-15); sexual relations can be sufficient evidence of aggravation to reach the jury on punitives in AOA (Ward v. Beaton). Punitive cap: greater of 3× compensatory or $250,000 (G.S. § 1D-25(b)).

Analysis

Jury instructions: Although Presser objected to a limiting instruction about a recorded call, he did not object to the AOA standard now challenged; issue waived for appeal.
Damages—investment-advisor income: Plaintiff’s expert projected lost income; uncertainties in commissions/market go to weight, not admissibility. Evidence was not “so speculative” as to bar recovery; the jury could consider it.
Damages—Davidson coaching income/retirement: Presser failed to preserve an “uncertainty/speculation” objection (only argued hearsay/summaries); thus not reviewable on that ground.
Damages—tuition benefits: Plaintiff introduced Davidson’s tuition-benefit policy and an expert PV figure (~$282k). Children were ages 10, 7, and 3; no evidence the benefit would exist 8–15 years later. Court held this category overly speculative; admitting it was error requiring a new trial on compensatory damages because the verdict didn’t segregate amounts attributable to tuition benefits.
Punitive damages—submission: Evidence showed sexual intercourse on two occasions before separation; under Ward, that sufficed to submit punitives on AOA.
Punitive damages—excessiveness: $500k punitive was below compensatory even if tuition-benefit dollars are removed; within §1D-25(b) limits and not “excessively disproportionate.” Because plaintiff established liability (at least nominal damages), punitives could stand irrespective of a new compensatory trial.

Conclusion

Reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on compensatory damages (tuition-benefit category was overly speculative). Otherwise, no error: challenges to instructions and some damages theories were unpreserved; investment-income evidence was admissible; punitive damages were properly submitted and not excessive.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Preservation matters: you must object on the specific legal ground you plan to argue on appeal.
Damages scope: future earnings tied to job loss from alienation of affections / criminal conversation can be recoverable with expert support; courts tolerate some forecasting uncertainty.
Speculation line: long-horizon, contingent education “benefits” for young children—without evidence of program continuity—are too speculative. Exclude or risk a compensatory re-trial.
Punitive gateway in AOA: proof of sexual relations pre-separation generally gets punitive damages to the jury.
Caps and ratios: NC’s punitive cap is generous in AOA/CC; punitives lower than compensatories are hard to overturn as “excessive.”
Practical trial tip: segregate damages categories on verdict sheets (e.g., exclude speculative tuition) to protect the award from global retrial if one category is later deemed inadmissible.

Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268, 554 S.E.2d 851 (2001)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Ruby Deaton Pharr; her husband, Walter Pharr (“Pharr”); Defendant Joyce W. Beck (Pharr’s co-worker and running partner).

Marriage & backdrop: Plaintiff and Pharr were married ~10 years. Defendant worked at the same company and shared Pharr’s passion for running; she asked him to train with her. By June 1992, Pharr was running almost daily, often with Defendant. Plaintiff supported his hobby and attended races.

Hospital incident (1993): After a race, Pharr had a heart attack while with Defendant. She notified Plaintiff and drove her to the hospital, then followed Plaintiff into ICU and held Pharr’s hand. When transferred hospitals, Pharr insisted Plaintiff notify Defendant. Defendant visited both weekends and brought a gift—one of several gifts over time. Despite doctor’s advice, Pharr resumed running with Defendant two days after discharge. He stopped telling Plaintiff his routes and discouraged her from attending races.

Mounting pre-separation conduct (1993–1996): Plaintiff noticed Pharr spending more time with Defendant, talking about her constantly; she observed Defendant’s affectionate looks toward Pharr and confronted him; he promised to cut back but continued. By 1996 they regularly ate lunch together. In April 1996 Pharr said he was unhappy and wanted to move out, but remained until June 8, 1996 (date of separation). In the six weeks before separation, Plaintiff found: (a) a phone card from Defendant with her number and instructions so Pharr could call her long-distance while vacationing with Plaintiff; (b) Pharr was using Defendant’s P.O. box with her permission; (c) Pharr spent many evenings remodeling Defendant’s house (where he later lived after separation).

Witness corroboration: Nurse Deborah Coffee saw Defendant and Pharr running “numerous” times pre-separation, “looked affectionate,” and once “hugged up.” Defendant’s then-husband, Lester Beck, testified that in April 1994 he came home to a locked back door; upon entry he saw Pharr coming from the bedroom; Beck later observed two mixed drinks on the nightstand; Pharr apologized; Defendant offered to move out.
Post-separation admission: Defendant admitted sexual intercourse with Pharr in December 1996 (six months post-separation).

Procedural posture: Jury awarded Plaintiff $86,250 for alienation of affections and $15,000 for criminal conversation. Defendant appealed only the AOA verdict, arguing lack of evidence of malicious acts causing the loss of affection and challenging use of post-separation conduct.

Issue

(1) Whether post-separation conduct can support an alienation of affections claim or is admissible only for corroboration; (2) whether there was substantial evidence that Defendant’s malicious acts proximately caused the loss of Pharr’s love and affection for Plaintiff.

Rule

Alienation of affections elements: (1) marriage with love and affection; (2) alienation; (3) defendant’s malicious acts produced the loss (malice = intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage; intercourse conclusively presumes malice). Proximate cause satisfied if defendant’s conduct was the controlling or effective cause; need not be the sole cause. AOA must be based on pre-separation conduct; post-separation conduct is admissible only to corroborate pre-separation activities. Consent/initiation by the alienated spouse is no defense.

Analysis

Post-separation evidence: The court harmonized AOA with alimony statutes (which confine “marital misconduct” to pre-separation acts). Therefore, AOA claims must rest on pre-separation conduct; post-separation acts may be used only to corroborate pre-separation misconduct.
Malice: Substantial pre-separation evidence showed intentional conduct by Defendant likely to affect the marriage—frequent joint runs/lunches, ICU hand-holding in Plaintiff’s presence, gifts, repeated weekend hospital visits, inviting Pharr to her home (with bedroom-area encounter observed by Beck), providing a calling card with long-distance instructions during Plaintiff’s vacation, authorizing use of her P.O. box, and enlisting Pharr to remodel her home. This qualifies as malicious conduct.
Causation: The pattern of escalating, intimate involvement leading to Pharr’s April 1996 declaration and June 8 separation supports that Defendant’s conduct was the controlling/effective cause of the loss of affection.
Corroboration: Defendant’s admission of intercourse in December 1996 (post-separation) properly served to corroborate the pre-separation relationship rather than to create liability for post-separation acts.

Conclusion

No error. The AOA verdict stands: sufficient pre-separation evidence of malicious acts proximately causing the loss of affection, with post-separation intercourse admissible as corroboration only. (The court noted—though not raised on appeal—that AOA and CC damages are intertwined and ordinarily should be submitted as a single damages issue, awarding the larger of the two.)

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AOA liability must be grounded in pre-separation conduct; post-separation acts are admissible only to corroborate pre-separation misconduct (same principle applies to CC).
“Malice” in AOA includes intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage; sexual intercourse conclusively presumes malice, but pre-separation non-sexual conduct can still satisfy malice and causation.
Proximate cause requires the defendant’s conduct to be the controlling/effective cause, not the sole cause; being merely the object of affection isn’t enough—there must be active participation/encouragement.
Trial practice: Consider submitting one combined damages issue for AOA/CC to avoid duplicative awards; plaintiff recovers the larger verdict.

Nunn v. Allen, 154 N.C. App. 523, 574 S.E.2d 35 (2002)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Donald Ray Nunn and wife Vickie O’Brien Nunn (later Woods). Defendant Clay Allen, VP at Allen Brothers Timber Company, where Mrs. Nunn was secretary.

Marriage history: Donald and Vickie married in 1978; three sons were born. By 1996 the marriage was strained but ongoing. In April 1997 Mrs. Nunn moved out of the marital home. Plaintiff and Mrs. Nunn signed a separation agreement in September 1997; they divorced in August 1998.

Relationship with defendant: Plaintiff introduced evidence that Mrs. Nunn spent time with Defendant before and during the separation—at work, weekends, and at Defendant’s home. Plaintiff testified that in September 1997 he and others saw Mrs. Nunn and Defendant through a window, kissing and engaging in oral sex.

Defendant admitted having sexual intercourse with Mrs. Nunn in October 1997 and continuing thereafter. Allen Brothers also provided benefits that supported Mrs. Nunn, including helping her obtain a car and providing housing for her grandmother (where Mrs. Nunn lived after separation).

Other context: Plaintiff himself had a close relationship with a female co-worker in 1996, though no sexual contact was proven. Rumors circulated about Mrs. Nunn’s youngest son’s paternity involving Allen family members.

Verdict: Jury found for Plaintiff on alienation of affections and criminal conversation; awarded $50,000 compensatory and $50,000 punitive damages. Defendant appealed, raising 28 assignments of error including constitutional attack on the torts, evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of evidence, and jury instructions.

Issue

Should NC abolish the torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation?
Did the trial court err in evidentiary rulings (exclusion/admission of testimony, cross-exam, child support testimony, drug “suitcase” statement)?
Was there sufficient evidence to support liability for alienation of affections and criminal conversation?
Did the separation agreement bar or waive criminal conversation claims?
Were punitive damages properly submitted and supported?
Were jury instructions erroneous?

Rule

NC recognizes alienation of affections and criminal conversation as valid common law torts; only the Supreme Court or legislature can abolish them.
Alienation of affections requires: (1) valid marriage with some love/affection; (2) alienation or loss; (3) defendant’s malicious acts proximately caused the loss (malice = intentional conduct likely to affect marriage; proximate cause = controlling or effective cause).
Criminal conversation requires: (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse with spouse during coverture.
Post-separation conduct may corroborate pre-separation misconduct in alienation of affections; for criminal conversation, intercourse during coverture suffices even if after separation.
Consent/connivance is the only substantive defense to CC. Separation agreements between spouses do not bar third-party liability absent clear consent/approval.
Punitive damages require aggravating factors beyond malice implied by the tort; sexual relations plus evidence of malice or impact on children may suffice.

Analysis

Abolition: The Court of Appeals lacks authority to abolish torts recognized by NC Supreme Court; Cannon v. Miller controls.
Evidence rulings:

Exclusion of some statements Defendant claimed his lover made was harmless—similar evidence came in later.
Cross-exam about father’s property and wife’s embezzlement charges: general objections, no prejudice.
Child support testimony: not expert opinion, simply application of guidelines; no prejudice.
Redirect testimony about suitcase of drugs: improperly admitted, but harmless in light of other evidence.
Sufficiency—AOA: Plaintiff and wife had affection until mid-1990s; evidence showed Defendant’s relationship with her, benefits provided, and observed intimacy. Post-separation conduct corroborated pre-separation misconduct. Jury could find Defendant’s acts proximately caused alienation.
Sufficiency—CC: Defendant admitted intercourse in Oct. 1997, while Mrs. Nunn was still married. CC lies even on post-separation relations; separation agreement between spouses doesn’t waive third-party liability or constitute Plaintiff’s consent.
Damages: Jury could consider Plaintiff’s mental anguish, humiliation, loss of consortium. Evidence supported damages.
Punitive damages: Evidence of intercourse suffices; plus Defendant laughed when confronted by Plaintiff and his father and knew his actions harmed the children. Sufficient aggravation to support punitive award on both claims.
Jury instructions: Followed NC Pattern Instructions; adequately conveyed law. No preserved or prejudicial error.

Conclusion

No error. The torts stand; sufficient evidence supported both alienation of affections and criminal conversation; separation agreement did not bar claims; punitive damages were properly submitted and supported; jury instructions were proper. Verdict and judgment for Plaintiff affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

NC courts reaffirm validity of alienation of affections and criminal conversation; only the Supreme Court or legislature can abolish them.
Post-separation sexual conduct can sustain a criminal conversation claim so long as the spouses are still married.
Separation agreements do not immunize third parties; consent must be explicit from the plaintiff.
Even minimal pre-separation evidence can be bolstered by post-separation corroboration to sustain AOA claims.
Punitive damages may rest on sexual relations plus aggravating conduct (mockery, awareness of harm to children).
Trial lawyers must preserve specific objections with authority; general objections or failure to show prejudice usually waive appellate review.
Courts treat minor evidentiary errors as harmless when overwhelming other evidence exists.

Norris v. Alexander (Unpublished), 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 2351 (2002)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Arnold Norris; his wife Reba Wood; Defendant James T. Alexander (married to Jerri Alexander).
History with parties: Defendant and Ms. Wood met as co-workers in 1962 and remained friends. Ms. Wood and Plaintiff married in 1990; they separated for the third time on 10 Sept 1996, when Ms. Wood moved to a trailer and they later divorced.

Pre-/post-separation contacts: Defendant testified he visited Ms. Wood’s trailer three times after the 9/10/96 separation: (1) late Sept/early Oct 1996 for 15–20 minutes (Ms. Wood’s daughter present); (2) just before Thanksgiving 1996 (coffee while Ms. Wood made wedding mints); (3) 31 Dec 1996 (New Year’s Eve). Defendant denied any hugging, kissing, or sexual intercourse.

New Year’s Eve incident: Mrs. Alexander and Plaintiff went to Ms. Wood’s trailer after seeing Defendant’s truck. Plaintiff forced entry. Mrs. Alexander saw both fully clothed; Defendant sitting on the couch; no compromising position. Plaintiff testified he saw Defendant lying on his back with Ms. Wood “between his legs” on top of him, both clothed, no hugging or kissing observed; an altercation ensued and they left.

Phone records: Plaintiff referenced 443 long-distance calls from Defendant’s White Lake residence over ~2.5 years but offered no dates/recipient numbers or content, except one overheard call about flowers.

Procedural posture: At the close of Plaintiff’s evidence, the court granted Defendant’s directed verdict on alienation of affections (AOA) and criminal conversation (CC). Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Did Plaintiff present sufficient evidence to go to the jury on (1) AOA—malicious acts by Defendant that effectively caused the loss of Ms. Wood’s affection, and (2) CC—sexual intercourse during coverture (including post-separation)?

Rule

Alienation of affections elements: (1) marriage with some love/affection; (2) alienation; (3) Defendant’s malicious acts (intentional, unjustifiable conduct likely to affect the marriage) were the controlling/effective cause of the loss. AOA must be based on pre-separation conduct; post-separation conduct is admissible only to corroborate pre-separation activities.

Criminal conversation elements: (1) valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse between Defendant and the spouse during coverture; may be based on post-separation relations so long as the marriage continues.

Abolition: Only the NC Supreme Court or General Assembly may abolish heart-balm torts.

Analysis

Alienation of affections: Plaintiff met elements (1) and (2), but failed on (3). The only pre-separation evidence tying Defendant to alienation was the undated 443 calls lacking destination numbers or content (aside from a benign gardening call). Without specifics showing wrongful, intentional interference, this does not amount to “malicious acts” designed to affect the marriage. The New Year’s Eve incident occurred post-separation and, even if considered, showed both parties clothed with no affectionate behavior per Mrs. Alexander; Plaintiff’s account showed physical proximity but not wrongful acts pre-separation. Under Pharr, post-separation conduct can only corroborate pre-separation misconduct; there was nothing substantial to corroborate. Directed verdict proper.

Criminal conversation: Plaintiff offered no direct evidence of intercourse. Circumstantial proof via opportunity and inclination failed: record lacked proof of adulterous inclination (only long-term friendship and three short post-separation visits), and the 12/31/96 event showed, at most, touching while fully clothed with conflicting testimony. Without both inclination and opportunity, inferring intercourse would be mere conjecture. Directed verdict proper.

Other: The Court reiterated it could not abolish AOA/CC; that authority rests with the Supreme Court/legislature.

Conclusion

Affirmed. Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit either AOA or CC to the jury.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Alienation of affections needs pre-separation misconduct by the defendant; post-separation events only corroborate— they cannot supply the missing pre-separation wrongful acts.
Phone records without specifics (dates, dialed numbers, content) are too thin to prove malicious interference.
Criminal conversation via circumstantial proof requires both inclination and opportunity; physical proximity while fully clothed, with no other indicia, is not enough.
Unpublished decisions still reinforce practice points: build a pre-separation evidence record (content of communications, gifts, secret meetings, romantic conduct) or risk DV/JNOV.
The COA will not abolish heart-balm torts; challenges must be taken to the NC Supreme Court or the General Assembly.

Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, 159 N.C. App. 355, 583 S.E.2d 707 (2003)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Marcel Eluhu (Tennessee resident); Defendant Vladimir Rosenhaus (California resident; formerly lived in Raleigh 1991–1997; Nashville 1997–1999; California from Aug. 1999). Plaintiff’s former wife, Colette Calmelet-Eluhu, is a Tennessee resident.

Allegations: Plaintiff sued in Wake County for alienation of affections, asserting Defendant committed a tortious act “within North Carolina,” alleging a romantic affair beginning in 1998 and continuing, and that for some time during the affair Defendant “resided in Wake County.”

Defendant’s affidavit: Denied any sexual relationship; said he and Colette were Nashville co-workers who became friends. Post-1997 NC contacts: occasional Raleigh visits to see his wife/son until Apr. 1999; a 3-day Atlantic Beach vacation (May 24–27, 1999) where he briefly saw Colette publicly and once at her rental condo in the presence of her children; owned but rented out a Raleigh house Aug. 1999–Aug. 2000; sold March 2001.

Colette’s affidavit: Never lived in NC; friendship with Defendant mostly in Nashville; beach trip contact had no effect on her marriage; she had planned the beach vacation before learning Defendant would be there.

Procedure: Defendant made a special appearance and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Whether North Carolina courts may exercise personal jurisdiction (specific or general) over a nonresident defendant in an alienation of affections suit where neither party resides in NC and the record shows minimal, largely unrelated NC contacts (a brief beach encounter; historic residence/ownership), with the relationship centered in Tennessee.

Rule

Personal jurisdiction requires (1) statutory authorization (NC long-arm) and (2) due process—minimum contacts such that suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (International Shoe). Minimum contacts factors: quantity; nature/quality; connection to the cause; forum state’s interest; convenience. Specific jurisdiction requires case-linked contacts; general jurisdiction requires continuous and systematic contacts plus fairness. Allegations “on information and belief” are insufficient against counter-affidavits; plaintiff bears the burden to show jurisdiction with competent facts.

Analysis

Specific jurisdiction: Defendant conceded the long-arm prong (plaintiff “claimed” injury in NC), so the focus is due process. The only NC event tied to the claim was the Atlantic Beach overlap, which both Defendant and Colette described as incidental and non-impactful; Colette attested it caused no change in her relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s verified complaint lacked concrete, place-and-time facts connecting NC to the alleged alienation and was effectively rebutted by affidavits. With the relationship and parties anchored in Tennessee, the NC nexus was “little, if any,” and the forum’s interest slight; convenience favored dismissal.

General jurisdiction: Defendant had historic NC ties (residence 1991–1997; visits while family remained; owned/leased a Raleigh home; one 1999 beach trip). Even if “continuous and systematic,” due process still looks to fairness. Here, neither party lives in NC, evidence/witnesses are outside NC, and plaintiff showed no NC-based proof. With minimal forum interest (contrast Cooper v. Shealy involving an NC resident and NC-centered injury), exercising general jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.

Conclusion

Affirmed. North Carolina lacked personal jurisdiction (specific and general) over Defendant on the alienation of affections claim.

Dissent (Tyson, J.)

Would find minimum contacts sufficient under due process: Defendant purposefully availed himself of NC (years of residence, property, vacation), and NC’s policy interest in heart-balm torts—retained here but abolished in CA/TN—supports jurisdiction (citing Cooper). The “fairness” factors should not outweigh established contacts at the Rule 12 stage.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

For AOA filed in NC, you need concrete NC-tied facts (calls, emails, meetings in NC that affected the marriage) to sustain specific jurisdiction; bare “on information and belief” allegations won’t survive counter-affidavits.
Historic residence/ownership alone may not justify general jurisdiction when the dispute and parties are out-of-state and NC’s interest is minimal.
Forum shopping risk: When both states of residence (CA/TN) have abolished heart-balm torts, courts scrutinize NC filings for real forum connections.
Build the record: Identify NC witnesses, documents, and dates/locations of NC acts causing alienation; otherwise dismissal for lack of PJ is likely.
Dissenting view underscores a path to jurisdiction where ongoing NC contacts + NC’s policy interest could suffice—particularly when plaintiff can show NC-based solicitations or injury effects.

Hooks v. Eckman, 159 N.C. App. 681, 587 S.E.2d 352 (2003)

Facts

Parties: Plaintiff Mary M. Hooks; Defendants Thomas and Mary Alice Eckman (parents), and Mary Elizabeth Boening and husband Robert.

Prior suit (1998 Action): Hooks sued Boening for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. In discovery, Hooks asked about Boening’s assets. Boening produced an equitable distribution affidavit from her divorce case showing the marital residence (claimed as separate) valued at ~$279,000. In Sept. 1999, Boening sold the home and directed ~$143,000 of proceeds to the Eckmans. She did not supplement discovery to disclose the transfer.

Trial in 1998 Action (Oct. 2000): Hooks confronted Boening with the $143,000 payment. Boening testified she owed the Eckmans under a promissory note for land and construction; her ex-husband Dulude testified the note had been forgiven in 1993. Hooks argued the $143,000 was a fraudulent conveyance and should count as Boening’s asset for punitive damages. Judgment (Nov. 16, 2000): $42,500 compensatory + $15,500 punitive, which Boening paid; Hooks accepted and the judgment was marked “satisfied.”

Current suit (filed Sept. 13, 2001): Hooks alleged Boening gave false testimony about assets in the 1998 Action, depressing the punitive award; she also alleged the Eckmans aided the fraud. In parallel, Hooks filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the prior judgment; the trial court found the fraud issue had been presented at the original trial, denied Rule 60 relief, and Hooks withdrew her appeal of that denial. Defendants then moved for summary judgment in the new action; the court granted it.

Issue

Can a plaintiff bring an independent action for “fraud” based on alleged false testimony about assets given in a prior alienation/criminal conversation trial, after that issue was raised and litigated there and after Rule 60(b) relief was denied?

Rule

Intrinsic vs. extrinsic fraud:

Intrinsic fraud (e.g., perjured testimony, matters involved in the merits) must be addressed by a Rule 60(b)(3) motion in the original case and cannot support a separate independent action.
Extrinsic fraud (prevents a party from fully presenting their case) can justify setting aside a judgment.
Judicial finality: A final judgment is not annulled merely for perjury; issues litigated in the prior case cannot be re-litigated by collateral attack. Acceptance/satisfaction of judgment further weighs against later attack.

Analysis

Nature of alleged fraud: Hooks’ claim is that Boening lied about assets, affecting punitive damages. False testimony is intrinsic fraud. The record shows Hooks fully litigated the question in 2000—she examined Boening and Dulude, argued fraudulent conveyance, and urged the court to treat $143,000 as an asset when fixing punitives. Thus, there was no deprivation of the opportunity to present her case; this is not extrinsic fraud.

Exclusive remedy: Intrinsic fraud must be pursued via Rule 60(b)(3). Hooks did file Rule 60(b); the court denied it, finding the matter had been presented at trial. Hooks withdrew her appeal from that denial, and is bound by it.

Collateral attack barred: Bringing a new tort/fraud action to relitigate the same issue would undermine finality. Additionally, Hooks accepted payment and the judgment was marked “satisfied,” further undercutting the collateral suit.

Summary judgment: With no genuine issue of material fact and the law barring an independent action on intrinsic fraud, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Affirmed. Summary judgment for defendants was proper. Hooks’ allegations concern intrinsic fraud (false testimony) that was raised and litigated in the prior action; her sole remedy was Rule 60(b), which was denied and not appealed. A separate action to set aside or enhance the prior judgment is barred.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

False or incomplete testimony in a prior case is intrinsic fraud; your remedy is Rule 60(b)(3) in that case—not a new lawsuit.
If you litigate an issue (e.g., whether a transfer was a fraudulent conveyance) and the court rules, you can’t repackage it as a new fraud claim later. Preserve and appeal the adverse ruling.
Courts protect finality: perjury alone does not reopen final judgments; otherwise litigation would be endless.
Accepting and satisfying a judgment makes collateral attacks even less viable.
Practical trial tip in AOA/CC cases: aggressively develop and document asset issues pre-trial; if you suspect concealment, pursue discovery sanctions or continuances then, and if necessary, timely Rule 60(b) relief and appeal—not a follow-on tort action.

Carson v. Brodin, 160 N.C. App. 366, 585 S.E.2d 491 (2003)

Facts

Parties: Steve and Pattie Carson (NC residents, Guilford County) hired Kenneth R. Brodin (VA resident, custom home builder) to construct a vacation home at Smith Mountain Lake, Franklin County, VA.

How they connected: The lake developer kept a builder referral list; Brodin was listed. The Carsons learned of him in Virginia; initial contact was in Virginia.

Contracts: In Nov. 1993 the Carsons traveled to Virginia and signed a construction contract with Brodin. After a lot-swap with the developer, Brodin executed a new contract and mailed it to North Carolina, where the Carsons signed in NC and mailed it back.

In-state contacts by Brodin:

2–3 in-person visits to North Carolina to discuss the project and view designs in Greensboro.
Numerous phone calls into North Carolina during negotiations and the 3-year build.
Invoices mailed to NC; payments remitted from the Carsons’ North Carolina bank account.
Construction completed July 1996.
Suit: In 2001, the Carsons sued Brodin in NC for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence (construction defects). Brodin moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Trial court denied; Brodin took an interlocutory appeal (jurisdictional ruling is immediately appealable under § 1-277(b)).

Issue

Do North Carolina courts have specific personal jurisdiction over a Virginia builder in a dispute arising from construction of a Virginia home where the builder repeatedly communicated with, visited, contracted with, and billed North Carolina residents in North Carolina?

Rule

Two-step inquiry: (1) NC long-arm statute (liberally construed) and (2) Due Process—minimum contacts so that suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Long-arm § 1-75.4(4)(a) (local injury from foreign act) is satisfied where the action claims injury in NC arising from acts outside NC and solicitation or services were carried on in NC at or about the time of injury. Alleging injury suffices at this stage (Godwin).

Minimum contacts factors: quantity; quality/nature; connection of cause to contacts; forum’s interest; convenience. Specific jurisdiction exists when the claim arises out of the forum contacts.

Analysis

Long-arm: The Carsons alleged in-state injury (economic losses from construction defects) caused by Brodin’s out-of-state construction acts; and solicitation/services in NC—contract sent to NC for signature, multiple NC visits, numerous calls, ongoing invoices/ payments through NC. That fits § 1-75.4(4)(a).
Due Process / minimum contacts:

Quantity/quality: Repeated, purposeful contacts—calls, mailings, in-person meetings in NC, contract execution in NC, billing/payment through NC.
Nexus: The lawsuit (contract/warranty/negligence) arises directly from that cross-state contracting relationship and communications.
Purposeful availment: By negotiating and performing key aspects with NC residents in NC (contract execution; meetings; billing), Brodin could reasonably anticipate being haled into NC court.
Forum interest & convenience: NC has a manifest interest in providing a forum to its residents; the Carsons are here and much of the transactional conduct occurred here. Balancing favors jurisdiction.
Thus, specific jurisdiction is proper; no need to reach general jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Affirmed. North Carolina courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Virginia builder. The contract was executed in NC and supported by repeated NC-directed communications, visits, and billing—all tied to the claim—satisfying the long-arm statute and due process.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Contract mailed into NC and signed here + repeated NC calls/visits/billing can establish specific jurisdiction even when the project/property is out of state.
Under § 1-75.4(4)(a), alleging in-state injury plus in-state solicitation/services at or about the time of injury is enough to clear the statutory prong.
For builders/suppliers: Doing business with NC residents through contract execution in NC, site visits, and invoicing to NC creates foreseeable exposure to NC courts.
Plaintiffs should plead the NC contacts concretely (who called whom, when; visits; contract execution; invoices/payments) to anchor jurisdiction.

Carson v. Brodin and Alienation of Affections

Carson v. Brodin (2003) was a construction contract jurisdiction case, not about marriage torts, but its reasoning ties directly into alienation of affections (AOA). The Court of Appeals held that NC courts had specific jurisdiction over a Virginia builder because the contract was executed in NC, the builder made calls, mailings, and visits into NC, and invoices were paid from NC. This satisfied the long-arm statute and due process.

In reaching that result, the Court emphasized that under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(4)(a), “injury to person or property” is interpreted broadly. The opinion even cited Golding v. Taylor (1973) for the proposition that actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation count as “injury to person or property” under the statute.

That means the same jurisdictional framework applies in AOA cases: when a nonresident paramour makes purposeful contacts into NC—calls, emails, visits, gifts—that contribute to the alienation, those contacts satisfy the statute and minimum contacts. Courts have applied this reasoning in cases like Cooper v. Shealy (2000) (SC defendant’s phone calls and emails into NC = jurisdiction proper) and contrasted it with Eluhu v. Rosenhaus (2003) (minimal NC contact, affair centered in TN = no jurisdiction). Pharr v. Beck (2001) reinforces that pre-separation conduct is key, but corroboration can come from post-separation acts.

Bottom line: Carson shows NC’s broad, flexible reading of its long-arm statute. The same approach supports alienation of affections and criminal conversation suits against out-of-state lovers: if the injury is felt in NC and the defendant directed any significant contacts here, NC courts will likely exercise jurisdiction.

Misenheimer v. Burris, 169 N.C. App. 539, 610 S.E.2d 271, (rev’d by 360 N.C. 620, 637 S.E.2d 173 (2006)) (2005)

Facts

Donald Misenheimer married Rebecca in 1971. Defendant James Clayton Burris was a longtime friend and business colleague. Plaintiff alleged Burris engaged in a sexual affair with Rebecca between 1991–1994/95. In Feb. 1996, Rebecca told Donald she wanted a divorce; they separated in March 1997 and divorced in 2000. Plaintiff began to suspect an affair in 1996 but did not file suit until April 2000, alleging alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Trial court directed verdict against plaintiff on alienation but allowed criminal conversation to go to jury. Jury awarded $100,001 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages. Defendant appealed, arguing the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

Issue

Does the three-year statute of limitations for criminal conversation claims begin at the time of the extramarital conduct, or can it be tolled under the “discovery rule” until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the affair?

Rule

N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5) imposes a three-year limitation for criminal conversation. N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) (“discovery rule”) delays accrual for latent injury cases until the injury becomes apparent. Case law (e.g., Coachman v. Gould) holds that when a cause of action is specifically enumerated with its own limitation, the discovery rule does not apply.

Analysis

Majority: The alleged affair ended by 1994/95; thus the three-year window expired by 1998 at the latest. Plaintiff filed in 2000, two years too late. Criminal conversation is specifically named in § 1-52(5), so the discovery rule in § 1-52(16) does not apply. Trial court erred in denying directed verdict.
Dissent (Tyson, J.): Criminal conversation is inherently secretive, like fraud; injured spouses are often the last to know. The discovery rule should apply to prevent rewarding concealment. The jury was properly instructed, found plaintiff filed within three years of discovery, and its verdict should stand.

Conclusion

Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, holding the claim time-barred because the discovery rule does not apply to criminal conversation.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Criminal conversation is governed by a strict three-year statute of limitations under § 1-52(5).
Discovery rule for latent injuries does not toll that period, even if plaintiff was unaware of the adultery until later (per this Court of Appeals ruling).
The dissent underscored fairness concerns, arguing that clandestine affairs resemble fraud and should permit tolling.
This case was later taken up by the NC Supreme Court, which reversed, extending the discovery rule to criminal conversation.

Misenheimer v. Burris, 360 N.C. 620, 637 S.E.2d 173 (2006)

Facts

Donald Misenheimer and Rebecca married in 1971. Defendant James Burris was a longtime friend and employee of Plaintiff. Defendant and Rebecca began an affair in 1991 that lasted until 1994/95. Rebecca sought divorce in 1996 and separated in 1997. Plaintiff suspected but did not confirm the affair until July 1997 during counseling. Divorce finalized in 2000. Plaintiff filed suit for criminal conversation on April 12, 2000—within three years of discovering the affair, but more than three years after the affair ended. Jury found for Plaintiff, awarding $100,001 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages. Court of Appeals reversed, holding the claim time-barred under the strict three-year statute of limitations.

Issue

Does the discovery rule in N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) toll the three-year statute of limitations for criminal conversation under § 1-52(5) until the injured spouse discovers or should have discovered the affair?

Rule

N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5): three-year limitation for criminal conversation.
N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16): discovery rule — cause accrues when personal injury becomes apparent or should reasonably be apparent, but subject to a ten-year statute of repose.

Analysis

Majority (Justice Brady):

Found § 1-52(16) ambiguous regarding “personal injury.” Could mean bodily injury or broader invasions of personal rights (including marital fidelity).
Criminal conversation fits as a “personal injury” because it invades the exclusive sexual rights of marriage and causes emotional harm.
Discovery rule is remedial and should be construed liberally to prevent injustice. Affairs are inherently concealed; barring claims before discovery rewards deceit.
Harmonized §§ 1-52(5) and (16): the three-year limitations period begins when the affair is discovered or reasonably should be discovered, but actions remain capped by the ten-year repose.
Evidence showed Plaintiff discovered the affair in July 1997 and filed within three years. Jury’s verdict was proper.
Policy: aligns with NC’s strong interest in protecting marriage (citing McCutchen, Cannon v. Miller).

Dissent (Chief Justice Parker):

Statutory language unambiguous: criminal conversation is expressly covered by § 1-52(5); therefore, § 1-52(16) does not apply.
“Personal injury” in § 1-52(16) refers to bodily harm, not spousal torts.
Majority improperly expands discovery rule and effectively creates a personal injury action out of criminal conversation.
Would have affirmed Court of Appeals that the claim was time-barred.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The discovery rule applies to criminal conversation. The three-year limitations period runs from discovery of the affair, not the date of the last adulterous act, subject to the ten-year statute of repose.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

New precedent: Criminal conversation claims are tolled until discovery of the affair (or when it reasonably should be discovered).
Plaintiffs must still file within three years of discovery and within ten years of the last act.
This decision prevents adulterous defendants from escaping liability by concealing affairs until the statutory period expires.
Shows NC’s policy commitment to protecting marriage and marital rights.

Fox v. Gibson, 176 N.C. App. 554, 626 S.E.2d 841 (2006)

Facts

Plaintiff Mary Beth Fox sued Tracy Gibson (a Georgia resident) for alienation of affections. Plaintiff resided in North Carolina; her husband (“Skip” Fox) averred that during the marriage he (in NC) and Defendant (in GA) had numerous phone calls and emails, and that he and Defendant had sexual relations in North Carolina. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting she never availed herself of NC law and never had sexual relations with Mr. Fox in NC. The trial court denied the motion; Defendant took an interlocutory appeal.

Issue

Whether North Carolina courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in an alienation of affections suit based on phone calls, emails directed into NC, and sexual relations in NC with the plaintiff’s spouse.

Rule

Two-step analysis: (1) statutory authority under NC’s long-arm statute; (2) due process—minimum contacts such that jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3) authorizes jurisdiction for an action “arising out of an act or omission within this State,” and the statute requires only that the action “claim” an in-state injury (proof not required at this stage). Minimum contacts factors include quantity, nature/quality, connection to the claim, forum interest, and convenience.

Analysis

Statutory prong: The court credited Mr. Fox’s affidavit that Defendant sent emails and had numerous phone calls into NC and had “sexual relations” with him in NC during the marriage. Those acts within NC created the requisite nexus; AOA falls within § 1-75.4(3).

Due process: Nature/quality of contacts—targeted communications into NC and in-state sexual intercourse during coverture—directly connected to the alleged injury (alienation). Forum interest: NC has a strong interest in providing a forum for AOA claims, especially where the defendant’s home state (Georgia) has abolished the tort.

Convenience: Evidence/witnesses about the marriage are in NC; travel burden for a neighboring-state defendant is minimal. On balance, exercising jurisdiction comported with fair play and substantial justice.

Conclusion

Affirmed. North Carolina properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over the Georgia defendant in this alienation of affections action.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Phone calls and emails directed into NC, plus sexual relations in NC during coverture, are sufficient forum contacts to ground jurisdiction in alienation of affections cases.
Under § 1-75.4(3), a plaintiff need only “claim” in-state injury; detailed proof is not required at the jurisdictional stage.
NC’s forum interest is heightened when the defendant’s home state has abolished AOA/CC, and convenience factors often favor NC where the marriage was centered here.

Stann v. Levine, 180 N.C. App. 1, 636 S.E.2d 214 (2006)

Facts

Plaintiff Frederick Stann married Allison in 1991. They lived in North Carolina until 1996, then moved to South Carolina. In July 2003, Allison began corresponding with Defendant Levine (a Tennessee resident) by email, phone, and instant messaging; they discussed love and marriage. Allison and Defendant met in person only after September 2003, and then had multiple sexual encounters, including in North Carolina (Asheville and other locations). The Stanns separated in September 2003; Allison later moved to Salisbury, NC, and Plaintiff claimed to have returned to Gastonia, NC. Plaintiff sued Defendant in June 2004 for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and emotional distress. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted dismissal. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Whether North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a Tennessee defendant in alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions brought by a plaintiff with mixed SC/NC residency ties.

Rule

Jurisdiction requires: (1) a basis under NC’s long-arm statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4; and (2) compliance with due process (minimum contacts such that exercising jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).

Analysis

Majority (Jackson, J.): The Court dismissed the appeal due to Plaintiff’s multiple, serious violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure (improper spacing, no statement of grounds for appellate review, no standard of review, vague assignment of error, incomplete record citations). Citing Viar v. NCDOT (2005), the Court held such violations mandated dismissal, even if the issues could otherwise be reviewed.

Concurring (Tyson, J.): Agreed dismissal was required under Viar.

Dissent (Geer, J.): Criticized the majority for elevating form over substance. Plaintiff’s rule violations did not impede review or prejudice Defendant. Both parties’ briefs had errors. Dismissing deprived Plaintiff of review of a potentially meritorious case. On the merits, Judge Geer reasoned:

Alienation of Affections: Likely no NC jurisdiction, as the emails/calls causing alienation occurred while Allison resided in SC, and Defendant acted from TN.
Criminal Conversation: Jurisdiction proper. Defendant admitted sexual relations with Allison in NC post-separation. Those in-state sexual acts satisfied N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3) (local act) and minimum contacts. Defendant deliberately traveled to NC to meet Allison. Burden minimal, NC had an interest, and contacts were directly related to the claim.

Conclusion

Appeal dismissed for procedural rule violations. The dissent would have sanctioned both parties’ counsel but reached the merits, upholding dismissal of alienation of affections for lack of NC jurisdiction but reversing on criminal conversation, allowing that claim to proceed in NC.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Procedural rigor: Post-Viar, NC appellate courts strictly enforced rule compliance. Even strong substantive issues may be lost due to technical violations.
Jurisdiction: Alienation of affection requires proof of acts directed into NC before alienation occurred; if the marital breakdown happened while both spouses lived in SC, NC may lack jurisdiction.
Criminal Conversation: Sexual intercourse in NC during coverture is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, even if both parties are out-of-state residents.
Dissent’s warning: Overly harsh dismissal for procedural errors risks injustice and forum shopping concerns, especially where NC remains one of the few states recognizing AOA/CC.

Jones v. Skelley, 195 N.C. App. 500, 673 S.E.2d 385 (2009)

Facts

Rebecca Jones (Plaintiff) and Phil Jones married in 1974 and lived in South Carolina since 1979. They separated in January 2004 and divorced in March 2005. Defendant Susan Skelley admitted to living in North Carolina until August 2003 and again briefly in 2004. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant engaged in wrongful conduct with Mr. Jones in both NC and SC, including sexual intercourse in NC in June 2004 while the marriage still existed. Plaintiff sued for alienation of affections and criminal conversation in Brunswick County, NC. Defendant conceded personal jurisdiction but argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction since both spouses were SC residents and SC had abolished AOA and CC. The trial court granted Defendant summary judgment.

Issue

Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiff’s alienation of affections and criminal conversation claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the torts occurred in South Carolina, which has abolished the claims?

Rule

Alienation of affections: governed by the law of the state where the alienating conduct occurred (Darnell v. Rupplin).
Criminal conversation: governed by the law of the state where the sexual intercourse occurred (Cooper v. Shealy).
NC follows lex loci delicti: the place of the wrong controls substantive law.

Analysis

Alienation of Affections:

The injury arises where the alienating conduct occurred, not where the marriage resided.
Here, Defendant’s alleged wrongful acts spanned both SC and NC (phone calls, secret meetings, sexual activity in NC). Evidence of clandestine calls, meetings, and admitted sexual contact in NC created a genuine issue of fact whether alienation occurred, in whole or part, in NC. Under Darnell, that question should go to a jury.
Thus, dismissal was improper; Plaintiff raised triable issues.

Criminal Conversation:

Criminal conversation elements: (1) valid marriage, (2) sexual intercourse during marriage.
NC law recognizes even a single act of intercourse in NC suffices, including post-separation but pre-divorce encounters (Johnson v. Pearce; Nunn v. Allen).
Defendant admitted intercourse with Mr. Jones in NC in June 2004, before the formal separation agreement and divorce.
Under lex loci delicti, NC substantive law applies to that act.
Therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on CC.

Conclusion

Reversed and remanded. Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendant. On alienation of affections, factual disputes remain about whether alienation occurred in NC. On criminal conversation, Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment because intercourse in NC during marriage was undisputed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Alienation of affections: Jurisdiction depends on where the wrongful acts took place, not residency of the parties; acts in NC can sustain the claim even if spouses lived elsewhere.
Criminal conversation: A single act of intercourse in NC during marriage is sufficient for liability, regardless of residency or separation status.
NC courts emphasize lex loci delicti—where the tort occurred governs substantive law, not the state of residence.
Until abolished by legislature or Supreme Court, NC courts remain bound to enforce AOA and CC, even against out-of-state residents.

Brown v. Ellis, 206 N.C. App. 93, 696 S.E.2d 813 (2010)

Facts

William Brown (Plaintiff) sued Mark Ellis (Defendant), a California resident, for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, alleging Ellis pursued a romantic/sexual relationship with Mrs. Brown through frequent phone calls, emails, and business-trip encounters. Plaintiff alleged many calls/emails were received in NC, where the Browns lived, and that Ellis met Mrs. Brown on trips outside NC.

Trial: Defendant was served in California but did not appear for trial. The trial court entered a $600,000 judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant later moved for a new trial, arguing lack of jurisdiction and lack of notice.

Appeals:

Initially, the NC Court of Appeals held NC lacked jurisdiction.
The NC Supreme Court reversed, holding the complaint alleged sufficient NC contacts under § 1-75.4(4)(a) (local injury from foreign act) and remanded for due process and notice review.

Issue

Did Defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with NC for due process?
Did Defendant receive adequate notice of trial under due process?

Rule

Personal jurisdiction requires: (1) statutory basis (satisfied by Supreme Court ruling) and (2) sufficient minimum contacts under due process.
Due process factors: quantity, quality/nature, connection to the cause, forum state’s interest, convenience.
Notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise the party of proceedings (Rule 59; due process).

Analysis

Minimum Contacts:

Defendant initiated near-daily emails/phone calls into NC directed at Mrs. Brown, discussing their sexual/romantic relationship—even in presence of Plaintiff and child.
These communications were central to the AOA/CC claims.
NC has strong interest in providing a forum because many states (including California) have abolished these torts.
Only factor against jurisdiction was Defendant’s distance (California), but overall contacts were purposeful and directly connected to the alleged injury.
Court held minimum contacts existed; jurisdiction satisfied.

Notice of Trial:

Defendant’s attorney withdrew, but court notices (including trial calendar) were mailed to the wrong address (“28422” instead of “28442”).
Defendant only received actual notice three days before trial, via a private investigator, leaving no time to secure counsel.
Court held this violated due process; notice must be reasonably calculated to allow meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Like Laroque v. Laroque, failure to send calendars to correct address through no fault of Defendant meant constructive notice was inadequate.

Conclusion

NC courts had personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.
However, Defendant did not receive adequate notice of trial.
Judgment vacated; denial of motion for new trial reversed; case remanded for new trial.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Jurisdiction: Phone calls, emails, and communications directed into NC—even if Defendant never physically visits—are enough to establish minimum contacts in alienation of affections / criminal conversation cases.
Forum interest: NC’s interest is heightened when Defendant’s state has abolished heart-balm torts, ensuring NC citizens have a remedy.
Notice: Courts must strictly comply with notice rules; mailing to the wrong address or providing notice only days before trial violates due process.
Practical: Even when jurisdiction exists, inadequate notice will undo a default-style judgment.

Heller v. Somdahl, 206 N.C. App. 313, 696 S.E.2d 857 (2010)

Facts

Walter Heller sued Mary Jones for alienation of affections, alleging she (a third party—not the lover) actively encouraged and facilitated an adulterous relationship between Heller’s wife, Barbara, and one Russell Somdahl. Plaintiff claimed Jones intoxicated, coerced, persuaded, and otherwise orchestrated opportunities for the affair, interfered with spousal communications, and made threats. Jury found Jones liable and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Jones moved for directed verdict; the trial court denied; she appealed.

Issue

Was there sufficient evidence on each element of alienation of affections to survive directed verdict and go to the jury?

Rule

Elements of alienation of affections: (1) a marriage with genuine love and affection; (2) alienation/destruction of that affection; (3) defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts were a controlling or effective cause of the alienation (need not be sole cause; “active participation, initiative or encouragement” suffices).

Analysis

Genuine love/affection: Testimony showed a loving marriage—regular intimacy, mutual affection, daily communication (even during deployment), and family activities.

Alienation: After the affair began, the relationship grew “strained,” communications became curt, intimacy ceased, and trust was damaged—supporting diminished affection.

Wrongful/malicious causation: Evidence (viewed for plaintiff) showed Jones tried to drag Barbara from the home; told plaintiff it was none of his business; threatened Barbara with harm if she broke off the relationship; moved phones to block calls; withheld a ring from Barbara until she separated/divorced; arranged activities to keep Barbara from her husband; hosted a party with alcohol knowing Barbara’s vulnerability; and knew Barbara was married yet facilitated the liaison. This was more than a scintilla and could be found a controlling/effective cause of alienation.

Conclusion

No error. Denial of directed verdict affirmed; sufficient evidence supported each element, so the claim properly went to the jury.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Alienation of affections liability is not limited to the lover; a facilitating third party can be liable if they actively encourage or orchestrate the affair.
“Malice” can be shown by intentional acts likely to affect the marriage; the conduct need not be solely motivated by spite nor be the sole cause.
Evidence of threats, interference with spousal communication, arranging secret meetings, and exploiting intoxication supports wrongful/malicious causation.
Even partial loss of affection suffices; reconciliation attempts do not negate earlier alienation.

Bell v. Mozley, 216 N.C. App. 540; 716 S.E.2d 868 (2011)

Facts:
Plaintiff Robert Bell and Defendant James Mozley were both residents of Beaufort County, South Carolina. Bell also owned a second home in Blowing Rock, Caldwell County, North Carolina. Bell alleged that Mozley engaged in an affair with his wife, Lisa, constituting alienation of affection and criminal conversation. In Dec. 2006, Mozley and his wife visited the Bells’ Blowing Rock home for New Year’s. Bell left with a sick child, leaving Lisa with the Mozleys. Later, Bell claimed marital difficulties began after this visit. In July 2007, while at the Blowing Rock home, Lisa called Mozley’s home three times and spoke to him for five minutes. In July 2008, Bell found a bottle of vaginal lubricant in Lisa’s bedside table at the Blowing Rock home. Mozley admitted sexual relations with Lisa in South Carolina, New York, California, and Hawaii, but denied intercourse in North Carolina. Bell admitted he had no direct evidence of sexual relations in North Carolina and that all witnesses were South Carolina residents. Mozley’s NC ties were through his job with Crescent Resources, where he traveled to NC for business up to six times per year and oversaw development projects in Burke County and Lake Norman. Trial court denied Mozley’s motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; he appealed.

Issue:
Whether North Carolina courts had personal jurisdiction over a South Carolina defendant in an alienation of affection/criminal conversation case when both parties resided in South Carolina and nearly all alleged conduct occurred outside North Carolina.

Rule:
To exercise personal jurisdiction, defendant must have minimum contacts with NC so that maintaining the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Specific jurisdiction requires the cause of action arise out of forum contacts; general jurisdiction requires continuous and systematic contacts plus fairness. Courts apply a five-factor test: (1) quantity of contacts; (2) nature/quality; (3) connection of cause of action; (4) forum state’s interest; (5) convenience. See Eluhu v. Rosenhaus (2003).

Analysis:
Specific jurisdiction was lacking because the NC connections were tenuous (one three-day holiday visit, a five-minute phone call, lubricant discovery). No direct evidence of intercourse or alienating conduct in NC existed. General jurisdiction was not proper either. While Mozley’s business contacts with NC were continuous and systematic, they were unrelated to the affair. Both parties lived in SC, nearly all conduct and witnesses were in SC, and SC abolished AOA/CC. Under Eluhu, NC’s interest was weak and plaintiff’s filing in NC suggested forum-shopping. Litigating in NC would inconvenience defendant without countervailing NC interests.

Conclusion:
North Carolina courts lacked personal jurisdiction; trial court’s order denying dismissal was reversed.

Key Takeaways:

Business contacts alone do not justify PJ for unrelated personal torts.
Specific PJ requires concrete proof of NC-based acts of adultery or alienation.
When both parties are nonresidents and the situs state abolished AOA/CC, NC courts view such filings as forum-shopping.
Defendants should challenge PJ early; plaintiffs must tie conduct squarely to NC to survive.

Bell v. Mozley and Alienation of Affection — Interplay

Bell v. Mozley does not change the substantive elements of Alienation of Affection (AOA), but it is a key procedural case on jurisdiction.

Jurisdictional Barrier: AOA is recognized in North Carolina but abolished in South Carolina, where both parties lived. The Court of Appeals held NC courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction because the relationship and conduct were overwhelmingly tied to South Carolina.
Transitory Tort Concept: AOA is considered a transitory tort (it can be litigated wherever jurisdiction exists). However, the court stressed that NC cannot be used as a fallback forum when the marriage and affair have no meaningful NC connection. Filing in NC in that situation was deemed forum-shopping.
Minimum Contacts Applied: Plaintiff relied on Mozley’s NC business trips and a single social visit to Blowing Rock. The court ruled these were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction tied to the affair. General jurisdiction based on business activity was also rejected because the affair was unrelated to those contacts.
Practical Effect on AOA Claims: The case reinforces that plaintiffs must prove a substantial North Carolina nexus—either that the alienating acts occurred in NC or that the marital relationship was rooted here. Without that, the claim will be dismissed regardless of the underlying merits.

Bottom Line: Bell v. Mozley acts as a jurisdictional gatekeeper. It confirms alienation of affections survives in North Carolina, but only when the forum has a real connection to the alleged alienation. Business ties or incidental visits are not enough.

Miller v. Szilagyi, 221 N.C. App. 79, 726 S.E.2d 873 (2012)

Facts:
Plaintiff Vaughn Scott Miller (then a Surry County, NC resident; later moved to KY) sought to buy Florida healthcare businesses and related Florida real estate from James and Mary Thompson. On July 19, 2006, Miller and Richard Hadden (not a party) entered a First Agreement with the Thompsons to purchase Healthmark entities (Florida corporations operating only in Florida), JTMT, LLP partnership assets, a hospital annex building, and land. Miller wired/mailed a $360,000 deposit to the Thompsons’ Florida attorney; $50,000 was nonrefundable, $310,000 refundable in specified circumstances. The First Agreement never closed; on Feb. 7, 2007, the Thompsons declared it expired and kept the full $360,000. Later, on Apr. 7, 2008, the Thompsons entered a Second Agreement to sell Healthmark stock to Doctors Hospital of DeFuniak Springs, Inc., a North Carolina corporation headquartered in Surry County; Miller was its VP/director. On Apr. 14–15, 2008, a Third Agreement for the same sale circulated; Miller signed as VP in Surry County; the Thompsons signed the next day. None of these later agreements were parties to this lawsuit. On Mar. 28, 2011, Miller sued the Thompsons (and others) in Surry County to recover the refundable $310,000 from the First Agreement. The complaint contained no explicit personal-jurisdiction allegations. The Thompsons (Florida residents) moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), submitting affidavits averring they had no NC contacts, had never come to NC for these deals, and that performance was in Florida. Miller countered with affidavits listing calls/emails/faxes and pointing to the NC bank check and his NC residency. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Thompsons; Miller appealed.

Issue:
Whether North Carolina courts had specific personal jurisdiction over Florida sellers (the Thompsons) in Miller’s contract claim to recover a deposit from a Florida-centered asset/stock sale where negotiations and performance were centered in Florida.

Rule:
Two-step: (1) NC long-arm statute; (2) due process—minimum contacts such that exercising jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Specific jurisdiction requires purposeful availment and that the cause of action arises from or relates to the defendant’s forum-directed activities. Minimum-contacts factors: (1) quantity of contacts; (2) nature/quality; (3) connection between contacts and cause of action; (4) forum interest; (5) convenience. Mere contracts or communications with a NC resident are not automatically sufficient; defendant’s performance and purposeful entry into the NC market matter. See Burger King; Tom Togs; Charter Medical; Skinner.

Analysis:
Long-arm: satisfied under § 1-75.4(5)(d) because the Thompsons directed Miller to send a “thing of value” (money via check from a NC account) to their Florida attorney. Due process: not satisfied. Specific jurisdiction fails because the First Agreement—the only agreement at issue—was a Florida transaction: Florida corporations and property; signed/notarized in Florida; performance in Florida; Thompsons never traveled to NC for it; Healthmark/JTMT did no business or solicitation in NC (save a 2005 equipment purchase). Miller initiated contact with the Thompsons in Florida. The later Second/Third Agreements (2008) with a NC corporation are irrelevant to this claim (the suit seeks the $310k refund under the 2006 First Agreement, and Doctors Hospital is not a party). The phone/email/fax communications into NC are insufficient absent purposeful availment; unlike Brown v. Ellis (AOA/CC), where frequent NC-directed communications facilitated the tort, these communications did not show the Thompsons entered the NC market or invoked NC’s protections for the First Agreement. Factors 1–3 weigh against jurisdiction (limited, attenuated contacts; Florida-centered performance; weak nexus to NC); factor 4 (forum interest) is modest in a Florida deal; factor 5 (convenience) disfavors haling Florida sellers to NC. Thus, exercising jurisdiction would offend fair play and substantial justice.

Conclusion:
No specific personal jurisdiction over the Thompsons. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned:

Contracts alone aren’t enough: when a contract is negotiated/executed/performed outside NC and defendant never entered NC or the NC market, specific jurisdiction will fail.
Forum-directed communications (calls/emails) must reflect purposeful availment tied to the claim; volume alone isn’t dispositive.
Keep the claim tethered: only contacts tied to the specific agreement/claim count; later, different agreements—even with NC entities—won’t bootstrap PJ for an earlier Florida deal.
Plaintiffs should build a record of NC-centered performance obligations, negotiation acts in NC, NC choice-of-law/venue clauses, and defendant’s entry into NC markets.
Defendants should segment transactions and show situs of performance, execution, and assets to defeat PJ.

Here’s the clean analysis of how Miller v. Szilagyi fits into the Alienation of Affection (AOA) framework, even though the case itself was a business dispute:

1. Same Legal Terrain — Personal Jurisdiction.
Like Bell v. Mozley, Miller v. Szilagyi is not an alienation of affections case. It’s a contract case. But the personal jurisdiction analysis applies the same principles AOA defendants often raise. AOA suits often involve out-of-state defendants (the alleged lover) and the key fight is whether NC courts can exercise jurisdiction. Miller reinforces that out-of-state defendants can win dismissal when their contacts with NC are too attenuated.

2. Limiting “minimum contacts.”
In Miller, the plaintiff argued that contracts with a NC resident, payments from a NC bank, and communications into NC were enough. The Court of Appeals disagreed:

Contacts must show purposeful availment (the defendant reaching into NC, not plaintiff pulling them in).
Mere contracts, phone calls, or emails don’t suffice if the substance of the relationship is elsewhere.
This parallels AOA cases, where the plaintiff may point to texts, calls, or brief NC visits. Miller shows courts require a substantial NC connection, not just incidental communications.

3. Contrast with Brown v. Ellis.
In Brown, personal jurisdiction in an AOA/CC case was upheld where there were daily calls/emails into NC, meetings arranged, and adultery tied to those communications. That was purposeful availment. Miller, by contrast, rejected PJ when the calls/emails were incidental to a Florida-centered deal.
So: repeated NC-directed communications can matter in AOA, but only if they directly relate to the tort (wooing the spouse in NC).

4. Guard against forum-shopping.
Just as in Bell v. Mozley, Miller underscores that NC courts won’t allow plaintiffs to bootstrap jurisdiction when the real locus is out-of-state. For AOA claims, this means: if the marriage, affair, and defendants are tied to another state (especially one that abolished AOA), NC courts scrutinize jurisdiction claims closely.

Bottom Line:
Miller v. Szilagyi reinforces the jurisdictional gatekeeping function in NC tort law. For Alienation of Affection suits, it’s a reminder that:

Plaintiffs must tether the alienation to North Carolina conduct.
Defendants can defeat jurisdiction by showing the relationship and acts were centered outside NC, even if there were contracts, payments, or communications touching NC.
Courts distinguish between incidental NC contacts (Miller) and purposeful NC-directed misconduct (Brown).

Smith v. Drumm, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1380, 224 N.C. App. 225, 735 S.E.2d 633 (2012) (unpublished)

Facts:
Daniel Smith (plaintiff) and his wife were long-married South Carolina residents. Defendant Drumm and plaintiff’s wife had dated and been engaged decades earlier. Around March 2009, while plaintiff’s wife was in Mecklenburg County, NC, caring for her mother in the hospital, Drumm re-established contact. Plaintiff alleged Drumm began telephoning plaintiff’s wife and meeting her weekly in North Carolina (often in Mecklenburg County), where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Defendant resided in Charlotte, NC, until July 2009, when he moved to Clover, SC. Plaintiff’s wife admitted the affair in June 2009. The marriage ended in divorce. Plaintiff sued in Mecklenburg County Superior Court for alienation of affection and criminal conversation. Drumm moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (2), and (6). The trial court denied dismissal; Drumm appealed.

Issue:
Whether North Carolina courts had personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an AOA/CC case where the marriage was based in South Carolina, but the defendant resided in NC at the relevant time and the alleged wrongful acts (calls, meetings, sexual relations) occurred in NC.

Rule:

N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4 (long-arm statute) confers jurisdiction where an action claims injury to person/property arising out of acts in NC. AOA and CC qualify as “injury to person” under the statute.
Due process requires “minimum contacts” such that suit in NC does not offend fair play and substantial justice. Contacts may support specific jurisdiction if the claims arise out of the defendant’s forum conduct.

Analysis:

Long-arm statute: satisfied. Allegations claimed injury to marriage caused by defendant’s acts (soliciting, meeting, having sex) in NC.
Minimum contacts: plaintiff alleged defendant was a NC resident at the time, lived in Charlotte, initiated calls from NC, and met/engaged in sexual intercourse with plaintiff’s wife in NC. These acts formed the basis of the AOA/CC claims. That nexus distinguished this case from Bell v. Mozley and Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, where out-of-state defendants and affairs occurring outside NC doomed jurisdiction.
Defendant’s later move to SC did not erase the fact that the tortious acts occurred in NC. NC’s interest in adjudicating torts arising from conduct within its borders was strong. Requiring defendant to defend suit in NC did not violate due process.
Forum shopping/public policy argument: rejected. Plaintiff had a sufficient NC nexus; not mere forum shopping like Bell.

Conclusion:
North Carolina courts properly exercised jurisdiction over Drumm. Denial of motion to dismiss affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned:

Smith v. Drumm shows the flip side of Bell v. Mozley: when the defendant resides in NC during the affair and the adulterous acts occur in NC, personal jurisdiction exists even if the marriage is based in another state that abolished AOA/CC.
Establishing where the affair occurred is critical. NC courts will hear cases if the alienation or sexual conduct is rooted in NC, regardless of where the marital home was.
Defendants moving out of NC after the fact won’t shield them from NC jurisdiction if the wrongful acts happened while they lived or acted here.
For plaintiffs, plead and prove the NC contacts clearly: calls, meetings, residences, and physical intercourse in NC.

Smith v. Drumm’s contribution to Alienation of Affection (AoA) case law is largely jurisdictional, but it is an important counterbalance to cases like Bell v. Mozley and Eluhu v. Rosenhaus. Here’s the significance:

Confirms NC jurisdiction when the affair occurs in North Carolina.
- In Drumm, the defendant was living in Charlotte at the time of the alleged affair. The complaint alleged he solicited the plaintiff’s wife in NC, met her weekly in NC, and engaged in sexual intercourse in NC.
- The Court of Appeals held these contacts were enough for specific jurisdiction, even though the marriage itself was based in South Carolina (a state that abolished AoA).
Distinguishes forum-shopping cases.
- In Bell and Eluhu, NC courts refused to hear cases where both parties were out-of-state residents and the adulterous conduct occurred primarily elsewhere.
- Drumm shows the other side: if the affair touches NC directly (residence here, meetings here, sexual acts here), the case may proceed.
Strengthens the principle that AoA/CC are “injury to person” under NC’s long-arm statute.
- The court reaffirmed that these torts qualify as “injury to person” under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4(3). This cements the statutory basis for bringing such claims in NC when the injury arises from acts here.
Public policy argument rejected.
- Defendant argued that because the marriage was in South Carolina, allowing the claim in NC violated public policy and invited forum-shopping.
- The court disagreed, stressing that NC has an interest in regulating conduct within its borders, even if the marital home was elsewhere.

Contribution in short:
Smith v. Drumm reinforces that North Carolina will not close its doors to out-of-state marriages if the defendant’s wrongful conduct occurred in NC. It provides plaintiffs with a pathway to sue in NC when the affair has a genuine NC nexus, and it signals that courts will not dismiss such claims as forum-shopping if the adulterous acts themselves happened in NC.

Rushing v. Barron, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 972, 222 N.C. App. 317, 729 S.E.2d 730 (2012) (unpublished)

Facts:
Dr. Janice Rushing sued her father (Dr. John Barron) and brother (William Barron) after years of family estrangement and being excluded from inheritance. Mother (Nelle) executed a will and revocable trust excluding plaintiff; mother died in 2004. Plaintiff filed a 2006 caveat to the will and a civil action alleging: defamation, civil conspiracy, IIED, breach of fiduciary duty, UDTPA, to set aside conveyances, injunctive relief, punitive damages, and fees—asserting father/brother “turned her mother against her.” Trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on all but one defamation statement against the father; after trial on that count, father prevailed. Court also awarded ~$42k in attorney’s fees against plaintiff for improper purpose.

Issue:
Whether plaintiff’s non-spousal “alienation” theory can sustain a civil conspiracy claim; whether her remaining tort and trust-related claims survive summary judgment; whether fees were proper.

Rule:

No independent civil conspiracy—requires an underlying unlawful act.
Alienation of affection in NC protects only the spousal relationship; NC has never recognized alienation of parental/filial affection.
IIED requires extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe distress.
Trust contest limitations: N.C.G.S. § 36C-6-604 (3 years from settlor’s death, or 120 days with notice).
UDTPA requires conduct “in or affecting commerce,” aimed at protecting the consuming public.
Defamation one-year statute of limitations (N.C.G.S. § 1-54(3)).
Punitive damages require compensatory liability plus an aggravating factor (N.C.G.S. § 1D-15).
Rule 11 fees for improper purpose.

Analysis:

Civil conspiracy: Fails because the alleged “underlying wrong” was “alienation of a mother’s affection,” which NC does not recognize outside the marital context; without an actionable tort, conspiracy cannot lie.
IIED: Alleged conduct—exclusion from family functions, being treated as if she didn’t exist—was hurtful but not “atrocious” or “utterly intolerable”; no extreme/outageous conduct shown.
Set aside conveyances / Injunction: Time-barred under § 36C-6-604; action filed in 2008, mother died in 2004.
UDTPA: Family trust/property transfers were private transactions, not “in or affecting commerce”; statute targets business/consumer practices.
Defamation: All alleged statements time-barred except one 12/8/2007 statement; that lone claim proceeded to trial and defendant won.
Punitive damages: No surviving substantive tort → no basis for punitives.
Motions to continue/stay: Interlocutory; denial within discretion.
Attorney’s fees: Affirmed under Rule 11; court found suit brought for an improper purpose to harass family.

Conclusion:
All summary judgments for defendants affirmed; denial of stay/continuance affirmed; Rule 11 attorney’s fees affirmed; plaintiff takes nothing.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned (AOA/CC Project Relevance):

Scope limiter: NC alienation of affection protects spouses only. Attempts to extend “alienation” to parent–child or other familial relations won’t support an underlying tort (and thus won’t support civil conspiracy).
Pleading strategy: Do not frame non-spousal family disputes as “alienation” torts; they will be dismissed.
Procedural guardrails: Watch SOLs—defamation (1 year) and trust contests (§ 36C-6-604).
UDTPA boundary: Intrafamily estate/trust maneuvers are generally outside “commerce.”

Rushing v. Barron (2012) is important to Alienation of Affection (AoA) law because it draws a clear boundary line around the tort.

Here’s why it matters:

Confirms AoA is a strictly spousal tort.
- The plaintiff (a daughter) tried to allege that her father and brother had engaged in a conspiracy to “alienate her mother’s affection” and disinherit her.
- The Court of Appeals held flatly: North Carolina has never recognized alienation of affection in any relationship other than that of spouses.
- The tort exists only to protect the marital relationship, not parent–child, sibling, or any other family ties.
Blocks attempts to expand AoA beyond marriage.
- By rejecting a “parental alienation of affection” theory, the court shut the door on importing AoA into estate fights, custody battles, or inheritance disputes.
- This preserves AoA as a narrowly cabined tort, rather than a catch-all for hurt family relationships.
Civil conspiracy context.
- The plaintiff’s “civil conspiracy” claim failed because conspiracy requires an underlying unlawful act. Since “alienation of a parent’s affection” isn’t recognized, there was no tort to support conspiracy.
- That reasoning reinforces AoA’s limited scope and prevents backdoor expansion through conspiracy claims.
Practical importance.
- Litigants in family disputes sometimes look for ways to weaponize AoA theories outside the adultery context. Rushing is a cautionary case: courts will not stretch AoA beyond the spousal bond.

Bottom line:
Rushing v. Barron is important to AoA case law because it reaffirms that Alienation of Affection is a marriage-only tort in North Carolina. It cannot be applied to parents, children, or other relatives, and attempts to repackage family estrangement as AoA or conspiracy will be dismissed.

Quackenbush v. Steelman, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 1104; 230 N.C. App. 410; 753 S.E.2d 399 (2013) (unpublished)

Facts:
Arlene Quackenbush (plaintiff) and her husband were New Jersey residents. Defendant Steelman was also a New Jersey resident. Plaintiff alleged that Steelman began pursuing her husband in 2009, starting with a meeting at Bike Week in Florida. There, Steelman seduced plaintiff’s husband and began a sexual relationship. On the drive back north, Steelman and the husband stopped in Dunn, North Carolina. They had dinner, where Steelman pressed him to leave his wife, and then stayed overnight at a Comfort Inn. They allegedly had sexual intercourse twice in Dunn. Afterwards, the husband moved in with Steelman in New Jersey, filed for divorce, and bought her gifts, though he later reconciled with plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an alienation of affection and criminal conversation suit in Wake County, NC, claiming NC jurisdiction because of the intercourse and solicitations in Dunn. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed.

Issue:
Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a New Jersey defendant in an AOA/CC suit based on an eighteen-hour stopover in North Carolina, during which intercourse and statements occurred, when the parties otherwise had no ties to NC?

Rule:

Jurisdiction requires (1) statutory basis (long-arm statute), and (2) due process—sufficient minimum contacts such that suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (International Shoe).
Relevant factors: quantity, nature/quality of contacts, connection of cause of action to contacts, forum interest, convenience.
Alienation of affections requires proof of a genuine marriage, alienation of affection, and wrongful acts producing the alienation. Criminal conversation requires proof of intercourse during the marriage.

Analysis:

Contacts: Defendant’s NC contact was limited to a single overnight in Dunn (≈18 hours). Quantity was minimal.
AOA claim: Alleged alienation was already underway in Florida before NC; thus, the “cause” of alienation was not tied to NC.
CC claim: Intercourse in NC could technically satisfy the elements. But due process requires more than a single, fleeting contact.
Forum interest/convenience: All parties were New Jersey residents; the marriage was based in NJ; nearly all conduct occurred in Florida/NJ. Trying the case in NC would be inconvenient. The NC nexus was “tenuous.”
Comparison: The Court relied on Bell v. Mozley and Eluhu v. Rosenhaus, where NC jurisdiction was rejected when most of the affair and marriage were centered out of state. It distinguished Brown v. Ellis (daily NC communications, purposeful NC contacts) and Smith v. Drumm (defendant resident in NC, affair in NC).

Conclusion:
The trial court correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant’s brief NC stop was too attenuated to justify haling her into NC court.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned:

NC courts require more than a “drive-through” contact. A single overnight stop with sexual activity in NC is insufficient to confer PJ when the relationship and parties are based elsewhere.
AOA claims especially require nexus: Alienation already occurring outside NC weakens any NC claim.
CC claims are not enough on their own: Even if intercourse happens in NC, due process limits PJ where the contacts are isolated and the overall relationship has no NC ties.
Forum shopping guardrail: This decision prevents non-residents from dragging out-of-state lovers into NC court solely because of a brief visit.

Quackenbush v. Steelman (2013) is important to Alienation of Affection (AoA) case law because it illustrates the limits of North Carolina’s jurisdiction in heart-balm actions.

Here’s the significance:

NC won’t take every case just because one act occurred here.
- Plaintiff (from New Jersey) alleged her husband and defendant paramour had sex during a single overnight stop in Dunn, NC.
- The Court of Appeals said that was too isolated and tenuous to justify personal jurisdiction. Even though criminal conversation can be proven by a single act of intercourse, due process still requires substantial NC connections.
AOA must be tied to NC conduct.
- The alleged “alienation” had begun earlier in Florida and continued in New Jersey. The court reasoned that NC’s connection was incidental, not the source of the alienation.
- This shows NC courts want more than a “drive-through” contact to anchor AoA jurisdiction.
Forum-shopping safeguard.
- All parties lived in New Jersey, the marriage was based in New Jersey, and the relationship unfolded mainly in Florida and New Jersey.
- The Court echoed Bell v. Mozley and Eluhu v. Rosenhaus: plaintiffs can’t pick NC as a forum just because NC still allows AoA/CC.
Balanced against other cases.
- Contrast Brown v. Ellis (daily NC calls/emails, strong NC nexus → jurisdiction upheld) and Smith v. Drumm (defendant lived in NC, acts in NC → jurisdiction upheld).
- Quackenbush sets the outer boundary: brief, incidental contacts aren’t enough.

Bottom line:
Quackenbush v. Steelman is important because it clarifies that while NC still recognizes alienation of affection and criminal conversation, the forum will not entertain cases with only fleeting connections to North Carolina. Plaintiffs must show that the wrongful acts were rooted in NC, not just passing through.

Puryear v. Puryear, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 420, 233 N.C. App. 787, 759 S.E.2d 713 (2014) (unpublished)

Facts:
Carol Puryear sued her husband’s former fiancée, Betty (Beverly) Carlton Puryear, for Alienation of Affection (AOA) and Criminal Conversation (CC). Husband and defendant reconnected at his father’s funeral (July 17, 2007); an affair began within a month; spouses separated Nov. 2007; divorce Jan. 23, 2009. Plaintiff filed AOA/CC Jan. 13, 2009. Defendant answered/counterclaimed, then stopped participating: ignored discovery, violated an order compelling responses (fees $1,625), counsel moved to withdraw, defendant withdrew her answer and counterclaims, and the court entered default (Sept. 13, 2010). Defendant failed to appear on an order to show cause re unpaid fees ($1,900 contempt fee), then physically came to the courthouse on the damages bench trial date but left after confirming she could waive appearance. The court entered $10,000,000 compensatory and $20,000,000 punitive damages (May 15, 2013). Defendant appealed.

Issues:

Whether constitutional attacks on alienation of affections / criminal conversation (and on the judgment) were preserved.
Whether NC courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction because AOA/CC are unconstitutional.
Whether the trial court erred in the present-value calculation of damages.

Rules:

Issues not raised below are not preserved for appeal (N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1)).
AOA and CC are common-law torts recognized by the NC Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals cannot abolish them (Cannon v. Miller (1985) (Cannon II) vacating the COA’s abolition; Nunn v. Allen (2002)).
Constitutional challenges, even if meritorious, do not deprive courts of subject-matter jurisdiction; they go to the merits, not power to hear the case.
Arguments unsupported by authority or developed reasoning are abandoned (App. R. 28(b)(6)).

Analysis:

Most constitutional arguments (due process/excessive damages/etc.) were not raised in the trial court → dismissed on appeal for lack of preservation.
The “no subject-matter jurisdiction because AOA/CC are unconstitutional” theory fails: NC appellate precedent binds; only the Supreme Court or legislature can abolish; even if unconstitutional, courts would deny on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction.
Damages present-value methodology challenge was undeveloped and unsupported by authority → abandoned.
Defendant’s litigation conduct (withdrawing pleadings, ignoring orders, not appearing) justified default; the appeal did not properly attack the default or damages findings with preserved, supported assignments of error.

Conclusion:
Appeal dismissed; the $30 million default judgment (alienation of affections and criminal conversation) stands.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned (AOA/CC practice):

AOA & CC remain viable in North Carolina; intermediate courts will not abolish them.
Preservation is everything: constitutional and damages arguments must be raised below and briefed with authority.
Default is deadly: withdrawing an answer and refusing to participate can lead to massive AOA/CC judgments that are hard to unwind on appeal.
Subject-matter jurisdiction isn’t the escape hatch: claims that a tort is unconstitutional don’t strip jurisdiction.
For defense: aggressively litigate preservation, move to set aside default timely with competent grounds, and build a record on damages.
For plaintiffs: enforce discovery, seek sanctions where appropriate, and prove damages meticulously; appellate attack windows are narrow if the defense defaults.

Puryear v. Puryear (2014) is important to Alienation of Affection (AoA) case law for three reasons:

Confirms survival of AoA and CC in North Carolina.
- The defendant argued that Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation were unconstitutional relics and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them.
- The Court of Appeals rejected this outright, pointing to Cannon v. Miller (1985) and Nunn v. Allen (2002): these are common-law causes of action recognized by the NC Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals cannot abolish them. Only the NC Supreme Court or the legislature could do that.
- This makes Puryear another modern reaffirmation that heart-balm torts remain alive in NC, despite policy attacks.
Shows the consequences of default and non-participation.
- Defendant essentially abandoned her defense—ignored discovery, withdrew pleadings, skipped hearings.
- The trial court entered default, then imposed a massive $30 million judgment ($10M compensatory, $20M punitive).
- On appeal, the defendant’s constitutional and damages challenges were mostly dismissed as unpreserved. The judgment stood.
- Lesson: In AoA cases, defaulting is extremely risky; courts will uphold large verdicts if defendants fail to engage.
Clarifies jurisdictional argument.
- The Court made clear that even if a cause of action were unconstitutional, that does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction—it would go to the merits.
- Thus, constitutional attacks are not a jurisdictional escape hatch. Defendants must preserve them properly at trial.

Bottom line:
Puryear v. Puryear matters because it reinforces that Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation are still enforceable in North Carolina, it warns defendants that procedural defaults can yield ruinous judgments, and it blocks the argument that AoA’s controversial nature strips NC courts of jurisdiction. It is often cited as a cautionary tale in modern AoA litigation.

Shackelford v. Lundquist, 233 N.C. App. 787, 759 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. Ct. App. May 6, 2014) (unpublished)

Facts
Cynthia Shackelford (Plaintiff) and her husband, Allan Shackelford, married in 1972 and had two children. Plaintiff alleged that while still married, Allan began an affair with Anne Lundquist (Defendant), starting as early as November 2004. On November 9, 2007, Plaintiff filed suit in Guilford County for Alienation of Affection (AoA), Criminal Conversation (CC), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), demanding a jury trial.

Defendant (residing in Aurora, NY) was served November 20, 2007. She did not hire counsel or file an answer. She mailed a pro se motion for extension (dated Dec. 18, 2007; filed Dec. 27, 2007), which the Clerk rejected as late. Defendant wrote the Clerk on Jan. 14, 2008, asking how to cure; the Clerk replied she should consult an attorney. On Jan. 22, 2008, Defendant mailed a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, but she never calendared it for hearing. She wrote again on Feb. 11, 2008, saying she could not afford counsel and asking for “simple direction.” There is no record response.

Nearly two years passed. In November 2009, Defendant received notice the case was on a December 2009 Clean-Up Calendar. She took no action before the Dec. 11, 2009 hearing (at which Plaintiff’s counsel appeared and no one appeared for Defendant). The court set the case for jury trial in March 2010. By at least Feb. 19, 2010, Defendant had actual notice of the March setting. On March 1, 2010, she filed an Emergency Motion for Continuance, asking for time to answer, complete academic job responsibilities, gather documents, and arrange witnesses; she also asked the court to rule on her 2008 Rule 12 motion (again without calendaring it). She remained unrepresented.

Trial proceeded March 15–16, 2010 with no appearance by Defendant. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on AoA, CC, and IIED, awarding $5,000,000 compensatory and $4,000,000 punitive. Judgment entered March 19, 2010.

On March 25, 2010, Defendant retained counsel and moved under Rules 52, 59, and 60 to vacate the orders and judgment, or alternatively reduce damages to $1.00, arguing lack of notice and constitutional defects in AoA/CC. On April 9, 2013, the trial court denied all relief. Defendant appealed.

Issues

Were Defendant’s constitutional challenges to AoA/CC preserved?
Did alleged unconstitutionality of AoA/CC deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Continuance?
Did the court err in denying post-trial relief under Rules 52, 59, and 60 for lack of notice/due process?
Did the trial court err by failing to rule on Defendant’s un-calendared 2008 Rule 12(b) motion?

Rule

Appellate preservation: Issues must be raised below and ruled upon. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
Subject-matter jurisdiction vs. constitutionality: Courts decide constitutional validity on the merits; an unconstitutional statute does not defeat jurisdiction. See, e.g., Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170 (2003); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, 347 F.3d 72, 82 (3d Cir. 2003).
Continuances: Granted only on motion, for good cause, within the trial court’s sound discretion. N.C. R. Civ. P. 40(b). Abuse of discretion standard; movant must show diligence and that substantial justice requires a continuance.
Post-judgment relief: Rule 59/60 relief requires showing of error, excusable neglect, or extraordinary circumstances; failure to obtain counsel is not excusable neglect. See Creasman v. Creasman, 152 N.C. App. 119 (2002).
Calendaring/rulings: A party cannot complain a court failed to rule on a motion never calendared for hearing.

Analysis / Reasoning

Preservation: Defendant’s first, second, fourth, and fifth appellate arguments sounded in constitutional challenges to AoA/CC but were never presented to or ruled upon by the trial court. Under Rule 10(a)(1), they were not preserved and were dismissed.
Subject-matter jurisdiction: Defendant reframed the constitutional attack as a jurisdictional defect. The Court rejected that as a matter of law: even if AoA/CC were unconstitutional (an issue the Court of Appeals lacked authority to declare contrary to Cannon v. Miller), that would be a merits question, not jurisdictional. Thus, no jurisdictional defect; the argument was abandoned/unavailing.
Continuance: The record showed prolonged lack of diligence. After service (Nov. 2007), Defendant filed a late extension request, received direction to consult counsel, filed a Rule 12 motion but never calendared it, and then was inactive for almost two years. After the Clean-Up Calendar notice (Nov. 2009), she again took no action before the Dec. 11 hearing. After learning in February 2010 of the March trial setting, she waited several days past the calendar call to file an “emergency” continuance, still without counsel and relying on a five-page letter to opposing counsel. The court emphasized that parties must give litigation the attention a prudent person gives important business; continuances are disfavored, and Defendant showed neither good cause nor due diligence. Denial of the continuance was within discretion; no due-process violation.
Rules 52/59/60: Her claim of “no notice whatsoever” failed on the same diligence grounds. Any lack of awareness of dates resulted from her own choices (not calendaring motions, not hiring counsel, not responding promptly). Failure to obtain counsel is not excusable neglect. Denial of post-trial relief was proper.
Un-ruled 12(b) motion: Defendant never noticed or calendared her 2008 Rule 12 motion. A litigant cannot fault the court for not ruling on a motion that was never brought on for hearing. No error.

Conclusion / Holding
Affirmed. The Court of Appeals found no error: unpreserved constitutional challenges dismissed; no subject-matter jurisdiction defect; no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance; proper denial of Rule 52/59/60 relief; and no error in failing to rule on an un-calendared motion.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Preserve, or lose it. Constitutional attacks on AoA/CC (or any claim) must be raised and ruled on in the trial court to reach the Court of Appeals.
Unconstitutionality ≠ no jurisdiction. Even if a statute were unconstitutional, that would go to the merits, not the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Continuances demand diligence. Long inaction, late “emergency” motions, and proceeding pro se without timely effort to obtain counsel are classic grounds to deny a continuance.
Post-judgment relief is narrow. Failure to hire counsel or to monitor the docket is not excusable neglect under Rules 59/60.
Calendar your motions. A Rule 12(b) motion that is never noticed or calendared will not be ruled upon, and the absence of a ruling is not error.
Practical AoA/CC note: Massive verdicts (here, $9 million) can and do stand when defendants default functionally through non-participation; due-process arguments fail where the record shows actual notice opportunities and lack of diligence by the defendant.

Shackelford v. Lundquist matters to Alienation of Affection (AoA) case law for several reasons:

Huge Verdicts Still Stand
- The jury awarded $9 million total ($5M compensatory, $4M punitive) against the alleged paramour.
- The Court of Appeals let it stand, reinforcing that North Carolina juries will award — and appellate courts will uphold — massive AoA/CC verdicts when the defendant defaults or fails to mount a real defense.
Unconstitutionality Arguments Fail
- The defendant tried to argue that AoA and Criminal Conversation are unconstitutional.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the argument for two reasons:
  - It wasn’t preserved at trial.
  - Even if it had been, unconstitutionality doesn’t strip subject-matter jurisdiction — the trial court can still hear the case unless and until the Supreme Court abolishes the torts (which it hasn’t).
- This continues the pattern seen in Cannon v. Miller and later Malecek v. Williams: constitutional attacks on AoA/CC won’t work at the appellate level unless properly raised, and even then, the courts are unwilling to abolish the torts without legislative action.
Procedural Diligence is Key
- The defendant here ignored the case for nearly two years, filed late motions, never calendared her Rule 12(b) motion, and waited until the last second to request a continuance.
- The Court held that a litigant must treat litigation with the same seriousness as important personal business. If you don’t participate, you don’t get a second chance.
Practical Lesson for AoA Defendants
- If you are sued for alienation of affection or criminal conversation in NC, you must appear, hire counsel, and actively defend.
- Otherwise, you risk a catastrophic default-type judgment, like here.
Broader Doctrinal Significance
- Shackelford shows that AoA/CC remain powerful, enforceable torts in NC, capable of producing eye-popping verdicts, despite academic and constitutional criticisms.
- It also highlights how procedural missteps (like not preserving arguments or calendaring motions) can lock in liability.

👉 In short: Shackelford v. Lundquist matters because it reaffirms both the substantive survival of alienation of affection and the practical danger of ignoring such suits. It’s often cited in commentary as proof that AoA cases in North Carolina are not just relics — they can still devastate defendants financially if taken lightly.

Willis v. Willis, 242 N.C. App. 385, 776 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. Ct. App. July 21, 2015) (unpublished)

Facts
Zona Willis (plaintiff) married Thomas (“Tom”) Willis in 1974. On December 30–31, 2011, Tom told plaintiff he wasn’t coming home. The trial court set the separation date as December 31, 2011. Plaintiff later learned Tom had been having an affair with Marilyn Willis (defendant), who resided in Charleston, South Carolina. On January 2, 2012, defendant changed her Facebook status to “engaged.” On February 7, 2013, plaintiff and Tom divorced. Two days later, on February 9, 2013, Tom and defendant married in Laurinburg, North Carolina. Plaintiff filed suit in November 2013 for Alienation of Affection (AoA), Criminal Conversation (CC), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). Defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2), (3), and (4), claiming lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service. Key evidence included ~140 phone calls between Oct. 31–Dec. 10, 2011, with many calls made by defendant to Tom while he was in Moore County, NC. The trial court found these were personal. Defendant admitted in her deposition she visited Tom in Pinehurst “many, many times,” and “more than likely” had sex with him at a Pinehurst condo between March and September 2012. Tom testified that sexual relations began in March 2012. The trial court found service proper under Rule 4(j)(1a) and held that defendant’s actions satisfied North Carolina’s long-arm statute (§ 1-75.4) and due process. It denied dismissal and compelled discovery. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant (South Carolina paramour) in an AoA/CC/IIED action?
Did compelling discovery violate defendant’s rights absent jurisdiction?

Rule
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 allows jurisdiction over acts or omissions causing injury to a North Carolina resident, including acts committed outside NC if they cause injury in NC and involve solicitation or services directed into NC.

AoA requires: (1) a happy marriage with genuine love and affection, (2) alienation/destruction of that affection, (3) caused by defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts.

CC requires proof of sexual intercourse between defendant and plaintiff’s spouse before separation (per G.S. § 52-13(a), effective 2009). Post-separation conduct cannot create liability, though it can corroborate pre-separation acts.

Due process requires “minimum contacts” that don’t offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; arguments unsupported by authority are deemed abandoned.

Analysis / Reasoning
The verified complaint and evidence tied defendant’s conduct to NC. Defendant made frequent, personal calls into NC and engaged in visits and sex with Tom in NC. Courts in Brown v. Ellis and Fox v. Gibson had already held that telephonic and email communications into NC can establish long-arm jurisdiction in AoA cases. Minimum contacts analysis favored jurisdiction: (1) quantity—140 calls in 40 days, (2) quality/nature—personal, not business, (3) nexus—directly tied to marital breakdown, (4) state interest—strong, since South Carolina abolished AoA/CC, (5) convenience—witnesses in NC, modest burden on defendant. Jurisdiction and due process satisfied. While the court noted admissions of sexual activity in Pinehurst in 2012, under current law (G.S. § 52-13), only pre-separation conduct can create liability; post-separation acts may corroborate pre-separation misconduct but cannot themselves support AoA/CC. Because jurisdiction was proper, defendant had to answer discovery. Her generalized objections lacked authority and were deemed abandoned.

Conclusion / Holding
Affirmed. North Carolina properly exercised jurisdiction over the South Carolina defendant based on phone communications and visits into NC, consistent with the long-arm statute and due process. The discovery order also stood.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned
Willis underscores that out-of-state lovers aren’t insulated from AoA/CC liability. If they direct communications or travel into NC, they can be haled into NC courts. Digital/telephonic communications count as sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction.

State interest matters: NC courts emphasized that since South Carolina had abolished these torts, NC had a heightened interest in providing a remedy for its citizens.

Pre-separation rule governs: by statute (since 2009), liability for AoA and CC must be based on pre-separation acts. Post-separation acts, while not independently actionable, may corroborate pre-separation misconduct.

Practical defense lesson: jurisdictional defenses in AoA suits need strong factual support; denying the personal nature of communications is insufficient if records show extensive, intimate contact directed into NC.

Hayes v. Waltz, 246 N.C. App. 438, 784 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016)

Facts

Christopher Hayes (plaintiff) married Rebecca Hayes in 2000. They had two children, and plaintiff adopted Rebecca’s son from a prior relationship.
In March 2011, Rebecca attended a Bayer work conference in Cancun, where she met Scott Waltz (defendant, from Indiana). They had sexual intercourse twice during the trip.
After Cancun, they exchanged thousands of texts and calls (over 3,000 in four months, including ~26 hours of phone calls).
On June 27, 2011, plaintiff discovered the phone records. Defendant avoided plaintiff’s call and warned Rebecca. Rebecca admitted the affair in a letter. Plaintiff confronted defendant, who admitted the sexual encounter. Plaintiff told him to “leave her alone.”
Days later, defendant came to North Carolina, picked up Rebecca, and took her on a six-day trip to Indiana. On the way, they shared a hotel room in NC and were affectionate.
Rebecca later told plaintiff the marriage was over. A separation agreement listed July 18, 2011 as the separation date, though testimony varied (some evidence suggested late June).
Plaintiff sued in 2013 for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC).
Jury verdict: Defendant liable for AoA ($82,500 compensatory damages). CC claim failed. Jury awarded $47,000 punitive damages.
Trial court granted JNOV on punitive damages (vacated), but upheld compensatory damages. Defendant appealed, plaintiff cross-appealed.

Issues

Was there sufficient evidence to support AoA (wrongful/malicious conduct, causation, and situs of actionable conduct)?
Did improper closing arguments or alleged excessiveness justify a new trial?
Did the court err by vacating punitive damages without the written analysis required by statute?

Rule

Alienation of Affection requires: (1) a marriage with genuine love and affection; (2) loss of that love and affection; (3) caused by defendant’s wrongful and malicious acts.
Wrongful acts include intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage, not limited to sex.
Pre-separation rule (G.S. 52-13): acts after separation cannot create liability but may corroborate pre-separation conduct.
JNOV: must be denied if there is “more than a scintilla” of evidence on each element, with conflicts resolved in the nonmovant’s favor.
Punitive damages (§ 1D-50): trial courts must issue a written opinion specifically addressing evidence supporting or lacking for punitive liability.

Analysis / Reasoning

AoA evidence: Thousands of texts/calls over four months, admissions of sexual intercourse, affectionate conduct in NC, and defendant’s decision to ignore plaintiff’s call allowed jury to infer wrongful, malicious intent.
Causation: Plaintiff testified to genuine love and affection, active family life, and counseling after prior affairs. The relationship with defendant was “different” and precipitated the final breakdown. Defendant’s acts didn’t need to be sole cause, only a controlling cause.
Pre-separation conduct: Majority of communications and Cancun sex occurred before June 27. Separation date was disputed (agreement listed July 18). Conflicts resolved for plaintiff meant jury could consider evidence through the Indiana trip.
Closing arguments: Some remarks (e.g., calling defendant a “con man,” questioning Rebecca’s credibility) were improper but not egregious; curative jury instructions minimized prejudice. No abuse of discretion in denying new trial/Rule 60 relief.
Damages: Plaintiff presented evidence of financial loss (foreclosure, loss of spouse’s income) and emotional harm (loss of companionship, diminished time with children, reputational effects). Compensatory award was supported.
Punitive damages: Trial court vacated punitive damages without issuing the required § 1D-50 written opinion. This omission required reversal and remand for compliance.

Conclusion / Holding

Compensatory damages verdict on AoA upheld.
Denial of new trial and Rule 60 relief affirmed.
JNOV vacating punitive damages reversed; case remanded for a proper written opinion under § 1D-50.
Jury’s defense verdict on CC stood.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AoA liability doesn’t require intercourse; personal communications, trips, and defiance of the spouse’s warnings may suffice.
Pre-separation acts are required for liability; post-separation acts can corroborate but not create the claim.
Conflicts about separation dates go to the jury; even slight evidence can sustain a verdict.
Situs: AoA is a transitory tort. NC law applies where wrongful acts occur in NC, even if sex occurred elsewhere.
Punitive damages procedure matters: trial courts must follow § 1D-50 and write specific reasons when disturbing an award.
Trial practice tip: improper closing arguments rarely overturn verdicts absent timely objection or extreme prejudice.

Why Hayes v. Waltz matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Proof Standard Reinforced
- The Court of Appeals made clear that a jury can infer wrongful/malicious conduct from patterns of communication and circumstances, even if the content of texts/calls isn’t in evidence.
- Thousands of texts, late-night calls, and affectionate conduct were enough to get to a jury. This lowered the bar — plaintiffs don’t need “smoking gun” texts or salacious details, just circumstantial proof of intent and impact.
Pre-Separation Rule Applied in Practice
- NC law (G.S. 52-13) requires liability to be based on pre-separation conduct. In Hayes, the date of separation was disputed (late June vs. mid-July). The court said: conflicts about separation dates are for the jury, and if the record supports later separation, pre-separation conduct can include a wide time window.
- This shows defendants can’t easily escape liability by pointing to ambiguous separation dates — juries decide.
Causation Clarified
- Defendant argued prior affairs destroyed the marriage. The court reiterated that defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause, only a controlling or effective cause.
- Even in a troubled marriage, if some genuine affection existed and the defendant’s conduct destroyed it, liability attaches.
Transitory Tort Doctrine Applied
- AoA is transitory; NC law applies where alienating conduct occurs in NC.
- In Hayes, while sex happened in Cancun and Indiana, wrongful acts (calls, trip through NC, hotel stay, affection in NC) occurred here, supporting NC jurisdiction and substantive law.
Damages Guidance
- The decision reaffirmed that compensatory damages can include emotional, reputational, and financial harms (loss of income, foreclosure, time with children, stigma).
- It also highlighted procedural requirements for punitive damages: trial courts must issue a written opinion under § 1D-50 when disturbing or upholding punitive awards.

Bottom line:
Hayes v. Waltz matters because it shows how circumstantial evidence of communication and contact can sustain AoA, how separation-date disputes are resolved for plaintiffs, and how causation doesn’t require the defendant to be the sole cause of marital breakdown. It also reinforces that NC courts carefully police punitive damages procedure while continuing to uphold AoA as a living tort.

Hedden v. Isbell, 250 N.C. App. 189, 792 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016)

Facts

Susan Hedden (plaintiff) married Michael Hedden in 1977; they lived in Florida.
Ann Isbell (defendant) was a resident of Virginia.
In summer 2014, defendant and Michael Hedden engaged in an extramarital affair in Buncombe County, North Carolina. Plaintiff alleged Michael drove to NC specifically to meet defendant for sex.
Plaintiff claimed defendant knew Hedden was married but nevertheless encouraged the relationship, alienating his affection. Plaintiff and Hedden separated on February 3, 2015.
On June 2, 2015, plaintiff filed suit in Buncombe County Superior Court for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC).
Defendant was personally served in Buncombe County by a sheriff’s deputy.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction), Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), and later Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Trial court denied dismissal; defendant appealed.

Issue

Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a Virginia defendant in an AoA/CC case where neither spouse resided in NC?
Did service of process while defendant was physically present in NC suffice to establish jurisdiction?

Rule

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(1)(a), NC courts have personal jurisdiction over a natural person personally served in the state.
Lockert v. Breedlove (1987): Personal service on a nonresident while physically present in the forum automatically confers jurisdiction; no “minimum contacts” analysis is required.

Analysis / Reasoning

Defendant was personally served in Buncombe County while physically present in NC. That fact was undisputed.
Under Lockert, minimum contacts analysis (International Shoe) is unnecessary where there is in-state service. “Transient” jurisdiction — personal service within the state — remains valid.
Defendant argued courts should abandon the transient rule and always require minimum contacts. The Court of Appeals declined, bound by NC Supreme Court precedent in Lockert.
Subject matter jurisdiction arguments (Rule 12(b)(1)) were dismissed as interlocutory and not immediately appealable.
Since service was valid, the trial court had personal jurisdiction; dismissal was properly denied.

Conclusion / Holding

Trial court’s order denying dismissal was affirmed.
North Carolina courts had jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant because she was personally served while present in the state.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Transient personal jurisdiction is alive in North Carolina: if a nonresident is personally served while physically in NC, jurisdiction is automatic.
For AoA/CC claims, this gives plaintiffs a strong tool: if the alleged paramour ever sets foot in NC, service there locks in jurisdiction, regardless of residency or minimum contacts.
Courts reaffirmed they are bound by Lockert v. Breedlove; International Shoe did not eliminate the transient service rule.
Defendants cannot defeat jurisdiction simply because the spouses live out of state, as long as acts (or service) tie them to NC.

Why Hedden v. Isbell matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Confirms Transient Personal Jurisdiction
- The case reaffirmed that if a nonresident paramour is personally served while physically in North Carolina, the courts automatically have personal jurisdiction — no “minimum contacts” or due process balancing needed.
- This comes from Lockert v. Breedlove (1987) and was squarely applied in Hedden.
Practical Effect for AoA/CC Cases
- Plaintiffs don’t need to show that the out-of-state defendant maintained substantial connections with NC.
- If the defendant happens to be in NC — visiting, vacationing, even briefly — and is served, that alone suffices.
- This makes NC a particularly plaintiff-friendly forum in AoA cases, ensuring nonresident lovers can be pulled into NC courts if caught in the state.
Affair Ties to North Carolina
- The facts showed that the defendant and the husband traveled to Buncombe County, NC for sexual encounters. That grounded the case further in NC, but the Court emphasized service alone would have been enough.
National Outlier Status Reinforced
- Most states have abolished AoA and CC. NC’s willingness to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants — even if the married couple lives elsewhere (here, Florida) — underscores how NC remains a litigation magnet for these claims.
Defense Strategy Limited
- The defendant’s attempt to argue for a modernized “minimum contacts” test failed. The Court of Appeals flatly declined to move away from Lockert.
- This signals that appellate courts will stick to precedent unless the NC Supreme Court or legislature changes the rule.

Bottom line: Hedden v. Isbell matters because it shows North Carolina’s broad reach in Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation cases. A nonresident defendant who engages in an affair that touches NC — and is served while in NC — cannot escape jurisdiction by arguing lack of contacts. For plaintiffs, this is a powerful tool; for defendants, it’s a jurisdictional trap.

Vonfeldt v. Grapsy, 1:16-CV-1179 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2017)

Facts

Theodore P. Vonfeldt (plaintiff) filed suit against Mark A. Grapsy (defendant) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
Plaintiff alleged state-law tort claims, including Alienation of Affection, arising out of defendant’s alleged involvement with his spouse.
Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing constitutional infirmities.
The Magistrate Judge recommended denial; defendant objected. The District Court (Judge Schroeder) considered those objections.

Issue

Does North Carolina’s tort of alienation of affection violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Does alienation of affection infringe on the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech or freedom of association?

Rule

Due process challenges to AoA laws are reviewed under rational basis, not strict scrutiny (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
First Amendment protections:
- Adultery is not protected speech or association (Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D.N.C. 1978)).
- Courts have declined to extend fundamental association protections to adulterous relationships (Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002)).
- Cases like Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees (1984) and Snyder v. Phelps (2011) do not extend First Amendment protection to adultery.

Analysis / Reasoning

Due Process: The court held the Magistrate Judge did not improperly apply rational basis review; Lawrence did not mandate strict scrutiny for laws regulating adultery. AoA laws can be justified as furthering a legitimate state interest in protecting marriage.
Freedom of Association: Defendant’s reliance on Roberts was misplaced. That case addressed civic membership rights, not adulterous affairs. The court agreed with prior rulings that adultery is not constitutionally protected intimate association.
Free Speech: Defendant analogized to Snyder v. Phelps, claiming his “innocuous speech” urging someone to leave a marriage was protected. The court rejected this, finding Snyder involved public matters of speech, whereas adultery/encouraging infidelity falls outside First Amendment protection.
The court emphasized that multiple courts have consistently rejected the notion that adultery is constitutionally protected.

Conclusion / Holding

Defendant’s motion to dismiss was DENIED. The court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation in full.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Constitutional challenges fail: Federal courts have repeatedly held that adultery is not protected under the First Amendment (speech or association) or as a fundamental liberty under due process.
AoA survives scrutiny: North Carolina’s tort of alienation of affection remains enforceable despite challenges. It passes rational basis review and does not violate free speech/association.
Strategic defense limits: Defendants cannot avoid liability by cloaking adulterous conduct as constitutionally protected speech or association. Courts consistently reject this framing.
Broader context: This case joins a line of federal and state cases (e.g., Malecek v. Williams, Shackelford v. Lundquist) upholding the validity of AoA in North Carolina against constitutional attack.

Why Vonfeldt v. Grapsy (M.D.N.C. 2017) is important for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Federal Court Endorsement of AoA’s Constitutionality
- Many challenges to AoA are raised in state court; Vonfeldt is notable because it is a federal court decision in the Middle District of North Carolina.
- The defendant argued that AoA violated due process and the First Amendment (free speech, freedom of association).
- The court rejected both, explicitly holding that adultery is not constitutionally protected and that North Carolina’s AoA law passes rational basis review.
Due Process Challenge Rebuffed
- Defendant tried to argue Lawrence v. Texas required strict scrutiny. The court clarified that Lawrence does not elevate adultery to a fundamental right.
- AoA furthers a legitimate state interest in protecting the institution of marriage, satisfying rational basis review.
First Amendment Challenge Rebuffed
- Defendant claimed that encouraging someone to leave a marriage was “innocuous speech” like the protected protest in Snyder v. Phelps.
- The court disagreed: speech and association in the context of an adulterous affair are not protected rights. Prior cases (Wilson v. Swing, Marcum v. McWhorter) confirm that adultery falls outside First Amendment protection.
Consistency with State Precedent
- The decision lines up with North Carolina state court rulings (Cannon v. Miller, Shackelford v. Lundquist, Malecek v. Williams).
- Together, they demonstrate that constitutional attacks on AoA keep failing in both state and federal courts.
Practical Significance
- Defense lawyers often raise constitutional challenges in AoA cases. Vonfeldt shows that in federal court, just like state court, those arguments are dead ends.
- For plaintiffs, it strengthens the position that AoA remains a viable, enforceable tort in NC.

Bottom line:
Vonfeldt v. Grapsy is important because it confirms, at the federal level, that North Carolina’s alienation of affection tort survives constitutional scrutiny. It reinforces that adultery is not protected by due process or the First Amendment, making it harder for defendants to use constitutional arguments as a shield.

Malecek v. Williams, 255 N.C. App. 300, 804 S.E.2d 592 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017)

Facts

Marc Malecek (plaintiff) sued Dr. Derek Williams (defendant), a physician who began a sexual relationship with plaintiff’s wife, for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC).
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing both torts are facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Trial court granted the motion and dismissed the claims; plaintiff appealed.

Issue

Are North Carolina’s common-law torts of Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment (speech/expression/association)?

Rule

Alienation of affections elements: (1) genuine love and affection; (2) alienation/destruction; (3) defendant’s wrongful acts caused it.
Criminal conversation elements: valid marriage + sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture.
Substantive due process: Lawrence v. Texas recognizes a liberty interest in adult intimate relations but applied a robust rational basis; state action may stand where it furthers a legitimate interest and avoids demeaning groups based on moral disapproval alone.
First Amendment (speech/expression): Content-neutral laws that incidentally burden expression are judged under O’Brien (substantial governmental interest, unrelated to content, and narrow enough).
Defenses/limits baked into NC law: Open marriage consent is a defense; post-separation acts (G.S. 52-13) cannot create liability.

Analysis / Reasoning

Due Process:
- Unlike the moral-disapproval criminal statute in Lawrence, AoA/CC remedy personal injury and protect marriage/fidelity—interests the state may legitimately further.
- Applying Lawrence’s robust rational-basis style review, the Court held there are many constitutional applications of these torts; thus they are not facially invalid.
First Amendment (speech/expression/association):
- Intimate conduct can have expressive elements, but AoA/CC target harms, not the content of expression.
- Under O’Brien, the torts incidentally burden expression while furthering substantial interests (deterring injury, protecting marital promises, preserving the institution of marriage).
- They do not ban association per se; countless non-injurious associations with married persons remain lawful.
Scope & Caveat:
- The Court did not endorse heart-balm torts as policy; it held only that on their face they survive constitutional scrutiny.
- As-applied challenges might succeed in edge cases (e.g., counseling a friend to escape abuse), but that question was not before the Court.

Conclusion / Holding

Facial challenge rejected. The dismissal was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Constitutional survival: North Carolina’s AoA and CC remain valid; challenges under Lawrence and the First Amendment fail on their face.
State interests matter: Deterring injury to a spouse and protecting marital vows are substantial, legitimate interests supporting these torts.
Speech/association framing won’t win facially: Because the laws are content-neutral and only incidentally burden expression, O’Brien upholds them.
Practical litigation note: Reserve constitutional arguments for as-applied scenarios; on a facial attack, courts look for any constitutional application, which exists here.
Elements & limits still apply: Plaintiffs must prove pre-separation wrongful acts (G.S. 52-13) and, for criminal conversation, actual intercourse; open-marriage consent defeats both.

What Malecek v. Williams means for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Facial Constitutionality Upheld
- The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that AoA (and Criminal Conversation) are not facially unconstitutional under either the Fourteenth Amendment (due process) or the First Amendment (speech/association).
- This was a direct, modern constitutional challenge, and the court rejected it — meaning AoA survives as a cause of action in North Carolina.
Due Process Argument Rejected
- The defendant argued that Lawrence v. Texas (protecting private, consensual sexual intimacy) made AoA unconstitutional.
- The Court said Lawrence struck down laws rooted in moral disapproval, but AoA is different: it aims to remedy personal injury to the faithful spouse and protect the institution of marriage, which are legitimate state interests.
- Thus, even though AoA burdens sexual liberty, it passes the robust form of rational basis review used in Lawrence.
First Amendment Argument Rejected
- Defendant claimed AoA punishes “speech” and “association” (expressing love to a married person).
- The Court said AoA targets harms, not the content of expression. Any burden on expression is incidental and survives scrutiny under the O’Brien test (substantial government interest unrelated to suppressing speech).
Not an Endorsement, but a Survival
- The opinion was frank: these torts are “born out of misogyny” and often misused in divorce cases.
- But policy dislike doesn’t equal unconstitutionality. Because there are many constitutional applications, the court could not strike them down on their face.
Leaves Door Open for Future Limits
- The court acknowledged that as-applied challenges might succeed. For example, if someone simply advises a friend to leave an abusive marriage, applying AoA liability might be unconstitutional.
- But that was not the case before the court.

Bottom line:
Malecek v. Williams cemented that Alienation of Affection is still alive in North Carolina despite modern constitutional challenges. The court recognized its controversial and archaic roots but said it serves legitimate interests in protecting marriage and compensating injured spouses. Going forward, AoA is safe from facial attacks, but future as-applied challenges could narrow its reach in extreme situations.

Rodriguez v. Lemus, 257 N.C. App. 493, 810 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018)

Facts

Brenda Rodriguez (plaintiff) married Andres Jimenez in 2007. Defendant Liliana Lemus, a family friend, attended the wedding and spent time with the couple.
By late 2011–early 2012, plaintiff noticed changes in her marriage. She discovered:
- 120 phone/text contacts in one month between Jimenez and defendant.
- Hotel receipts for two weekday stays in January 2012, when Jimenez was supposed to be at work.
- A March 2012 hotel receipt; hotel staff confirmed Jimenez stayed with a woman.
On April 8, 2012, Jimenez moved out of the marital home, ending cohabitation. Their child was born later that month. Divorce finalized in 2014.
Jimenez later lived with defendant, and defendant gave birth to his child in 2013.
Trial court (bench trial, 2016) found for plaintiff, awarding $65,000 for Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation. Defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of pre-separation sex.

Issue

Was there competent evidence that defendant and Jimenez engaged in sexual relations before separation, as required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-13(a)?
Can post-separation conduct be considered to corroborate evidence of pre-separation adultery?

Rule

Criminal Conversation requires (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse before separation.
Alienation of Affection requires (1) marriage with genuine love and affection, (2) loss of that affection, (3) caused by defendant’s malicious acts (malice is presumed from proof of sex).
§ 52-13(a): No act post-separation creates liability; only pre-separation conduct counts.
Evidence rule: Post-separation conduct may be admissible to corroborate pre-separation misconduct (Pharr v. Beck; Trogdon). Adultery is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence; opportunity + inclination suffices to reach a jury.

Analysis / Reasoning

Plaintiff’s pre-separation circumstantial evidence: repeated phone contacts, multiple hotel stays charged to Jimenez, March 2012 hotel report that he was with a woman.
Post-separation evidence: Jimenez and defendant later lived together, had a child together, and he professed love for defendant.
Court held that post-separation acts corroborated the inference that defendant was the unidentified woman at the hotel in March 2012, meaning intercourse occurred before Jimenez moved out on April 8, 2012.
Defendant argued trial court’s use of “legal separation” was ambiguous. Court clarified: here “legal separation” meant physical separation with intent to remain permanent, which occurred April 8, 2012. The findings properly tied sexual conduct to before that date.
Circumstantial evidence exceeded “mere conjecture,” allowing a reasonable inference of pre-separation sex.

Conclusion / Holding

Trial court’s findings were supported by competent evidence.
Judgment awarding plaintiff $65,000 for AoA and CC affirmed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Pre-separation rule enforced: Since 2009, AoA/CC liability attaches only to pre-separation acts (§ 52-13(a)).
Post-separation conduct remains valuable: While not actionable itself, it can corroborate pre-separation adultery and bolster circumstantial proof.
Opportunity + inclination test alive: Phone records, hotel stays, and later cohabitation/child were enough to prove pre-separation sex despite lack of direct evidence.
Malice presumed from adultery: Once sex is inferred, malice is automatic for AoA.
Practical point: Plaintiffs can succeed on AoA/CC with circumstantial evidence and corroboration; defendants cannot rely on denials if the circumstantial case is strong.

Why Rodriguez v. Lemus (2018) is important for Alienation of Affection (AoA) case law:

Clarifies the “pre-separation” rule.
- Since 2009, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-13(a) limits AoA and Criminal Conversation to acts occurring before the spouses’ physical separation with intent to remain apart.
- Rodriguez reaffirmed this rule: liability must be grounded in pre-separation conduct.
Defines how post-separation conduct can be used.
- While post-separation acts can’t create liability, the Court held they are admissible to corroborate pre-separation misconduct.
- Example: living together later, having a child together, and public affection after separation can support an inference that sex occurred before separation.
Confirms circumstantial evidence is enough.
- Direct proof of intercourse is rare. The Court reiterated that opportunity + inclination (phone records, hotel bills, secrecy, subsequent cohabitation) is sufficient to prove adultery for both CC and AoA.
- This matches older precedent like Trogdon and Coachman.
Reinforces the presumption of malice.
- Once sexual intercourse is shown (even by inference), malice is conclusively presumed for AoA. This makes it easier for plaintiffs to establish wrongful conduct.
Practical litigation significance.
- Rodriguez makes clear that plaintiffs can build strong cases with circumstantial and corroborating evidence, even without eyewitness testimony or explicit admissions.
- Defendants cannot escape liability merely by pointing out that the strongest proof came after separation — courts will use it to confirm what happened before.

Bottom line: Rodriguez v. Lemus is important because it cements how pre- and post-separation evidence interact in modern AoA and Criminal Conversation claims: liability rests only on pre-separation acts, but post-separation behavior can prove what was already going on. This case gives plaintiffs a practical evidentiary path to win in situations where direct proof of adultery doesn’t exist.

Dipasupil v. Neely, 268 N.C. App. 466, 834 S.E.2d 451 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2019)

Facts

James Dipasupil (plaintiff) and Heather Wong married in 1997; six children. They lived in Minnesota; plaintiff later worked in Union County, NC (2013). Wong and the children moved to NC in Nov. 2014.
Wong reconnected with Harold Neely (defendant), a Virginia resident; they met in D.C. on 3 Apr. 2015 and had sex.
Wong left plaintiff on 22 Apr. 2015 and returned to Minnesota. Divorce finalized Nov. 2016. Wong later moved to Virginia, entered a relationship with defendant, and had a child with him.
Plaintiff sued in Union County (Mar. 2018) for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC).
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (SMJ) and personal jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed CC but denied dismissal on AoA; defendant appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction over the alienation of affections claim where the pleadings/evidence failed to show that the alienating conduct occurred in North Carolina?

Rule

AoA is a transitory tort; the governing substantive law (and thus a NC court’s authority to hear it) hinges on where the tortious injury/alienating conduct occurred, not on the parties’ residences. To invoke NC jurisdiction, plaintiff must show alienating conduct in North Carolina.
Conclusory allegations of “jurisdiction” are insufficient; the court may consider affidavits/evidence on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Unverified filings are not competent evidence.

Analysis / Reasoning

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged various contacts (texts, photos, travel receipts) and a March 2015 sexual encounter, but did not allege those acts occurred in NC; the sexual encounter was in Washington, D.C. (CC was properly dismissed for that reason).
Statements like “Defendant’s alienation occurred within North Carolina” were conclusory. The complaint lacked concrete allegations tying defendant’s alienating conduct to NC (e.g., meetings, sex, specific inducing communications sent to/received in NC tied to time/place).
Defendant and Wong each filed sworn affidavits averring they never met, were present together, or had sex in NC. Plaintiff offered no affidavits; his unverified response could not supply competent evidence and mischaracterized the pleadings.
With no competent evidence of NC-based alienating conduct, the trial court lacked SMJ over the AoA claim. Because SMJ is a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals reversed without reaching the minimum-contacts question.

Conclusion / Holding

Reversed. The trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the AoA claim; no subject matter jurisdiction existed because plaintiff failed to show alienating conduct occurred in North Carolina.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Place matters: For AoA, you must tie specific alienating acts to North Carolina. Residence in NC or divorce here is not enough.
Competent proof at the motion stage: On a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge, be ready with verified pleadings or affidavits. Unverified responses and conclusory jurisdictional statements won’t carry SMJ.
Multi-state affairs: If the affair’s key acts (sex, inducing communications, in-person meetings) occurred outside NC, a NC AoA claim can fail for lack of SMJ even before personal-jurisdiction analysis.
Plead with precision: Allege where and when the wrongful acts occurred (e.g., calls/texts directed into NC on specific dates, in-state meetings), and attach competent evidence if challenged.

Why Dipasupil v. Neely (2019) is important for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Sharp reminder on jurisdiction:
The Court of Appeals held that North Carolina courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over AoA unless the alienating conduct itself occurred in North Carolina. It’s not enough that one spouse lived in NC or that the marriage broke down there — the wrongful acts must be tied to NC.
Limits forum-shopping:
Plaintiffs sometimes try to file in NC because it’s one of the last states recognizing AoA. Dipasupil makes clear that NC courts won’t hear cases where all the meaningful acts of the affair happened elsewhere (here, Washington, D.C. and Virginia).
Evidence and pleadings matter:
The court rejected the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that “the alienation occurred in North Carolina.” Because the complaint didn’t allege specific acts in NC — and because defendant and the spouse provided sworn affidavits denying any NC contact — the case was dismissed.
Practical impact:
1. Plaintiffs must plead and prove that the wrongful acts (calls, meetings, sex, inducing behavior) occurred in NC.
2. Defendants can defeat jurisdiction early by showing through affidavits that nothing happened in NC.
3. This case makes it much harder to drag out-of-state lovers into NC courts without concrete NC conduct.
Broader significance:
Dipasupil narrows AoA litigation in North Carolina by reinforcing that it’s not a “catch-all” for affairs with NC connections. The tort can only proceed here if the alienating acts have a factual, territorial nexus to NC.

Bottom line: Dipasupil v. Neely is important because it protects North Carolina from becoming a universal forum for alienation of affection suits. It emphasizes that jurisdiction depends on where the wrongful conduct occurred, not just where the marriage was centered.

Estes v. Battiston, 274 N.C. App. 1, 850 S.E.2d 557 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2020)

Facts

Jonathan Estes (plaintiff) sued John Battiston (defendant) in Caldwell County in 2018 for Alienation of Affection (AoA), Criminal Conversation (CC), and punitive damages, alleging defendant sabotaged his marriage.
Defendant answered and filed multiple motions, including one to dismiss on the grounds that AoA and CC are “facially unconstitutional.”
Defendant moved to have that constitutional question referred to a three-judge panel under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-267.1, which requires a three-judge panel in Wake County for certain facial constitutional challenges.
The trial court denied referral, ruling that § 1-267.1 applies only to facial challenges to acts of the General Assembly, not to common-law torts like AoA and CC. Defendant appealed.

Issue

Did the trial court err by refusing to refer the constitutional challenge to a three-judge panel under § 1-267.1?

Rule

§ 1-267.1(a1): Any facial challenge to the validity of an act of the General Assembly must be transferred to a three-judge panel.
AoA and CC are common-law torts, not enacted statutes. Though recognized in case law and acknowledged by statute (§ 4-1), they are not legislative acts subject to the three-judge panel rule.
Interlocutory appeals are generally dismissed unless they affect a substantial right that would be lost without immediate review.

Analysis / Reasoning

The Court held the appeal was interlocutory: denial of referral didn’t dispose of the case, and no substantial right was affected.
Defendant’s argument that common-law torts were “codified” under § 4-1 failed; codification doesn’t convert them into legislative enactments.
Even if referral were proper, the challenge would fail because Malecek v. Williams (2017) already held that AoA and CC are not facially unconstitutional. A three-judge panel would be bound by that precedent.
Thus, defendant suffered no prejudice from the denial.

Conclusion / Holding

Appeal dismissed as interlocutory. The trial court’s refusal to refer the issue to a three-judge panel stood.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Constitutional challenges to AoA/CC go to trial courts, not three-judge panels, because they are common-law causes of action, not legislative statutes.
Malecek v. Williams controls: AoA and CC are not facially unconstitutional, so repeating that argument won’t succeed.
Appellate timing matters: interlocutory appeals of constitutional challenges will be dismissed unless a substantial right is shown.
This case underscores that defendants can’t use procedural maneuvers (like demanding a three-judge panel) to derail AoA suits. The constitutional ground has already been litigated and rejected.

Why Estes v. Battiston (2020) matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Shuts down the “three-judge panel” tactic.
- Defendants in AoA cases sometimes try to argue that because these torts are unconstitutional, the case must be referred to a three-judge panel in Wake County under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-267.1 (the procedure for facial challenges to acts of the General Assembly).
- Estes confirms that § 1-267.1 does not apply. AoA and Criminal Conversation are common-law torts, not statutes enacted by the legislature. That means defendants can’t use the panel process to delay or derail cases.
Reaffirms Malecek v. Williams.
- The Court noted that even if the issue were sent to a three-judge panel, that panel would be bound by precedent holding that AoA/CC are not facially unconstitutional.
- This underscores that the “facial constitutionality” debate is settled law in North Carolina.
Practical effect:
- Keeps constitutional challenges in the ordinary trial court. Defendants can still raise them in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but they won’t get special procedures.
- Ensures that AoA litigation moves forward without procedural roadblocks based on panel-referral arguments.
Big picture:
- Estes is less about reshaping the tort itself and more about closing a procedural loophole.
- It reinforces the message from Malecek and Vonfeldt: constitutional challenges have been tried, and they fail. AoA remains alive and enforceable in North Carolina.

Bottom line: Estes v. Battiston matters because it blocks an attempted end-run around alienation of affections by clarifying that defendants cannot force these cases into a special constitutional review process. It keeps the tort in the normal trial system and solidifies the broader pattern that constitutional challenges won’t stop Alienation of Affection in North Carolina.

Ponder v. Been, 275 N.C. App. 626, 853 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2020)

Facts

Mark Ponder (plaintiff) married Mary in 2010. They lived in North Carolina until their separation in November 2013 (following a DVPO against plaintiff).
Mary traveled often to Naples, Florida, where she met Stephen Been (defendant), a Florida resident.
Plaintiff alleged that before separation, while Mary was still in North Carolina, defendant and Mary engaged in hundreds of phone calls, emails, and texts. Defendant allegedly sent her airline tickets and “things of value.”
After separation, Mary and her children moved to Florida in 2014. Defendant allegedly supported Mary financially, provided housing, and later married her.
Plaintiff filed suit in Mecklenburg County (2017) for Alienation of Affection and punitive damages.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Trial court denied the motion; defendant appealed.

Issue

Did North Carolina courts have personal jurisdiction over a Florida defendant in an AoA case based on alleged pre-separation communications with plaintiff’s wife while she lived in North Carolina?

Rule

Long-arm statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(3), (4)): NC courts may exercise jurisdiction where the defendant’s acts caused injury in NC, including solicitation or services directed into NC.
Due process (minimum contacts): Defendant must have contacts with NC such that jurisdiction doesn’t offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Plaintiff’s burden: When defendant submits affidavits denying NC contacts, plaintiff must respond with competent evidence (affidavits, verified pleadings, testimony) tying defendant’s conduct to NC. Allegations alone are insufficient.

Analysis / Reasoning

Plaintiff alleged ~476 phone contacts between June–Nov. 2013 but failed to show they were directed to Mary in NC. The phone records did not clearly link the NC number to Mary.
Defendant and Mary filed sworn affidavits denying any affair or sexual relationship during the marriage and denying in-state conduct.
Plaintiff presented no affidavits or verified evidence beyond the complaint.
Unlike in Brown v. Ellis (2009), where verified pleadings and affidavits tied calls/emails to NC, here the record was too speculative.
The trial court’s findings that defendant “availed himself” of NC law through “active” contacts were unsupported by competent evidence.
Thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction failed at the threshold under § 1-75.4.

Conclusion / Holding

Reversed. The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant; the case was dismissed.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Jurisdiction in AoA cases requires hard evidence: Plaintiffs must present verified pleadings or affidavits tying the lover’s acts (calls, emails, solicitations) to North Carolina. Allegations and circumstantial suspicion won’t survive a Rule 12(b)(2) challenge.
Brown v. Ellis vs. Ponder v. Been: Brown shows NC courts will assert jurisdiction if plaintiffs show phone/email contact into NC; Ponder shows that without competent proof of those contacts, jurisdiction fails.
Burden-shifting is critical: Once defendant produces affidavits denying NC acts, plaintiff can’t rest on bare allegations — they must rebut with sworn, competent evidence.
Practical effect: Narrows forum-shopping. Out-of-state defendants can defeat NC jurisdiction early if plaintiffs lack verified evidence of in-state communications or acts.

Why Ponder v. Been matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

Raises the proof bar for NC personal jurisdiction (at least at the COA stage).
The Court of Appeals reversed for lack of personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff didn’t supply competent, sworn proof tying the out-of-state defendant’s pre-separation communications to North Carolina. Bare allegations and ambiguous phone logs weren’t enough once the defendant filed affidavits.
Burden-shifting lesson on Rule 12(b)(2).
After a defendant counters with affidavits, the plaintiff can’t rest on the complaint—he must respond with verified evidence (affidavits, deposition excerpts, authenticated records) that show who was called/emailed, where they were (in NC), and when (pre-separation).
What plaintiffs must do.
- Use a verified complaint or affidavits.
- Link the number in phone records to the spouse.
- Tie calls/texts/emails to North Carolina and to dates before separation.
- Add corroboration (tickets sent to NC, items delivered to NC, etc.).
What defendants can do.
- File sworn denials (no NC meetings/sex/solicitations).
- Attack gaps: unlabeled phone numbers, lack of NC location proof, post-separation acts.
Contrast with plaintiff-friendly cases.
Unlike Brown v. Ellis (frequent calls/emails into NC = jurisdiction) or Willis (140+ calls + NC contacts), Ponder shows courts will not infer jurisdiction without solid, NC-tethered evidence.
Important caveat on precedential weight.
The North Carolina Supreme Court later reversed the COA (2022). So don’t cite the COA result as the last word; treat Ponder as a practical caution about evidentiary rigor, and check the Supreme Court opinion for the controlling standard on remand.

Hull v. Brown, 279 N.C. App. 570, 866 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2021)

Facts

Plaintiff sued for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC), plus NIED/IIED.
Defendant moved (i) to dismiss the “covenant claims” and (ii) to transfer a facial constitutional challenge to G.S. § 52-13 to a three-judge panel in Wake County under Rule 42(b)(4)/§1-267.1.
Trial court denied transfer and denied dismissal; defendant took an interlocutory appeal.

Issue

Is an immediate appeal proper from an order refusing to transfer a facial challenge to § 52-13 to a three-judge panel?
When does Rule 42(b)(4) require transfer of a facial challenge to an act of the General Assembly?

Rule

Interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable absent a substantial right at risk.
Rule 42(b)(4) (and §1-267.1) require three-judge panel review of facial challenges to acts of the General Assembly, but only after all other, non-contingent issues are resolved and a facial ruling is still necessary to completely resolve the case.
The trial court keeps everything else; transfer is limited to the facial challenge portion and is sequenced last. See Holdstock v. Duke.

Analysis / Reasoning

No Rule 54(b) certification; defendant must show a substantial right—he didn’t.
Even though § 52-13 is a statute (unlike common-law challenges in Estes), Rule 42(b)(4) timing controls: transfer comes after the court resolves other issues (e.g., summary judgment, overlapping emotional-distress claims).
Defendant can still raise the facial challenge later; denial now doesn’t cause irreparable harm. The appeal is premature.

Conclusion / Holding

Appeal dismissed as interlocutory; no present substantial right; transfer not yet required under Rule 42(b)(4).

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Sequencing matters: Even facial attacks on § 52-13 (AoA/CC statute) don’t jump straight to a three-judge panel. The trial court must first decide all non-contingent issues; only then, if a facial ruling is still needed, does transfer occur.
No early escape hatch: Defendants can’t use the three-judge panel procedure to stall AoA/CC cases at the outset. The case proceeds in the trial court on the merits and other defenses first.
Procedural map (compare):
- Estes v. Battiston — three-judge panel doesn’t apply to common-law torts; facial attacks stay in the trial court (and Estes dismissed interlocutory appeal).
- Hull v. Brown — even when a statute (§ 52-13) is attacked, transfer is late-stage only.
Practical strategy: Frame and develop merits defenses (pre-separation proof, SOL under § 52-13(b), “natural person only” under § 52-13(c), lack of jurisdiction) while preserving any facial challenge for the proper, post-resolution moment.

Why Hull v. Brown matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA):

No early “three-judge panel” detour. Even when a defendant makes a facial constitutional challenge to G.S. § 52-13, the case does not get whisked to a Wake County three-judge panel at the outset. Rule 42(b)(4) says transfer happens only after the trial court resolves all other non-contingent issues and a facial ruling is still necessary.
Interlocutory appeals won’t fly. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, reinforcing that defendants can’t use panel-transfer requests to create an immediate appeal and stall an AoA/CC case.
Keeps cases moving on the merits. Trial courts proceed first on everything else—personal jurisdiction, venue, § 52-13(a) pre-separation limitation, three-year limitations, evidence, summary judgment. Many cases will be resolved on these grounds, making any facial challenge unnecessary.
Pairs with Estes and Malecek.
- Estes closed the door on sending common-law AoA/CC challenges to a panel.
- Hull adds: even when attacking the statute (§ 52-13), panel review is sequenced last, not first.
- Malecek confirms AoA/CC are not facially unconstitutional anyway.
Practical playbook.
- Plaintiffs: press the merits (prove pre-separation acts; meet limitations) and oppose premature panel transfer/appeals.
- Defendants: preserve any facial challenge in your answer (to keep it alive later), but expect to litigate merits and discovery first; don’t bank on an early escape hatch.
Bottom line: Hull v. Brown prevents procedural end-runs and ensures AoA/CC suits advance in the trial court before any late-stage, facial constitutional review is considered.

Clark v. Barrett, 280 N.C. App. 403, 867 S.E.2d 704 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2021)

Facts

Parties
- Plaintiff: Elizabeth Clark (married to Adam Clark, U.S. Army).
- Defendant: Kimberly Barrett (Army Lt. Col., OB-GYN; Adam’s later paramour).
Marriage history
- 2010 marriage; early marital strain (Plaintiff’s brief affair) but reconciliation through marriage retreats; two children (2014, 2015).
Affair and pre-separation conduct
- Spring 2016: Adam meets Barrett during training at Fort Belvoir; they spend time alone in each other’s rooms; Barrett knows Adam is married.
- Plaintiff notices behavior changes: fewer trips home to NC, curt phone behavior, unreachable at times; Plaintiff’s phone-tracking pings Adam’s phone near Barrett’s room.
- July 2016: At the NC marital home, Plaintiff finds a woman’s number in Adam’s phone; argument; Plaintiff hospitalized for “stroke-like symptoms” (migraines/stress).
- Sept. 2016: Plaintiff finds texts between Adam and Barrett including a penis photo taken in the marital home bathroom; Barrett saved in phone as “Jane S.” (Plaintiff matches number to Barrett). Adam leaves the marital home soon after.
Ongoing contact and IVF
- Late 2016–mid-2017: Despite separation, Adam and Plaintiff continue emotional/sexual intimacy; Jan. 2017 they purchase land together while “reconciling.”
- Mid-2017: Adam and Barrett pursue IVF and conceive; Adam simultaneously maintains intimate communications with Plaintiff (including videos).
Online harassment and “revenge-porn”-type activity
- 2018: “Brian Bragg” account (allegedly Adam) sends Plaintiff her topless photo and taunts; fake “Liz Clark” profiles on Kik solicit sex using Plaintiff’s image; a Facebook weight-loss ad juxtaposes Plaintiff’s postpartum photo with her topless image.
- Kik records trace “Liz Clark” postings to an IP address at Adam/Barrett’s residence; messages include “We are going to continue doing everything in our power to make your life miserable.”
Suit and trial
- Aug. 2018: Plaintiff sues Adam and Barrett for libel per se, IIED, NIED, and under the “revenge porn” statute; adds Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation against Barrett.
- Forensics examiner (Ellington) lays foundation for a flash drive (≈32,000 files) from Plaintiff’s devices/accounts showing she sent the topless photo only to Adam.
- Jury verdict: AoA and IIED against Barrett; total damages $1.2M. JNOV/new trial denied.

Issues

Evidence: Did the court err admitting Ellington’s testimony (expert vs. lay), and was any error prejudicial?
IIED: Could IIED proceed alongside other torts; was there sufficient evidence of extreme/outrageous conduct, causation, and severe emotional distress?
AoA: Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction (situs of alienating acts in NC), and was the evidence sufficient on love/affection, alienation, wrongful/malicious causation?
Damages: Were compensatory/punitive rulings proper?

Rules

JNOV: deny if more than a scintilla supports each element, viewing evidence for nonmovant.
IIED: (1) extreme/outrageous conduct; (2) intent or reckless indifference; (3) severe emotional distress (no expert required; lay testimony suffices).
AoA: (1) marriage with some love/affection; (2) alienation/destruction; (3) defendant’s wrongful/malicious acts were the controlling/effective cause (need not be sole cause).
Situs for transitory AoA: governed where alienating conduct occurred; if uncertain, generally for the jury.
Evidence/authentication: Rule 901 allows authentication by a witness with knowledge; civil factfinder may draw adverse inference from Fifth Amendment invocation.
Election of remedies: affirmative defense that must be pleaded/preserved.

Analysis / Reasoning

Ellington testimony
- Functioned as lay foundation (what he collected/copied and observed); even if deemed expert, any error was harmless—his testimony corroborated Plaintiff’s own evidence that she sent the topless photo only to Adam.
IIED
- Subsumption/election waived: Defendant did not plead election of remedies; cannot raise on appeal.
- Severe distress: Plaintiff’s hysterical crying, hyperventilation, anxiety, counseling visit; corroborated by a friend—expert not required.
- Outrageousness and causation: Affair while married; IVF during attempted reconciliation; demeaning communications (including an email attacking Plaintiff’s motherhood); fake profiles and threats traced to Adam/Barrett residence. Evidence supported intent/recklessness and that the conduct proximately caused severe distress.
AoA—subject-matter jurisdiction (situs)
- Record tied alienating acts to North Carolina: explicit photo sent from the NC marital home; texts discovered while Adam was in the home; Barrett invoked the Fifth on NC sexual activity—allowing adverse inference. Sufficient nexus for NC to hear AoA.
AoA—sufficiency
- Love/affection: Retreats, continued intimacy, “I love you” texts, sex even post-separation—“some affection” shown.
- Alienation and wrongful/malicious causation: Behavioral shift after Fort Belvoir; phone ping near Barrett’s room; separation after confrontation; later cohabitation and child with Barrett—ample scintilla that Barrett’s intentional conduct was a controlling/effective cause.
Damages
- Compensatory upheld: Emotional harm; financial/economic impacts (lost spousal military benefits, pension access), debt load, caregiving burdens, income disparity—within jury’s discretion.
- Punitive: Court properly instructed punitives on IIED; pre-separation intercourse is not a prerequisite for IIED punitives (that pre-separation requirement applies in AoA punitive context).

Conclusion / Holding

No error; affirmed. Evidence rulings, submission of IIED, subject-matter jurisdiction and sufficiency on AoA, and damages determinations all stand.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

AoA + IIED can be tried together. Election of remedies must be pleaded or it’s waived.
Anchor NC situs without proving intercourse in NC. In-state communications and acts (e.g., sending explicit photo from the marital home) can suffice; Fifth-Amendment invocations support adverse inferences.
Modest proof thresholds. “Some affection,” “more than a scintilla,” and “controlling/effective cause” will defeat JNOV.
Digital evidence roadmap. Authenticate with a witness with knowledge; a forensics examiner can serve as a fact foundation witness.
Damages are broad. Emotional distress, reputational harm, and economic consequences (including military-spouse benefits) support substantial awards; IIED punitives aren’t tied to pre-separation sex.

How Clark v. Barrett matters for Alienation of Affection (AoA)

Situs in NC without in-state sex.
The court reaffirmed AoA is a transitory tort and that non-sexual, in-state acts (e.g., texts/explicit photo sent from the NC marital home) can anchor the tort in North Carolina. You don’t need proof of intercourse in NC to establish NC as the place of injury.
Pre- vs. post-separation evidence (use it smartly).
Liability must rest on pre-separation conduct, but post-separation acts (like IVF, cohabitation, later harassment) can corroborate pre-separation alienation and intent.
Low proof thresholds, clear elements.
- “Some love and affection” is enough—even a messy marriage qualifies.
- Defendant’s conduct need not be the sole cause; it’s enough if it’s the controlling/effective cause.
- The “more than a scintilla” standard gets the claim to the jury and defeats JNOV.
Wrongful/malicious acts = more than sex.
Intentional conduct likely to affect the marriage—communications, secrecy, deception, provocative images—can satisfy the wrongful/malicious element.
Adverse inferences help fill gaps.
A paramour’s Fifth Amendment invocation can support a negative inference, bolstering findings on disputed facts tied to alienation.
Digital evidence playbook.
Phone screenshots, messages, and photos can be authenticated through witness-with-knowledge testimony; a digital examiner can lay foundation as a fact witness. This is practical guidance for proving modern affairs.
Damages are real and broad.
The court upheld a significant award, recognizing emotional distress plus economic/lost-benefit harms—useful when framing AoA damages beyond pure emotion.
Pairing claims:
AoA can be tried alongside IIED; “election of remedies” must be pleaded or it’s waived. IIED can supply punitive exposure even where AoA punitives are constrained.

Bottom line: Clark v. Barrett strengthens plaintiffs’ hands on where and how to prove AoA in NC (using in-state communications and circumstantial digital evidence), clarifies what level of proof is enough (scintilla + controlling cause), and shows courts will uphold substantial damages when the record supports pre-separation alienation—while letting post-separation conduct corroborate the story.

Sprinkle v. Johnson, 278 N.C. App. 684, 863 S.E.2d 627 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2021)

Facts

Parties & claims
- Plaintiff (husband) sued Defendant (wife’s employer/oral surgeon) for Alienation of Affection (AoA) and Criminal Conversation (CC).
Affair evidence
- Wife worked for Defendant ~17 years; over ~4 years they had a sexual relationship.
- Defendant initiated explicit talk/touching at work; supplied Adderall; provided a separate phone; met wife at hotels and his lake house for sex.
- A photo of a sexual act on Defendant’s phone surfaced; wife told Plaintiff; couple attempted reconciliation; wife lost her job; Plaintiff sought mental-health treatment.
Litigation timeline
- Complaint served May 2018 at Defendant’s business address; Defendant hired counsel, answered, and filed motions.
- Jan. 2019 mediation report stated “agreement on all issues,” with Plaintiff to dismiss by June 30, 2019 to allow payment time (terms unclear/undocumented).
- March–April 2019: Defense counsel moved to withdraw and was allowed to withdraw; certificate of service used a residential address (Beaten Path Rd.), not Defendant’s business mailing address.
- Pre-trial order entered 17 June 2019 (without a pre-trial conference); signed only by Plaintiff’s counsel and the judge; stated Plaintiff’s counsel couldn’t coordinate with Defendant.
- Trial June 24–25, 2019 (Rowan County): Defendant did not appear and had no counsel. Jury awarded $794,000 compensatory + $1,500,000 punitive = $2,294,000 on AoA/CC; judgment entered July 1.
- Defendant learned of verdict from a reporter; then filed (and later withdrew) Rule 59/60 motions; appealed pro se from his business address.

Issue

Did proceeding to trial and entering judgment without proof that Defendant received notice of trial violate due process?

Rule

Due Process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of property.
Calendaring notice must be mailed to each attorney of record and, when a party is unrepresented, to the party at the last available address; systematic notice is required at each calendaring stage.
Appellate Rule 2 permits suspension of preservation rules to prevent manifest injustice.
Key precedents: Mullane (notice essential), Laroque v. Laroque (no trial without mailed calendar/notice), Brown v. Ellis (AoA/CC default-style verdict set aside where notices went to wrong address), Dalgewicz (contrast—no relief where party had notice but was neglectful).

Analysis / Reasoning

The record showed no service to Defendant (at any address) of:
- the order allowing counsel to withdraw;
- the Pre-Trial Order;
- the trial calendar; or
- notice of trial.
Counsel’s withdrawal notice used an address Defendant had left months earlier; Defendant had consistently used his business address for mail and said he told counsel he’d moved.
Defendant’s absence was not “neglectful/inattentive” (Dalgewicz); it was a lack of notice (Laroque; Brown).
Although Defendant didn’t preserve objections (withdrew Rule 59/60), the Court of Appeals invoked Rule 2 due to the fundamental nature of notice and the magnitude of the $2.294M judgment.
Result: due process violation; judgment cannot stand.

Conclusion / Holding

Vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial; remaining arguments not reached.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned (AoA/CC practice)

Default-style wins are fragile: Massive AoA/CC verdicts can be wiped out if trial notice isn’t provably given to a now-pro se defendant.
Serve the right address: After withdrawal, courts and opposing counsel must mail calendars/notices to the party at the last known/available address (often the business address if that’s the mailing address). Keep a clean paper trail.
Use Rule 2 sparingly—but it applies to notice: COA will reach unpreserved notice issues to prevent manifest injustice.
Pre-trial orders require participation: Avoid entering stipulations when the other side hasn’t appeared; it risks reversal.
Mediation “settlements” need clarity: Vague mediation reports (e.g., planned dismissal by a future date) do not replace the need for proper trial calendaring and notice.
For defendants: Keep your address updated on the record; don’t withdraw post-trial motions without securing a ruling if notice is your core due-process defense.

Why Sprinkle v. Johnson matters (for Alienation of Affection / Criminal Conversation cases):

Due process trumps a big verdict. The Court of Appeals vacated a $2.29M AoA/CC judgment because the defendant didn’t receive adequate notice of trial. It’s a reminder that even overwhelming facts (or a no-show trial) won’t stick without proper notice.
Notice requirements are strict—especially once counsel withdraws. When a party is unrepresented, courts and opposing counsel must mail calendars and trial notices to the party’s last known/available address (often the business mailing address). If the record doesn’t prove that happened, the judgment is at risk.
Pretrial shortcuts can backfire. A pretrial order signed only by the plaintiff and judge—without the defendant’s participation—was part of the problem. Don’t lock in “stipulations” against an absent party; build a clean notice record instead.
Rule 2 safety valve. Even though the defendant hadn’t perfectly preserved objections, the court used Appellate Rule 2 (to prevent manifest injustice) to reach the notice issue. Lack of trial notice is fundamental.
Contrast with “blame-the-defendant” cases. The court distinguished situations where a party had notice but was neglectful. Here, the record didn’t show the defendant ever got the calendaring or trial notices—so the fault wasn’t his.
Practical playbook:
- Plaintiffs: before trial, double-check addresses, serve the calendar and trial notice to the party (not just prior counsel), and document service meticulously—or risk losing a default-style victory on appeal.
- Defendants: keep your mailing address current in the file; if blindsided by a judgment, a notice-based due process argument can reopen the case.

Bottom line: Sprinkle v. Johnson isn’t about the merits of AoA/CC—it’s about process. It underscores that these high-stakes torts live or die on airtight compliance with trial-notice requirements.

Warren Cty. DSS ex rel. Glenn v. Garrelts, 278 N.C. App. 140, 862 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. Ct. App. June 15, 2021)

Facts

2010: In Virginia, Ericka Glenn asks friend Anthony Garrelts to be a sperm donor so she and her partner can have a child; they make a verbal agreement.
Conception and birth occur in Virginia; Glenn resides in VA throughout pregnancy; child is born Dec. 2011; only Glenn is listed on the birth certificate.
2012: The parties appear in a Virginia court so Garrelts can “sign over parental rights” to enable Glenn’s partner to adopt (record of the VA order is absent).
2014: Glenn and child move to California; Garrelts lives in North Carolina.
2019: Warren County DSS (NC) sues Garrelts in NC to establish paternity and child support.
Trial court applies North Carolina law, adjudicates paternity, and orders support (arrears, insurance, $50/mo).

Issue

Which state’s law governs whether a sperm donor is a legal parent: the law of the state of conception/birth (Virginia) or the forum state where support is sought (North Carolina)?
Is this a full faith and credit issue or a choice-of-law issue?

Rule

Full faith and credit applies to judgments from other states—not to situations with no existing foreign order.
NC choice-of-law:
- Lex fori (forum law) governs procedure/remedies.
- Lex loci (law of the situs of the claim) governs substantive rights.
Paternity is substantive (parental status is a fundamental right) → lex loci controls.
Situs here = Virginia given: verbal donor agreement in VA; insemination in VA; pregnancy and birth in VA; early residence in VA.
Under Va. Code § 20-158(A)(3): a donor is not a parent of a child conceived through assisted conception (unless married to the gestational mother).
- Bruce v. Boardwine (Va. Ct. App. 2015) suggests physician involvement may be dispositive; the record is unclear → must be determined on remand.

Analysis / Reasoning

The trial court erred by treating this as a full faith and credit question and by applying NC law.
Applying lex loci aligns with parties’ expectations, ensures uniformity, and discourages forum shopping (parentage shouldn’t change based on where a support suit is filed).
Other jurisdictions addressing AI parentage (e.g., Illinois, Kansas) also look to the state of conception/birth with the most significant relationship.

Holding

Reversed and remanded: Apply Virginia law to determine whether the donor is a legal parent.
On remand, the court must develop facts on the method of insemination (physician/clinic vs. private) and then decide parentage under VA law.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

In assisted reproduction parentage disputes filed in NC, courts apply the law of the state where conception/birth occurred (here, Virginia), not automatically NC law.
Paternity = substantive → lex loci analysis; full faith & credit is irrelevant absent an existing foreign judgment.
Fact development matters: physician/clinic involvement may control whether a donor has parental status under VA law.
Practice tips:
- Gather records of the insemination method, any written consents, and any prior VA court orders.
- Anticipate and brief choice-of-law early to avoid misapplication of NC law and potential reversal.
- This framework helps prevent forum shopping in multi-state AI cases.

How Warren Cty. DSS ex rel. Glenn v. Garrelts relates to Alienation of Affection (AoA)

Reaffirms NC’s choice-of-law playbook.
The Court insists that substantive questions are governed by lex loci—the law of the place where the claim “sits.” AoA is a transitory tort, and NC already applies lex loci to it (e.g., Jones v. Skelley). Garrelts is fresh appellate reinforcement for that approach.
Situs analysis, not full faith & credit.
The Court rejected “full faith and credit” arguments where there’s no foreign judgment and instead performed a choice-of-law analysis. In multi-state AoA fights, that’s your roadmap: argue situs, not FFC, unless you’re actually enforcing an out-of-state order.
Anti–forum shopping principle you can cite.
The opinion expressly warns against letting outcomes hinge on whichever forum a party picks. That’s directly useful in AoA, where plaintiffs may try to sue in NC (an AoA state) even when alienating acts happened elsewhere. Garrelts supports dismissing or applying the other state’s law in those scenarios.
Fact-intensive “situs of the claim” framing you can borrow.
The Court looked to where the core events occurred (agreement, procedure, birth). Translate that to AoA: focus on where the wrongful/malicious acts occurred (calls/texts into NC, in-person meetings, images sent from the marital home, etc.) to anchor or defeat NC law.
Practical litigation uses in AoA:
- For defendants: Move to dismiss/apply foreign law if the alienating conduct was outside NC (especially if the other state has abolished AoA). Use Garrelts + Jones v. Skelley to frame lex loci and anti-forum-shopping.
- For plaintiffs: Plead with specificity the pre-separation acts that occurred in North Carolina (dates, locations, communications) to establish NC as the situs and keep NC law in play.
Bottom line:
While Garrelts is a paternity/AI case, it’s valuable AoA authority on which state’s law applies and why—cementing lex loci, discouraging forum shopping, and emphasizing a fact-driven situs inquiry that you can deploy in cross-border AoA disputes.

Bassiri v. Pilling, 287 N.C. App. 538, 884 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2023)

Facts

Plaintiff (husband) and his wife lived together in North Carolina in a “happy and loving marriage.”
Defendant and the wife formed a friendship in 2019 that evolved into a romantic, intimate relationship; the spouses later separated (still legally married when suit filed).
Plaintiff sued (Wake County, 12/1/2020) for Alienation of Affection (AoA), Criminal Conversation (CC), and IIED.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction; later voluntarily dismissed his personal jurisdiction challenge with prejudice, leaving only a Rule 12(b)(1) subject-matter jurisdiction motion.
Interrogatory responses (verified) from Defendant:
- He met the wife in person only three times: Oct 2019 (California), Nov 2019 (Nevada), Jan 2020 (Utah).
- No sexual intercourse admitted; most contact was via texts, emails, Facebook, Snapchat.
- He never met the wife in North Carolina and had never been to NC.
Trial court findings: no intimate acts in NC; only electronic communications while wife was in NC; concluded no subject-matter jurisdiction over AoA/CC because no act occurred in NC; dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed IIED; appealed dismissal of AoA (did not argue CC on appeal—abandoned).

Issue

Does a North Carolina trial court lack subject-matter jurisdiction over an AoA claim if the alleged alienating acts occurred outside NC?

Rule

Subject-matter jurisdiction = the court’s power to hear the kind of case (conferred broadly by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-240).
AoA is a recognized tort in NC; NC trial courts have general civil jurisdiction over such claims.
The place where the tort occurred (lex loci) governs substantive law and viability of the claim; that is a choice-of-law/merits question, properly raised via Rule 12(b)(6) or resolved on the facts—not a 12(b)(1) SMJ defect.
AoA must have occurred in a state that recognizes AoA (e.g., NC or Utah), otherwise the claim fails on the merits. See Jones v. Skelley; Darnell v. Rupplin; Hayes v. Waltz.

Analysis / Reasoning

The trial court conflated subject-matter jurisdiction with choice-of-law/merits.
Because NC courts possess general jurisdiction over the class of action (AoA), SMJ exists even if the ultimately applicable substantive law might be that of another state—or might bar the claim.
Determining where the alienation occurred (NC, Utah, or a non-AoA state like CA or NV) is a fact-intensive situs/choice-of-law inquiry, not a jurisdictional defect.
On remand:
- If the trier of fact finds the tort occurred in NC or Utah, apply that state’s AoA law.
- If the acts occurred solely in California or Nevada (abolished jurisdictions), then no substantive AoA exists and the case must be dismissed on the merits, not for lack of SMJ.

Conclusion / Holding

Reversed the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal; remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff’s AoA claim under the proper choice-of-law/merits framework.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned

Big clarification: In AoA litigation, subject-matter jurisdiction is not defeated just because alleged acts occurred outside NC. NC trial courts do have SMJ over AoA.
Use the right motion: Arguments that the alienation occurred in a state that abolishes AoA go to choice-of-law and failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)), not SMJ (12(b)(1)).
Electronic contacts matter: Even when the paramour never sets foot in NC, communications into NC may be relevant to situs/choice-of-law—evaluate where the alienating conduct occurred (and whether that jurisdiction recognizes AoA).
Strategy on remand: Develop a clear factual record on where the controlling pre-separation acts occurred; if in NC/Utah, proceed under that law; if solely in non-AoA states, seek dismissal on the merits.

What Bassiri v. Pilling means for Alienation of Affection (AoA)

Subject-matter jurisdiction ≠ situs/merits.
NC trial courts do have SMJ over AoA claims because AoA is a recognized tort in NC (G.S. § 7A-240). Whether the alienating conduct happened in NC (or another AoA state) is a choice-of-law/merits question—not a basis for a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal.
Use the right motion.
If the conduct occurred only in states that abolish AoA, the case should be dismissed on Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) or later on summary judgment—not for lack of SMJ.
Situs remains dispositive—but downstream.
The claim still rises or falls on where the pre-separation, wrongful/malicious acts occurred (lex loci). If in NC or another AoA state (e.g., Utah), apply that law; if solely in a non-AoA state (e.g., CA, NV), the claim fails on the merits.
Electronic contacts can matter to situs.
Even if the paramour never comes to NC, texts, emails, DMs directed into NC during the marriage can be part of the situs analysis (while personal jurisdiction is a separate inquiry).
Cleanly separates personal jurisdiction from SMJ.
The court emphasized the distinction: SMJ is the court’s power over the type of case; personal jurisdiction is power over the defendant. Don’t conflate them.
Appellate framing for multi-state affairs.
Earlier cases sometimes blurred SMJ with situs when NC was the only AoA jurisdiction involved. Bassiri clarifies: litigate where the tort occurred and which law applies under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1).

Practical playbook

Plaintiffs:
- Plead specific, pre-separation acts that occurred in NC or another AoA state (dates, locations, the nature of communications).
- Preserve evidence of in-state communications and their connection to the breakdown.
Defendants:
- Move under Rule 12(b)(6) (or summary judgment) arguing the lex loci shows all controlling acts occurred in non-AoA states; develop affidavits/timestamps to fix situs.
- Don’t waste fire on a Rule 12(b)(1) SMJ attack; it will likely be reversed under Bassiri.

Bottom line:
Bassiri v. Pilling is a procedural reset for AoA: North Carolina courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over AoA; disputes about where the tort occurred and what law applies belong in the merits/choice-of-law lane, not the jurisdictional one.

Chagaris v. Harden, 289 N.C. App. 267 (N.C. Ct. App. June 6, 2023) (unpublished)

Facts

Christopher Chagaris (plaintiff) and Angela Chagaris married in 1996; lived together in NC until separating 1 Feb 2019.
Wife admitted an affair beginning fall 2017 and ending Dec 2017; said paramour was a younger, married man in finance with military background; met via Ashley Madison; had sex at hotels on four occasions (Oct–Dec 2017).
Discovery showed calls/texts between wife and Nicholas Harden (defendant) around hotel stays: Hyatt Place Charlotte Airport (19 Oct 2017) and Renaissance Charlotte Suites (3 Nov 2017).
Defendant admitted meeting wife in fall 2017, fit her description (bald white male, medium height), and meeting for “coffee,” but claimed a purely professional relationship and denied intercourse.
Plaintiff swore wife identified defendant as the paramour and asked him not to tell defendant’s wife.

Procedural posture

Plaintiff sued for Criminal Conversation (CC), Alienation of Affection (AoA), IIED, and NIED (Oct 2020).
Trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment on all claims; denied defendant’s Rule 11 motion.
On appeal, plaintiff abandoned IIED/NIED.

Issues

CC: Did plaintiff forecast sufficient evidence of sexual intercourse during the marriage to create a genuine issue of material fact?
AoA: Did plaintiff forecast sufficient evidence that defendant’s wrongful/malicious acts proximately caused the loss of love and affection?

Rules

Summary judgment: Denied if the nonmovant forecasts more than a scintilla of evidence such that a reasonable mind could find for that party.
Criminal Conversation: (1) Valid marriage; (2) sexual intercourse between defendant and spouse during coverture. Intercourse may be proven by circumstantial evidence; direct proof not required. Opportunity+inclination is a sufficient but not necessary route to proof.
Alienation of Affection: (1) Marriage with some genuine love/affection; (2) loss/alienation; (3) defendant’s malicious acts were the controlling/effective cause. Malice is conclusively presumed upon proof of intercourse.

Analysis

CC: Phone records and texts closely tied to hotel reservations and stays, the match between defendant’s appearance and wife’s description, the Ashley Madison and “coffee” details, and the timing of contact created a reasonable inference that defendant was the paramour and that intercourse occurred. Although the content of calls/texts was unknown, the contextual evidence was enough to reach a jury; “opportunity and inclination” is not the only path to prove adultery.
AoA: Plaintiff’s verified allegations and divorce timeline supported love/affection and later alienation. Because the CC evidence created a triable issue on intercourse, malice could be presumed; combined with the separation following the affair, a jury could find defendant’s acts were a controlling/effective cause of the loss of affection.

Holding / Disposition

IIED/NIED: Affirmed (abandoned on appeal).
CC & AoA: Reversed summary judgment; remanded for trial—genuine issues of material fact exist.

Key Takeaways / Lessons Learned (AoA/CC practice)

Circumstantial proof carries CC: Coordinated timelines (calls/texts + hotel records), identity match, and affair context can defeat summary judgment without direct evidence of sex.
“Opportunity & inclination” is sufficient, not required: Courts won’t treat it as a rigid threshold; the question is the ordinary summary-judgment sufficiency standard.
Presumed malice: If a jury could find intercourse, malice for AoA follows; focus on causation as “controlling/effective,” not sole cause.
Evidence packaging matters: Build a tight chronology linking communications to rendezvous points (reservations, entries, charges) and witness admissions; even sparse content can be enough when context is strong.
Appellate note: Unpublished but persuasive; aligns with Rodriguez v. Lemus and Trogdon on circumstantial adultery proof and with Hayes v. Waltz on low “more than a scintilla” thresholds.

Little v. Clay, 915 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. Ct. App. May 21, 2025) (unpublished)

Facts

Plaintiff (Little) and his wife Rebecca lived in New Hanover County, NC beginning July 2018 when she joined PPD (a NC corporation).
Defendant (Clay), an Arizona resident, worked with Rebecca at Synexus (2016–2018) and later at PPD (2018–2019). Plaintiff alleges Clay “lured” Rebecca to PPD’s Wilmington HQ, then solicited her through phone and internet with romantic/lascivious messages while she was in NC, alienating her affections and engaging in sexual intercourse (CC).
The marriage later moved to Tennessee and ended in divorce, but Plaintiff alleges the alienation and injury occurred while domiciled in NC.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff filed AoA, CC, and IIED claims in NC Superior Court.
Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (subject-matter jurisdiction) and 12(b)(2) (personal jurisdiction), attaching verified affidavits (his and Rebecca’s).
Plaintiff filed a verified amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion.
On earlier appeal the COA remanded for clarification; after entry of an amended order again denying dismissal, Defendant appealed. The COA exercised immediate review for PJ (G.S. 1-277(b)) and granted certiorari to reach SMJ (judicial economy).

Issues

Were the trial court’s findings supported by competent evidence?
Did NC courts have personal jurisdiction over an Arizona defendant in this AoA/CC suit?
Did the court lack subject-matter jurisdiction over AoA/CC because acts allegedly occurred outside NC?

Rules

Verified complaint can function as an affidavit if based on personal knowledge and admissible facts. Trial court may weigh competing affidavits on a 12(b)(2) motion; COA upholds findings if supported by any competent evidence.
Long-arm: G.S. 1-75.4(4)(a) authorizes PJ where the action claims injury in NC arising from out-of-state acts provided the defendant carried on solicitation or service activities in NC; telephone/Internet contacts can be “solicitations.” Cooper v. Shealy; Brown v. Ellis.
Due process: minimum contacts factors (quantity; quality/nature; connection to claim; forum interest; convenience).
Subject-matter jurisdiction (G.S. 7A-240) concerns the court’s power over the kind of action; location of wrongful conduct is a choice-of-law/merits question, not SMJ. Bassiri v. Pilling.

Analysis

Competent evidence: Plaintiff’s verified amended complaint alleged specific NC-tethered facts (soliciting calls/messages into NC; communications in the NC marital home; workplace nexus with NC corporations; timing while the couple domiciled in NC). The trial court’s findings (a–e) citing those allegations were supported by competent evidence; weighing them against Defendant’s affidavits was within the trial court’s role.
Long-arm: Allegations that Clay telephoned/messaged Rebecca in NC with romantic/lascivious content and that injury (loss of affection) was suffered in NC bring the case within § 1-75.4(4)(a).
Minimum contacts: Even if Clay’s NC trips were limited, his purposeful, relationship-advancing electronic contacts into NC directly related to the claim, plus NC’s strong interest in protecting residents from out-of-state tortfeasors in AoA/CC, satisfied due process. Distinguishing Bell v. Mozley and Eluhu v. Rosenhaus: those involved vacation/home-forum shopping and weak NC nexus; here, the marital domicile, alleged solicitations, and injury were in NC, and witnesses/evidence are in NC (PPD/Javara coworkers).
Subject-matter jurisdiction: Following Bassiri, the trial court has SMJ over AoA/CC as a class of actions; whether acts occurred in an AoA-recognizing jurisdiction (e.g., NC) goes to choice-of-law/merits, not SMJ. Plaintiff alleged alienating conduct occurred “within a state that still recognizes AoA,” which suffices at this stage.

Holding

Personal jurisdiction properly exercised under § 1-75.4(4)(a) and due process.
Subject-matter jurisdiction exists; dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was correctly denied.
Order denying 12(b)(1)/(2) motion AFFIRMED.

Key Takeaways / Lessons for AoA/CC

PJ via e-contacts: Repeated phone/text/social communications into North Carolina that further a romantic relationship during the marriage can be solicitations establishing both long-arm coverage and minimum contacts.
Verified pleadings matter: A verified complaint can operate as an affidavit and supply competent evidence on a PJ motion when defendant submits competing affidavits.
Forum interest & convenience: NC’s interest in AoA/CC and presence of NC-based employers/witnesses weigh in favor of PJ.
SMJ clarified: Do not use Rule 12(b)(1) to argue situs; that is a choice-of-law/merits issue (Rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment) per Bassiri.
Distinguish Bell/Eluhu: Avoid forum-shopping fact patterns; tether your claim to NC domicile, NC-directed solicitations, and NC-suffered injury.
Unpublished: Persuasive but not controlling authority; pair with Brown v. Ellis, Cooper v. Shealy, and Bassiri v. Pilling for published support.

Fish v. Stetina, 913 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025)

Facts

Husband (Fish) sued wife’s California-based cycling acquaintance (Stetina) for Alienation of Affection (AoA) (and earlier also Criminal Conversation (CC)).
2022 order in the original suit granted summary judgment on CC and denied it on AoA; husband then voluntarily dismissed and refiled a new action alleging AoA only.
Evidence at trial: explosive growth in phone contacts (2016–2017), overlapping travel (Boone, NC; Colorado; Irvine, CA), Life360 location data showing co-location, separation on 17 Aug 2017, and defendant’s deletion of all texts with wife after learning he might be sued. Jury awarded $804,000 compensatory + $500,000 punitive.

Issues on appeal

Did the prior CC summary judgment bar admission of evidence (law-of-the-case / preclusion)?
Was Life360 location evidence improperly admitted (hearsay/foundation)?
Should the court have directed a verdict (insufficient malice evidence)?
Was submitting punitive damages error absent pre-separation sex?
Was it error to admit out-of-state conduct (Nevada/Colorado) in an AoA case?

Holdings & reasoning

Issue preclusion, not law-of-the-case: The first suit (20 CVS 1640) and the second suit (22 CVS 931) are different lawsuits; the unappealed CC summary judgment is a final judgment that precludes relitigating pre-separation intercourse. But preclusion applies to issues, not evidence. The trial court did not submit the intercourse issue to the jury and properly allowed phone/location evidence even if it could be probative of that already-decided issue.
Life360: Objection below was “lack of foundation,” not hearsay; hearsay/business-records argument was unpreserved. Any authentication argument was abandoned on appeal.
Directed verdict: Denied. Even without pre-separation sex, evidence of the volume/timing of calls, travel overlaps, and in-person visits could allow a jury to find malice (“intentional conduct that would probably affect the marital relationship”); see Beavers v. McMican (2024).
Punitive damages: Although pre-separation sex often supplies “aggravation,” it’s not required. Here, defendant’s intentional spoliation (deleting all texts with wife upon learning of possible suit) was sufficient “aggravating circumstance” beyond baseline malice to send punitives to the jury.
Out-of-state conduct: Admissible. In multi-state AoA matters, the jury may consider all acts to determine where injury occurred (situs) and causation (see Darnell v. Rupplin, Jones v. Skelley). Even if situs isn’t contested, Nevada/Colorado evidence was relevant (Rule 401) to whether defendant’s conduct produced the loss; no Rule 403 abuse, and no requested limiting instruction.

Result

No error: Verdict and punitive award stand.

Key takeaways for AoA practice

Preclusion vs. evidence: A prior CC summary judgment can preclude the intercourse issue, but does not bar admission of phone/location and travel evidence used for AoA malice/causation.
Malice proof: Massive, relationship-oriented communications + coordinated travel can defeat directed-verdict even without intercourse.
Punitive damages: You can reach punitives without pre-separation sex if you prove aggravation (e.g., spoliation).
Multi-state proof: Acts in non-AoA states remain admissible to show situs and causation; ask for a limiting instruction if you fear misuse.
Preservation: Specify hearsay vs. foundation at trial; don’t “swap horses” on appeal.

Why Fish v. Stetina matters (Alienation of Affection)

Preclusion isn’t a gag order. A prior CC summary judgment (no pre-separation sex) precludes the issue, not the evidence. Phone logs, travel overlaps, and location-app pings still come in to prove malice and causation. Courts separate what’s already decided from what’s admissible to prove the remaining elements.
You can win AoA without proving sex. The Court okayed a verdict where malice flowed from the pattern—huge call volume, coordinated trips, in-person time—not intercourse. Malice = “intentional conduct that would probably affect the marriage,” and the mosaic was enough.
Punitive damages without CC. Punitives don’t require pre-separation sex. Here, spoliation (deleting all texts with the spouse once suit loomed) counted as aggravation beyond baseline malice—properly sending punitives to the jury.
Out-of-state acts are still relevant. Conduct in non-AoA states (e.g., Nevada/Colorado) was admissible to show where the injury occurred and whether defendant produced the loss. If you worry about misuse, ask for a limiting instruction—don’t expect blanket exclusion.
Preserve it or lose it. The Life360 challenge failed on appeal because trial counsel objected only for “foundation,” not hearsay. Be specific at trial; no “swapping horses” on appeal.

Bottom line: Fish v. Stetina tightens the AoA playbook—circumstantial context can prove malice and support punitives, even when sex is off the table; preclusion limits issues, not evidence; and precise, timely objections matter.

Ponder v. Been, No. COA24-552 (N.C. Ct. App. July 2, 2025)

Procedural Posture

Husband (Ponder) sued Wife’s later fiancé (Been) for Alienation of Affection (AoA) (2017 refiling).
Personal-jurisdiction fight: this Court (2020) reversed; N.C. Supreme Court (2022) reinstated PJ, sending the case back.
Been answered and counterclaimed Abuse of Process, seeking punitives.
Jury (Aug. 2023): Not liable on AoA; liable on Abuse of Process, awarding ~$932k compensatory + ~$606k punitive.
Trial court granted Ponder’s JNOV; Been appealed.
Court of Appeals: reverses the JNOV and reinstates the jury verdict.

Facts

Marriage & breakdown: Ponder married “Mary” (2008/2010), two stepchildren. Evidence at trial showed years of verbal/physical abuse escalating with Ponder’s heavy drinking. In Nov. 2013, after Ponder accused Mary of an affair with Been, police were called twice; Mary obtained a DVPO and the couple separated. Mary later moved to Florida (June 2014) and, in 2017, became engaged to Been.
AoA litigation: Ponder first sued in 2015 (voluntarily dismissed), then refiled AoA on 14 Sept. 2017.
Service issue: Been’s counsel offered to accept service, but instead on 28 Oct. 2017 Ponder drove to Been’s Florida home “to locate” him. Crediting defense evidence (as required on JNOV review): Ponder trespassed into the garage, backed Mary against a wall, threatened the son, spat on Been, and left. A Florida court later entered a DVPO against Ponder, finding no reason for him to be at the residence and that his conduct fit a larger pattern of harassment. Been was ultimately served on 1 Nov. 2017 at a public football game.

Issue

Did the record contain more than a scintilla of evidence on each element of Abuse of Process such that the jury’s verdict must stand and JNOV was improper?

Rule

JNOV (Rule 50): Granted sparingly; court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, give every reasonable inference, and deny JNOV if there is more than a scintilla to support each element.
Abuse of Process: (1) Ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful, improper act in the use of process after issuance to achieve a collateral objective not within the normal scope of the process (mere malicious filing is insufficient). Chidnese; Beroth Oil; Fox; Melton.

Holding

Yes. The defense presented sufficient evidence on both elements; the trial court erred by granting JNOV. Reversed.

Reasoning

Ulterior purpose: The record (including Ponder’s own framing of motives and the domestic-violence history) supported a jury finding that he used the suit to harass, punish, and embarrass Mary and Been.
Improper post-issuance act: After filing, and despite counsel’s offer to accept service, Ponder invoked “serving the complaint” as a pretext to personally go to Been’s home; the jury could find his trespass, confrontation, threats, and spitting were wholly inconsistent with the regular prosecution of the case and a misuse of process to obtain a collateral end (intimidation/harassment).
- Note: Ponder himself could not lawfully serve out of state (Rule 4); even assuming “locating” was needed, he could have simply relayed information to a process server—there was no legitimate need to enter the property or confront the family.
Because this is more than a scintilla on both elements, the dispute was one for the jury; the trial court’s JNOV improperly usurped the jury’s role.

Disposition

JNOV reversed; the jury verdict (including punitive damages) on Abuse of Process is reinstated.

Key Takeaways

Don’t weaponize service. Using “service of process” as a pretext for in-person confrontation after filing can satisfy the improper-act element of Abuse of Process—and expose the filer to punitive damages.
Ulterior purpose + post-issuance act remains the core test; courts look for a perversion of process, not simply a bad motive in filing.
JNOV is a high bar. Where the defense shows even “very slight” evidence on each element, the verdict stands; credibility/weight are for the jury, not the court.

Why Ponder v. Been matters:

Abuse of process can boomerang an AoA suit. Even though the jury rejected Alienation of Affection, it found the plaintiff (the AoA filer) liable for abuse of process and awarded large compensatory and punitive damages. That verdict was reinstated on appeal.
Sharp line between bad motive and improper act. NC requires (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful, improper act after process issues. Here, using “service of process” as a pretext to go to the defendant’s home, trespass, confront the family, and spit on the defendant was enough to meet the act element.
Service is not a weapon. When defense counsel offers to accept service, bypassing that and turning service into an in-person confrontation can expose the filer to tort liability—with punitive exposure.
JNOV is a high bar. The Court of Appeals emphasized that courts must defer to the jury if there’s more than a scintilla of evidence on each element; the trial court erred by setting the verdict aside.
Practical playbook (for both sides):
- Plaintiffs: Keep clients away from service logistics; use process servers or acceptance of service. Don’t let post-filing conduct create a counterclaim.
- Defendants: Consider abuse-of-process counters where the plaintiff leverages process to harass; document offers to accept service and any post-filing confrontations.
Broader signal in AoA litigation: North Carolina will still try AoA cases—but it will also penalize misuse of the legal process that turns a civil claim into a tool of intimidation.

Bottom line: Ponder v. Been warns AoA filers: you can lose more than your claim if you weaponize process. It clarifies the abuse-of-process elements, underscores the strict JNOV standard, and protects the jury’s role in fact-heavy disputes.

About Adkins Law, PLLC — Huntersville, NC

Adkins Law, PLLC is a Huntersville-based family and civil litigation firm serving the Lake Norman and greater Charlotte region. North Carolina’s heart-balm torts—Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation—present unique risks and defenses, including potential counterclaims like abuse of process. Our team provides clear, strategic guidance from day one: evaluating claims, preserving evidence, navigating personal-jurisdiction and choice-of-law hurdles, and prosecuting or defending cases with meticulous attention to ethical service and procedure. If you’re considering filing—or have been sued—in a relationship-tort matter, we can help you chart a smart, practical path forward.

Schedule a confidential consultation with Adkins Law in Huntersville to discuss your options and next steps.

Chris Adkins

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5 responses to “Understanding Alienation of Affection Law in North Carolina”

Understanding Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation

September 22, 2025 at 7:21 am

[…] article provides a comprehensive examination of Alienation of Affection and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina today. It explains the elements required to prove each […]

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Criminal Conversation and Alienation of Affection in North Carolina: A Complete Guide – LKN Law

September 26, 2025 at 11:07 am

[…] North Carolina stands nearly alone in continuing to recognize two of the most controversial “heart-balm” torts: criminal conversation and alienation of affection. […]

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Top 🔟 Signs Your Partner May Be Cheating – LKN Law

September 30, 2025 at 4:36 pm

[…] personal: cheating can influence alimony, custody disputes, and even lead to civil lawsuits like Alienation of Affection or Criminal Conversation. The key is recognizing the signs and taking measured steps—calmly, […]

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Facing Family Law Issues in Denver, North Carolina? Here’s What You Need to Know – LKN Law

October 6, 2025 at 11:06 pm

[…] Alienation of Affection is a civil lawsuit filed by one spouse against a third party — most commonly, the person alleged to have interfered in the marriage. The claim alleges that the third party’s intentional actions destroyed the love and affection between the spouses, resulting in the collapse of the marriage. […]

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🏛️ Family Law in Huntersville, North Carolina: What You Need to Know – LKN Law

October 14, 2025 at 3:17 pm

[…] Alienation of Affection occurs when a third party intentionally causes the loss of love, affection, and emotional connection between a married couple. The injured spouse must show that genuine love and affection existed in the marriage and that the third party’s wrongful conduct destroyed it. […]

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